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Abstract 
 
This research aims at giving a comprehensive overview and understanding of the 
Lebanese party Hezbollah. Previous research on Hezbollah has typically focused on 
one or two aspects of the party’s identity, usually the military question, or has 
concentrated solely on the organisation’s religious discourse. This thesis presents an 
alternative perspective, using a historical materialist analysis to situate an 
understanding of Hezbollah in socio-economic and political developments in Lebanon 
and the wider region.  
 
To this end, the thesis begins by explaining the establishment of Hezbollah, 
proceeding then to the party’s development vis-à-vis the political situation in Lebanon 
and in the region. Particular focus is placed on Hezbollah’s historic ties with its main 
sponsor, the Islamic Republic of Iran – ties that have remained strong from the 
founding of the party until today.  
 
Situated in this narrative, the thesis analyses how neoliberal policies in Lebanon 
following the Lebanese Civil War – and the associated socio-economic evolution of 
the Shi’a population – influenced Hezbollah’s popular constituency and outlook. The 
ability of Hezbollah to build a hegemonic position within Lebanese Shi’a areas 
through its media and cultural wings, and use of arms, is examined. Later chapters 
critically analyse the party’s policies towards workers’ struggles, women’s issues, and 
its orientation towards the sectarian Lebanese political system.   
 
Through this analysis, the thesis provides a holistic approach to Hezbollah – an 
analysis with important implications for understanding Islamic political movements 
more generally. 
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Introduction 
 
Lebanon has long formed an important crossroads of the Arab world. Following 
World War I, the country was governed as a separate province known as Greater 
Lebanon under the French Mandate of Syria, only achieving independence in 1943. 
Since that time, Lebanon has been distinctively characterised by a formalised 
sectarian political system, which apportions representation between the key religious 
sects in the country – Maronite and various Christian denominations, Sunni and Shi’a 
Islam, and Druze. 
 
Today, Lebanon's main political forces are gathered in two key political fronts largely 
connected to these sects: the March 14 Alliance and the March 8 Alliance. The 
former unites the Sunni-based Future Movement (Tayyâr al-Mustaqbal), the Druze-
based Progressive Socialist Party, and two Maronite Christian parties: the Lebanese 
Forces (al-Quwât al-Lubnâniyya) and Lebanese Phalanges (al-Kataeb al-
Lubnâniyya). The latter brings together the Shi'a based Hezbollah and Amal parties 
and the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyâr al-Watani al-Hurr). 1 
 
Within this sectarian system, much of the political debate in Lebanon has focused on 
the role of Hezbollah and the status of its extensive armed capabilities.2 Hezbollah 
was formed in 1985 during a period of intense political crisis characterised by 
Lebanese Civil War and the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982. It was established 
as an Islamic political group, based in Shi’a-populated areas in Lebanon, with an 
emphasis on armed resistance against Israel. On this latter issue, the former Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged in July 2006 that “When we entered 
Lebanon… there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and 
flowers by the Shi’a in the South. It was our presence in Lebanon that created 
Hezbollah” (Norton 2007: 33). Over the years, Hezbollah came to be seen by many – 
in both Lebanon and the wider Arab world – as the only viable force able to resist 
Western and Israeli encroachment on the country. Following the various wars of 
                                                            
1 These coalitions also include a large range of other smaller parties.  
2 The March 8 coalition, supported by the Syrian and Iranian governments, argue that Hezbollah has the right to 
keep its arms in the framework of the resistance against Israel. The March 14 coalition is dominated by Saad 
Hariri, son and heir of Rafiq Hariri (see Ch.3) and head of the Future Movement, and is supported by Western 
governments and the Gulf monarchies. March 14 seek the disarmament of Hezbollah. 
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aggression on Lebanon by Israel, most notably the 2006 invasion, Hezbollah was 
celebrated for its apparently well-disciplined, organised military and propaganda 
capabilities, and its ability to effectively resist the Israeli state. Portraits of Hassan 
Nasrallah, the movement’s General Secretary, could be seen in demonstrations in 
major capitals in the Arab world. Even in the Gulf Arab states, where ruling 
governments have traditionally expressed hostility to Hezbollah, prominent 
individuals such as the wealthy Kuwaiti businessman Nasser Al-Kharafi have publicly 
praised the group (Farid 2001 and Wehbe B. 2011).3  
 
In addition to its armed capabilities and standing in the Arab world, Hezbollah has 
become one of the most important political actors in Lebanon, holding a large 
parliamentary bloc of no less than 10 deputies since the first post Civil War legislative 
elections in 1992, and a minimum of two ministers in every Lebanese government 
since 2005. Hezbollah has confirmed its popularity by winning many municipal 
elections and now controls the most significant Shi’a-populated areas in the South of 
Greater Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. The organisation is a mass 
movement, with an extensive network of charities and other institutions that provide 
needs and services for the population. Indeed, Hezbollah’s social and political 
influence among the Shi’a population is much more significant than its ally Amal.  
 
Hezbollah’s ideology is a Shi’a-inspired version of an Islamic political movement. 
Islamic political movements are found across the world – from the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and elsewhere, the “Jamaat-i-Islami”, the multiple Ulema 
associations, and the movement of Iranian Ayatollahs. In all these cases, Islam is 
erected as an absolute principle to which all demands, struggles and reforms are to 
be subordinated. The common denominator of all of these Islamic political 
movements is “Islamic fundamentalism”, according to Gilbert Achcar, “in other words 
a will to return to Islam, the aspiration of an Islamic Utopia that is not limited to one 
Nation and that should encompass all the Muslim peoples, if not the whole world” 
(Achcar 1981:2). This definition can be seen reflected in the words of Muhammad 
                                                            
3 Kharafi published an article entitled “To Live in Dignity or Die with Pride” that praised Hezbollah a week 
before his death in April 2011. He was ranked number 77 in the 2011 Forbes Magazine list of the world’s richest 
people, with a wealth estimated at $11.5 billion, and was closely linked to the Kuwaiti royal family and brother 
of the Speaker of Majlis al-Ummah, the parliament of Kuwait, Jassem Al-Kharafi. Following Kharafi’s death, 
Hezbollah issued a public statement of condolences for the Kuwaiti people and government.  
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Khairat Al-Shater, the former Deputy Guide of the Egyptian MB:  
 
“The Ikhwan are working to restore Islam in its all-
encompassing conception to the lives of people, and they 
believe that this will only come about through the strong society. 
Thus the mission is clear: restoring Islam in its all-
encompassing conception; subjugating people to God; 
instituting the religion of God; the Islamization of life, 
empowering of God’s religion; establishing the Nahda of the 
Ummah on the basis of Islam… Thus we’ve learned [to start 
with] building the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, the 
Muslim society, the Islamic government, the global Islamic 
state...” (Amal al-Ummah TV 2011 and Bargisi, Mohameed and 
Pieretti 2012)  
 
Religious fundamentalism is not limited to the Islamic religion, and we can see 
common elements among various religious fundamentalist movements throughout 
the world. It is important to note, however, that despite the call to return to an earlier 
age, fundamentalisms should not been seen as fossilized elements from the past. 
While they may employ symbols and narratives from earlier periods, 
fundamentalisms are alive, dynamic and representative of major contemporary 
trends, designed to satisfy cultural needs (Marty 1988:17). Their emergence must 
thus be fully situated in the political, economic and social context of the contemporary 
period. 
 
In the Middle East, the rise of both Shi’a and Sunni Islamic political movements took 
place in a period – through the 1980s and 1990s – in which the left and nationalist 
forces were considerably weakened. This included the set backs of Arab nationalism 
(particularly Nasserism) following the 1967 war in which Israel occupied the rest of 
Historic Palestine (East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), the Syrian 
territory of the Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai.4 Arab nationalism, which had 
been until that period the dominant political movement in the region, had been 
                                                            
4 The Sinai was ultimately given back to Egypt in 1981 following the peace concluded between Israel and Egypt 
under US patronage in 1979. 
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viewed by the USA as the main enemy. The USA therefore politically supported the 
Saudi Kingdom, which, in turn, helped foster various Sunni Islamic fundamentalist 
movements, most particularly the MB, as a counterweight against Arab nationalism. 
Israel used a similar strategy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, particularly in 
the Gaza Strip, by repressing the national and progressive forces of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and not blocking the expansion of Islamic 
fundamentalist forces (until the end of the 1980s) (Achcar and Chomsky 2007:50-51).  
 
Islamic movements were also boosted by regional events starting with the 1973 Oil 
boom that allowed Gulf monarchies to increase their regional funding. Another issue 
in the weakening of the progressive forces began in the early 1970s, with the intense 
repression by Arab regimes such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Abandoning their previous 
radical social policies, they increasingly adopted a rapprochement with the Western 
countries and the monarchies of the Gulf. In Egypt, following the death of Nasser in 
1970, the new regime led by Sadat used the MB to establish a tacit alliance against 
nationalist and progressive forces in the country (Achcar and Chomsky 2007:53 and 
Voll 2011:378).  
 
Finally, Palestinian and Arab national progressive forces were weakened by the 
multiple attacks against the Palestinian national movement by both the Arab states 
and Israel. First in Jordan, in 1970, during the events known as “Black September” 
and the violent repression by the Jordanian regime against Palestinian and Jordanian 
national and progressive forces, which resulted in the PLO main political forces’ 
transfer to Lebanon. Secondly, in Lebanon, the Palestinian and Lebanese national 
and progressive forces were faced first by the harsh repression in 1976 by the Syrian 
regime, which entered Lebanon in order to crush them. It was then the turn of the 
Israeli state to attack Palestinian and Lebanese progressive and nationalist forces, 
which led to the forced departure of Palestinian forces from Beirut to Tunis in 1982 
following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut (Achcar and Chomsky 
2007:196).  
 
This was the regional context in which Hezbollah was formed. According to 
Lebanese scholar Mona Harb (2010:245), Hezbollah has since its foundation 
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selected and adjusted its rhetoric of justification and its mechanisms of action based 
on a dual logic of legitimation: one rational and the other traditional. By this, Harb 
(2010:245) means that Hezbollah was able to combine and alternate between a 
discourse of modernisation with a social and religious appeal, used differentially 
according to time, place, and scale. Hezbollah’s popular social base among the 
Lebanese Shi’a population, which was first concentrated among the relatively poor 
Shi’a and some petit bourgeois components, was extended to encompass all social 
classes. Today, the party has significant political and social support among a growing 
Shi’a bourgeoisie, located both inside the country and in the diaspora.   
 
Given this process of integration into the political system, and the extending social 
base of the organisation, a range of questions can be raised about the nature of 
Hezbollah as a political party and as a social force. How can we explain the politics 
and practice of Hezbollah in relation to the political economy of Lebanon and the 
country’s Shi’a population? How has it been able to build such a widespread base of 
support amongst Shi’a in Lebanon? What is the nature of the relationship between 
Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)? What role do Hezbollah's military 
capacities play in its hegemony over Lebanese Shi’a populations? How can we 
explain the political and social evolution of Hezbollah? 
 
The answers to these questions are significant both in terms of the insights they offer 
into Political Islam as an ideology, as well as their implications for understanding the 
broader political economy of Lebanon and the Middle East.  
 
Scholarly analysis of Political Islam in general, and Hezbollah in particular, tends to 
divide into three contrasting approaches to these questions.5 The first approach 
characterises movements such as Hezbollah as anti-imperialist, believing that they 
represent an Arab variant of Latin American ‘Liberation Theology’, which seeks 
                                                            
5 This thesis does not engage with the normative characterisations of Hezbollah as simply a reactionary, 
“terrorist” or “jihadist” organisation whose violent behaviour is an inherent attribute of Islam (Klein 2010; Levitt 
2013; Phares 2010). These non-scholarly approaches typically essentialise Islam as being anti-democratic and 
reactionary, and Hezbollah as simply “jihadists who use terrorism as their tactic of choice to realize their 
malignant intentions” (Klein 2013). As many authors have pointed out, there is nothing intrinsic to Islam, or any 
other religion, which makes it inherently democratic or undemocratic, peaceful or violent. Islam can be 
interpreted in many different ways, and in politics its role can act as a tool for legitimisation and for the 
preservation of the status quo, to being a vehicle of protest and revolution (Ayubi 1993:60). 
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greater social justice and a reassertion of national identity in the face of encroaching 
foreign values. As Rula Abisaab puts it:   
 
“The language of revolutionary Islam contests the hegemonic 
positioning of the American West through a set of beliefs and 
practices that emerge precisely from the endless exchanges 
between ‘Easts’ and ‘Wests’ and proves the fallacy of fixed 
geopolitical-cultural boundaries. The outlook and performance 
of Hezbollah coincides with ‘antisystemic struggles’ that kick 
against the few sovereign states exploiting international labour 
and resources, and push against the oppressive space of the 
globalized world-economy. As long as Hezbollah remains 
outside the state and is not integrated into the communicative 
networks of state-world relations, it remains antisystemic… 
Hezbollah used and co-opted central facets of socialist and 
unionist activism alongside the Palestinian liberation struggle.” 
(Abisaab 2006:235)  
 
A second approach views Hezbollah as a pragmatic political party. This approach 
concentrates on the political programme and practices of Hezbollah reflected, for 
example, by their integration into a political and institutional context that they initially 
fully rejected. The authors supporting this approach describe Hezbollah as an 
evolving and non-static entity, which becomes more and more institutionalised in the 
political environment, leading to a moderation of its overall politics. In this respect, 
Judith Palmer argues that several factors encouraged Hezbollah’s transformation into 
a mainstream and moderate Lebanese party: 
 
“First, Hezbollah’s transformation and integration advanced the 
foreign policy goals of Iran, Syria, and Lebanon and therefore 
the Party of God received a great deal of support of varying 
kinds from these governments…  
Second, Hezbollah leaders tried to overcome this hurdle by 
developing simultaneous strategies and tactics of 
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accommodation with the Lebanese authorities and other 
Lebanese groups, and militancy towards Israel. This approach 
was helped by the fact that Hezbollah leaders chose to use 
considerable ideological flexibility to allay the suspicions of the 
liberal component of Lebanese society, by presenting their 
organisation as a moderate, national party while still retaining its 
Islamic appeal and pious supporters… 
Third, pragmatic Hezbollah leaders were also able to adapt their 
organisation to Lebanese political traditions and exploit the 
realities that imposed themselves after the 1989 Document of 
National Reconciliation achieved peace.” (Harik 2004:3)  
 
A third approach recognises the nationalist features of some of the political and 
military achievements of Hezbollah or other Islamic political movements, but rejects 
any characterisation of these organisations as inherently progressive or anti-
imperialist. Instead, as Gilbert Achcar has written on Islamic political movements 
prior to Hezbollah, regardless of the “progressive, national and/or democratic 
features of some of the struggles of various currents of Islamic fundamentalism” 
these movements “cannot hide the fact that their ideology and program are 
essentially and by definition reactionary” (Achcar 1981:3).  
 
Each of these perspectives will be analysed indepth in Chapter 1. At this stage, it is 
sufficient to note that this work builds upon the analytical framework of the third 
approach, which emphasizes a historical and materialist understanding of Political 
Islam and presents a valuable counter-narrative to ‘anti-imperialist’ or institutionalist 
assumptions that typify much of the scholarly literature. It aims to deepen this 
perspective, by examining the significance of recent developments in Lebanon’s 
political economy that can help illuminate the shifting nature of Hezbollah’s 
ideological and political practice. The objective of this work is to understand 
Hezbollah through this lens, tracking the evolution of the organisation’s structures 
and relationship within the wider political system, and locating this evolution within 
the changing class and state formation in Lebanon. In this manner, this thesis moves 
the debate beyond the typical focus on ideology as a means of identifying and 
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understanding the policies of Islamic political movements. The thesis argues that 
while the ‘Islamic way of life’ may be the professed goal of Hezbollah, its actual 
practices can best be understood as harmonious with – and reflective of – the nature 
of the capitalist environment in which it operates.  
 
To this end, there are two key theoretical arguments advanced throughout this thesis. 
The first concerns the shifting terrain of class formation in the Lebanese state over 
the last two decades – the era of neoliberalism – and its relationship to the political 
practice of Hezbollah. It is argued (in Chapters 2 and 3) that while neoliberal reform 
in Lebanon has led to an impoverishment of significant parts of Lebanese society, it 
has also helped to enrich a layer of the country’s Shi’a community (closely connected 
to the diaspora). The political practice of Hezbollah has become increasingly 
responsive to the concerns of this layer, to which it holds close social, political and 
financial ties. This is reflected in the economic programme of the organisation, as 
well as its attitudes towards the social and labour struggles that have emerged to 
contest neoliberal reform.  
 
The second main theoretical argument employed in this thesis concerns the ways in 
which Hezbollah has been able to continue to build a hegemonic project within the 
Shi’a population, despite the contradictions arising from its political and economic 
trajectory. In this regard, this thesis draws upon a Gramscian analyses of hegemony, 
as well as the writing of the Arab scholar Mehdi Amel, who was also a prominent 
member of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), to show how Hezbollah has acted 
to present the interests of the Shi’a population as compatible with, and expressed 
through, the actions and norms of Hezbollah itself. A major feature of this hegemonic 
project is the deepening Islamization of the Shi’a population in Lebanon, through 
which Hezbollah has employed both consensual and coercive means to win 
dominance in Shi’a areas. Moreover, this process has important implications for how 
the nature of the sectarian system in Lebanon is understood. 
 
In addition to helping conceive the evolution of Hezbollah and its place within the 
contemporary politics of the region, both these theoretical arguments counteract a 
prevailing Orientalism within much of the study of the Arab world. This Orientalism 
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tends to hold up the region as being beyond the grasp of social scientific frameworks 
typically employed to understand processes of political and change elsewhere in the 
world.6 In this regard, this thesis concurs with the conclusion of Arab writer, Aziz Al-
Azmeh, that “the understanding of Islamic political phenomena requires the normal 
equipment of the social and human sciences, not their denial” (Al-Azmeh 2003:39). 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis is organised into seven main chapters. Chapter 1 outlines and assesses 
the various scholarly research problematics and theoretical frameworks used to 
approach the study of Political Islam in general, and Hezbollah in particular. The 
chapter discusses these themes within the wider context of academic analysis of 
political parties in the Arab world. It shows that a great part of this literature has 
tended to interpret the creation and formation of parties in this region through a lens 
based primarily on social, religious and other group loyalties. In this regard, the 
chapter examines and critiques the approaches noted above, and puts forward an 
alternative analytical framework focused on the processes of class formation and 
composition in Lebanon, and the impact of neoliberalism on the broader 
transformation of the region’s political economy and the nature of political parties. It 
concludes with outlining how Hezbollah’s ideological expression can help in 
understanding the widespread appeal of Hezbollah within the Shi’a community.  
 
Chapter 2 looks at the origins of sectarianism in Lebanon from the time of the French 
Mandate through to the end of the Civil War (1975-1990). The chapter traces the 
position of different sectarian communities over this period, and analyses the impact 
of the Civil War on the political and social conditions of the Shi’a population in 
particular. This period coincides with the establishment of Hezbollah in 1985, and 
provides important insights into its subsequent evolution. Throughout this chapter, 
sectarianism is viewed as a political product of modern times used by the Lebanese 
bourgeoisie to intervene ideologically in the class struggle, strengthening its control 
                                                            
6 As Palestinian American Professor Edward Said wrote: “Human history is made by human beings. Since the 
struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. 
The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them despite the 
contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the 
latter" (Said 1978:331-2). 
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of the popular classes and keeping them subordinated to their sectarian leaders 
(Amel 1986:323+326-327). Along these lines, this thesis considers sectarianism as a 
product of modern times and not a tradition from immemorial ages. As Lebanese 
scholar Ussama Makdissi, has noted, “sectarianism is a modern story, and for those 
intimately involved in its unfolding, it is the modern story – a story that has and that 
continues to define and dominate their lives” (Makdissi 2000:2).  
 
Chapter 3 studies the evolution of the Lebanese political economy from 1990 to 
2013, the period covering the end of the Civil War until today. The chapter focuses in 
particular on the Shi’a population, whose political and socio-economic situation was 
significantly lower than other Lebanese religious sects at the end of the Lebanese 
Civil War and has since changed considerably. We will see the changes in the 
position and stratification of the Shi’a population as a result of neoliberal policies, and 
the connection of these changes to the development of Hezbollah as a political 
organisation.  
 
A major objective of this chapter is to understand the origins and consequences of 
the neoliberal policies promoted by former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was the 
main actor on the Lebanese political scene following the end of the Civil War (1975-
1990). Hariri’s economic policies were supported, or at least not consistently 
opposed, by the major political forces in the country including Hezbollah. These 
neoliberal policies led to the deepening of the historically constituted characteristics 
of the Lebanese economy: a finance and service oriented development model in 
which social inequalities and regional disparities were very pronounced. The chapter 
discusses the consequences of these characteristics as they developed through the 
neoliberal period, and the subsequent political orientation of Hezbollah towards both 
economic policy and the sectarian political system. It concludes with a survey of 
three specific case studies in areas where Hezbollah has significant influence and 
control: (1) management of urban policy in the municipal neighbourhood of Ghobeyri, 
(2) attitudes towards rent-control laws in Beirut and (3) agricultural policy in the 
Bekaa Valley. 
 
Having established these developmental trends over the neoliberal period, Chapter 4 
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examines their implications for Lebanon’s class structure, in particular amongst the 
Shi’a population. The chapter demonstrates that the neoliberal period saw the 
emergence of a new Shi’a bourgeoisie within various sectors of the economy, and 
the resulting re-balancing of sectarian power across the country. This process, 
however, was not evenly distributed, and many Shi’a remain marginalised throughout 
significant urban and rural areas. The chapter then turns to a concrete mapping of 
the new Shi’a bourgeoisie through an analysis of the largest Shi’a business groups 
and their relationship to Hezbollah itself. These factors are then brought together in 
an analysis of the changing social base of the party.  
 
Chapter 5 traces the growth of the party as a mass movement and attempts to 
understand how the party managed to achieve a position of hegemony in Shi’a areas 
despite the tensions arising from the nature of its social base. This chapter examines 
in detail the internal organisation of the party and its large network of institutions. The 
latter played an important role in diffusing the ideas of the party through the Shi’a 
community and extending its hegemony through the provision of much-needed 
services. The chapter analyses how the success of Hezbollah’s network of 
organisations, managed mostly from Hezbollah’s Executive Council, allowed it to 
strengthen its position amongst the population, focusing in particular on four critical 
sectors: (1) Social support, (2) Religious institutions, (3) Media and Culture, and (4) 
Education/Youth work. The chapter explores the ideological content of Hezbollah’s 
work in these sectors, emphasising the role that two concepts – hâla islâmiyya (the 
Islamic milieu) and iltizâm (personal commitment) – have played in building 
allegiance to the party. It also analyses the distinctively gendered characteristic of 
these ideological underpinnings of the party’s work.  
 
Chapter 6 turns to Hezbollah’s orientation towards the Lebanese labour movement. 
Beginning with the history of the trade union movement through the Civil War period, 
the chapter examines the various social and worker protests that continued through 
the 1990s and into the contemporary period. It shows how the General Union of 
Lebanese Workers (GULW), the main trade union confederation, was progressively 
weakened by the main bourgeois and sectarian political forces and subordinated to 
their interests, because they feared the GULW’s capacity of mobilisation. In this 
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regard, Hezbollah’s behaviour towards various economic demands, strikes and the 
organisation of labour is analysed. The chapter thus provides a link between the 
political economy analyses provided in Chapters 3 and 4, and the socio-political 
analysis of Chapter 5. In this manner, it offers an important illustration of the tensions 
that have arisen in the organisation as a result of its claim to represent the struggles 
and needs of the poorer ranks of the Shi’a population, concomitant with its changing 
social base. 
 
Chapter 7 analyses a crucial aspect of Hezbollah’s organisation: its military activities 
and armed apparatus. The chapter begins by examining Hezbollah’s military struggle 
against the Israeli state, followed by its coercive activities towards other Lebanese 
actors during the Lebanese Civil War and, later, in 2008, when it lead military 
operations against the March 14 coalition. Hezbollah’s use of its military capacities to 
guarantee its power and security in the region is also analysed. The concluding 
chapter brings together this overall analysis in both a theoretical and political sense.  
 
Methodology 
 
This study draws upon a wide range of academic writing in the fields of politics, 
political economy, sociology and development theory. As the following chapter will 
outline in greater detail, its basic theoretical framework is based upon Marxian and 
other critical analyses of Lebanon and the Middle East. In addition to the academic 
literature, research for the thesis has involved a detailed textual analysis of many 
books, newspaper articles, reports, political pamphlets and written interviews of key 
political personalities in Lebanon. Although the thesis relies mostly on secondarly 
material, my fluency in English, Arabic and French has enabled me to conduct 
interviews and consult primary material in the language of the sources and 
documentation used to establish the findings of this thesis.   
 
In addition to the insights gained from these written materials, I spent over 12 months 
in Lebanon conducting fieldwork, from August 2011 to September 2012. During this 
time I was able to travel extensively throughout Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and the 
southern and the northern regions of the country. This research period, which 
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included wide-ranging consultation with activists, trade unionists, workers, students, 
members of political parties and academics was a valuable complement to my 
previous experience in the country. More than 40 people were interviewed in relation 
to this study during my fieldwork in Lebanon (conducted in Arabic, French and 
English depending on the circumstances), and I also learnt from countless ‘off the 
record’ discussions with individuals and groups involved in Lebanon’s political scene. 
Moreover, my time in Lebanon allowed me the opportunity to consult various 
libraries, archives and research centres in Lebanon, including: American University of 
Beirut, Lebanese American University, University of Saint Joseph, Institute for 
Palestine Studies in Beirut, Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies in Beirut, and the 
Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD). 
 
Given the political environment of Lebanon, this fieldwork was faced with numerous 
obstacles. Firstly, accessing Hezbollah officials has become more difficult than in the 
past because of internal security measures within the party and the secrecy of the 
organisation. I nevertheless obtained some interviews with Hezbollah-affiliated 
intellectuals and party representatives in the organisation’s mass fronts and research 
institutes. I also met with rank-and-file sympathisers and members of the party. 
Throughout this process, I had to take into account the highly sectarian atmosphere 
of the country when assessing the information I gathered. My long involvement with 
and knowledge of Lebanese politics helped me assess the more ideological and 
biased claims made by some sources.   
 
Finally, my own personal vantage point contributed greatly towards the writing and 
framing of this thesis. I am a Swiss citizen of Syrian origin. I have spent long periods 
in Syria and in the region since my childhood. My family and close friends have been 
affected by the on-going events in Syria, and a large number of them have had to 
leave the city of Aleppo (where we are originally from), to other safer parts of the 
country or to neighbouring states. My interest in Hezbollah long predates the party’s 
involvement in Syria, but the events of recent years have helped me to corroborate 
and refine many of the arguments made below.  
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Perspectives: Understanding Hezbollah and 
Political Islam 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the Arab world, political parties have existed formally for more than a century as 
instruments for political mobilisation and for the organisation of political contests and 
elections (Catusse and Karam 2010:1). The party is therefore not a ‘new’ object in 
the region (Salamé 1991 and 2001). According to Catusse and Karam (2010:21), the 
scholarly study of parties can be periodised in two phases: the first, following the 
stabilisation of independent regimes throughout the mid-1960s and 1970s; the 
second, from the mid-1990s onwards, with the onset of liberalisation and the rise of 
Political Islam (Catusse and Karam 2010:21). It is this second period, particularly 
associated with the growth of parties such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which forms the 
main subject of enquiry for this thesis. 
 
This chapter aims to survey and assess contending theoretical approaches to 
understanding the nature of Hezbollah as a political party. In doing so, it explores the 
specific debates around the nature of Political Islam and Hezbollah and identifies two 
dominant approaches to the latter. First, the assessment of Hezbollah as an Islamic-
world variant of Liberation Theology, i.e. an anti-imperialist party that expresses 
resistance to Western encroachment within a discourse shaped by the specific 
religious and cultural values of the Middle East. This trend is quite prominent 
amongst some European scholars and is also found within the Arab literature. The 
second perspective, more recent in nature, attempts to categorise Hezbollah as a 
pragmatic political party, which differs little from other political actors that seek to 
ensure their position within the Lebanese political system. 
 
In opposition to both of these perspectives, this thesis draws upon a third body of 
literature. While recognising the significance of Hezbollah’s militancy and armed 
resistance, the third approach places greater emphasis on the role of its religious 
ideology in structuring its socio-political orientation while assessing the class basis of 
the party. This largely Marxian-inspired approach provides a theoretical framework 
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for analysing Hezbollah that allows for a well-rounded consideration of its ideological, 
religious and socio-economic facets.  
 
In this regard, this chapter focuses on the early contributions of the Lebanese scholar 
and political activist popularly known as Mehdi Amel, but whose real name was 
Hassan Abdallah Hamdan. Amel was an important figure on the Lebanese left who 
provided an innovative approach to understanding the character of sectarianism in 
the Arab world. Assassinated in 1987 by Islamic militants widely believed to be close 
to Hezbollah (Nassif-Debs 2006), his insights remain highly salient for setting out a 
theoretical framework for understanding the party. The focus on Mehdi Amel is all the 
more significant given that his work has rarely been translated into English, and is 
generally ignored by Western Middle East scholars. 
 
This chapter begins by exploring the methodological assumptions and questions 
asked by the key scholars working within these three approaches. While the focus of 
this analysis is the literature on Hezbollah, it necessarily requires some discussion of 
the nature of political parties in the Arab world and Islamic political movements more 
generally. The chapter concludes by laying out the main theoretical positions that will 
be employed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. These are mostly grounded 
within the literature of the third critical approach to Hezbollah explored below, while 
also drawing upon the work of other writers within the Marxian tradition, notably 
Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. 
 
1.2 Islamic Political Movements: An Arab Mode of Resistance? 
 
Much of the academic literature on political parties in the Arab world employs an 
essentialist or culturalist lens, in which a supposed original and distinct feature of the 
Arab world shapes the nature of its parties and distinguishes it from other societies. A 
common theme of this literature is the supposed weight of ‘group loyalty’ within Arab 
society – whether expressed through personal or familial ties,7 tribal belonging as in 
                                                            
7 Elizabeth Picard (2006:57), French academic, explains, for example, how, when faced with a wide variety of 
options within a particular social setting, individuals and groups in the Arab world tend to favour those that 
involve family relationships (whether by descent or marriage) and argues that parties are merely the institutional 
form of these family ties.  
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the concept of asabiyyat,8 religious fidelity or through a so-called Arabness.9 These 
qualities emphasize the primacy of social bonds – family, clan, ethnic or 
communitarian groupings – that are said to surpass any shared class or material 
interests and thus differentiate parties in the Arab world from those in European 
societies (Badie 1989; El-Kourani 2004; Charaf Eddin 2006).10 As ‘empty shells’ 
constructed along loyalty to a group and largely void of ideological principles, Arab 
parties are said to reproduce authoritarian and personalised forms of behaviour 
(Catusse and Karam 2010:11). This characteristic has been used to explain the party 
form – typically centred around a ‘strong man’, a clan or tribal group such as the 
Takritis in the case of the Iraqi Ba’th party (Luizard 1998:258), or a 
confessional/religious community such as parties in Lebanon (El-Khazen 2003:605-
606).  
 
These essentialist themes also characterise a significant stream of academic writing 
on Political Islam, in which Islam is said to represent the genuine, essential spirit of 
the Arab world – one that is reflected on the cultural and linguistic planes. From this 
perspective, which is represented in the work of both Western (Carré and Gérard 
1983; Roy 1985; Burgat 1995; Dot Pouillard 2009; Jensen 2009) and Arab scholars 
(Abd El-Malek 1970; Hanafi 1988), Political Islam constitutes the Arab expression of 
cultural and social resistance to Western encroachment. The strong group ties that 
characterise Islam allow it to become a vehicle for challenging Western Imperialism, 
enabling the Arab population to resist threats to their identity and emancipate 
themselves politically, economically and socially. Olivier Carré (1983 cited in Achcar 
2013b:50), for example, describes Political Islam in the 1980s as the “popular culture 
of the Muslim world that is managing to express itself at last after having been 
muffled successively by colonialism and post-independence regimes”. He goes on to 
assert that religiosity is a permanent and essential phenomenon of Arab societies.  
                                                            
8 This notion originates in the work of the 14th century scholar from North Africa, Ibn Khaldoun, and implies a 
particular ‘social bond’ that connects tribal and familial groups across a region. Khaldoun’s concept was later 
developed by Middle East scholars to encompass group solidarity based on social networks constructed through 
family and personal relationships (Roy 1996:6). 
9 For example Georges Saddikni, who was until the end of 1970s a member of the Damascus-based Ba’th party’s 
National (pan-Arab) Command and head of its Bureau for Cultural Affairs, and was Syria’s Minister of 
Information for many years, in his book ‘Man, Reason and Synonyms’, written in 1978, proposed in this latter to 
study certain ’basic’ words in the Arabic language as a means to attaining ‘genuine knowledge’ of some of the 
essential characteristics of the primordial Arab mentality’ underlying those very words. (Al-Azm 2008:169) 
10 Badie (1989:14), for example, argues that the features of parties in the European context would be “non-
transferable” to Arab countries because of the primacy of group loyalties rather than class interests.  
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Likewise, François Burgat (1995 cited in Achcar 2013:54) characterises “Political 
Islam as a need of a return to the cultural roots throughout the Muslim world”. 
Political Islam is the mode of expression of cultural resistance appropriate to the Arab 
world – the ‘Muslim speech’ (“le parler musulman”) (1995 cited in Achcar 2013:55). 
 
Much of this writing draws an analogy between Islamic movements and Third World 
nationalism. The prominent scholar Olivier Roy and others such as Nicolas Dot 
Pouillard, two writers within this school of thought, argue that contemporary Islamic 
movements have adapted notions of anti-imperialism and models of revolution found 
elsewhere in the world, making them fit the cultural context of the Arab world (Dot 
Pouillard 2009:193-194). Dot Pouillard, for example, contends that “Hezbollah adopts 
a Third-World speech, based on the South-North opposition and mustakbar 
(arrogant) / mustad’afîn (oppressed)” (Dot Pouillard 2007). Nicolas Dot Pouillard 
claims that this has important global implications, such that “the opening of the 
Islamo-nationalist movement on the left can indeed open a new pan-Arab 
nationalism... it may lead to the re-emergence of a Third-World and nationalist pole 
on an international scale” (Dot Pouillard 2009:193-194).  
 
This rhetoric of Hezbollah around the mustakbar (arrogant) vs mustad’afîn 
(oppressed) is directly linked to the former Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran (IRI) Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology and the evolution in his political discourse. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Khomeini adopted a militant rhetoric borrowed 
especially from the “Mujahidin”, the Confederation of Iranian Students in exile and Ali 
Shariati, a famous Iranian intellectual and opponent to the regime of the Shah, all of 
whom were strongly influence by contemporary Marxism – especially Castroism and 
Maoism according to Ervand Abrahamian (1993:23). Khomeini declared during this 
period that the Iranian society is now divided into two classes: the upper class 
(tabaqeh-e bala) or mustakbirîn (the oppressors) and the lower class (tabaqeh-e 
payin) or mustad’afîn (oppressed). The oppressors were notably identified as the 
rich, the exploiters, the powerful, the feudalists, the capitalists, the palace dwellers, 
the corrupt, the enjoyers of luxury, and the wealthy elite, while the oppressed were 
the exploited, the powerless, the slum dwellers, the barefooted, the hardworking 
poor, the hungry, the unemployed, the disinherited masses, and those deprived of 
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education, work, housing, and medical facilities (Abrahamian 1993:47). This stage 
was foundational to Hezbollah’s belief system, and corresponded to the 
establishment and the launch of the party in 1982. 
 
In its first official document in 1985, Hezbollah adopted the same terminologies, 
choosing to use the term “mustad’afîn”, rather than “mahrumîn” (deprived) as had 
Moussa Sadr, founder of the Amal movement. Mona Harb and Robert Leenders 
explain how Hezbollah's discourse and word choice around:  
 
“the resistance society modifies the perception of Shi'a 
individuals as “disinherited” (or “dispossessed”) (mahrumîn) to 
one of being “disempowered” (mustad'afîn). The nuance is 
essential, as the latter invokes an opportunity for transformation 
and change, whereas the former involves stagnation. Through 
its holistic approach Hezbollah transforms the typical Shi'a 
victimisation complex into meaningful values of justice, 
solidarity, community, sacrifice, progress, etc – which, in turn, 
instigates high self-esteem and a solid sense of pride.” (Harb 
and Leenders 2005:189) 
 
These same themes are also found in the Arabic language literature. The Egyptian 
intellectual Anouar Abd El-Malek, for example, defends the idea that “authenticity lies 
in Islamic heritage which is embedded in the hearts and minds of the masses and 
stands in contrast to the imported political and cultural ideas of western ideologies 
and intellectuals” (1970 cited in Browers 2009:29), adding that an authentic collective 
identity is a substitute for Marxist class consciousness. Likewise, the Egyptian 
philosopher Hassan Hanafi claims that “Political Islam acts to mobilise the 
revolutionary impulse of the Islamic heritage, ever-present in the hearts and minds of 
the masses, in order to fight local oppression and foreign hegemony and to struggle 
against the unjust distribution of wealth within the Islamic nation” (1988 cited in 
Kassab 2010:200).  
 
In the opinion of many of these authors, Hezbollah provides the best manifestation of 
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this progressive character of Political Islam (Saad Ghorayeb 2002; Charara and 
Dromont 2004; Dot Pouillard 2009). Often describing Hezbollah as ‘Islamo 
nationalist’, the party is said to be the only political actor with popular legitimacy, 
representing the national aspirations of the people in a discourse appropriate to Arab 
cultural norms. They thus place a great deal of emphasis on identifying the ‘anti-
imperialist’ characteristics of Hezbollah (Deeb L. 2007) and similar parties (notably 
Hamas (Danino 2009)).  
 
Methodologically, this leads to a focus on Hezbollah’s armed resistance, particularly 
in relation to Israel (Blanford 2011; Jaber 2010). Ahmad Jaber (2010), for example, 
describes Hezbollah as a party with one mission, the struggle against the Israeli 
occupation, which structures both: (a) the patterns of its alliances with other political 
actors such as Syria, Iran and national Lebanese parties and (b) the character of its 
own party institutions. Abd Al-Ilah Belkeziz, Secretary General of the Moroccan Arab 
Forum in Rabat and previous head of the Studies Department at the Beirut-based 
Arab Unity Studies Centre (Arab Media Forum 2012), also uses Hezbollah’s armed 
resistance as the key element for approaching his understanding of the party. 
Belkeziz adds that in addition to armed resistance, the social services and religious 
networks of the party allow it to realize a hegemonic ideology among Shi’a masses 
(Belkeziz 2006).  
 
This focus on Hezbollah’s armed activities has led some scholars to argue that the 
Islamic aspect of the party has become subordinate to its resistance goals. Aurelie 
Daher (2014:24), describes Hezbollah as embodying an Islam of resistance because 
their arms are not aimed at the Islamization of the society or at attaining political 
power. Indeed, she argues that Hezbollah should not be called an Islamist party. 
Instead, the emphasis on armed struggle means that we should use terms such as 
“militant Islam”, “Islamic militancy” and “Islamic movements or currents” to describe 
the party. According to her perspective (Daher 2014:25), Islam is seen by the leaders 
of the party as a tool to serve the armed struggle. Echoing the essentialist themes 
described above, Hezbollah’s religious practices and symbolic referents are the 
means appropriate to the Arab world for legitimising the cause of the resistance 
against Israel.  
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Another illustration of how these approaches tend to conceptualise Islam as the 
distinctive, essential feature of the Arab world, and thus providing a locally-specific 
form to ideologies found elsewhere, is the argument made by some authors that 
Political Islam is an Arab version of left-wing discourse. The comments of Dot 
Pouillard cited above are one indication of this perspective. Likewise, the feminist 
scholar Judith Butler has stated that “I think: yes, understanding Hamas, Hezbollah 
as social movements that are progressive, that are on the left, that are part of a 
global left, is extremely important”, adding nevertheless that this should “not stop us 
from being critical of certain dimensions of both movements” (Anonymous 2010). The 
noted Hezbollah scholar, Amal Saad Ghorayeb (2002:16), has argued that 
Hezbollah’s conception of mustad’afîn is analogous to the secular designation of the 
oppressed found in Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. In her view, there is an 
“Islamization of class analysis whose defining elements, exploitation and poverty, 
become Islamic virtue” (Saad Ghorayeb 2002:16). This left-wing character has even 
been characterised as a kind of subconscious impulse, of which Hezbollah itself is 
not fully cognisant. Nahla Chahal (2006 and Den Hond and Qualander 2007), for 
example, writes that “Hezbollah is not yet aware that it is a movement of the 
Theology of Liberation”.  
 
Evidence for the party’s leftist character is sometimes found in the widespread social 
and charitable institutions of the parties, used to build a popular base and provide a 
vehicle for struggle around social justice (Saad Ghorayeb 2002; Charara and Domont 
2004; Pearson and Salamey 2007), (see Chapter 5). As’ad Abu Khalil (1991:394) 
goes further than most in this regard, arguing that Hezbollah is an Islamic adaptation 
of a revolutionary Leninist organisation. Ulema, religious scholars in the Islamic 
tradition, resemble the apparatchiks of the high nomenklatura. He goes on to point 
out that a number of the cadres of the parties, including ulema trained in Iranian 
centres of religious learning such as Najaf or in Qom, joined leftist Lebanese political 
parties in the 1960s and 1970s and imported into Hezbollah an organisational 
structure and Leninist political culture (Abu Khalil 1991:396-398). In the same vein, 
Imad Salameya and Frederic Pearson have described Hezbollah as an “anti-
capitalist political movement” and “revolutionary styled vanguard party” (Pearson and 
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Salamey 2007:420). They add:  
 
“Hezbollah has offered a permanent class struggle with godly 
support that links national liberation with cultural cleansing and 
class emancipation. While indigenously Lebanese, centred in 
the Shi'a communities, Hezbollah's revolution has been 
Trotskyite in its international appeal, for no national borders, 
doctrinal differences or democratic stages precondition its 
revolutionary appeal… Seen in this light, Hezbollah has 
emerged as a revolutionary proletarian party with an Islamic 
manifesto par excellence.” (Pearson and Salamey 2007:422) 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that these perspectives are misplaced for several 
reasons. First, their narrow focus on the question of armed resistance leads analysts 
to downplay or ignore the attitude of Hezbollah towards specific social, political and 
economic issues in Lebanon itself. Later chapters will address this theme in some 
detail, arguing that the party has consistently adapted itself to the neoliberal 
trajectories of successive Lebanese governments despite a rhetorical opposition to 
some of these policies. Second, these approaches take for granted the sectarian 
political system in the country without subjecting the existence of this system and its 
role in the country’s power relations to a thoroughgoing analysis. Third, the allegedly 
leftist impulse of Hezbollah is largely posited without any concrete analysis of the 
party’s relationship to Lebanon’s class structure, specifically the evolution and 
changing character of the Shi’a population. A major theme of this thesis is an attempt 
to map this class structure in some detail, examining how Hezbollah’s orientation has 
reflected – in a contradictory manner – the changing fortunes of different layers of the 
Shi’a in Lebanon. Finally, the cultural and ideological programme of Hezbollah needs 
to be understood beyond simply its expression of armed resistance. Instead, as 
Chapter 5 will show, Hezbollah has used a particular ideological discourse to build its 
hegemony within the Shi’a population through a combined means of consent and 
coercion. This has a particularly important gendered component, which is often 
ignored by scholars writing in the ‘anti-imperialist’ tradition.  
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1.3 Hezbollah: a Pragmatic Political Party 
 
The second school of thought regarding Hezbollah emphasizes the party’s 
institutional relationship and role within the Lebanese political system. These 
scholars reject the essentialist features of the first paradigm discussed above, 
arguing that Hezbollah can be understood through its similarities with other political 
parties in Europe and elsewhere. Most particularly, the party, despite an initial 
rejection of the Lebanese political system, has become increasingly institutionalised 
into existing political structures through its participation in elections and its attempt to 
expand its constituency to all strata of society. This has led, in turn, to a moderation 
of its overall politics.  
 
Along these lines, some authors have argued that Hezbollah has transformed itself 
from a radical and clandestine militia to a moderate mainstream political party with a 
resistance wing, and in the process adapted its political discourse in order to more 
effectively reach a wider public (Corm 2003; Harik 2004; Norton 2007; Samaan 2007; 
Harb 2010; Qassir 2011). These authors believe that the partial or complete 
integration of Hezbollah into the Lebanese political scene has led to the increasing 
adaptation of its ideological principles to the national political environment (Louër 
2008). For example, Mona Harb explains that the Lebanese party must make 
ideological and political compromises and develop an appropriate public discourse to 
justify short-term strategic alliances that appear to be against principles of the party. 
These alliances include agreements with its main competitor in the Shi’a population, 
Amal (discussed further in the following chapter), joint lists with former enemies such 
as Elie Hobeika (an ex-leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF)) and Michel Aoun’s Free 
Patriotic Movement (FPM) (Harb 2010:235). 
 
In this regard, a number of authors have pointed to what they call a “Lebanonization” 
of Hezbollah. Hezbollah and its General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah have used the 
concept of ‘Infitâh’ (opening) – a more nuanced term that allowed Hezbollah to 
maintain the pretence of impartiality and an ability to distinguish itself from other 
Lebanese parties (Di Peri 2014:496). This process is said to have begun with 
Hezbollah’s approval of the 1989 Ta’if agreement, which officially ended the 
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Lebanese Civil War. The subsequent integration of the party into the sectarian 
political system was demonstrated particularly by its participation in the legislative 
elections of 1992 (Usher 1997:63-64; Samii 2008:42). Through this process, the 
party has reconciled its Islamic agenda with a form of Lebanese nationalism. All this 
while ‘nationalizing’ its discourse around the resistance, in other words military 
confrontation against Israel, since the beginning of the 1990s (Harb and Leenders 
2005:183-187; Yadav 2010:203). According to Wärn (2009:131), the inclusion of the 
party in the sectarian political system was the price that had to be paid in order for it 
to continue to legitimize itself as a resistance force capable of defending the country 
from Israel. Accompanying this process of political incorporation, the party has 
increasingly characterized its goal of an ‘Islamic state’ as a utopian ideal that was not 
possible due to Lebanon’s religious diversity; indeed, party leaders have celebrated 
this religious diversity in numerous articles and speeches (Harb and Leenders 
2005:179; Høigilt 2007:128). This supposed acceptance of diversity is provided as 
further indication of Hezbollah’s pragmatic turn – a necessary means to promote its 
political interests and protect its military organisation (Hamzeh 2004:132-133; Hazran 
2010:524). 
 
These authors present a useful counterpoint to essentialist views of the party, 
emphasising instead Hezbollah’s non-static and continuously evolving nature. This 
insight has enabled scholars to better grasp Hezbollah’s political alliances and their 
changing institutional context. Elizabeth Picard (2007:93), for example, speaks of the 
growing pragmatism and moderation of the civilian cadres of the party at the national 
and local levels, including the development at the municipal level of clientelist 
relations with its electorate. This is not very different from other political parties. 
Similarly, the pressure that arises from the need to maintain its position in the political 
system has led Hezbollah to become reliant on the traditional large families that 
dominate the Shi’a population, the so-called zu’âma (see following chapter). Lara 
Deeb and Mona Harb (2012), for example, have pointed to the relationship between 
Hezbollah and the prominent Al-Miqdad family, who have provided the party with 
electoral endorsements, funding and other kinds of support. They emphasize that the 
party cannot afford to antagonise these family organisations. Similarly, Aurelie Daher 
(2012) has discussed the way that Hezbollah had to take into account the influence 
of tribes and clans in the 2004 municipal elections in the northern district of the 
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Bekaa Valley, attempting to learn from their loss in the earlier 1998 elections. 
  
This institutionalist approach provides an analysis of the root causes of Hezbollah’s 
integration into Lebanese politics. The party’s increasing pragmatism is often seen as 
a response to regional pressures (notably from Iran and Syria) in order to give these 
regional forces greater influence in the country’s political rule (Mervin 2008a:82-83). 
Sometimes the argument falls into tautological forms of analysis where pragmatism is 
simply assumed as given – thereby becoming an explanation for itself – or as the 
natural outgrowth of political participation (Corm 2005:184). This thesis will attempt to 
provide a more convincing explanation of Hezbollah’s apparent moderation and 
pragmatism through an analysis of the changing character of its social base in the 
Shi’a population. As noted above, I argue that Hezbollah’s politics are best 
understood as reflecting the contradictory class position of the Shi’a itself: the 
increasing subordination of the party to an emerging Shi’a bourgeoisie coupled with 
the growing polarisation of power and wealth within the community as a whole. The 
integration of Hezbollah into the political system, as well as its orientation towards 
various social movements (notably labour, as will be discussed in Chapter 6), must 
be located within these socio-economic changes.  
 
1.4 Critical Perspectives 
 
A third body of literature concerning Political Islam puts forward a much more 
rounded analysis of these political parties by attempting to situate them in the class 
and social dynamics of the Arab world. Writers in this school of thought include: Aziz 
Al-Azmeh, Asef Bayat, Gilbert Achcar, Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm, Aijaz Ahmad, Fawaz 
Traboulsi and political activists such as Chris Harman and Luiza Toscane. All of 
these authors acknowledge the resistance element characteristic of Islamic 
movements such as Hezbollah, but argue that this is not enough to classify them as 
anti-imperialist, left-wing or progressive. Most significantly, they contend that 
elevating one aspect of these parties’ practices over other considerations leads 
scholars to overlook the ways in which organisations like Hezbollah project 
themselves vis-à-vis the self-mobilisation of social movements or the existing political 
and economic status quo. Moreover, in contradiction to the two approaches outlined 
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above, this third critical approach attempts to offer an analysis of the class base that 
underlies these movements. 
 
These authors reject the essentialist claims about Arab society that form the 
methodological basis of the ‘anti-imperialist’ approach. Rather than assuming that 
Islam is some kind of authentic expression of Arab identity, they present a critique of 
the ideological underpinnings of Political Islam, particularly its goal of re-establishing 
an Islamic ‘Golden Age’. As Gilbert Achcar (1981:3) has emphasized, the ‘will to 
return to Islam’ is the common denominator of various movements from the Sunni 
MB to the Shi’a Hezbollah. Achcar (1981:3) consequently characterises these 
movements as ‘Islamic fundamentalist’, because they posit a return to a supposed 
utopia of the past as a means of solving the problems of today (a utopia that is not 
limited to a single nation but encompasses all Muslim peoples in the region, if not the 
world). Their vision of how individuals and societies should behave, including gender 
relations, is structured by this religious fundamentalism and is in no way progressive 
(Achcar 2006). Nevertheless, according to Achcar, this element has not prevented 
parties such as Hezbollah from adapting to the specificities of the Lebanese multi-
confessional society. He acknowledges their full integration into the Lebanese 
political system, including holding ministerial posts, while acting as a sectarian 
political force like other political parties in the country. In this regard, Achcar’s work 
provides an important alternative to analyse which downplays the party’s political and 
economic record – noting that, like other fundamentalist Islamic parties, Hezbollah 
has not challenged neoliberal policies in Lebanon or the sectarian configuration of 
the political system (Achcar with Warschawski 2006:35).  
 
Other Arab writers have also identified the way in which Islamic movements prioritise 
a religious conception of the world, notably the goal of returning to a supposedly 
pristine ‘Golden Age’ of Islam, as a means of explaining contemporary politics.11 
Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm (2008:170), for example, highlights how this culturalist and 
                                                            
11 In many respects, these authors follow the pioneering analysis of Political Islam developed by the late Maxime 
Rodinson (1978) in his 1970s comments over the character of the Iranian revolution. Rodinson argued that while 
the Iranian revolution may hold anti-American and anti-Western positions, the regime sought to return to an 
archaic order from times past. In defence of universalism, Rodinson stated: “we cannot think the role of Islam as 
an ideology at the present time other than in a context of class struggle and that the Islamic world is no exception 
to the general laws of human history” (Rodinson 1966:235).  
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idealised view of the past has led to a hermetic closure of Islamic thought to socio-
economic structures, politics, historical changes, class conflicts, revolutions etc. 
Similarly, Aziz Al-Azmeh (1993:60) critiques the notion that the liberation and 
development of Arab countries depend firstly upon an assertion of an Islamic identity 
posited as “permanent” and “eternal”. He contrasts the opposition expressed by 
nationalist and socialist movements in the past, which were forward looking and 
opposed to socio-economic structures of oppression and domination, to that of 
Islamic movements of today that frame the struggle as a battle of cultures. Even the 
conceptualisation of imperialism has been changed within Islamic discourse, shifting 
away from a political economy analysis that views the Arab nation as part of the 
Third-World and subject to similar relations of exploitation towards notions such as 
“Satans big or small” and the opposition between the forces of faith and the infidels 
(Al-Azmeh 1993:61).12 As explained by Gilbert Achcar, the United States are not 
considered as “the imperialists” but rather as the “Great Satan”, while Saddam 
Hussein is firstly an “atheist” and an “infidel”.13 On a similar note he adds that Israel 
is, for the Islamic movements, “the Jewish usurper of a sacred Islamic land” rather 
than the Zionist usurper of Palestinian territory (Achcar 1981:3). 
 
This critique has important implications for understanding Hezbollah’s approach to 
armed struggle against Israel and its conception of Zionism. While Hezbollah’s role in 
military resistance was indeed a critical factor in the organisation’s support within 
Shi’a areas (and indeed the wider Arab world), the party conceives this in religious 
terms rather than as an anti-colonial political struggle. This can be seen in the way 
Hezbollah continues to use the words Zionism and Judaism in an interchangeable 
and synonymous manner. This has meant that Hezbollah leaders frequently employ 
anti-Semitic tropes that essentialise Jews as evil. Sheikh Naim Qassem has written, 
“the History of Jews has proven that, regardless of the Zionist proposal, they are the 
people who are evil in their ideas” (cited in Saad Ghorayeb 2002:174). Former 
Hezbollah Secretary General Abbas Al-Mussawi, killed in an Israeli operation, 
                                                            
12 James Piscatori (1994:363) also cites the following examples regarding Islamic fundamentalist discourses 
against their opponents: “Mubarak’s Egypt has become “Dâr Al-Kufr” (land of unbelief), Saddam’s Iraq is a 
“jahilî” society, and Israel is the descendant of both the evil Banu Isra’il of ancient times and the treacherous 
Jews of Prophetic time depicted in the Qur’an”.  
13 The Shi’a Islamic fundamentalist movements in Iraq for example accused the Ba’th regime of being anti-
Islamic, a “satanic Aflaqite party” that excels in its “Crusader-Masonic hatred towards the Islamic People of Iraq 
and Iran alike”. In addition Saddam Hussein is defined as the enemy of religion and the Qur’an (Baram 
1994:566-567),  
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declared that “according to the Qu’ranic interpretation of Jewish history, the problem 
with the Jewish people lies in their religious creed” (cited in Saad Ghorayeb 
2002:174). Hassan Nasrallah has also employed such a discourse on occasion 
saying, “If we searched the entire world for a person more cowardly, despicable, 
weak and feeble in psyche, mind, ideology and religion, we would not find anyone 
like the Jew. Notice I do not say the Israeli” (cited in Saad Ghorayeb 2002:170). In 
events organized by Hezbollah, it is not unusual to see books by the French 
intellectual Roger Garaudy, who denied the project of Jewish extermination by Hitler 
and the existence of gas chambers.14 In February 2006, Hezbollah leader Hassan 
Nasrallah described Garaudy as “a great French philosopher” who exposed the 
“alleged Jewish Holocaust in Germany … [Garaudy] proved that this Holocaust is a 
myth” (MEMRI TV 2006).  
 
Comments such as these point to the importance placed by critical scholars on 
unpacking Hezbollah’s religious and essentialist view of human history. In this regard 
critics have noted how Hezbollah’s discourse echoes the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
approach of Samuel Huntington, where the struggle against the West is based upon 
a rejection of its values and religious system rather than exploitative global relations 
(Saad Ghorayeb 2002:88).15 It is noteworthy that Hezbollah believes this ‘clash’ goes 
back to the early origins of Islam in the seventh century (Saad Ghorayeb 2002:89).16 
This fact is often overlooked or downplayed by those analysts who attempt to frame 
Hezbollah as an anti-imperialist party.17  
                                                            
14 Personal observation during a Hezbollah event in 2012 Dahyeh Beirut 
15 Hezbollah’s opposition to foreign actors takes its ideological source from the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
opposition to what it called “Westoxication” and “Eastoxication”. “Westoxication” was considered to be a 
pathology that took its source in the total and irrational fascination with everything Western at the expense of the 
indigenous culture's heritage, while “Eastoxication” was a pathological obsession among intellectuals with 
Marxist and communist ideologies. The latter were accused of having detached themselves from the masses by 
negating religion as “the opiate of the masses and serving the interests of the colonial powers in the Soviet 
Camp. The solution to both problems was a return to the national self, in other words an Iranian Islamic identity” 
(Tehranian 1993:363). 
16 Despite this hostility to Western civilisation, Hezbollah’s overall discourse also displays a flexibility 
connected to its relationship with Iran. According to Norton (2000:25), in 1999 Hezbollah’s leading officials, 
including Shura Council and Political Bureau members, had privately explored the possibility of a dialogue with 
the United States.  
17 Charara and Dromont (2004:105-107), for example, characterise the Khomeinist discourse adopted by 
Hezbollah, as anti-imperialist because it designates the US as the main enemy of the peoples of the region and 
claim that Israeli policies are opposed because they are colonial. Others deny this anti-Semitism by pointing to 
the fact that Hezbollah has invited Jewish non-Zionist personalities to events, such as Noam Chomsky and 
Norman Finkelstein (Daher 2014:131). These perspectives, however, tend to completely ignore the actual 
content of Hezbollah’s discourse. 
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In line with this critique, scholars have also opposed the analogy between the 
Liberation Theology movement in South America and Islamic movements in the 
Middle East. Asef Bayat (2010:50 and 83) points out that these two movements have 
different natures and objectives: the first is not an expression of supposed cultural 
identity or self-preservation vis-à-vis a dominating Western ‘other’, but rather 
emphasizes a discourse of socio-economic development and emancipation of the 
subaltern. Bayat adds that while Islamic movements aim to Islamise their society, 
political structures and economy, liberation theologists never intended to Christianise 
their society or nation-states, but rather aimed to change them from the vantage point 
of the deprived. As a result Islamic movements, in contrast to Liberation Theology, 
generally prioritise wider moral and political objectives (such as an Islamic state, law 
and dress codes) rather than helping the downthrodden. Within their worldview, 
issues such as social justice for the poor are subordinate to – and follow from – the 
establishment of an Islamic order (Bayat 2010:83).  
 
Critical scholars also argue that essentialist assumptions about Islam and the 
prioritisation of religious identity lead Islamic movements to downplay the desirability 
or salience of other social struggles. Political activist Toscane (1995:28) for example 
argues that Islamic discourse promotes a supposed natural brotherhood between 
Muslims that should prevent the struggle between believers of different classes. The 
solution to poverty is to be found in a return to Islamic values and tradition, or in the 
words of the Tunisian Islamic leader Rached Ghannouchi: “we need to emphasize 
that poverty, in the eyes of Islam, is linked to unbelief” (1979 cited in Toscane 
1995:28). Likewise, Mustapha Sibai, founder of the MB in Syria, noted that: “the 
socialism of Islam leads necessarily to the solidarity of various social categories and 
not to the war between classes as communism” (1959 cited in Carré and Gérard 
1983:87). As such, Islamic parties seek to re-establish the Ummah, a religio-political 
entity that would gather all Muslims and transcend the cleavages that divide them 
today (Toscane 1995:24). 
 
Another common feature in the work of these scholars is a concern with 
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understanding the orientation of Islamic movements towards particular class forces.18 
Gilbert Achcar (1981:3) has argued that much of the social base of Islamic 
movements is the petit bourgeoisie, particularly those groups of society that come 
from rural origins and were urbanised under the impact of the economic changes of 
the 1960s and 1970s, as well as recently educated youth who were hard hit by the 
collapse of Nasserism and the Arab nationalist and left movements. Along side this 
layer, squeezed by capitalist transition, the leadership of Islamic organisations is 
frequently drawn from professional layers such as doctors, engineers and lawyers, as 
well as new business groups that emerged with the liberalisation processes of the 
1980s and 1990s (Achcar 2013a:147). Achcar (2013a:147) explains that the 
Egyptian MB alongside other Arab branches of the Islamic movement had privileged 
access to business and employment opportunities in the Saudi Kingdom and other 
Gulf monarchies during the 1970s and 1980s at a time of a full oil boom. This 
situation boosted and accelerated the process of embourgeoisement of the Islamic 
movement, which experienced a major social transformation, with more and more 
capitalists now playing an increasing role inside the movement. According to Shater, 
an important figure of the Egyptian MB and a successful businessman, the Egyptian 
secret services had identified around 900 companies belonging to members of the 
Islamic movement (cited in Achcar 2013a:147). 
 
In the case of Hezbollah, the Lebanese scholar Fawaz Traboulsi (2014:48) has 
recently argued that a major base of the party’s social support rests upon Shi’a 
businesspeople who profited from the Civil War or commercial activities in the 
diaspora, as well as upper middle classes linked to new education and migration 
opportunities. The tension that results from these different social forces means that 
Islamic movements tend to profess a rhetorical concern for social justice aspirations 
(to be largely fulfilled through charitable means), whilst on the other hand, defending 
market-led principles and economic liberalisation. As the Tunisian Islamic leader 
Rached Ghannouchi noted in 1992: “we (the Islamic political movements) are the 
guarantor of a particular social order and of a liberal economic regime” (1992 cited in 
Toscane 1995:95). Ghannouchi has also declared that “foreign investment is 
welcome in Tunisia, companies must make profits and unions have sometimes been 
                                                            
18 At a more general level, this attempt to examine the class basis of political parties has been applied to other 
political parties in the Arab world (see Waterbury 1970; Batatu 1978; Achcar 1981; Favier 2004). 
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excessive in their demands, including the General Union of Tunisian Workers (known 
as the UGTT)”  (cited in Sereni 2014). Indeed, Ghannouchi has accused the UGTT of 
being a heritage of the French colonial period and of not being a natural institution of 
Muslim society (cited in Sereni 2014).  
 
On a similar note, the MB in Egypt also supports neoliberal policies and their 
economic programme has been criticized for favouring big businesses. Their 
economic programme is considered to be no different than under Mubarak’s 
regime.19 Hassan Malek, a businessman and ranking MB figure, actually went so far 
as to say in 2012 that the principles guiding economic policies followed under 
Mubarak were sound and on the right track, but corruption and nepotism marred their 
implementation (Reuters 2011). 
 
The scholar Patrick Haenni (2005:65) has written that Islamic political movements 
have witnessed an increasing “embourgeoisement” in the process of Islamization of 
society in different countries, especially among its leadership and cadres.  He speaks 
of an “Islam de Marché” (Islam of the Market) that is sympathetic to neoliberal 
policies while combining it with moral conservatism. He describes that this “Islam de 
Marché” was promoted by the rising and newly pious bourgeoisie from the beginning 
of the 1980s. He cites first the “Anatolian Tigers”, who benefited from the export 
support policies of the 1980s, restoring at the same time Islam and Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SME) at the expense of the secular elites at the head of large 
conglomerates in Istanbul and Ankara. A second example is the Egyptians’ 
“Infatihin”, who benefited from the policies of Sadat favouring the private sector and 
opening up the economy while rehabilitating Islamism in the social and political 
scene. The immigration of some sectors of Egyptians to the Gulf monarchies also 
combined this process of economic enrichment with increased religiosity (Haenni 
2005:65-66). 
 
                                                            
19 Khaled Ali, an Egyptian activist and lawyer, said that Muhammad Morsi’s economic platform is identical to 
that of Ahmed Ezz, referring to the businessman and former leader of the National Democratic Party, which was 
the ruling party under Mubarak’s regime. Ali added that the MB’s platform would not achieve the revolution’s 
goals of social justice and a just distribution of wealth. Another activist, Khaled Youssef, who had participated in 
Hamdeen Sabahi’s campaign, described the MB’s project as a plan prepared by businessmen for business 
interests, referring to Deputy Chairman of the MB, Khairat Al-Shater, as well as prominent Brotherhood figure, 
Hassan Malek (Abdel Hafeez 2012). 
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The predominance of upper and middle class forces in the leadership of these 
movements has shaped their orientation towards political action and the character of 
their institutions. Asef Bayat (2010:83) argues that Islamic movements – in contrast 
to Liberation Theology that largely mobilised the poor – tend to target educated 
middle classes, which they view as the main agents of political change. This view is 
shared by Clark (2004:37), who argues that NGOs and organisations of the Islamic 
movements provide jobs, social networks and services to the middle class. Similarly, 
Achcar (2006:35) has criticized those authors who claim that the welfare institutions 
of Islamic organisations represent a progressive alternative to capitalist social 
relations or a form of counter society (a position most forcefully expressed in the 
Lebanese context by the sociologist Waddah Charara (2007:7-8). Achcar (2006:35) 
points out that the so-called ‘Hezbollah state’, while consisting of real institutions and 
social services, can also be found in other communities and thus reinforces the 
nature of sectarian clientelism in the country. Moreover, the services provided by 
these institutions are aimed solely at the Shi’a population, and for this reason do not 
represent any real attempt to replace existing capitalist society. 20   
 
The focus on the class basis of Islamic movements raises complex questions around 
the relationship between religious sect and class in the Arab world. Given the 
prominent role of sectarianism in many Arab countries – including Lebanon, Iraq, 
Syria and Bahrain – some scholars have argued that membership in a religious sect 
can be mapped onto class position. This identification of sect and class is perhaps 
best exemplified in the concept of ‘community class’, which was developed by two 
prominent intellectuals associated with the Organisation of Communist Action in 
                                                            
20 Indeed, throughout the world, conservative religious movements have supported neoliberal policies while 
advocating increased charitable work, leading some scholars to talk of “a smooth alliance between neoliberals 
and religious fundamentalists”, which could be characterised as “religious neoliberalism” (Hackworth 
2013:100). Confirming this trend, various religious conservative movements support the idea that Faith Based 
Organisations (FBO) could replace the state's public services because they are more efficient. The American 
religious leader Marvin Olavsky, for example, argues that government-based welfare is an abject failure because 
it is wasteful and does not emphasize personal responsibility. Therefore, he argues, welfare states should be 
dismantled and replaced with locally based religious systems that are funded by biblical tithes. He adds: “such 
programmes would not burden the federal government and would be able to sort the 'deserving' from the 
'undeserving' poor” (Hackworth 2013:104-105). Olasky’s political views have wide influence in the US 
Republican party; he was a close advisor to former President George W. Bush in the 1990s. Based on this idea of 
less state and more independent FBOs, Olasky promoted the idea of “compassionate conservatism” (Hackworth 
2013:105). In the Middle East context, Islamic fundamentalist movements have also adopted this form of 
“compassionate conservatism”, combining neoliberal policies and conservative moralism (Haenni 2005:104; 
Roy 2002:150-152). The Egyptian MB, for example, has supported increased religious compliance and the work 
of charity organisations (Freedom and Justice Party 2011:9), while also advocating neoliberal policies in which 
the private sector would play a leading role in the economy (Freedom and Justice Party 2011:26). 
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Lebanon (OCAL), Mohsen Ibrahim and Fawaz Traboulsi. 21  The concept soon 
expanded from its origins among a small circle of left intellectuals to become one that 
was widely held among key left organisations in Lebanon – notably the LCP and the 
progressive front, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM).  
 
According to this theory, the predominant weight of Christians in Lebanon’s business 
elite meant that Christians could be understood as constituting the bourgeoisie, while 
Muslims (particularly Shi’a) made up the vast majority of the working class and poor. 
Shi’a, according to Ghassan Tueni, editor of the liberal Nahar Newspaper: “are the 
proletarians of the land, the most submissive class in appearance and the most 
revolutionary at the bottom. The revolt of the Shi’a masses can become a revolt in 
the name of all communities” (cited in Picard 1985:1005). From this perspective, the 
struggle of a particular sect – in this case the Shi’a – represented a form of class 
struggle. In Fawaz Traboulsi’s words, the left needed “to confront the religion of the 
rulers with the religion of the governed, the religion of the satiated with the religion of 
the hungry” (1988 cited in Daou 2013).  
 
Clearly the concept of community class bears some affinity to the ‘anti-imperialist’ 
perspective outlined earlier. Indeed, in the Lebanese context, some intellectuals 
associated with the LCP were to make this analogy explicit. They argued that groups 
such as Hezbollah were important allies of the left because they represented the 
struggle of the Shi’a population as an exploited underclass. Karim Mroue, a 
prominent leftist intellectual and leader of the LCP, argued that closer relations and 
collaboration by the left with religious organisations would push the latter to more 
progressive politics. Mroue saw a potential of convergence between what he called 
the “tributaries of the revolutionary movement” (i.e. the left) and anti-imperialist and 
anti-Zionist religious organisations (1990 cited in Ismael J. S. and Ismael T. 
1998:134). Drawing a comparison with Liberation Theology, Mroue wrote that: “we 
have to consider that if the revolutionary Islamic movements are the most salient in 
our countries, then we have to exert more efforts for the sake of producing the effect 
that Liberation Theology has had in Latin America” (cited in Ismael J. S. and Ismael 
                                                            
21 Personalities such as Nahla Chahal and Fawaz Traboulsi were part of the OCAL and supported as well this 
vision of the concept of community class at the time (For Fawaz Traboulsi see article Daou 2013).  
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T. 1998:137).  
 
Nonetheless, positions such as these were to be contested within the LCP and the 
wider Lebanese left. George Hawi, another historic leader of the LCP, stated that the 
party faced a four-pronged struggle: the struggle against Israeli occupation, against 
the President of the Republic, against extremists and against mounting Islamic and 
Christian sectarianisms (cited in Ismael J. S. and Ismael T. 1998:121). The LCP also 
condemned calls by Islamic parties for the establishment of an Islamic republic, 
which came in reaction to right-wing demands for a Christian republic. The LCP 
stated that both projects were: 
 
“ultimately serving the objectives of the US-Israeli alliance, not 
only because they now help to fuel strife and discord, but also 
because these slogans impel the establishment on our soil of 
several entities on the denominational principle, and provoke 
divisions in other Arab countries, thereby providing justification 
for the establishment of the state of Israel on a religious basis.” 
(1987 cited in Ismael J. S. and Ismael T. 1998:126)  
 
One of the most vocal critics of the concept of “community class” was the LCP 
intellectual, Mehdi Amel. Amel had been a student of the French philosopher Louis 
Althusser, and provided a strikingly original analysis of the phenomenon of 
sectarianism in the Arab world and the relationship between sect and class.22 Amel’s 
(1986:248) approach to sectarianism emphasized its contemporary role in facilitating 
patterns of class power within the colonially-dominated societies of the Arab world. In 
this sense, he argued against what he described as ‘historicist’ perspectives that 
characterised sectarianism as a primordial remainder of earlier periods of history, 
which would disappear through processes of modernisation. Instead, in Amel’s view, 
sectarianism needed to be seen as constitutive, and reinforcing, of current forms of 
state and class power. The Lebanese bourgeoisie sought to give a confessional 
                                                            
22 Some key texts of Mehdi Amel are Muqadimât nazariyya li-dirassa âthar al-fikr al-ishtirâkî fi haraka al-
tahrîr al-watanî; Âzma al-hadâra al-‘arabiyya am âzma al-burjwâziyyât al-‘arabiyya?; Al-nazariyya fî al-
mumârissa al-siyyâssiyya: bahth fi âsbâb al-harb al-âhliyya al-lubnâniyya; Moudakhal ila naqd al-fikr al-tâ`ifî: 
al-qadiyya al-falastîniyya fi idîulujiyya al-burjwâziyya al-lubnâniyya; Mârks fî istishrâq idwârd sa’id: hal al-
‘aql lil-gharb wa al-qalb lil-sharq?    
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aspect to the class struggle in order to strengthen its own position (Amel 1986:212). 
In this sense, Lebanon’s confessional system arose alongside the development of 
Lebanese capitalism (in interaction with colonial rule), and thus sectarianism was 
something that needed to be opposed as a necessary feature of the struggle against 
class rule itself. 
 
Echoing Amel, the Palestinian Lebanese scholar Ussama Makdissi (2000:2-7) has 
also explained how sectarianism was a modern product that had its origins in the mid 
19th century. Makdissi (2000:2-7) explains well how sectarianism was constructed in 
the context of European domination and Ottoman reforms and because its producers 
at the colonial (Europe), imperial (Ottoman) and local (Lebanese) echelons 
considered themselves as moderns who used the historic past to justify 
contemporary demands and future development.  
 
From this standpoint, Mehdi Amel argued against any attempt to ascribe and equate 
class position according to membership in a particular sect, and as a result, to then 
build alliances on the basis of sectarian affiliation. Such alliances would, according to 
Amel, further entrench the sectarian dynamic inherent to the system and thus 
strengthen the position of those in power. At a theoretical level, the community class 
concept was mistaken, in Amel’s (1986:242) belief, because it resulted from an 
amalgam of the political (the sectarian system) and the economic (the social relations 
underlying capitalist society). Instead, Amel advanced a position that highlighted the 
contradictory class nature of different sect communities, one in which the role of 
sectarianism helped to obscure relations of power and domination within the 
community itself.  
 
Regardless of these contested positions, the LCP and LNM slowly moved towards 
advocating closer collaboration with Islamic parties. This political trajectory occurred 
despite increasing attacks on the left by Islamic militias – including the assassination 
of both Hussein Mroue and Mehdi Amel in 1987,widely believed to have been 
committed by Islamic groups close to Hezbollah (Nassif-Debs 2006). One of the 
consequences of the growing alliance between the left and the Islamic political 
parties in Lebanon was a downplaying of the demand for an end to the sectarian 
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system and a shift in the discourse of the LNM – away from an emphasis on the 
struggle between right and left towards one that viewed the conflict as a struggle 
between conservative Christian forces on one side and progressive and Islamic 
forces on the other side (Picard 1985; Chiit 2009; Daou 2013). Small numbers of the 
left – particularly the OCAL – even joined Hezbollah, in the belief that the party 
represented the struggle of the poor in Lebanon (Dot Pouillard 2008). This trajectory, 
as Amel predicted, deepened the sectarian character of the Civil War itself, which 
was to have profound implications on the development of Hezbollah (see Chapter 2 
for further discussion).23 
 
1.5 Theoretical Framework of this Thesis 
 
This thesis develops an analysis of Hezbollah on the basis of the method offered in 
the third set of critical literature. In doing so, there are two key theoretical aspects 
that will be emphasized. First, in line with the observations made by Amel, Achcar, 
Al-Azm and Azmeh, the thesis will focus in detail on the social and political 
consequences of Hezbollah’s religious ideology, particularly the party’s claim that the 
deep-rooted problems facing society can be best addressed through a return to an 
Islamic ‘way of life’ supposedly grounded in an earlier period of history. Unlike the 
perspectives of the anti-imperialist or pragmatic party approaches, it is necessary to 
take seriously the impact of Hezbollah’s particular concept of religion in its politics – 
not sidelining it by focusing solely on the military aspects of Hezbollah’s practice 
against Israel or minimising the role played by this religious ideology in the party’s 
growing political conformity. It is noteworthy that Hezbollah itself emphasizes this 
culturalist/religious element as the single most essential feature of its ideology, with 
its vision of Islam said to be “the overall, total and appropriate route for a better life … 
representing the ideological, doctrinaire and practical basis on which the movement 
is founded” (Qassem 2008:32-33). All aspects of the party’s practice – including the 
armed struggle against Israel – flow from this perspective (Fadllalah 1994). 
 
Following an approach based on Marxist class analysis relying on historical and 
                                                            
23 The historical accounts of leftist leaders Mohsen Ibrahim (al-Harb wa-Tajriba al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-
Lubnâniyya, Beirut: Beirut al-Mazaa, 1983) and George Hawi (al-Tariq December 1982), both recognise this 
phenomena of increasing sectarianism in the ranks of the LNM.  
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sociological data, the thesis will analyse the form and content of Hezbollah’s religious 
worldview and the implications of this for how the party relates to the Shi’a 
population. Specifically, it will show that the party’s particular religious conception has 
been a key element in its ability to win hegemony over Shi’a society. The concept of 
hegemony is understood here in the Gramscian sense as, “the whole range of 
values, attitudes, beliefs, cultural norms, legal precepts that are deeply embedded in 
the fabric of social relations” (Thomas 2009:210). According to Gramsci, these 
elements are a vital part of any group’s ability to become dominant. Hegemony is 
established not simply through force but through, “the combination of force and 
consent, which balance each other reciprocally” (cited in Roccu 2012:44). Although 
this counter-balance is a unity, it is also – as Thomas notes – “a precise, unbalanced 
equilibrium… force must not appear to predominate too much over consent, but the 
proper relationship in reality involves more weight on the side of the former” (Thomas 
2009:165). Through this unity, hegemony becomes a “form of political power 
exercised over those classes in close proximity to the leading group, while 
domination is exerted over those opposing it. Consent is one of the means of forging 
the composite body of a class alliance, while coercion is developed against the 
excluded other” (Thomas 2009:163). 
 
Lisa Wedeen, in her research on the propaganda of the Assad regime in producing 
power and hegemony, acknowledges the Gramscian concept of hegemony employed 
by some social science theorists. She points to the significance of “ideas, signs and 
images in producing dominant understandings that are taken for granted and 
perceived as natural and commonsensical” (Wedeen 1999: 11). This understanding 
of hegeomony, in her opinion, although helpful in proposing ways in which images 
and ideas are involved in producing power, nonetheless fails to apprehend the 
dynamics of official rhetoric in Syria regarding the regime of Hafez Al Assad. She 
argues that  
 
“the practices and language of the cult do cultivate Asad’s 
power in ways that are “taken for granted. In other words, while 
the litteral statements of the cult are frequently clearly 
preposterous, the dominance to which they refer (and which 
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they also help to produce) is implicit in the regime’s demands of 
public dissimulation and in people’s conformity to them”. 
(Weden 1999:12)  
 
Her research provides what Louis Althusser and others would probably call a 
materialist approach to rhetoric and symbols. She explains that it “focuses on the 
observable, material effects of the cult and on the everday practices of domination 
and transgression the cult produces through its system of representation” (Weden 
1999:12). In much the same way, Althusser and Stuart Hall argued that there “is a 
dialectal relationship between practices and ideology in which practices produce 
ideological representations, and ideology material because it is inscribed in practices” 
(cited in Weden 1999:12).   
 
Anne Showstack Sasson (2000) presents Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as 
indicating consent and moral and intellectual leadership. She adds that hegemony 
has cultural, political and economic aspects and entails compromises between social 
groups in which sectional interests are transformed and a notion of the general 
interest is promoted (Sasson 2000:45). She explains that Gramsci developed the 
concept of hegemony in recognition of the changing nature of political power in the 
twentieth century and the political significance of civil society. The attributes of civil 
society, Sasson argues, were an indicator of the democratic nature of a society, in 
which if its democratic and pluralistic potential were developed, coercive aspects of 
the state could diminish (Sasson 2000:103). In this perspective, she also put a lot of 
emphasis on the role of leaders and intellectuals in elaborating a new historic project, 
a new hegemony. She says that the process of achieving a new hegemony:  
 
“ will be facilitated by the development of new groups of organic 
intellectuals, including from social strata whose intellectual 
capacities have not traditionally developed, and a new 
conception of the world. Yet the goal of making ‘politically 
possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of 
small intellectual groups requires both a criticism of common 
sense and of traditional philosophy. This is the precondition for 
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a new hegemony (Sasson 2000:34). 
 
In her opinion, the meaning of critical self-consciousness, historically and politically, 
is the creation of an élite of intellectuals.  
 
The ability to win hegemony does not simply apply to those who dominate any 
society, but is an important element for any group that aspires to hold that position. In 
the case of Hezbollah, it will be demonstrated that its hegemony over the Shi’a 
population is highly contradictory because of the different (and evolving) social 
interests that the party attempts to encompass. Because Hezbollah’s hegemony acts 
to obscure and mystify the underlying exploitation inherent to Lebanese sectarian 
capitalism, it is a “form of hegemony designed to give rise to manipulated consent, a 
consent of subaltern allies” (Thomas 2009:227). It works, in Thomas’ apt phrase, to 
maintain “the subaltern classes in their subaltern position, glossing over or obscuring 
the true, fractured nature of the present by speculatively sanctifying it as the only 
possible present and this as eternity” (Thomas 2009:291). As will be shown for 
Hezbollah, it is through portraying the self-interests of the dominated as identical with 
the actions and norms of the party that the latter has been able to win leadership 
within the Shi’a population.  
 
The concept of articulation, regarding the linkages between the modes of production, 
modes of coercion and modes of persuasion, in which power manifests itself 
structurally, as explained by Nazih Ayubi, is also useful to understand Hezbollah’s 
hegemony. He argues that Islamist discourse is essentially anti state, and “often 
manages to interpellate (i.e to “call”, entreat or persuade by pleading) different, or 
even contradictory, classes and forces (the proletarianised intelligentsia and the 
prosperous traditional and/ or new merchants), which may eventually form a power 
bloc united in its opposition to the state: to its managerial failure and cultural alterity” 
(Ayubi 1995: 28). He says that the concept of interpellation (which has Gramscian 
and Althusserian antecedents) denotes the articulated discursive process, which has 
been built in such a way that it literally appeals to people from various social classes 
and groups who all believe that they are being addressed or called by it. He adds that 
“it is therefore an ideological mechanism through which subjects are endowed with 
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specific identities, interests and social positions. It is usully involved in the 
construction of “historic blocs” and in most populist discourses” (Ayubi 1995: 29). He 
ends by saying that religious discourses, as well as nationalist, have a strong 
“interpellatory” potential because they illustrate cases whereby the same symbolic 
code can attract disparate social constituencies (Ayubi 1995: 29).   
 
Hezbollah’s hegemony is actually underpinned by its religious worldview, which as 
later chapters will demonstrate, articulates a particular set of collective and individual 
behavioural norms that are encapsulated in the terms hâla islâmiyya and iltizâm. 
These behavioural norms constitute the core of Hezbollah’s discourse and are firmly 
based upon the notion of a ‘return to Islam’ as the solution to the problems that beset 
the Shi’a population. Most significantly, they act to encourage deep social conformity 
(although not, it should be emphasized, any kind of social passivity) and submission 
to the leadership of the party itself as the institutional vehicle of religious salvation. 
They work through both consensual and coercive means; there are numerous 
rewards (both material and moral) for those who comply with these norms, while their 
rejection brings social ostracism and in some cases violence. These norms are 
dispersed and reinforced through what Gramsci described as the party’s ‘hegemonic 
apparatus’, the network of organisations and services within civil society including: 
educational facilities, professional syndicates, the media, religious establishments 
and cultural institutions (Thomas 2009:291). In this sense, Hezbollah’s religious 
foundation is not simply a set of beliefs but an ideology that reproduces a conception 
of the world which prescribes how Muslims should think and act, and which is 
consciously diffused through various socialisation structures (Kandil 2011:46).  
 
We will also see that Hezbollah, with its large network of institutions and its own 
military force, (legitimized by the Ta’if Agreement and the Lebanese state until 
today), possesses in many aspects the characteristics of a state as defined by 
Marxists. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci explained that the state is “ the entire 
complex practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those 
ove whom it rules (cited in Ayubi 1995:5). Gramsci developed an analysis 
incorporating the apparatus of hegemony in the state, in other words understanding 
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that “the general notion of the state includes elements which need to be referred 
back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that state = political 
society + civil society; in other words hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercition) (cited in Ayubi 1995:6). The Italian Marxist explains that the governing 
class did not have to rely exclusively on the coercive power of the state or even its 
direct economic power to rule, but rather through its hegemony, expressed in the civil 
society and the state, in which the ruled are convinced and persuaded to take the 
system of beliefs of the ruling class and to share its social, cultural and moral values 
(cited in Ayubi 1995:6). The Gramscian concept of hegemony, in addition to 
analysing the processes according to which political structures are appproved by the 
system’s agents, explores as well the area of cultural and ideological consent, and 
underlines the role of the state as educator.  
 
In his understanding of the state, Gramsci observed that various levels of 
development of the state existed. He described for example the “gendarme state” 
(based on its law and order functions) and the “corporative state” (based on its 
economic interests and functions) as a primary and narrow phase of state formation 
and development. In the absence of the development of civil society, the state 
remains in Gramsci’s terms backwards, in other words mainly coercive and relying on 
force, while enjoying at best a highly limited hegemony over society (Sasson 
2000:72). On the opposite, what he called the “integral state” or the “state in its 
totality” was not limited to the government, but incorporated some aspects of the civil 
society and is based on hegemony and leadership (cited in Ayubi 1995:7). The 
transition to an integral state involves the development of hegemony throughout 
society, in other words, as explained by Gramsci “relationships at all levels of the 
society, from the factory through to the school, that aim at the creation of a new type 
and level of civilization” (cited in Ayubi 1995:8). The integral state with a leading or 
directive class creates a particular “Weltanschauung” (worldview). Hegemony is then 
realized when this particular “Weltanschauung” is “diffused by agencies of ideological 
control and socialisation into every area of daily life to the extent that this prevailing 
consciousness is internalised by the broad masses to become part of the common 
sense” (Boggs 1976 cited in Ayubi 1995:8). This is generally carried out through a 
dialectical interaction between the structure and the superstructure, between the 
objective and the subjective, manifested in the creation of a socio-political bloc, or, as 
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Gramsci calls it, a historical bloc. (Ayubi 1995:8). 
 
We will see that Hezbollah’s hegemony represents a coalition led by a particular 
fraction of the Lebanese Shi’a petit bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie linked to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and dominating the Lebanese Shi’a popular classes, and tries to 
impose a particular world view on the Lebanese Shi’a population through both 
hegemony and armed coercion.  
 
To analyse the development of Hezbollah’s hegemony on the Lebanese Shi’a 
population, French Marxist Louis Althusser’s analysis of the State is very helpful 
(1976). Althusser describes the state as a 'machine' of repression and the instrument 
that allows the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working class, but 
notably explains that to ensure the domination of the rulling classes the state has two 
main sets of institutions: the (repressive) State Apparatus (SA) and the Ideological 
State Apparatus (ISA). According to Althusser (1976), the SA includes: the 
government, the administration, the army, police, courts, prisons, etc. The ISA 
appears for observers on the other hand as distinct and specialised institutions and 
encompass various sectors of society, which are not necessarily directly under the 
authority of the state: religious institutions, educational institutions, the family, laws, 
the political (the political system, including the different political parties), trade unions, 
the media (press, radio, TV, etc.), cultural institutions (literature, fine arts, sports, 
etc.). Instutions of ISA, for its majority do not have public status, and are private 
institutions. Gramsci nevertheless warned that the distinction between public and 
private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in (subordinate) domains in 
which bourgeois law exercises its 'powers' (cited in Althusser 1976). The state 
domain escapes to the bourgeois law because it is "beyond the law", argued 
Althusser (1976) and he adds that the state which is the state of the ruling class, is 
neither public nor private, it is rather the condition of any distinction between public 
and private. Althusser explains that whether the institutions that perform them are 
"public" or "private", what matters is how they work. Private institutions can perfectly 
well 'function' as Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser 1976).  
 
What distinguishes the ISA from the (repressive) SA is that the first operates 
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overwhelmingly through ideology, while operating secondarily on repression. On the 
contrary, the (repressive) SA operates through repression (including physical), while 
functioning secondarily on ideology. In the same time, there are no purely repressive 
or ideological apparatuses. For example the army and the police, which are based on 
repression and are part of the SA, also run on ideology, both for their own cohesion 
and reproduction, and through the "values" they offer to the outside (Althusser 1976). 
Mehdi Amel, a student of Althusser, developed this understanding in the Arab world 
as the state being owned and used by the dominant class to submit the socio-
economic development to its class domination or to maintain this development in the 
framework of relations of production that is determined by the ruling class (Amel 
1973:57). He adds that the State apparatus is the basic and fundamental political and 
ideological tool of the ruling class, and that it is a class repressive apparatus to 
protect the domination of the dominant class (Amel 1973: 59). Althusser (1976) 
actually argued that no class can permanently hold state power without exercising 
the same time its hegemony over and in the Ideological State Apparatus. This is why 
the ISA is not simply a place of challenge, but also of the class struggle. The class 
(or class coalition) in power does not easily impose its law in the ISA as in the SA, 
not only because the old ruling classes can conserve for long periods strong 
positions, but also because the resistance of the exploited classes can find the 
means and the opportunity to express themselves, either by using the contradictions 
that exist there, either by conquering them by the struggle of combat positions 
(Althusser 1976). Chapter 5 (on the institutions linked to Hezbollah) and chapter 7 
(on the military institution of the Islamic movement) demonstrate that Hezbollah 
shares many of these features presented by Althusser, despite not being formally a 
state.    
 
The second theoretical aspect of the critical literature that is emphasized in this 
thesis is the importance of tracing the changing class characteristics of the Shi’a 
population, and the relationship of this to Hezbollah’s political practice. Class is here 
understood as a set of social relations that emerge around capital accumulation and 
forms of labor. In doing so however, as argued by Adam Hanieh:  
 
“we need to avoid an abstract and economistic understanding of 
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what we mean by class… What this means is that questions such as 
gender, age, national and ethnic origin, citizenship status, and so 
forth, are part of what constitutes class as a concrete social relation. 
In this sense, class is not an abstract category shorn of particularity 
and difference – difference is essential to how we understand it” 
(Hanieh 2015).  
 
As David McNally has pointed out, drawing upon the observations of the Canadian 
theorist Himani Bannerji, we need to avoid an approach that sees “different forms of 
social oppression as discrete and autonomous social relations … rather than as 
‘social relations and forms [that] come into being in and through each other’” 
(McNally 2015, 143 cited in Hanieh 2015). 
 
In this regard, Chapter 2, 3 and 4 examine the political economy of development of 
Lebanon over recent decades, in order to reveal how the position of different 
sectarian communities has changed in relation to economic reproduction. The critical 
literature surveyed above emphasizes this methodological approach, but it is 
noteworthy that much of this writing was produced in the 1970s and 1980s, and thus 
does not generally consider the significant changes that have ensued through the 
most recent period. In this sense, the thesis aims to update the existing literature in 
line with the most recent development of Lebanon’s political economy. 
 
As Goodwin and Hetland (2013:90) have argued at a general level, tracing patterns 
of capitalist development is important to an appreciation of party and social 
movement dynamics in at least four specific ways. First, changing patterns of 
capitalist reproduction act to “inhibit or facilitate the formation of new collective 
identities and solidarities, including both class and non-class identities. In this way 
capitalism shapes the very condition of existence of many social movements” 
(Goodwin and Hetland 2013:91). Second, the relative balance of power that exists 
between different classes “shapes the way movements evolve over time and what 
they can win for their constituents” (Goodwin and Hetland 2013:91). Third, within 
movements themselves, class divisions “may powerfully shape movement goals and 
strategies” (Goodwin and Hetland 2013:91). And finally, the kinds of goals and 
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strategies developed by movements, and their ideological expressions, are “closely 
linked to capitalist institutions and practices” (Goodwin and Hetland 2013:91).24  
 
Each of these four observations will be noted throughout this thesis. In particular, the 
analysis in the following chapters will focus on these dynamics throughout the period 
of neoliberal reform in Lebanon (1990s to the current day).  
 
We understand neoliberalism as a particular organisation of capitalism to ensure the 
conditions for capitalist reproduction at a global scale and as part of a ruling class 
offensive, which ran through the recessions in the 1970s and 1980s and resulted in 
restructuring and generated a new wave of capitalist expansion.25 The basic goal of 
neoliberalism, as David Harvey has emphasized, is the development of a new 
“regime of capital accumulation characterised by a minimal direct intervention of the 
state in the economy, limited to setting up the legal, political and military functions 
required to guarantee the proper functioning of markets and their creation in those 
sectors where markets do not exist” (cited in Roccu 2012:72). In the framework of 
neo liberalism, the State has actually the explicit role of guaranteeing capital 
accumulation as explained and emphasized by David Harvey: “The state has to 
guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those 
military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private 
property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of 
markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, 
education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be 
created, by state action if necessary” (Harvey 2005: 2).   
 
At a general level, Lebanese neoliberalism – understood as a set of both economic 
policies and a restructuring of class power – differs little from elsewhere in the region 
(Hanieh 2013:160). In this sense, successive Lebanese governments have 
                                                            
24 Goodwin and Hetland’s approach provides a useful counterpoint to analyses of party politics and social 
movements that deny the salience of capitalist development itself. As Goodwin and Hetland have noted in their 
critique of New Social Movement theory and ‘contentious politics’, while much social science writing on social 
movements “provide valuable insights into the internal dynamics of social movements”, they “nevertheless tend 
to undermine the reality of capitalism, proletarianisation, class conflict, or political economy generally” 
(Goodwin and Hetland 2013:91). (For further discussion of these themes, see Barker, Cox, Krinsky and Nilsen 
2013) 
25 http://isj.org.uk/take-neoliberalism-seriously/ 
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embraced policies such as privatisation, opening up of markets, deregulation of 
labour and other markets and cuts in social spending. 
 
At a more specific level, however, subsequent chapters will demonstrate several 
distinctive characteristics of Lebanon’s process of neoliberal reform. Most notably, 
Lebanese neoliberalism is distinguished by its focus on urban-led restructuring and 
financialisation of the economy linked to foreign capital inflows. These characteristics 
have their roots in the earlier development of Lebanon as an intermediary hub 
between the Arab world and Europe, as well as the ways in which the devastation 
due to decades of war and civil strife shaped neoliberal policy-making. The specificity 
of Lebanese neoliberalism has had a profound impact on the position and character 
of the Shi’a population, and cast a particular character on the four dynamics noted by 
Goodwin and Hetland. 
 
Any study of the Lebanese case requires addressing the question of the nature of 
sectarianism, and the contending approaches to the ‘community class’ concept noted 
above. In this regard, the thesis will utilise many of the earlier insights of Mehdi Amel, 
and attempt to assess these insights in light of the developments following Amel’s 
untimely death. Most notably, the thesis draws upon Amel’s observation that 
sectarian patterns of political mobilisation reflect the manner in which fractions of the 
bourgeoisie act to impose themselves as representatives of the popular classes 
(Amel 1986:125). Sectarianism is a powerful mechanism of control over the course of 
the class struggle through its creation of ties of dependence between the popular 
classes and their bourgeois leadership. In this manner, popular classes are deprived 
of an independent political existence and instead are defined (and act politically) 
through their confessional status.  
 
This analysis of sectarianism provides a useful theoretical bridge between both the 
religious character of Hezbollah’s ideology – notably its role in strengthening the 
hegemony of the party over the Shi’a population – and the changing class 
characteristics of the Shi’a population itself. If Hezbollah’s politics are understood as 
increasingly oriented towards the bourgeois class fraction of the Shi’a – itself an 
outgrowth of the patterns of neoliberal reform analysed in subsequent chapters – 
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then sectarianism represents one of the means by which this class fraction 
entrenches its hegemony over Shi’a population. 
 
These processes, however, do not develop without contradiction or tension. Later 
chapters will note many of these contradictions at different levels. They include: the 
ways in which Hezbollah conceives of its economic programme as a ‘social market’ 
economy, the party’s policies in the areas over which it exerts significant control 
(particularly the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Bekaa Valley) and, as Chapter 6 
will discuss in some detail, the tension between the organisation’s presence in 
government and the emergence of non-confessional labour struggles throughout the 
country over the last decade. Revealing these contradictions is an important goal of 
this thesis – they point to the importance of moving beyond any timeless or 
essentialist characterisations of Hezbollah itself. 
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Chapter 2: Sectarianism and the Lebanese Political Economy: 
Hezbollah’s Origins 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the origins and development of Hezbollah 
within the sectarian political system of Lebanon and the changing socio-economic 
position of the Shi’a population. The first part of the chapter traces the evolution of 
the Lebanese political economy from the period of the French Mandate through to 
independence in 1943. Throughout this period, Lebanon was dominated politically 
and economically by France, whose control rested upon the sponsorship of sectarian 
patterns of rule – notably its close alliance with the Maronite Christian sect. Within 
this system, the Shi’a population was the most marginalised of all groups in the 
country. Largely rural based, the Shi’a were politically controlled by the zu’âma.26  
 
These characteristics of the Shi’a population began to change following 
independence. The financial and service-oriented character of Lebanon’s political 
economy was accentuated through 1960s and 1970s, with the country forming an 
intermediary position between the Arab world and Western states. While remaining 
marginalised, some segments of the Shi’a population saw an improvement in their 
relative position through increased opportunities in the state administration and 
growing access to education (particularly under the administration of President Fuad 
Chehab). A new and growing Shi’a bourgeoisie was appearing as well, especially 
from the return of wealthy Shi’a migrants (Nasr 1985). 
 
At the same time, the penetration of market relations into rural areas, notably the 
introduction of export based agro-capitalism that replaced earlier economic bases 
with cash crops like tobacco (Deeb L. 2006:73), provoked large-scale migration – 
both internal (to Beirut) and on a regional and international level. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, emigration was increasingly oriented to the Arab oil-producing countries 
(especially Kuwait and Libya) and transformed many Lebanese Shi'a villages (Nasr 
                                                            
26 Zu’âma were generally large landowners who acted as intermediaries to access services for the popular 
classes. See further details page 61.  
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1985). These trends altered the existing power relations of Shi’a society, undermining 
the position of the zu’âma and deepening the Shi'a's urban character. The Shi'a, 
therefore, came to form a large component of the poor and working classes 
concentrated in the massive slums of South Beirut. The social effects of emigration 
on the Shi‘a community were considerable. Local power relations in the villages 
shifted dramatically, leading to the loss of influence by traditional notabilities and 
religious families in favour of wealthy returning migrants who constituted an emerging 
new Shi‘a bourgeoisie. This new group purchased land and orchards, established 
new commercial networks and carved out their own spheres of social influence (Nasr 
1985).  
 
New political formations arose alongside these changes in Shi’a social structures, 
notably the “Harakat al-Mahrumîn” (Movement of the Dispossessed) – a movement 
led by Moussa Sadr that competed with some elements of the zu’âma but more 
particularly against the left, for political dominance within Shi’a areas. The Lebanese 
Civil War, which began in 1975, further reinforced these transformations within Shi’a 
social structures. The Civil War deepened the pre-existing sectarian divisions in the 
country, leading to a highly fractured state dominated by militias. Politically, the 
“Harakat al-Mahrumîn”’s position began to be undermined in the later years of the 
Civil War, as the organisation was increasingly viewed as unrepresentative of the 
needs of large sections of the Shi’a populations and unwilling to confront Israel’s 
occupation of Beirut in 1982. The migration of a growing portion of the Shi’a 
population and the Iranian revolution of 1979, which brought Khomeini to power also 
played a role in the diminishing influence of the movement. In this context, Hezbollah 
was able to emerge as a principal voice of the Shi’a population in Lebanon.   
 
This narrative helps to establish the relationship between Hezbollah and its social 
base in the Shi’a population. It confirms, in particular, the observations made by 
Mehdi Amel (1986:326), that sectarianism is an essential component of how the 
political power of the Lebanese bourgeoisie (of all religious identities) is maintained. 
Sectarianism enables the Lebanese bourgeoisie to intervene ideologically in the 
class struggle, strengthening its control of the popular classes and keeping them 
subordinated to their sectarian leaders. Religious sects in Lebanon are not essential 
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entities, but rather a political relationship determined by a specific historical form of 
the movement of class struggle in which the bourgeoisie wins through the political 
absence of its class opponent. The political relationship therefore becomes a relation 
of class dependency that links the popular classes to the bourgeoisie by a sectarian 
link (Amel 1986:326-327). 
 
2.2 Lebanon’s Early History 
 
In September 1920, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the country of Greater 
Lebanon was established under the authority of the French Mandate. The territory of 
the new country included Mount Lebanon, which had gained a semi-autonomous 
status under Ottoman rule through the interferences of European foreign powers in 
1860, and also the regions of the Bekaa Valley, Jabal ‘Amil (South Lebanon), Akkar, 
Beirut, Saida and Tripoli. These latter regions had been, until 1918, part of the two 
Ottoman wilâya of Damascus and Beirut (Picaudou 1989:57). 
 
At this time, Lebanon was composed of 17 religious groupings that each had 
particular geographical and social characteristics.27 Christians, who composed 55 
percent of the total population of the country in 1920, were mainly concentrated in 
Mount Lebanon (Picaudou 1989:57). The Christian population was divided into 
various sects, the main ones being Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic.28 
Muslims – Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, and Ismaeli – were a majority in the new territories 
incorporated into Greater Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley, Jabal ‘Amil, Akkar, Beirut, 
Saida and Tripoli. In these regions, Muslims formed a majority of 200,814 against 
117,332 Christians (Picaudou 1989:57).29  
 
The French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria was a means of furthering France's 
political and economic interests in the Middle East (Khoury 1981:452; Makdissi 
                                                            
27 Following the Ta’if Agreement (see below), the Alawite community was recognised on the political level as a 
sect in Lebanon, and thus Lebanon is now composed of 18 officially recognised religious communities.  
28 In Mount Lebanon, the breakdown between these different denominations was 156,000 Maronite, 40,689 
Greek Orthodox and 16,468 Greek Catholic. Other Christian denominations are also present, such as Armenian 
Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, 
and Protestant (Picaudou 1989:57). 
29 A small Jewish community also existed at that period and was an official recognized community by the 
Lebanese political system. 
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1996). Lebanon and Syria were controlled by two sets of French companies called 
“Intérêts communs” and “Sociétés concessionaires”. These two companies had a 
monopoly over public services and controlled the main sectors of the economy. 
Lebanon’s role as an economic intermediary towards Syria was also confirmed 
during French occupation (Owen 1976:24), with Beirut continuing to represent the 
main port for the Syrian interior (Traboulsi 2007:91). Beirut's role as a regional 
warehouse was strengthened by the Mandate's policy of reserving the large Syrian 
market for Beirut merchants in exchange for higher tariff protection for agriculture and 
industry, which was more important to the Syrian hinterland economy (Gates 
1989:14). 
 
These projects consolidated the Christian bourgeoisie’s power linked to European 
capitalism and the tertiary sector – notably banking and finance (Gates 1989:16). The 
large landowners of the periphery, who constituted the local notabilities, also 
benefited from the French Mandate. Projects of agricultural development and 
government aid in the Akkar, the South and the Bekaa principally benefited the large 
landowners supported by French governors (Traboulsi 2007:92).  
 
A principal mean through which France dominated the country was the 
encouragement of sectarian patterns of rule, particularly its strategic alliance with the 
Maronite population. Under French control, elections for a representative council took 
place in 1922 followed four years later by elections for the Chamber of Deputies. 
These two elections were conducted along sectarian lines and were boycotted by the 
country’s Sunni Muslim population who were generally opposed to the partition of 
Syria and the formation of Greater Lebanon.30 Sunni Muslim leaders complained that 
83 percent of the fiscal revenues came from territories with a Muslim majority, in 
which 380,000 people lived, while 80 percent of those revenues were spent in Mount 
Lebanon that held only 330,000 inhabitants (Traboulsi 2007:81). Furthermore, in the 
new Greater Lebanon under French rule, Maronite Christians from Mount Lebanon 
constituted a majority of state politicians and civil servants, as opposed to the 
previous wilayat of Beirut, which were mainly Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodox 
                                                            
30 The notables of the coastal cities (Beirut, Saida, Tripoli and Tyr) – mostly Greek Orthodox and Sunni Muslim 
– feared economic losses because their direct links to the Syrian hinterland had been severed by annexations to 
the new Greater Lebanon.  
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(Traboulsi 2007:93). 
 
Within the uneven political economy dominated by French capitalism, the Maronite 
population played a principal intermediary role involving themselves in international 
import and foreign trade, finance, and the representation of European firms. For this 
reason, the announcement of the French Mandate was supported by the Maronite 
Patriarch Huwayk, and those sections of the Maronite population linked to (and 
dependent upon) French rule. Other smaller Christian denominations were less 
inclined to the Mandate, partly because they were more closely linked to regional 
trade networks – especially trade between Beirut and Damascus. 31 
 
Muslim populations, particularly the Sunni community, were on the whole opposed to 
the French Mandate (Firro 2003:67). In addition to their marginalisation within the 
political structures established by the French, Sunni notables feared threats to their 
position within intra-regional trading networks including trade between the different 
ports of the Ottoman Empire, the export of agricultural products from the Syrian 
interior and the local trade in grain (Issawi 1982:58). For these reasons, Sunni elites 
tended to support the political and territorial unity of Syria.  
 
Throughout the 1930s, however, differences between the Sunni and Maronite elites 
began to narrow in favour of independence for both Lebanon and Syria (as two 
separate countries), albeit with strong political and economic links.32 Some Muslim 
leaders, notably Riyad Al-Solh from Saida, argued for an alliance with Christian-led 
political forces that were supportive of the separation of Lebanon and Syria (while 
remaining opposed to the French Mandate).33 Initially this position was not widely 
                                                            
31 The Christian population of Zahle, for example, which had a largely Greek Catholic population, voted in 
favour of remaining to Syria and against the French Mandate. The establishment of two separate countries could 
threaten Zahle’s intermediate role as a freight hub in the trade between Beirut and Damascus from which it 
benefited immensely. The city was also a regional agricultural centre, providing both Beirut and some regions of 
Syria with a plentiful supply of food (Issawi 1982:58). 
32 The political parties representing this trend were the Constitutionalist Bloc led by Bechara Al-Khuri, a 
Maronite notable, and composed as well of many Muslim notables, and the Republican Party created by Riyad 
Al-Solh, a Sunni notable, his cousins, and Aziz Al-Hashim, a Maronite notable from Aqra in the region of Jbeil 
(Traboulsi 2007:99). 
33 We can see this evolution in the Congress of the Coast of 1936 of Muslim Unionists, who reiterated the 
resolution of the previous Coastal Conference of 1933 that had rejected the separation of Greater Lebanon from 
Syria. A divergence among the participants regarding the unification of Lebanon with Syria appeared. Sunni 
leaders, such as Kazim Al-Solh and Shafiq Lutfi, refused to sign the resolution reached at the conference. Kazim 
Al-Solh actually considered the issue of unity with Syria as being of secondary importance if an independent 
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supported within the Sunni population and led to a distancing between Solh and the 
dominant Muslim pro-union factions. Nevertheless, this opposition did not last, 
especially following the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty in 1936 in which the 
Syrian representatives of the National Bloc dropped their annexionist demands 
concerning Lebanon in return for France’s integration of the Druze and Alawite 
autonomous zones into the Syrian Republic (Traboulsi 2007:101).  
 
In addition to this, opposition to the French Mandate and harsh social and economic 
conditions spread throughout Lebanon. The bourgeoisie from across sectarian 
tendencies increasingly opted for the independence option and supported the various 
workers and popular strikes and protests challenging the rule of the French Mandate. 
The opposition of the bourgeoisie targeted the economic privileges of the Mandate, 
as demonstrated by the monopolies exercised on behalf of the French concessionary 
companies, their fiscal exemptions and the export of their profit to France (Traboulsi 
2007:105). Even the Maronite church, a traditional ally and supporter of the French in 
the country, joined the opposition to the French Mandate for reasons very close to 
those of the bourgeoisie (Traboulsi 2007:105).  
 
Independence was finally realised in 1943. The National Pact, an unwritten 
understanding made between Maronite and Sunni notables, 34  and the new 
Constitution of 1943, would become the founding principles of the newly independent 
Lebanon. Both documents confirmed political representation along sectarian lines 
and entrenched the domination of the Maronite community within the top echelons of 
the state. The President, according to Constitution, was required to be Maronite, and 
had extensive powers such as the right to appoint the Prime Minister, choose 
ministers, dismiss the Cabinet and veto legislation passed in parliament. Christian 
deputies also had a majority in the parliament in a 6:5 ratio to Muslims, while it was 
also agreed that key security positions (like the Army command and the Directorate 
of General Security) would be reserved for Christians (Salibi 1971:83; Faour 
1991:631). The Sunni elite, however, was nevertheless promised greater 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Lebanon would fully adopt Arabism as its national identity (Firro 2006:751). At the same time, some Muslim 
personalities advocated, since the mid 1920s, participating in the new state of Greater Lebanon. The first Sunni 
Muslim to show readiness to share in the management of affairs was Muhammad Al-Jisr, who since the 1920s 
was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies (Salibi 1971:81).  
34 The two most prominent being the aforementioned Bechara Al-Khuri and Riyad Al-Solh (see previous note). 
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participation in state affairs and decision-making, including the position of Prime 
Minister. 
 
In contrast to their Maronite and Sunni counterparts, the political and socio-economic 
situation of the Shi’a population was significantly weaker at the time of 
independence. They had the lowest social indicators with illiteracy rates reaching 
68.9 percent in 1943, compared to 31.5 percent in the Catholic Christian community 
(Nasr 1985). 85 percent of Shi’a were concentrated in two main regions: South 
Lebanon (with the exception of the coastal city of Saida, which was predominantly 
inhabited by Sunni) and North-Eastern Lebanon, particularly the Baalbek-Hermel 
region (Nasr 1985). The Shi’a population was also largely rural – a characteristic 
which in subsequent decades would change dramatically with very significant 
implications (see below). Indeed, urban-based Shi’a constituted no more than 10 
percent of the whole community in 1948 (Nasr 1985).  
 
The reason for this socio-economic situation of great sections of the Shi’a population 
was that they were located – as much as 85 percent – in the periphery of Lebanon. 
The vast majority of the Shi‘a peasantry, which constituted the majority of the Shi’a 
population, lived on meagre plots with poor soil and very limited water resources. 
They practiced subsistence dry farming (primarily grains, olive trees and vineyards in 
the South, grains and some orchards in Baalbek). At the time of independence, 
Lebanon’s periphery was characterized by large private properties owned by wealthy 
landowners. These properties accounted for three-fourths of the best land in the Shi'a 
countryside, and enabled the quasi-feudal exploitation of private sharecroppers (Nasr 
1985). The Shi‘a population had not yet experienced the social disruption, peasant 
revolts or rapid expansion of export farming that had already transformed the 
Maronite majority area of Mount Lebanon as it was integrated into the world capitalist 
economy.  
 
Shi’a were also largely marginalised within the political system, despite the 
agreement (as part of the National Pact) that they would hold the position of Speaker 
in the National Assembly (Hazran 2010:533). They held the lowest level of political 
representation of all communities, with very few Shi’a holding a position of state 
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official before 1974 (Daher 2014:43). Empirical studies indicate that in 1946 only 3.2 
percent of the highest civil service posts were held by Shi'a, increasing to just 3.6 
percent by 1955, although Shi’a were 18 percent of the Lebanese population (Hazran 
2010:533). In 1962, only three percent of class I posts in the state administration 
were held by Shi'a, who constituted 19.2 percent of the population at this period. In 
addition, similar figures were revealed for class II and III governmental posts in the 
late 1960s (Halawi 1992 cited in Hazran 2010:534).  
 
Notabilities of important Shi’a families typically governed the Shi’a population during 
this period with political power monopolised by six "notable families": the As’ad, Zein 
and Osseiran in southern Lebanon, and the Hamadeh, Haydar and Husseini families 
in Baalbek and Byblos (Firro 2006:750-751; Nasr 1985). This elite was divided into 
quarrelling rival factions who often shifted alliances with the government in Beirut 
(Nasr 1985). These zu’âma, as they were called, were generally large landowners 
who acted as intermediaries to access services for the vast majority of poor Shi’a. 
This relationship meant that the Shi’a population was heavily characterised by 
clientelism and patronage. Harel Chorev describes these characteristics as follows: 
 
“The Shi‘a zu’âma were usually portrayed as having four 
channels for recruiting clients: (1) control of landed families over 
their sharecroppers; (2) capital of merchant families; (3) control 
over the allocation of national resources; and (4) ability to 
mediate between the public and the authorities. All of these 
made it possible for a za‘îm to provide his clients with protection 
and employment, and help them in their contacts with the 
authorities. This patronage-based socio-political structure was 
presented as being all-encompassing, characterising not only 
the relationships between the za‘îm and the public, but also 
between senior zu‘âma and zu‘âma of lower standing.” (Chorev 
2013:308) 
 
This zu’âma system was not limited to the Shi’a population, and was also present 
among Christian and Sunni populations. 
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2.3 1945-1975: From Independence to Civil War  
 
Following Lebanon’s independence in 1943, control of the state and the country’s 
economy continued to be concentrated in the hands of a narrow oligarchy. Between 
1920 and 1972, deputies in the Parliament represented some 245 of Lebanon's most 
prominent families. By 1972, and after nearly 50 years of parliamentary life, 359 MPs 
had been elected of whom slightly more than 300 had inherited their seat because of 
family ties (Khalaf 1979:196). State policies reflected the interests of these political 
and economic elites, which aimed to maintain and strengthen Lebanon’s position as 
a key financial intermediary between the Arab world and Europe (Gates 1989:32). 
 
Several other regional factors favoured this intermediary role for Lebanon. The 
Palestinian Nakba and the creation of Israel in 1948 had contradictory consequences 
for the country. Firstly, the Arab boycott of Israel principally benefited Lebanon’s 
service economy, with Beirut replacing Haifa as the main port of the Arab hinterland 
and as an international connection between Europe, Asia and some parts of Africa 
(Traboulsi 2007:113; Gaspard 2004:59). A number of wealthy and middle class 
Palestinians took refuge in Beirut, providing an inflow of capital. On the other side, 
the export sector suffered a severe blow, as goods shipped to Palestine were more 
important than exports to France, Great Britain and the US combined (Traboulsi 
2007:113). 
 
The presence of other diaspora groups in the country was also important, with 
Lebanon witnessing the arrival of sections of the commercial, financial and industrial 
bourgeoisie of Syria, Egypt and Iraq. This followed the nationalisation policies, 
agrarian reform, and increased state intervention by regimes in these countries. For 
this diaspora bourgeoisie, the Lebanese service sector became an essential point of 
contact with the international market (Nasr 1978:3). Finally, Lebanon’s intermediary 
role with Western markets was strengthened considerably by the emergence of the 
Gulf oil economies and their expanding markets and surplus capital.  
 
Due to this intermediary position between the West and the Arab world, the 
Lebanese economy in the first two decades after independence was largely 
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dominated by the service sector – trade, banking, transport, communications, tourism 
and professional services. In 1976, the service sector constituted 72 percent of the 
Lebanese economy (Dubar and Nasr 1976:67; Owen 1988:32). Within this sector, 
banking was dominant, helping to facilitate the development of Lebanon’s 
intermediary function between the Western and Arab regions. The total volume of 
banks deposits jumped from 215 million Lebanese Pound (LP) in 1950 to 8220 
million in 1974 (Dubar and Nasr 1976:69). 
 
The Lebanese financial and mercantile bourgeoisie who controlled the banks was 
subordinate to international capital, particularly from France. France’s influence in the 
country had been codified by the 1944 Catroux agreement, which brought Lebanon 
into the Franc zone and gave Paris a large measure of control over the reserves of 
foreign currency that Lebanese merchants needed to finance their imports (Traboulsi 
2007:119). In addition to this, the concessions granted to French companies in major 
public institutions such as the Central Bank, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban 
(BSGL), allowed France to maintain considerable influence.35 French banks also 
came to dominate and control Lebanese banks such as Banque Sabbagh controlled 
by Banque d’Indochine, and Banque G. Trad & Co. taken over by Le Credit Lyonnais 
(Traboulsi 2007:119). France remained predominant in the banking system through 
the 1960s. 
 
1965 saw the collapse of Intra Bank, the most important Lebanese-Arab owned bank, 
followed by other Lebanese banks in 1966. This plunged the economy into one of its 
most serious crises since 1943.  Western financial capital was the main beneficiary of 
this crisis, through which it extended its direct control over the Lebanese financial 
sector and reduced the Lebanese banking sector to a situation of great dependency 
(Dubar and Nasr 1976:70). In 1975, the percentage of Lebanese-owned banks did 
not exceed 15 percent of the total banks in Lebanon, while Western financial 
institutions made up nearly 75 percent of the total number of foreign companies in 
Beirut (Dubar and Nasr 1976:71; Nasr 1978:4). 
 
Alongside the predominant weight of finance and services, industrial production was 
                                                            
35 The concession exercised by the BSGL lasted until 1964, when Lebanon was finally able to establish its own 
Central Bank. 
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limited, growing only minimally from 14.52 percent of GDP in 1950 to 16.7-18 percent 
in 1974 (Dubar and Nasr 1976:76; Traboulsi 2007:157). Lebanese industry followed 
a typical path of a dominated economy, with most production concentrated in low-
wage light industry, particularly food processing, textiles and building materials (these 
sectors made up 67 percent of all industrial production and 58 percent of the whole 
labour force in the industrial sector in 1971) (Dubar and Nasr 1976:80). Industry as a 
whole faced a number of significant barriers including: competition from foreign 
goods, insufficient financial resources (medium and long term credit), the small size 
of the Lebanese market and the preference of the country’s bourgeoisie to invest in 
trade and speculative activities rather than industry.36  
 
The dominant position of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie, linked closely to 
Western capital, also imposed itself on the structure of the agricultural sector. This 
dominance was expressed through provision of credit; distribution of pesticides, 
fertilizers, and agricultural equipment; ownership of packing and refrigeration; and 
sales and distribution of agricultural goods. Through their control over all segments of 
the agricultural commodity chain, large agricultural trading companies could maintain 
very low prices for producers and high prices for consumers, benefiting from the 
massive price differential. Market prices for agricultural goods averaged two or three 
times the prices paid to producers (Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) 1973 cited in 
Nasr 1978:10). This market power was backed by government policies that 
supported the interests of large landowners, who received the large majority of the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s assistance while small farmers were neglected (Dahir 1974 
cited in Nasr 1978:10).  
 
This situation had important consequences for the structure of social relations in rural 
areas. Most significantly, agricultural production became increasingly dominated by 
                                                            
36 Nasr (1978:10) notes that Lebanese industry was divided into two distinct enterprise types. The first of these 
were craft and small-scale enterprises numbering less than 25 workers, the number of which was estimated at 
10,700 firms in 1971. The production of these small enterprises accounted for one third of total industrial 
production, 40 percent of the value added, 42 percent of wage earners and more than 50 percent of the active 
population in industry. Their share in production was constantly declining, and they survived primarily on the 
basis of sub-contracting to large companies. In this manner, large enterprises benefitted from the low wages in 
these small firms, and were able to displace most of the risk arising from fluctuations in market demand. 
Moreover, the existence of the small-scale sector allowed larger industrial enterprises to maintain a constant 
downward pressure on wages in their own firms. Large-scale enterprises, those employing 25 or more wage 
earners, were responsible for two-thirds of industrial production despite only constituting 10 percent of industrial 
enterprises in 1971.  
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large farms located in areas such as the Bekaa Valley, Akkar and the southern 
coastal plains. These farms were frequently owned by urban elites, who forced 
traditional sharecroppers to leave the land. The proportion of sharecroppers in the 
active population fell from 25 percent in the 1950s to five percent in the 1970s (Dahir 
1974 cited in Nasr 1978:6). After being displaced from their traditional livelihoods, 
former sharecroppers were forced to either move to Beirut, migrate abroad or to 
become agricultural wage labourers. If they chose the latter option, they faced very 
difficult working conditions and extremely low wages as a result of the cheap labour 
available to landowners from Palestinian refugee camps and Syrian migrants. There 
were an estimated 30,000 Lebanese and 15,000 Palestinian and Syrian agricultural 
wage labourers in 1970 (Direction Centrale de la Statistique 1972 cited in Nasr 
1978:6).  
 
Smallholder farmers, who constituted 57 percent of the active agricultural population 
in the early 1970s, faced similar pressures to sharecroppers but were able to survive 
the increased pauperization by engaging in more than one type of activity. More than 
half of all farmers at the end of the 1960s worked in a secondary, usually non-
agricultural job (Gaspard 2004:91; Nasr 1978:6). The relative share of agriculture in 
the national economy declined from 20 percent of the GDP in 1948 to less than nine 
percent in 1974, while the share of the active population working in the sector 
decreased from 48.9 percent in 1959 to 18.9 percent in 1970 (Mallat 1973:6; Nasr 
1978:13). The agrarian sector lost more than 100,000 active members in less than 
two decades (Dubard and Nasr 1976:100).  
 
In this context, Lebanon experienced large-scale rural to urban migration during the 
two decades following independence, with the urban population rising sharply from 
25 percent of the overall population in 1950 to 65 percent in 1975 (Nasr 2003:148). 
Most of these internal migrants joined the urban service sector, and came 
predominantly from Shi’a rural areas. By 1973, 63 percent of Shi’a were living in 
cities, including 45 percent in Greater Beirut (Harb 2010:42). These newcomers 
found jobs in the service sector, where they were subjected to severe exploitation in 
terms of wages and working conditions. These trends were reinforced by the lack of 
work opportunities in services and public administration for new graduates. The level 
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of unemployment grew from 70,000 people in 1969, about 10 to 13 percent of the 
workforce, to 120,000 people in 1974, representing 15 to 20 percent of the workforce 
(Nasr 1978:3). Great disparities remained between the centre (Mount Lebanon and 
Beirut) and the periphery (the suburbs of Beirut, the South of Lebanon, Akkar and the 
Bekaa). The annual per capita income in Beirut was estimated at $803 in the early 
1970s, while in South Lebanon it did not exceed $151 (Traboulsi 2007:160). Rapid 
urbanization meant that Beirut was surrounded with a massive poverty belt in which 
400,000 people out of a total population of 1 million lived on the eve of the Civil War 
in 1975 (Traboulsi 2007:161). 
 
2.4 Class and Sectarian Divisions 
 
By the early 1970s, Lebanese society was characterized by pronounced social, 
regional and sectarian inequalities. It was estimated in 1959-1960 by the French 
mission of inquiry IFRED (Institut Français de Recherche et d’Etudes du 
Développement) that four percent of the “very rich” were taking 33 percent of the 
national income, while the poorest 50 percent of the population received only 18 
percent (cited in Farsoun K. and Farsoun S. 1974:95-96). A study conducted by 
Bishop Gregoire Haddad stated that 79 percent of the Lebanese population received 
less than the minimum income (1975 cited in Traboulsi 2007:162). Another indicator 
of these inequalities was that 84 percent of the total savings were undertaken by 
three to four percent of households until the mid 1960s (Gaspard 2004:76). 
 
Overlaying these inequalities were clear sectarian and regional distinctions. As noted 
above, prior to independence, the Maronite bourgeoisie held a position of 
dominance. In 1973, the Christian fraction of the bourgeoisie owned 75.5 percent of 
total commercial companies, 67.5 percent of total industrial companies and 71 
percent of the total of Lebanese owned banks (Labaki 1988b:166). At the same time, 
the Shi’a popular classes were relatively deprived. In terms of secondary education, 
15 percent and 17 percent of Sunni and Christian respectively had finished their 
secondary education, while the percentage of Shi’a did not exceed 6.6 percent 
(Norton 1987:17). In 1971, the average Shi’a family’s income was 4,532 LP in 
comparison with the national average of 6,247 LP (Norton 1987:17) (3 LP = 1 US$). 
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Shi’a represented the highest percentage of families earning less than 1500 LP. They 
were also the most poorly educated, with 50 percent of Shi’a having no schooling 
(compared to 30 percent nation-wide). In 1974, the Shi’a-dominated South received 
less than 0.7 percent of the state budget while the region held 20 percent of the 
national population (Norton 1987:18). 
 
Despite these differences, it is important to note that the gap between the Christian 
and Muslim populations had nonetheless narrowed and it would be wrong to ascribe 
class position solely on the basis of affiliation to sect. According to Nasr (2003:151), 
the upper class was divided between 65 percent Christians and 35 percent Muslims 
in 1975. The percentage of professionals in banking who were Muslim jumped from 
zero in 1950 to 35 percent in 1982–83, while the percentage of Muslim professionals 
in industry increased from 33 percent to 44 percent (Labaki 1988a:145). Similar 
trends could be seen within the poorer classes. One 1974 survey of 7070 workers in 
26 of the largest industrial factories in the eastern suburb of Beirut found that the 
breakdown of the workforce was almost evenly divided between Muslim and 
Christian (54.96 percent and 45.04 percent respectively) (Dubar and Nasr 1976:88-
90). The sample interviewed in this survey represented nearly 10 percent of total 
employment in factories employing more than five workers, and around 40 percent of 
workers in large industry. The results indicate that, at that time, a substantial number 
of Christian workers were found within the Lebanese labour force.  
 
Despite its generalised impoverishment, the Shi’a population had undergone 
significant changes in the period following independence, particularly under the 
Presidency of Fuad Chehab (1958-1964). Chehab had attempted to integrate parts of 
the Shi’a population into the political administration of the country, and moderated 
regional inequalities through the development of economic, transport, electricity and 
water infrastructure.37 His government imposed stricter quotas on the recruitment of 
civil servants and military personnel, which benefited Shi’a who were hitherto largely 
under-represented (Deeb L. 2006:73). Indeed, by the early 1970s, Shi’a represented 
22 percent of Class I Civil Service posts (31 of 139 positions), up from just over 3 
percent in the 1960s (Hazran 2010:533). Increased state intervention in education 
                                                            
37 Chehab’s policies did not mark a sharp break with economic liberalism but were rather oriented towards 
providing a more efficient framework for the functioning of the market (Daou 2013).  
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also benefited the Shi’a, who did not have a large network of private schools like the 
Maronite population. Thus in South Lebanon and the Bekaa (mostly populated by 
Shi’a), the number of pupils in primary and secondary schools increased from 62,000 
in 1959 to 225,000 in 1973 (Nasr 1985). Similarly, the development of the Lebanese 
University, which was national and free, opened access to higher education for 
young Shi’a from poorer backgrounds. One indication of the impact of these reforms 
was the number of Muslims working in the state administration, which reached 47.32 
percent in 1978 – up from 41.3 percent in 1943 (Labaki 1988b:175).  
 
Another very significant trend affecting the development of the Shi’a population was 
the impact of international migration (as it had been for the Maronite population a 
century earlier). The growth of a Shi’a diaspora had begun during the French 
Mandate, with Shi’a from villages and small towns such as Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Tyr 
and Jouyya migrating to West Africa. In the 1950s and 1960s, these flows were 
redirected towards the Arab oil countries (Kuwait and Libya, in particular) (Labaki 
1988b:175). By 1975, 50 percent of Shi‘a in the Bekaa and 65 percent in South 
Lebanon had abandoned their villages. Some three-quarters, according to Salim 
Nasr (1978:10), settled in Lebanese cities and the remainder went abroad, chiefly to 
Africa and the Gulf. 
 
The growth of an increasingly educated, younger middle class and a relatively 
prosperous Shi’a diaspora had begun to transform power relations in the community. 
Older established leaders of that community, the zu’âma, and the clerical leaders 
associated with them, were increasingly marginalised by migrants who used their 
remittances to purchase land and orchards, establish channels of commerce and 
carve out spheres of socio-political influence (Nasr 1985). This new layer of the Shi’a 
population initially directed its economic activities towards relatively minor sectors 
such as small-scale real estate, citrus cultivation, leisure businesses and trade with 
Africa (Nasr 1985). By the early 1970s, however, it had expanded into banks, 
industries and large commercial enterprises. This new elite, formed through the 
pathway of migration, could be seen in clerical institutions (Imam Sadr), the political 
sphere (MPs such as Y. Hammoud, S. Arab, H. Mansour), and financial activities (A. 
Jammal, H. Mansour) (Nasr 1978:10).  
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It was in this context that a key Shi’a-based party emerged, known as the movement 
of the “Mahrumîn” (later known as Amal), around the leadership of the cleric Moussa 
Sadr. Sadr was born in Iran and arrived in Lebanon in the early 1960s with significant 
funds to launch social projects for the Shi’a population. He sought to capitalise on the 
institutionalised discrimination of the Shi‘a and to build a movement rival from the left, 
which was influential amongst the Shi’a at the time (Chorev 2013:309). Malek and 
Rula J. Abisaab (2014:114) argue that Moussa Sadr intended to weaken progressive 
and leftist political ideas among the Shia population. In order to achieve this goal, 
Sadr built alliances with important families such as the Beidun, Bazzi, Osseiran and 
Zein (the latter controlled the al-‘Irfan newspaper which served as a platform for 
Sadr’s political project) (Chorev 2013:309-310), while opposing specific traditional 
zu’âma (Deeb M. 1988:683)38 families such as the As’ad. 
 
It was under Sadr’s initiative that the Shi’a were organised into a more coherent 
voice, codified in the creation of the Higher Islamic Shi’a Council in 1967 that had the 
goals of defending the rights of the community and improving its social and economic 
conditions, including the distribution of relief funds to Shi’a. In May 1969, Sadr was 
appointed to chair the Higher Islamic Shi’a Council. This Council was primarily 
conceived as a forum for the rising and increasingly influential Shi’a middle class and 
bourgeoisie and newly influential political Shi’a personalities, who in the past were 
blocked from political power and social influence by traditional Shi’a zu’âma 
(Sachedina 1991:445).  
 
He was able to mobilise a great majority of the Shi’a population behind his movement 
of the “mahrumîn”, established in 1974. The movement drew their strength from 
peasants, workers and urban middle classes who directly experienced the frustration 
caused by the under-representation of Shi’a in a political system dominated by the 
Maronite and Sunni bourgeoisie. Wealthy overseas Shi’a also supported him as they 
sought a place in this system, as well as a social status that corresponded to their 
newly acquired wealth (Daher 2014:46-47; Abisaab M. and Abisaab J. 2014:115-
                                                            
38 Some authors have claimed that he was assisted in this process by the Lebanese security services, with the 
objective of undermining the zu’âma while moderating the expanding Shi’a proletariat in Beirut's suburbs 
(Johnson 1986:149). Traboulsi (2007:23) claims that he was backed by the Shah of Iran. 
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116). Sadr wanted the state to act as a guarantor of the interests of the new and 
emerging Shia’s bourgeoisie and able it to achieve a higher status in the 
administration and ministries (Abisaab M. and Abisaab R. 2014:115-116). Although 
Sadr did not challenge the sectarian basis of Lebanon’s political arrangement, he 
was critical of Maronite domination and accused the various governments of 
neglecting the South and the Bekaa, rendering the Shi’a a “disinherited population in 
Lebanon” (Norton 1987:42). This was all the more significant given the substantial 
demographic changes in Lebanon at the time, with the Muslim population estimated 
at 55-60 percent of the Lebanese population by the early 1970s (Picard 1985:1000). 
Moreover, the Shi’a constituted the largest single confessional group in Lebanon on 
the eve of the Civil War, with an approximate population of 30 percent (equivalent to 
around one million people) (Norton 1987:17). 
 
2.5 The Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990 
 
The Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, and had profound consequences on these 
trends and the character of the sectarian system in the country. A full discussion of 
the causes of the Civil War is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to 
highlight some of the political and social changes that were occurring in the country 
at the time as part of situating the roots of Hezbollah’s formation and the character of 
its relationship to the Shi’a population. 
 
Foremost amongst these changes was the increasingly fractious debate opened up 
by the growing presence of the Palestinian resistance in Beirut and southern 
Lebanon. In addition to the 100,000 Palestinian refugees already located in Lebanon 
from the time of the 1948 Nakba (Norton 1987:8), South Lebanon had become the 
main geographical base of Palestinian armed groups following the events of “Black 
September” in 1970 in Jordan and the repression of Palestinian organisations by the 
Hashemite Kingdom. At the onset of the Civil War, the number of Palestinians living 
in Lebanon had reached around 260,000, of which more than half resided in refugee 
camps (Kassir 1994:74). Palestinians living in the camps were largely excluded by 
Lebanese law from full integration into Lebanese society,39 while those who lived 
                                                            
39 Palestinian refugees did not enjoy the minimal rights that normally go with the "refugee" status. Palestinians 
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outside of the camps generally had higher socio-economic standing. Many 
Palestinians in the camps were incorporated into Palestinian armed political 
organisations, mostly as military recruits (Kassir 1994:208). It should be noted as well 
that a great number of Lebanese Shi’a joined Palestinian armed organisations during 
this period (Norton 2007:16). 
 
Political forces in Lebanon were increasingly divided over support to the Palestinian 
resistance and the large Palestinian presence in the country – questions that 
intersected with the future of the sectarian system described above. The Phalange 
party and its allies, organised in the Lebanese Front and led by Maronite notables 
such as Sulayman Frangieh, Charbel Qassis, Camille Chamoun and Charles Malek 
(Traboulsi 2007:187), criticised the resistance and sought to maintain the domination 
of the Maronite community in Lebanon’s political and economic life. In opposition to 
the Lebanese Front, the LNM – led by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt of the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) 40  in alliance with other leftist and nationalist 
movements – supported the Palestinian resistance and called for an end to the 
sectarian political system.  
 
Within this constellation of forces, Lebanon’s Shi’a saw increasing divisions between 
the poorer populations in Beirut and southern Lebanon and the community’s 
leadership represented by Moussa Sadr’s movement “al-Mahrumîn”. In the early 
stages of the Civil War, Shi’a areas had been the targets of attacks by Phalangist 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
were barred from working in the public sector, where work permits depended on the economy's labour needs and 
personal connections. The Cairo Agreement signed on November 3, 1969 between the Lebanese government and 
the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat redefined the regulations governing refugees in Lebanon. The key points 
approved in the Cairo Agreement were: to give the Palestinians in Lebanon the right to employment, residence, 
and movement; to form local committees in the camps; to establish posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle 
inside the camps; to give the Palestinians in Lebanon the right to engage in the armed struggle (against Israel); to 
safeguard and protect the fidâ`în path to the Arkub region in the South; to cease/end the propaganda between the 
two sides [the Palestinians and the Lebanese]; and to release prisoners and confiscated arms. The Lebanese 
Chamber of Deputies terminated the Cairo Agreement on May 21, 1987 unilaterally, restoring the pre-1969 
status towards the Palestinians (Siklawi 2010:610). 
In 2010, only 37 percent of Palestinian refugees of working age were employed. Palestinians face large-scale 
legal and socio-economic obstacles to work in Lebanon. By law, Palestinians refugees are not allowed to 
practice their professions in over 30 unions and 72 un-syndicated professions, including medical doctors, 
engineers, nurses and taxi drivers. With a signed contract from a company, Palestinians are able to obtain a work 
permit free of charge. Most Palestinians, however, are engaged in occupations that do not need work permits and 
many remain unaware of the procedures for regularising their status (UNHRC 2013:6). 
40 Born in 1917, Kamal Jumblatt is issued from one of the most important family of Druze notables. He is the 
founder of the PSP in 1949, mostly composed of Druze but with small number of Christian, Shi’a and Sunni. He 
was also one of the founders and leaders of the LNM. He was assassinated in 1977.  
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forces, including the infamous massacre of “Black Saturday” on 6 December 1975, in 
which numerous Shi’a were killed.41 In this context, the movement “al-Mahrumîn” 
initially participated in the LNM and held a strong relationship with Palestinian 
organisations, from 1975 the latter provided training bases, instructors and arms to 
the newly established movement’s military organisation “Afwâj al-muqâwama al-
lubnâniyya” (known by its acronym Amal) (Nasr 1985). In May 1976, following the 
Syrian entry into Lebanon in support of the Lebanese Front against the LNM, Amal 
began to distance itself from the Palestinian resistance and eventually left the LNM 
(Norton 1987:42).42 This shift was criticised by large sections of the Sh’ia population, 
which in its majority supported the LNM and the Palestinian resistance. Moreover, 
continued attacks by Phalangist forces against Shi’a areas – notably the agreement 
between the Kataeb and Amal, which in July of 1976 led to the expulsion of 100,000 
Shi’a residents from the neighbourhood of Naba’a – further accentuated the divisions 
between the population as a whole and the stance of the Amal leadership (Daher 
2014:49). Following the disappearance of Moussa Sadr in Libya in September 
1978,43 Amal entered into fierce battles with different forces of the LNM, particularly 
the LCP and the Pro-Iraqi Ba’th party. The latter was targeted because of the Assad 
regime's hostility to the Iraqi Ba’th regime led by Saddam Hussein largely due to 
Hussein's hostility and repression against the Shi’a political opposition in Iraq.44 
                                                            
41 On Saturday December 6 1975, following the discovery of four mutilated bodies of members of their 
organisation, the Kataeb entered some neighbourhoods of the center of Beirut and killed dozens of Lebanese 
Muslims in revenge. 
42 According to As’ad Abu Khalil, both actors needed each other and shared mutual interests: “when Al-Assad 
was facing growing sectarian tensions in his own country in the early 1970s, and when Syria's Sunni were 
increasingly emphasising the non-Islamic nature of Alawism, Imam Moussa Sadr provided the Assad regime 
with crucial religious and political legitimacy by officially recognising the Alawite as Twelver Shi’a. Sadr did 
not try to conceal the political motivation for his measure; he even stated his opposition to the rising Islamic 
movement in Syria. It should be recalled that this fatwa was issued at a time when Sadr was looking for a patron 
to sponsor his embryonic organisation/militia that would later be declared as Harakat al-Mahrumîn (later known 
by the acronym of its military arm, Amal). Assad and Sadr needed one another for their own political purposes. 
The Assad regime returned the favour to Sadr; Amal was supplied and armed by the As-Saiqah in Lebanon. This 
pro-Syrian Palestinian organisation undertook to train followers of Sadr. By 1975, Amal had become a Lebanese 
tool of Syrian policy in Lebanon. Sadr consistently supported Syria's policies and fluctuating alliances in 
Lebanon, even when those policies were highly unpopular among Lebanese Shi’a” (Abu Khalil 1990:9). 
At the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, Amal became at this point the major pillar in the formation of the 
Nationalist Front (Al-Jabha al-Qawmiyya) which was established in December 1975 as the Syrian counterpoise 
to Kamal Jumblat's LNM. Amal became inextricably linked to the Assad regime which has used Amal whether 
in fighting against the Lebanese government led by Amine Gemayel during the years of 1983-84, culminating in 
the takeover of West Beirut on February 6 1984, or by unleashing Amal against the Palestinian refugee camps 
during May-June 1985, April-July 1986, and October 1986-February 1987. In all these conflicts the interests of 
Amal were secondary to those of the Assad regime in Syria. In fact Amal has become Assad's most important 
proxy and has enabled Syria to achieve a range of policy objectives in Lebanon (Deeb M. 1988:697).  
43 In August 1978, Sadr disappeared without a trace in Libya after a meeting with Mu‘amar Qadhafi.  
44 The regime of Saddam Hussein launched in 1979 an intense repression against the Shi’a religious and political 
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These battles reflected a competition over the political leadership of the Shi’a 
population, with the LCP and Ba’th holding a strong base of support in Shi’a suburbs 
of South Beirut (Kassir 1994:104).  
 
In addition to the regional dimensions that underlay the root causes of the Civil War, 
the conflict also indicated profound social discontent with the political and economic 
situation in the country. Deepening social inequalities had given birth to a growing 
trans-confessional social and political movement struggling for better working and 
salary conditions, freedom of trade unions, democratisation and a secularisation of 
the Lebanese system. On the political level, the challenge to the political and 
economic elites coalesced under the LNM. Since 1967, leftist and nationalist forces 
had increased their strength in different social struggles, trade unions and other 
institutions (Dubar and Nasr 1976:326). The result of the legislative elections in 1972 
and regional elections in the South in 1974 registered a growth in support for leftist 
candidates as well as candidates of the Amal movement – both forces challenging 
the power of the traditional elites.45  
 
Despite the widespread anger at the socio-economic situation, indicated by 
numerous individual and collective acts directed against symbols of wealth and 
power during the Civil War (industries, large stores, warehouses), (Traboulsi 
2007:234) its political expression tended to fall back into sectarian lines. This was 
partly the result of a weakness in the organisation of the urban workforce, which 
related to the disproportionate size of the unorganised informal sector linked directly 
to sectarian organisations (Dubar and Nasr 1976:332). The rate of union membership 
in the mid 1970s did not exceed six percent (Gaspard 2004:65). The weakness of 
organised labour undermined attempts to build across sectarian lines, although 
mobilisations by the General Union of Lebanese Workers (GULW) in the later years 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
elites willing to support the Iranian revolution, including the murder of the Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr 
in April 1980, spiritual guide of the Islamic movement al-Dawa, while hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Shi’a were 
deported to Iran under the pretext that they were Iranians (Roy 2008:31; Mervinb 2007:305). 
45 In the regional election in December 1974, in Nabatieh the candidate backed by Imam Sadr and Amal won 
20,000 votes, against 7,000 for the candidate of the 'feudal' leader K. Al-As’ad and nearly 5,000 for two 
candidates of the left. The elections of the Executive Committee of the Shi’a Supreme Council in 1975 resulted 
in the following representation: 5 candidates from the list of left parties, five candidates from a list of Sadrists 
and 2 independent left-wing candidates personally very close to the Imam Moussa Sadr. This body is elected by 
an electorate of 1,200 members consisting essentially of elected Shi’a politicians, senior officials, members of 
the liberal professions, presidents of unions and associations, academics and other few similar categories (Nasr 
1985).   
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of the Civil War did express an important counterpoint to sectarianism (see Chapter 
6). 
 
In addition to this underlying social structure, the ideological orientation of the LNM 
and some sections of the left reinforced the increasingly sectarian turn of the Civil 
War. In many ways, this related to the conception of ‘community class’ discussed in 
the previous chapter, which excluded large sections of the Christian popular classes 
who came to be seen as a homogenous entity and representative of the 
“bourgeoisie”. At the same time, the LNM deepened its alliance with Muslim elites 
and some Islamic groups, leading it to increasingly abandon socio-economic 
demands and the goal of secularising political structures (Picard 1985:1014; Chiit 
2009; Daou 2013). Fawaz Traboulsi (2007:214) described the LNM’s position as 
increasingly defensive by dropping its reform programme and adopting an 
increasingly Arab nationalist discourse with sectarian themes, in which sects were 
divided between “patriotic” and “non patriotic ones”. 
 
These trends confirm the prognosis of Mehdi Amel (1986:212), who argued that the 
bourgeoisie would attempt to give a confessional aspect to the class struggle in order 
to maintain its own dominant position. The confessional inflexion of class struggle 
reflected the ability of the bourgeoisie to impose itself as the representatives of 
subordinated classes, making the latter dependant on its political and confessional 
representation (Amel 1986:125). In this manner, the positions of the LNM and some 
sections of the left paved the way for increased sectarianism and the facilitation of 
foreign interference in the internal politics of the country (Picard 1985:1016-1017; 
Chiit 2009; Daou 2013). 
 
The departure of the Palestinian political and armed forces – in addition to thousands 
of civilians – of Lebanon in late August and early September of 1982 also constituted 
a big blow for the progressive and national forces of Lebanon. This was after 79 days 
of siege of East Beirut, which was completely deprived of water and electricity during 
this period by the Israeli army.46 The progressive and national forces of Lebanon lost 
                                                            
46 The new invasion of the Israeli army of Lebanon, which reached Beirut, at the beginning of June 1982 was 
intended principally to evict the PLO and impose Bashir Gemayel, head of the Maronite Christian Phalange 
party, as President of Lebanon in order to get Lebanon to sign a peace treaty with Israel and bring the country 
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an important political and military ally and were now on their own against the rest of 
the Lebanese bourgeois and sectarian forces, even ex allies such as Amal who had 
increasingly begun to oppose the presence of Palestinian forces. At the end of the 
1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the Amal movement, headed by Nabih Berri 
alongside other traditional Muslim leaders, led the opposition to the Palestinian mini 
state,47 demanding the halt of military operations from Lebanese territory and the 
return of Lebanese authorities to the South (Traboulsi 2007:214). In addition to this, 
Syria did not hesitate to militarily train young Amal members on its soil in the early 
1980s. Syria saw the organisation as a tool to check and undermine Palestinian 
power in Lebanon (Norton 2007:32).  
 
In the two years preceding the Israeli invasion of June 1982, frequent clashes 
occurred between Amal on one side, and the Palestinian organisations and LNM on 
the other. 
 
The LNM, which had lost many political forces since its establishment in 1969, was 
dissolved following the 1982 Israeli invasion, increasing the process of 
sectarianisation in the Lebanese political scene. In addition to PLO forces, the Israeli 
forces targeted the Lebanese nationalist and progressive organisations that had 
members from various religious sects, weakening them considerably, politically and 
militarily. All this while the Lebanese sectarian political forces, among them Druze, 
Christian and Shi’a, were not the object of Israeli attacks, or only at the margin 
(Achcar and Chomsky 2007:52). 
 
The Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF), commonly known by its Arab 
acronym as Jammul, was nevertheless established in 1982 by the LCP, the OCAL, 
the Arab Socialist Action Party Lebanon (ASAP-L) and the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (SSNP). This new coalition had the objective of replacing the LNM, but above 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
into Israel's sphere of influence (Bensaid 1982). The expulsion of the PLO and Palestinian civilians occurred 
following an agreement with the USA, brokered by the United States Special Envoy Philip Habib. The 
leadership, cadres, fighters, civilians and institutions of the Palestinian national movement were forced to leave 
Beirut, and they were scattered to Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and Libya. Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO and 
Fatah, and thousands of its supporters who had transferred their headquarters from Beirut to Tripoli (Lebanon), 
in June 1982, left Lebanon in November/December 1982 following fights with other Palestinian organisations 
supported by the Syrian regime. 
47 The PLO had almost complete control over certain areas of Lebanon using their own police force, military and 
economic infrastructure. 
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all to resist the Israeli occupation. The LNRF staged its first attack on September 20 
1982, four days after its creation and two days following the massacres in the Sabra 
and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps by the Phalangist militias in cooperation with 
the Israeli army. By the spring of 1985, the LNRF had succeeded in driving the 
Israelis out of the western Bekaa, Rashaya and other large areas in the South. The 
leadership of the Front then decided to bring the fight to the Israelis by attacking 
targets inside the “security belt,” the highly militarized strip of territory along 
Lebanon’s southern border that the Israelis used as a buffer zone (Diab 2012). 
Nevertheless, this period was the beginning of the end of the LNRF, which was the 
target of not only Israel, but also the Syrian regime following the refusal of the 
LNRF’s leadership to submit to the demands of “coordination” with Syria (Diab 2012). 
In addition, from 1984, economic assistance to the LNRF from the USSR and Arab 
countries was ceased (Daher 2014:103). 
 
Over the next few years, the LNRF’s leadership was subject to a wave of 
assassinations that were attributed to Islamic forces close to Hezbollah, as we will 
see later in the text, and also to Amal. At the same time, according to Elias Atallah 
(then the LNRF’s top commander), Amal and Hezbollah would frequently inform the 
Syrians of any LNRF plans they caught wind of. The LNRF’s resistance attacks 
became less frequent and less successful (Nash 2008).  
 
The internal fighting between leftist groups – including remaining PLO elements and 
the Druze PSP – and Amal in the Lebanese capital in 1987 also weakened the 
LNRF, while the entry of Syrian forces into West Beirut increasingly prevented the 
LNRF's frame of actions. 
 
After Amal suspended most of its resistance activities following Israel's first 
withdrawal in 1985, and because the Syrian regime progressively prevented with all 
its capacities all of the LNRF's resistance activities, Hezbollah gradually became the 
sole resistance movement, strongly supported by the Syrian and Iranian regimes 
(Traboulsi 2007:230). The Ta’if agreement then acknowledged Hezbollah as the sole 
resistance actor. The Islamic party with its close ties to Tehran would therefore carry 
the resistance torch, but only if it coordinated closely with Damascus.  
 78 
 
Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and a growing turn towards 
sectarian politics, basic survival for much of the population – particularly in the capital 
Beirut – was increasingly linked to the control of resources by various militias. 
Political, economic and administrative functions in Beirut were divided between ten 
militia-controlled territories, largely built around illegal ports. Militias took over most of 
the state’s income generating functions, including customs duties and indirect taxes, 
and the collection of a "protection tax" from families in areas that they controlled 
(Traboulsi 2007:232; Chiit 2009). Militias were also involved in: arms and drug 
trafficking, contraband sale of commercial goods and livestock, piracy and attacks on 
banks and ports. These groups maintained trade relations between themselves 
because none of them could achieve full economic independence in the 
neighbourhoods under their authority.  After 1983, the main militias took control over 
a major part of the import trade and all distribution of fuel and flour. They would 
develop into large business enterprises, which not only invested their revenues in the 
war effort, but also in a number of “holding companies” registered in Lebanon 
(Traboulsi 2007:237). 
 
The Civil War also brought considerable social dislocation. 15 years of conflict 
resulted in the deaths of 71,328 people, with a further 97,184 injured (Traboulsi 
2007:238). The demography of Lebanon was modified during this period as the 
sectarian cleansing of the various militia cantons led to the displacement of 670,000 
Christians and 157,500 Muslims (Abou Rjeili and Labaki 1994:256; Nasr 2003:146). 
This meant an increasing homogeneity of the various districts and a corresponding 
segregation of the population along sectarian lines – patterns that would endure in 
the post Civil War environment. No more than 30 percent of the displaced were to 
return to their homes after the Civil War (Nasr 2003:150). Moreover, nearly a third of 
the population of Lebanon, estimated at 894,717 people, left the country during the 
Civil War (Abou Rjeili and Labaki 1994:256). As a result, the bulk of the Lebanese 
workforce became employed abroad; the structure of the economy leaned even more 
in favour of the tertiary and rentier activities at the expense of the productive sectors, 
which suffered most of the destruction (Traboulsi 2007:238). 
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2.6 Hezbollah’s Establishment 
 
Although officially established in 1985, Hezbollah began to be active military and 
politically from mid-1982, operating under the banner of the “Islamic Resistance” 
(Traboulsi 2007:229-230).48 The emergence of the organisation was associated with 
several factors in the context of this fractured state increasingly dominated by 
militias. First, since the early sixties, young ulema of Lebanese origin came back 
from Najaf in Iraq and tried to re-establish – each on their own – the political and 
social role of the theologists (Qassem 2008:25-26). Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, 
Muhammad Mahdi Chamsedine and Moussa Sadr were the most prominent, and are 
mentioned by Naim Qassem (2008:25-30) as key actors in the Shi’a population and 
in the origins of Hezbollah. Moussa Sadr was the one who most influenced the Shi’a 
population and its different social environment. It was his political culture, which he 
contributed through the Movement of the “Mahrumîn”, and the communitarian 
awakening he provoked that played an important role in the creation of Hezbollah. 
The members of Hezbollah today, like its current Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah, Naim Qassem and others such as Hussein Mussawi, were originally 
members of the Movement of the “Mahrumîn” (Charara and Dromont 2004:86). He is 
still often cited in speeches of Hezbollah officials.  
 
Although he was never a member of the party, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah played 
an important role in the origins of the Islamic movement, and he is often displayed as 
the spiritual father of Hezbollah (Mervin 2008c:277). Without occupying an official 
position in the party, he was in many ways its leading ideologue throughout the 
1980s. His speeches were published in Hezbollah’s newspapers (al-‘Ahed), and he 
encouraged the members of the al-Dawa 49  Lebanese branches to merge with 
                                                            
48 According to the author Al-Madini, Sayyid Abbas Al-Mussawi along with his students and other leading 
ulema officialy established “the Hezbollah of Lebanon” in 1979 following the establishment of the IRI (Al-
Madini 1999 cited in Alagha 2007:88).  
49 The al-Dawa party was originally established in Iraq in 1958 as an Islamic alternative to the communist party. 
It became the main Shi’a Islamic party in the country. It expanded its field of influence in different countries of 
the region, notably Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait and Bahrain. This secret organisation lauds to overthrow the 
regimes in power in the objective to establish an Islamic state. The organisation offered to its followers a 
political and theoretical formation, it enumerated few thousands militants and sympathisers in Lebanon in the 
end of the seventies. A number of them will join the Hezbollah after its creation, such as Muhammad Raad, 
Abbas Al-Mussawi and Sheikh Subhi Tufayli. The Lebanese Dawa was disbanded, and its erstwhile members 
were instructed by party strategists to infiltrate the secular Amal and reform it from within. (Norton 2007:31). 
The Lebanese Dawa activists also established a network of secret armed cells, dubbed Qassam, that was based 
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Hezbollah (Mervin 2008c:278). 
 
Fadlallah first engaged politically on the side of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, who was 
the main spiritual guide of al-Dawa party in Iraq, where he was born and raised. He 
was one of the theorists of al-Dawa, notably through his publications in the magazine 
“al-Adwâ’ al-Islâmiyya” (the Islamic Holy Lights), directed by Muhammad Baqir Al-
Sadr (Mervin 2008c:278). In 1966, he went back to the popular neighbourhood of 
Naba’a in Lebanon, which was inhabited in majority by Palestinians and Lebanese 
Shi’a. He opened a husayniyya, a dispensary called the “Usra al-Tâkhî” (Fraternity 
Family) and a hawza, 50 the Islamic Legal Institute (al-Ma’had al-char’î al-islâmî), 
which was a unique institution in Lebanon for advanced religious studies modelled on 
the seminaries of Najaf (Charara 2007:63-71; Blandford 2011:26). In 1966, “al-Ittihâd 
al-Lubnânî lil-talaba al-Muslimîn” (The Lebanese Union of Musilm Students), which 
was the first Shi’a Islamic student organisation in Lebanon, was established under 
Fadlallah's influence and patronage. His political thought was published in the 
magazine of the organisation, “al-Muntalaq”. The organisation's students used to 
follow the religious courses of Fadlallah in the Islamic Legal Institute in Naba’a 
(Charara 2007:88; Mervin 2007:311).  
 
Many young people were attracted to Fadlallah and some gravitated around him, 
distinguishing themselves later on in Hezbollah, such as Ali Fayyad (Hezbollah MP) 
and Muhammad Said Al-Khansa (Hezbollah Mayor of Ghobeyri) (Harb 2010:239). In 
1976, he left Naba’a with the rest of the Shi’a local population following the 
agreement between Amal and the Kataeb and relocated to Dahyeh, after a short 
passage in Bint Jbeil. Fadlallah was first supportive of the IRI and of the concept of 
Wilâyat al-Faqîh51 (Mervin 2008c:281). He was also a supporter of the export of the 
Islamic revolution, considering it a duty following the establishment of the IRI in 1979. 
In the middle and late 1980s, he became more critical of the Islamic Movement in 
Iran and of the IRI (Mervin 2008c:282), and in the early 1990s his relation with Iran 
and Hezbollah became more distant (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2003:13), as 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
mainly in Beirut, and targeted particularly fighters from the Iraqi Ba’th party, especially after war broke out 
between Iran and Iraq (Blanford 2011:35). 
50 Hawza is the traditionnal religious Shi’a school forming ulema (Mervin 2008c:348). 
51 The theory of the Willâyat al-Faqîh is that a guardianship of the jusrisprudent or jurisconsult should hold 
ultimate political power. In 1987, Hassan Nasrallah explained that the authority of this leader is both spiritual 
and political, and may not be challenged (cited in Lamloun 2008a:29). 
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we will see in chapter 5.  
 
The establishment and development of Hezbollah must also be understood in the 
framework of the political dynamics and developments of the IRI. As we will see 
further in the text, Hezbollah has been politically, socially and financially supported by 
the IRI since its official establishment in 1985 and even before with the activities of 
groups linked to it. In the ten years following the overthrow of the Shah and the 
establishment of the IRI, the regime’s foreign policy was dominated by the two main 
ideological foreign policy principles of the revolution: “Neither East nor West” and the 
“Export of the Revolution” (Rakel 2009:113). The policy of exporting “the revolution” 
was particularly promoted during the first years of the revolution by the conservative 
factions of the IRI.  
 
In the summer of 1982, the IRI decided to send 1,500 soldiers from the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), known as Pasdaran, 52 to training camps set up 
in the Syrian city of Zabadani and in the western Bekaa district (with Syria’s 
authorisation) (Norton 1987:19).53 According to Norton (2000:11): “the contingent 
quickly became the nodal point for the Iranian training, supply, and support of 
Hezbollah under the watchful eye of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, then Iran’s ambassador 
to Damascus”.54 Khomeini also instructed the Iranian Defence Minister at the time, 
Khameini (the current Supreme Leader), to keep a close eye on Hezbollah and take 
                                                            
52 The Pasdaran has been used by the Islamic Republic's leadership to suppress internal dissent. Khomeini 
actively employed the Revolutionary Guards to coerce and, when necessary, crush former political allies as he 
consolidated power. The Islamic Republic's law made the Revolutionary Guards not only a military organisation 
deterring foreign threats but also a political-military organisation tasked with fighting domestic opposition. 
Article 2 of the statute's second chapter defined an IRGC role as the "legal fight against elements or movements 
who aim at sabotaging or dismantlement of the Islamic Republic or act against the Islamic Revolution of Iran," 
and Article 3 stressed the IRGC's mission also as a "legal fight against elements waging an armed struggle to 
nullify the authority of the laws of the Islamic Republic (Alfoneh 2008). 
53 Syrian support of Hezbollah did not always prevent disagreements between the two sides. During the “War of 
the Camps” (1985-1988), for example, Amal, supported by the Syrian regime, clashed violently with Palestinian 
organisations, which Hezbollah supported. Military repression by the Syrian regime against Hezbollah also 
occurred on February 24 1987, when the Syrian army assassinated 27 members of Hezbollah in the Fathallah 
military barracks in Basta, West Beirut (Lamloum 2008b:96). 
54 In the beginning of the 1990s, the Pasdaran presence was reduced by about two-thirds, and by 1998 the 
remainder of the Iranian contingent was withdrawn. At the same time as establishing these training camps, Iran 
sponsored the establishment of a “Shura Lubnân”, the Council of Lebanon. The Council had as a role to organise 
and oversee the activities and programs of Hezbollah within Lebanon and to operate as a nodal connection 
between Iran and Lebanon. The Council was constituted of five men, including three Lebanese and two Iranians: 
Subhi Tufayli (al-Dawa representative), Abbas Al-Mussawi (representative of the Ulema assembly of the 
Bekaa), Muhammad Raad (representative of “al-Ittihâd al-Lubnânî lil-talaba al-Muslimîn” (The Lebanese 
Union of Musilm Students)) Ali Akbar Mohtachemi (Iranian ambassador in Syria) and Ahmad Kan’ani (head of 
the Pasaran in Lebanon) (Nasrallah 1994 cited in Daher 2014:85). 
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full responsibility of it (Alagha 2007:94). 
 
The attempt by the new Iranian leadership to export the Islamic revolution was further 
accompanied by the imposition of religious practices and discourses following 
Khomeini's ideology in the regions where the IRGC and Hezbollah were present. 
Upon their arrival, IRGC soldiers spread Khomeini’s theories on Islam in Baalbek and 
surrounding villages, while pictures of Khomeini and Iranian flags became much 
more prevalent in the region. In addition, the main square in Baalbek was renamed 
after Khomeini; more women were wearing full-length black chador and alcohol was 
removed from many shops and hotels (Blanford 2011:45). 
 
Between 1984 and 1986, Hezbollah and groups linked to it attempted to impose 
Sharia rule and conservative social codes in areas it controlled (Daher 2014:116), 
notably in some areas of West Beirut and in villages of the Bekaa such as 
Machghara. Owners of grocery stores were forbidden to sell alcohol, while others 
were deliberately attacked. Shops and restaurants had to close on religious days. In 
some cases they also forbade Christians in the Ras Beirut neighbourhood close to 
the American University of Beirut and Hamra, to perform their own religious 
celebrations (Charara 2007:356-357). Hezbollah was also accused of plastering 
posters of Khomeini on walls in Beirut, harassing women who were said to be 
immodestly dressed and bombing shops selling alcoholic beverages (Jaber 1997:51-
53). As Hezbollah became ever more entrenched in the South following Israel’s 
withdrawal and the establishment of the security zone in June 1985, it banned the 
sale of alcohol, parties, dancing, mixed swimming on the long beaches of Tyr and 
closed down cafés (Chehabi 2006:226). In some villages in the Bekaa Valley, 
Christians were reported to have left their villages because of the atmosphere of fear 
and threat imposed by Hezbollah (Charara 2007:356-357).  
 
This very close link between Iran and Hezbollah was reflected by the declarations 
during this period by the groups' leaders. Sheikh Hassan Trad, Imam of the mosque 
of the Imam Mehdi in Ghobeyri at the time and Hezbollah member, said that “Iran 
and Lebanon are one people and one country” (1986 cited in Charara 2007:250). Ali 
Akbar Mohtashemi, Iran's ambassador to Syria from 1982 to 1986, played a pivotal 
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role in the establishment of Hezbollah: “we will support Lebanon as we support 
militarily and politically our Iranian provinces” (cited in Charara 2007:250); Sayyid 
Ibrahim Al-Sayyid, at the time Hezbollah's spokesman: “We do not say that we are 
part of Iran, we are Iran in Lebanon, and Lebanon in Iran” (1987 cited in Charara 
2007:250).55   
 
Another key element in the emergence of Hezbollah was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982, which saw support for Amal plummet as the organisation was widely 
perceived as having offered tacit endorsement of the June invasion (Norton 2000:9). 
In July 1982, Amal Deputy head and official spokesman of the party, Hussein 
Mussawi (who later cofounded Hezbollah and who was attracted to the model of the 
IRI), accused Amal’s leadership of blatant collaboration with Israeli occupying forces 
(Norton 1987:88). Another point of contention of Amal members was the participation 
of Amal leader Nabih Berri in the National Salvation Committee (NSC). The NSC was 
created by Lebanese President Elias Sarkis to foster dialogue between the most 
powerful militia leaders including Bashir Gemayel, who was viewed as an Israeli ally 
during the Civil War. Therefore, the NSC was described by many of Amal’s youth as 
an ‘American Israeli bridge’ (Norton 1987:105). Indeed, according to Norton, Amal 
leaders, notably Nabih Berri and Daoud Sulayman Daoud, were seeking a modus 
vivendi with Israel and the United States. They assumed that the latter was now the 
major power in Lebanon (Norton 2000:13). Norton argues (1987:50): “there is no 
doubt that Berri’s willingness to contemplate a deal that would privilege Syria’s 
enemies provoked Damascus to lend support to Hezbollah as a counterweight to 
Amal” and led to the Syrian regime accepting the establishment and development of 
Hezbollah during this period in the regions under the authority of Damascus in 
Lebanon (Lamloun 2008b:95).  
 
The initiative to establish Hezbollah came mostly from Amal members at odds with 
the leadership of Nabih Berry, who had become Amal’s leader following Sadr’s 
                                                            
55 Following the death of Khomeini in 1989 and the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, the IRI and segments of the 
conservative faction softened their position considerably on the two principles of foreign policy (“Neither East 
nor West” and the “Export of the Revolution”). The regime’s foreign policies have since then been more or less 
independent of the composition of factions that control the republican institutions and religious supervisory 
bodies (Rakel 2009:113). These changes will have consequences on Hezbollah, as the next chapter will discuss. 
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death.56 These Amal members formed an organisation called Islamic Amal (led by 
Hussein Mussawi), and allied themselves with other Shi’a groups such as the al-
Dawa party, “al-Ittihâd al-Lubnânî lil-talaba al-Muslimîn” (The Lebanese Union of 
Musilm Students), and the Ulema assembly of the Bekaa. These organisations 
represented a geographical base of the Shi’a Islamic leadership from Beirut to the 
Bekaa Valley. Following cooperation and joint activities between 1982 and 1985, they 
produced a joint document entitled “Manifesto of the Nine”,57 and advanced the 
following objectives: 
 
“- Islam is the comprehensive, complete and appropriate 
programme for a better life. It is the intellectual, religious, 
ideological and practical foundation for the proposed 
organisation. 
- Resistance against Israeli occupation, which is a danger to 
both the present and future, is the ultimate priority given the 
anticipated effects of such occupation on Lebanon and the 
region. This necessitates the creation of a jihad structure that 
should further this obligation, and in favour of which all 
capabilities are to be employed.       
- The legitimate leadership is designed to the Guardianship of 
the Jurist who is considered to be the successor to the Prophet 
and the Imam. The Jurist Theologian draws the general guiding 
direction for the nation of Islam. His commands and 
proscriptions are enforceable.” (cited in Qassem:32) 
 
These groups dissolved their existing organisations in favour of a single new party, 
which later came to be known as Hezbollah.  
 
An important part of Hezbollah’s legitimacy in its beginning was the military struggle it 
                                                            
56 Nabih Berri rejected the Iranian-influenced Islamic national model espoused by some members of Amal. In 
addition Husain Mussawi, a member of the Amal Command Council, opposed Berri’s presence on the National 
Salvation Committee (see earlier note) (Shanahan 2005:113). 
Mussawi also opposed the fact that the leadership was no longer led by clerics (Louer 2008:59). 
57 The name came from the nine representatives elected to speak for the convening parties: three stood for the 
clerical congregation of the Bekaa, three represented the various Islamic committees, and three spoke for the 
Islamic Amal’s movement (Qassem 2008:33). 
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waged against the Israeli occupation. During this period, groups acting under the 
banner of the “Islamic resistance” also pursued military operations against the US 
presence in Lebanon, notably through an attack against the US embassy in April 
1983 and against the US Marine barracks in October 1983, which led to the 
departure of the American marines from Lebanon (Norton 2000:1). Both attacks were 
largely considered to have been carried out under the order of the IRI (Norton 
2007:71). 
 
Following the withdrawal of Israel from Beirut in 1983, Hezbollah engaged in an 
active recruitment campaign in Beirut’s southern suburbs with a view to expand into 
Amal’s heartland of South Lebanon (Shanahan 2005:115). In 1984, the party 
established its political bureau and its weekly newspaper al-‘Ahed, which expressed 
support to the IRI during the Iraq-Iran war and praised the aid brought to Hezbollah 
by the IRGC (Lamloun 2008a:23). This was followed a year later by the publication of 
“Hezbollah’s Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World”, a political 
manifesto that formally declared the existence of the movement. The manifesto (Al-
rissâla al-maftûha allati wajjahaha “Hizb Allâh” ila al-mustad’afîn 1985) held up the 
1978-79 Iranian revolution as an inspiration to action, a proof of what could be 
accomplished when the faithful gather under the banner of Islam. It stated the 
movement’s belief in Ayatollah Khomeini as the “single wise and just leader”, in line 
with Khomeini’s own vision of Wilâyat al-Faqîh. The manifesto outlined Hezbollah’s 
rejection of Israel on the grounds that it had occupied Muslim land and had an 
expansionist agenda. It also expressed Hezbollah’s opposition to Western nations, 
particularly the United States, due to their support for Israel (Al-rissâla al-maftûha 
allati wajjahaha “Hizb Allâh” ila al-mustad’afîn 1985). 
 
Reflecting its origins, Hezbollah’s members were mostly drawn from young clerics 
who were opposed to Amal’s non-clerical leadership and its accommodation with 
Lebanese clientelism and the political system.  Shi’a who had fought alongside 
Palestinians prior to the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut were compelled by 
circumstance and conviction to join the ranks of Hezbollah (Nir 2011:44). The party’s 
unequivocal opposition to both the Israeli invasion and the Lebanese political system 
thus drew supporters away from Amal and into its own sphere of influence.  
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Significant levels of financial support from Iran was another factor that allowed the 
party to grow to the detriment of Amal, with Hezbollah able to “offer not only the 
virtue of ideological simplicity and authenticity, but the rewards of hard cash as well” 
(Norton 1987:106). Hezbollah fighters were well paid and guaranteed to receive a 
regular monthly salary from Iran, while Amal’s members were dependent on the Shi’a 
of Lebanon for their funds. Hezbollah could afford full time gunmen and possessed 
an extensive system for the payment of pensions to the families of martyrs, while 
many Amal cadres were part-time and volunteers (Norton 1987:106). By the middle 
of the 1980s, members of Hezbollah received $300 per month, compared to $100–
150 in other militias including the South Lebanon Army (SLA) sponsored by Israel 
(Picard 2000:198). 
 
The rivalry between the two organisations was most sharply expressed in the 
southern suburbs of Beirut, where the two groups fought each other over leadership 
of the Shi’a population. Hezbollah and Amal waged a struggle against leftist parties 
and intellectuals in these areas and the South of Lebanon, most significantly against 
the LNRF, as we will see in chapter 7.  
 
The suburbs are strategically localised at the entry of the capital Beirut on the road 
that leads to the South. In this area, Hezbollah’s political activities were mostly 
concentrated in Dahyeh – particularly the neighbourhood of Ghobeyri – where they 
launched what was described as “Islamic work” through committees operating in 
mosques and hussayniyyât (public meeting rooms dedicated to the Imam Hussein, 
the third Imam in Shi’a Islam) (Harb 2010:59).58 Dahyeh was home to half a million 
Shi’a, many of whom had been displaced there following the Israeli occupation of the 
South of Lebanon or attacks by Christian militias on eastern Beirut suburbs such as 
Naba’a and Sin El-Fil. The concentration of the Shi’a population in this area means 
that it came to provide an important base of power at the national level (Harb 
2010:78). Finally, the southern suburbs lacked basic and necessary services for a 
population in need, and thus presented great potential of investments in institutions 
and services for the political actor controlling this space or its supporters (Harb El-
                                                            
58 Hussein was the grandson of Muhammad that refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad Caliph. 
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Kak 1996). 
 
Hezbollah’s growth in these areas was further facilitated by the expansion of its 
charitable, medical and educational activities – funded principally by Iran.59 As Picard 
notes, in deprived areas such as the Bekaa and Beirut’s southern suburbs Hezbollah 
strengthened its popular base by establishing “local branches of numerous Iranian 
foundations created during the Iran-Iraq War to provide aid to various groups of the 
injured (orphans and the wounded) and for reconstruction, or for the support of social 
services” (Picard 2000:308). In practice the organisation set up its own social 
services independently from the state, structured around a set of autonomous 
organisations operating in networks and providing a complete range of assistance to 
Shi’a (discussed in Chapter 5 below) (Qassir 2011). During the Civil War, Hezbollah 
guaranteed the distribution of electricity to the population of Dahyeh during power 
outages through its own generators, and took care of garbage collection and repair of 
water and sewage pipes (Harb 2010:77). They also provided jobs to youth who were 
by and large unemployed during the Civil War, and for whom the only alternative was 
to become member of a militia. Those employed in Hezbollah institutions were not 
required to join the party, but had to respect its Islamic ideology including Islamic 
dress codes (Harb El-Kak 1996).  
 
This large social support network, and the on-going growth of the Shi’a population in 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa, massively expanded 
the constituency of the party. It enabled Hezbollah to position itself as a massive 
welfare provider with the support of Iran, transmitting the political and ideological 
beliefs of the Iranian Islamic Revolution to the poor Shi’a families and larger sectors 
of the Shi’a population. As explained by academics Dina Matar, Atef Alshaer and 
Lina Khatib, it has:  
                                                            
59 The level of Iranian financial support today is difficult to determine because it is largely channelled through 
non-governmental routes. Estimates, however, range from between $100 and $400 million a year. Abdallah 
Safieddinne, Hezbollah’s representative in Iran, has acknowledged that his organisation receives funding directly 
from the Wilâyat al-Faqîh himself. The Iranian Supreme Leader has sole control of the distribution of these 
funds to Hezbollah, and this is why it is largely unaffected by changes of governments in Iran (Norton 2007:110; 
Saad Ghorayeb 2012). Hezbollah nonetheless claims that donations and taxes of rich Shi’a businesspeople and 
other generous sponsors in the diaspora provide the bulk of financing to the party (Harb 2010:94). This statement 
is quite unlikely as in the beginning of 2015 Hezbollah had to impose salary cuts on personnel, defer payments 
to suppliers and reduce monthly stipends to its political allies in Lebanon after increase economic problems in 
the IRI due to lower oil revenues and international sanctions (Blanford 2015).  
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“sought to legitimize Iran’s symbolic leadership through the use 
of evocative and historically meaningful language and symbols 
with the aim of naturalising and legitimising Iran’s guidance and 
role among a local public already familiar with its religious 
political discourses… To emphasize the links with Iran and its 
leadership as role models, al-‘Ahed, Hezbollah first formal 
media outlet, began to disseminate the writings and speeches 
of Iran’s spiritual and revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, describing him as the guiding spiritual role model and 
force behind Hezbollah’s self image as a group fighting injustice 
and the “mustakbirin” (arrogant forces).” (Khatib, Matar and 
Alshaer 2014:43)  
 
This also went with the display of large posters of Khomeini in the neighbourhoods 
and areas under the control of Hezbollah. This practice is still very apparent today, 
alongside large posters of the current supreme leader of the IRI, Ayatollah 
Khameini.  
 
Hezbollah appeared and presented itself increasingly to the Shi’a popular masses as 
the party that continued the struggle for the Shi’a cause, which had been betrayed by 
Amal, and as the saviour of the violated rights of the Shi’a in the continuity of Imam 
Sadr. Hezbollah was also able to recruit members and supporters from wealthier 
layers of the Shi’a population, many of whom had lost confidence in Amal (Khatib, 
Matar and Alshaer 2014:50-52). 
 
The Lebanese Civil War finally ended in 1989-1990, following the signing of the Ta’if 
Agreement in Saudi Arabia. The agreement reconfigured the sectarian system in the 
country and, as will be discussed in later chapters, codified Hezbollah’s new 
ascendant position within the political system. The agreement granted Hezbollah’s 
military wing status as a legitimate resistance force against Israel, and the 
organisation was permitted to keep its arms. In the same year as the Ta’if 
Agreement, negotiated settlements under the auspices of Iran and Syria also 
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endorsed the military domination of Hezbollah in Dahyeh (Chehabi 2006:229). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The political economy of Lebanon from the time of the French Mandate until the 
contemporary period has been largely characterised by its intermediary role in the 
regional system, dominated by banking, finance and services. Within this structure, 
sectarian patterns of governance have played a critical role, symbolised in the 
dominance of a Maronite and Sunni-linked bourgeoisie over the main levers of the 
country’s politics and economy. Foreign actors, notably France, have encouraged 
these patterns of rule, forging close links with the upper layers of both the Maronite 
Christian and the Sunni Muslim population.  
 
Despite its historical marginalisation, the Shi’a population has undergone significant 
changes since Lebanon's independence. The period prior to the Civil War witnessed 
a progressive change in the socio-economic status of some parts of the Shi’a, 
signified in the rise and formation of a new Shi’a middle class that is relatively well-
educated, ambitious and seeking to challenge the peripheral position of their 
community. This was initially indicated in the rise of Amal and further accentuated 
through the 15 years of Civil War. The conflict had two main consequences for the 
Shi’a population: first, the political disappearance of the traditional zu’âma leadership 
of the community, who had already been significantly weakened in the years prior to 
the Civil War. Second, the establishment of Hezbollah in 1985. Hezbollah has since 
become the most prominent voice of the Shi’a population, surpassing Amal in the 
process. This position of prominence was reached through Hezbollah’s position as a 
welfare and services provider to the Shi’a population, and as the main actor in the 
military resistance against Israel. In both cases, this was made possible though the 
financial support of Iran, through which Iranian capital along with the political and 
ideological beliefs of the Iranian Islamic Revolution were transmitted and diffused 
among the Shi’a.   
 
This analysis confirms the early insights of Mehdi Amel regarding the relationship 
between class formation and the sectarian system in Lebanon. The deepening of 
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sectarian identity is a function of the political intervention of the Lebanese 
bourgeoisie and the Lebanese state (Amel 1986:326-327). As Amel observed, the 
latter is particularly important: “communities are not communities unless through and 
by the state… and the Lebanese state guarantees the sustainability of the dynamics 
that reproduce communities as political structure, which only by the state becomes 
institutions” (Amel 1986:29). For this reason, laws such as the electoral and personal 
status laws – which are regulated along religious and sectarian lines – are critical to 
the maintenance of sectarian identity. As Makdisi has pointed out, “to be Lebanese 
meant to be defined according to religious affiliation” (Makdissi 1996). 
 
Viewed from this perspective, the Lebanese Civil War was not simply a sectarian 
crisis; it was, according to Amel (1986:330), a crisis of the political system in its 
current form, in other words as the system of the domination of the Lebanese 
bourgeois class. In the case of the Shi’a population, the crisis of the traditional 
zu’âma leadership began before the Civil War and became accentuated during and 
after the Civil War. This crisis resulted in the re-articulation of sectarian patterns of 
rule, firstly through the rise of Amal, and subsequently that of Hezbollah.  
 
The other fundamental cleavage that established itself in the political and social 
spheres of Lebanese society since 1967 was the level of implication of Lebanon in 
the Arab Israeli war and the attitudes towards the Palestinian resistance. The 
departure of Palestinian fighters in 1982 increased the sectarianisation of the 
Lebanese Civil War considerably. 
 
Amel’s perspective points to the importance of understanding the changes in the 
class structure of the Shi’a itself, beyond homogenising interpretations that equate 
sect with class. Instead, as the analysis above has confirmed, the political expression 
of the Shi’a community has been shaped by the on-going class differentiation within 
the Shi’a. This can be seen first in the rise of Amal, and then later with the formation 
of Hezbollah. In both cases these Islamic movements have rested upon a 
contradictory class base that reflects both the growth of poorer layers of Shi’a (largely 
dispossessed from rural areas and concentrated in the southern suburbs of Beirut) 
as well as their linkages to the relatively prosperous layers that emerged through the 
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Civil War and in the Shi’a diaspora. Hezbollah has attempted to resolve the tensions 
arising from this contradictory class base through its emphasis upon a sectarian and 
religiously-structured identity rather than any kind of consistent representation of the 
poorer layers of Shi’a society. This religious identity has become one of the means 
through which the organisation has managed to deepen its hegemony within the 
Shi’a population, as Chapter 5 will show in further detail. 
 
The tensions arising from this social base of Hezbollah have been further 
accentuated in the neoliberal period that followed the end of the Civil War. Lebanese 
neoliberalism has promoted the increasing class differentiation of the Shi’a in 
Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s response to this process has been to move closer to the 
interests of the emerging Shi’a bourgeoisie. The following two chapters demonstrate 
and analyse this trend in greater detail, and indicate their implications for Hezbollah’s 
standing in the Shi’a population. 
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Chapter 3: Hezbollah and the Political Economy of Lebanese 
Neoliberalism  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter tracks the evolution of the Lebanese political economy from the 1990s 
until today, with a particular focus on the attitudes, orientation and practise of 
Hezbollah through the period of neoliberal reform. This analysis will lay the 
groundwork for the following chapter, which tracks the changes in the position and 
stratification of the Shi’a population as a result of neoliberal policies, and the 
connection of these changes to the development of Hezbollah as a political 
organisation. 
 
The chapter begins by analysing the economic trajectory under Rafiq Hariri, 
Lebanon’s Prime Minister in 1992-1998 and 2000-2004. Hariri was a driving force 
behind the elaboration of neoliberalism in Lebanon and received little challenge from 
any of the country’s elected political forces – including Hezbollah. Neoliberalism in 
Lebanon was uniquely focused upon the intersection of financial liberalisation and 
urban reconstruction, closely linked to the destruction of much of the country’s 
infrastructure during the periods of Civil War and foreign invasion. Neoliberal reforms 
have deepened the uneven and combined development of Lebanon, producing an 
economy characterised by over development in the financial and service sectors, 
while the industrial and agricultural sectors witnessed a continuous weakening of 
their weight and importance. We will also see that the construction and real estate 
sectors have been key investment sectors in Lebanon and in the region more widely, 
and in which Hezbollah has developed interests. As Roccu (2012:57) has noted, this 
economic structure acts as a framing influence that sets the boundaries of a playing 
field within which political agency – in this case that of Hezbollah – develops its 
strategies and projects.  
 
The second part of this chapter examines Hezbollah’s orientation towards the 
development of Lebanese neoliberalism. Beginning with a discussion of Hezbollah’s 
attitude towards the sectarian political system, this chapter shows how the party has 
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moved from a general opposition to sectarian allocation of political power towards an 
acceptance of the system itself. This increasing integration into political governing 
structures has shaped its conception of economic policy and development strategy. 
Along these lines, this chapter examines in depth Hezbollah’s policies in three key 
cases: (1) municipal planning in the suburb of Ghobeyri (2) discussions around a new 
law to lift rent controls through 2012-2014 and (3) agricultural policy in the Bekaa 
Valley. These three cases are instructive examples of Hezbollah’s orientation 
towards Lebanon’s political economy precisely because they encapsulate the nexus 
of financial liberalisation and urban renewal (and the accompanying neglect of other 
sectors) that typifies Lebanese neoliberalism. Many of the narratives and conclusions 
drawn from these cases are based on information gathered during fieldwork for this 
thesis, including: interviews with Hezbollah-affiliated economic policy-makers, an 
important Hezbollah development think tank called the Consultative Centre for 
Studies and Documentation (CCSD), mayors, trade unionists and farming 
representatives. These cases indicate that Hezbollah has generally pursued 
economic policies that support those of the central government and, moreover, has 
done so by promoting clientelist patterns of governance that reinforce the 
organisation’s influence over key geographical regions in Lebanon. 
 
3.2 Neoliberalism in Lebanon 
 
Emerging from the end of the Civil War, Lebanon’s political economy was marked – 
as the previous chapter discussed – by a fractured sectarian system dominated by a 
growing Sunni bourgeoisie led by Rafiq Hariri alongside various militias that ruled 
over much of the country. The political arrangements codified in the Ta’if 
Agreement60 entrenched this sectarianism while strengthening the position of the 
Sunni and Shi’a in the Lebanese political system. Political changes included the 
weakening of the position of President (required to be a Maronite Christian) and the 
commensurate increase in the Prime Minister’s powers (a Sunni Muslim). 61 
Moreover, the ratio of Muslims to Christians in the new Lebanese Parliament rose to 
6-6, up from 5-6. The term of Speaker of the Parliament, held by a Shi’a, was also 
                                                            
60 The Ta'if Agreement of October 22,1989, the fruit of a Saudi, US and Syrian agreement imposed on Lebanese 
deputies, confirmed Syria’s dominant position in Lebanon (Salloukh 2005). 
61 Under the Ta’if Agreement, the presidential office now performs a ceremonial and consultative role, with real 
power lying in the hands of the Prime Minister (Stewart 1996:494). 
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increased to four years (and constitutionally protected from being voted out during 
the first two years) (Traboulsi 2014:72). In addition, the Ta’if Agreement granted 
Syria de facto hegemony over the country, a situation that was supported by the US 
in 1990 following Syrian participation in the US/UN-led operation against Iraq in that 
year (Nizameddin 2006:95). 
  
The Ta’if agreement was not only the basis of a new political consensus between the 
Lebanese elite, but also put the country on the path of neo-liberal reform. As Volker 
Perthes explains:  
 
“To attract and maintain the confidence not only of local and 
international capital, but of its citizens, Lebanon needs to 
achieve substantial political consensus and national integration. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, as Lebanon's 
Second Republic was formally established on the basis of the 
1989 Ta'if agreement, the main approach of Lebanon's ruling 
elite was to produce an image of integration that would facilitate 
acceptance of the new order.” (Perthes 1997:19)  
 
This ‘new order’ echoed the economic liberalisation measures that had been pursued 
elsewhere in the Middle East since the 1980s, with an emphasis on increased 
integration into the global economy and private sector growth (Baroudi 2001:71). This 
reform plan worked to re-establish Lebanon's financial position in the Middle East, 
particularly in the context of an expected increase in regional cross-border capital 
flows as a result of the 1992 Oslo Accords (Perthes 1997:17; Bali and Salti 
2009:252).  
 
The other important factor of Lebanon’s place in the ‘New Middle East’ was the 
rehabilitation of infrastructure and transport (Perthes 1997:17). The government of 
Omar Karama (December 1990 to May 1992) began this task with the revival of the 
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) 62 and the launching of a three-
                                                            
62 The CDR was established through Decree No. 5 dated 31st January 1977. The responsibilities of the CDR 
were specified to three main tasks: complying a plan and a time schedule for the resumption of reconstruction 
and of development, guaranteeing the funding of projects presented and supervising their execution and 
utilization by contributing to the process of rehabilitation of public institutions, thus enabling it to assume 
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year plan, the National Emergency Reconstruction Program (NERP), at a World 
Bank-sponsored donor meeting held in Paris in December 1991 (Sherry 2014). 
During this initial phase of reconstruction, however, as Hassan Sherry (2014) has 
observed, “regional political complexities, along with a lack of commitment on the 
side of the Lebanese government to engage in a full-fledged economic reconstruction 
reform program, prompted the failure of the NERP”.  
 
Despite this initial ‘failure’, reconstruction plans began to take significant steps 
forward following Rafiq Hariri’s accession to the Prime Ministership in 1992. As a 
wealthy businessman benefiting from regional and international support, Hariri's 
appointment occurred in the wake of the strikes and demonstrations that swept the 
Karama government, and then forced the departure of the Solh government (May 
1992 to October 1992).63 Hariri had deep connections with the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, and had amassed a large fortune in the Saudi construction and public works 
sector. By the 1970s, he had become one of the Saudi royal family’s most important 
and trusted businessmen, even obtaining Saudi citizenship (ICG 2010:2). Entering 
domestic Lebanese politics in 1983, Hariri became a political adviser to Saudi Prince 
Bandar Bin Sultan, the then Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. (Mehio 2002), and Saoud 
Al-Faysal, the Saudi foreign minister. In 1983 and 1984, during mediation efforts in 
Geneva and Lausanne between representatives of the major Lebanese factions for a 
national dialogue conference, he was Riyadh’s official envoy to Lebanon. He also laid 
the groundwork that led to the 1989 Ta’if Accord. Throughout this period, Hariri 
developed ties with other key decision makers in Lebanon, including the 
governments of Syria, France and the United States.  In Lebanon itself, he 
established an independent network of services and charitable activities, including 
the provision of education, healthcare, jobs, food and financial aid, targeting mainly 
Sunni but benefiting other communities as well (ICG 2010:2). This business network 
gave him an important social base in the country’s predominantly clientelist system.  
 
Hariri’s vision for Lebanon’s political economy was centred upon the liberalisation of 
capital flows and deregulation of the tax system as means to entice foreign capital to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
responsibility for the execution of a number of projects under the supervision of the Council of Ministers (CDR 
2014). 
63 These protests were particularly concerned with deteriorating living conditions caused by the rapid rise of the 
U.S. dollar against the Lebanese Pound. 
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invest in economic infrastructure (ICG 2010:3; Young 1998:5).64 In this context, the 
character of neoliberalism in Lebanon was heavily oriented towards opening up the 
economy to foreign investment flows, primarily aimed at the banking, financial and 
real estate sectors, further deepening the heavily financialised nature of the 
Lebanese economy. 
 
Politically, Hariri’s rule was characterised by:  
 
“The support of the Syrian regime, which handed him control of 
the economy, outsourced the anti-Israeli resistance to 
Hezbollah and left politics and security in the hands of General 
Ghazi Kanaan, Syria’s High Commissioner in Lebanon. 
Secondly, Hariri had the cooperation of militia leaders and 
those who had accumulated their wealth from War and 
emigration, and was surrounded by associates, party members 
and security officials, who covered the entire political 
spectrum… in addition to a large coterie of technocrats and 
lawyers, graduates of international financial institutions and 
private companies. One of the most noteworthy measures he 
took to entrench his power was his indefatigable and costly 
effort to gain control of the media.” (Traboulsi 2014:23)65 
 
Hariri's economic agenda was financed by both his personal fortune and his 
international contacts.  
 
The main outlines of the Hariri government’s reconstruction plan were detailed in a 
document entitled Horizon 2000, for Reconstruction and Development, a sectoral and 
regional expenditure program of $14.3 billion that extended over the period from 
1993 to 2002. In 1994, the budget of the program was raised to $18 billion over a 13 
years period stretching from 1995 to 2007 (Makdissi 2004:119). The geographic 
distribution of reconstruction funding was characterised by the same regional 
                                                            
64 This orientation was partly predicated on a belief that a regional peace agreement would be reached by 1996. 
65 Dr. Hassan Fadlallah, Hezbollah MP, wrote in his book “Hizb Allâh wa al-Dawla fî Lubnân – al-ru`iyya wa 
al-massâr” that Ghazi Kanaan was the de facto ruler of Lebanon in the nineties (2014 cited in Bassam 2014). 
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inequalities as before the Civil War, with the bulk of investments concentrated in 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon – around 80 percent of the total – and the remainder 
outside of these areas. These projects were marked by the blurring of lines between 
public and private property and helped to consolidate Hariri’s increasing political and 
financial power. The best example of this is the case of the private company 
Solidere, in which the Hariri family was the major shareholder and the driving force in 
the company's lobbying. The Solidere Company was given exclusive rights to 
rehabilitate infrastructure and develop the downtown business area in Beirut, and 
was accused by property owners of forcibly purchasing their properties at less than 
their market value (Makdissi 2004:83). 
 
In practice, implementation of the reconstruction plan led to a large increase in 
government expenditure and a concomitant rise in debt levels. The ratio between 
government expenditure and domestic revenue was 150 percent in 1995, and grew 
to 233 percent in 2002 (Makdissi 2004:83). Alongside reconstruction expenditure, 
government spending between 1993 and 2005 was taken up in repaying interest on 
public debt (38 percent) and the wage bill (29 percent) (Gaspart 2004:217). 
Privatisation was also launched in this period, including: the entry of two private 
mobile phone companies, Libancell and Cellis, the first steps towards the 
privatisation of the postal service (Gaspart 2004:72) and the contracting out of 
garbage collection in greater Beirut to a private company called Sukleen. Private 
companies were granted a monopoly on the import of oil and airport and port 
operations (Catusse 2000). Furthermore, the government signed an agreement with 
the World Bank (WB) in 1996 committing the Lebanese authorities to privatise the 
electricity sector. Focusing on these liberalisation measures, successive 
governments failed to tackle other economic and social problems such as 
unemployment, low wages, poverty (particularly in the regions of the Akkar and the 
Bekaa Valley), increasing corruption and the poor quality of social services (Baroudi 
2002:64). 
 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new set of neoliberal policies was put in place 
to address the heavy fiscal burden of rising public debt and a relatively high debt 
service. Beginning in 1996, government wages were frozen and automatic wage 
increases were ended; real wages thus tended to decline significantly due to rising 
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inflation (prices increased by about 120 percent from 1996 to 2011) (Zaraket 2014).66 
At the same time, increasing levels of foreign debt were accumulated (Baroudi 
2002:68). In 2002, the public debt reached 173 percent of GDP, while the payment of 
the debt represented 18 percent of the GDP, which amounted to 80 percent of the 
budget income (Nasnas 2007:86).  
 
Privatisation was accelerated in the early 2000s with a new law, which established a 
Higher Privatization Council that aimed at the further sell off of public sector 
enterprises (Makdissi 2004:121; Nasnas 2007:90). During this period, the 
reorganisation of the state TV station and Middle East Airlines (MEA) was carried 
out, leading to the lay-off of 2,000 employees (Makdissi 2004:121; Nasnas 2007:87). 
In addition, a new VAT of 10 percent was introduced on goods and services. 
Moreover, the government in 2001 reduced the share paid by employers to the 
National Social Security Fund (NSSF) from 38.5 percent to 23.5 percent.67 As part of 
the Hariri government’s attempt to encourage Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), a 
new law on investments was adopted in 2001 that established a “One stop shop” for 
private investors (Nasnas 2007:87). Another law aimed at attracting “bien fonds”, or 
property funds, by lifting restrictions on property ownership and setting taxes for 
foreign investors at the same level as Lebanese citizens.  
 
These measures did little to reduce the public debt or revitalise the economy. The 
need for further external support led to the Paris I Conference on February 23, 2001, 
which was organised with the support of international institutions such as the WB, 
European Investment Bank, and the European Commission. At this meeting, 500 
million Euros were provided to Lebanon in accordance with pledges by the Lebanese 
government to stimulate the economy by liberalizing and facilitating trade, containing 
public expenditure – including cutting subsidies on some food products –, 
privatisation (in the telecommunications, water and electricity sectors), attracting FDI 
and modernising the tax system (Sherry 2014). 
 
                                                            
66 In 2008, a decree was passed increasing wages by 200,000 LP ($133) for the private sector, but it only 
benefited the private sector and not the employees of the public sector as the state Shura Council overturned the 
decree in 2011, citing its illegality (Zaraket 2014).  
67 The NSSF provides employees with insurance coverage for sickness and maternity care and it also covers 
family allowances, end of service pensions and work related accidents and diseases (Nasnas 2007:90). 
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A further meeting was called in Paris by then French president Jacques Chirac in 
November 2002. In preparation for this conference, the government put forward a 
budget for 2003 that incorporated further expenditure cuts and revenue enhancing 
measures, including new taxes and fees. The measures envisioned in the document 
submitted to the Paris II conference planned to fully privatise the cellular phone 
system and energy sectors, and to transform the fixed phone system and power 
sectors into commercial entities (Makdissi 2004:122). At this conference, donor 
countries and institutions finally provided a total package of financial and 
developmental assistance of $4.4 billion. The IMF was also given an important role in 
supervising financial assistance and the implementation of neoliberal measures in 
the country. In 2004 and 2005, the privatisation of the water sector, ports and airports 
through concession arrangements was agreed (Nasnas 2007:96). 
 
These plans were disrupted following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on February 
14 2005, which was followed by the Israeli war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006. 
The Israeli attack resulted in the death of more than 1,100 people, the displacement 
of over a quarter of the population, and an estimated $2.8 billion in direct costs with 
more than 60 percent of the damage affecting the housing sector (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 2009:42). This crisis was further reinforced by 
political instability that followed the resignation of Hezbollah ministers and their allies 
from the government in November 2006.68 
 
In the wake of the war, the WB carried out an Economic and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) at the request of the Lebanese government. The ESIA’s mission 
was to assess the challenges facing the economy, determine the impact of the 2006 
hostilities and to suggest appropriate reforms that should be undertaken (Bank 
Information Center (BIC) 2012:15). In September of 2006, the WB Board of 
Governors approved a grant of $70 million for a Trust Fund of which a part went to 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the WB Group. 
The IFC, in close cooperation with the government, was tasked with preparing a 
                                                            
68 On November 11 2006, two Hezbollah ministers, in addition to three others  (two from Amal’s movement and 
one independent) resigned from Siniora’s government, protesting what Hezbollah described as a lack of “power 
sharing”. Hezbollah was demanding a national unity government in which it would hold with its allies at least 
one-third – plus one – of the total cabinet seats. This is known as the blocking third, which would enable it to 
veto any important decisions, such as vetoing the upcoming budget on the international tribunal on the 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, which it opposed. 
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programme to rehabilitate Lebanon’s private sector focusing, among other elements, 
on small and medium enterprises and the removal of administrative barriers to 
private sector activity. Partly in response to this external pressure, the parliament 
adopted a plan put forward by the Prime Minister Siniora on January 4 2007, which 
aimed to bring the debt down from 180 percent to 144 percent of the GDP by 2011, 
increase VAT from 10 percent to 15 percent, privatise the mobile telephone sector, 
eliminate the budget deficit in five years and adopt other initiatives to attract foreign 
investors (Vivien 2007).  
 
At the Paris III Conference on Assistance to Lebanon on January 25 2007, the 
international community pledged $7.6 billion in financial assistance in the form of 
loans and grants to the Lebanese government. The bulk of these loans, especially 
those provided by international institutions such as the WB and IMF, were 
accompanied by strict conditionality and were based on the implementation of the 
reforms announced by the Prime Minister Siniora at the beginning of the month.  
 
Nevertheless, because of internal political conflict, a number of privatisation 
processes were delayed.  
 
3.3 Social Outcomes of Neoliberalism in Lebanon 
 
By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the political economy of Lebanon was 
marked by the highly polarised outcomes of neoliberal reform. In 2008, it was 
estimated that 28 percent of the population was categorised as poor and living on US 
$4/day or less (the upper poverty line), while eight percent were extremely poor, 
living on US $2.4/day or less (the lower poverty line) (UNDP 2008a:11). 
Unemployment levels were also significant, with only an estimated one-third of the 
working age population actually in employment (UNDP 2008a:14). Between 40 
percent and 50 percent of Lebanese residents did not have access to the NSSF or 
any other public social security. Temporary foreign workers, whose numbers are 
estimated to reach more than one million, lacked all social protection.69  
                                                            
69 These workers come mostly from Syria, Egypt, South East Asia and more recently the Horn of Africa. Syrians 
work mostly in construction and agriculture, while those from South East Asia are predominant in domestic 
work (Catusse and Abi Yaghi 2011:77).  
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Alongside this widespread poverty, inequality levels remained extremely high. The 
richest 20 percent of the population received 43.55 percent of the national income 
between 2004 and 2005, while the poorest 20 percent received 7.07 percent (UNDP 
2009:63). It has been estimated that only 800 bank accounts, belonging to less than 
200 families, contained approximately 20 percent of total deposits worth nearly $14 
billion in 2007. Credit Suisse's Global Wealth Databook 2013 notes that at least 48 
percent of Lebanon's privately-held wealth is held by some 8,900 citizens, just 0.3 
percent of the adult population (Credit Suisse 2013 cited in Executive Magazine 
2013). In this context, ownership and control of capital is highly concentrated, with 
half of Lebanon’s domestic markets considered oligopolistic to monopolistic and a 
third dominated by a single firm with a market share above 40 percent (Ministry of 
Economy and Trade (Lebanon) 2003 cited in Berthélemy, Dessus and Nahas 
2007:4). The banking sector, which had a size equivalent to 350 percent of GDP in 
2009 (The Daily Star 2010) is particularly marked by concentration of ownership – 
five banks controlled (Bank Audi, Blom Bank, Byblos Bank, Fransabank and 
BankMed) about half the volume of total deposits in 2002 (Gaspart 2004:194). 
 
These pronounced levels of inequality are closely related to the rentier and 
financialised nature of the economy, which has been reinforced by the neoliberal 
measures outlined above. Wages and social contributions, for example, accounted 
for only 23 percent of GDP in 2009, while the share of interest payments accounted 
for 10 percent of GDP or a third of government expenditures in 2011 (Matabadal 
2012:5). As the purchasing power of Lebanese citizens decreased due to rising 
inflation, the importance of rent derived from interest was accentuated through 
policies that encouraged banks and high-income earners to purchase Lebanese 
treasury bills with high interest rates. In 2002, when the general debt reached $30 
billion, $22 billion went to the banks in the form of interest on Treasury bonds 
(Traboulsi 2014:25).70 The banking sector benefited particularly from these policies, 
increasing its capital from $103 billion to $966 billion between 1990 and 2007, with 
deposits growing from $6.6 billion in 1992 to $58 billion in 2005 (Traboulsi 2014:25).  
                                                            
70 In the end of 2013, the Gross Public Debt reached $63.46 billion, representing 140 percent of the GDP while 
the payment of the interests of the debt represented 40 percent of the total revenues and 28 percent of the total 
expenditures. (Republic of Lebanon, Ministry of Finance 2013b:1). Between 1993 and 2008, Lebanon paid $38 
billion on debt, which reached an average of $9,000 per person (Traboulsi 2014:25). 
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In the context of rising prices and constant wages, increases in output and 
productivity have flowed to employer profits; from 1997 to 2012, around $30 billion 
was transferred from salaries into returns on capital (Dibeh 2013). Indeed, despite 
the increase in actual output by 50 percent and actual productivity by 75 percent 
since 1996, the share of wages declined by 35 percent in 1997 (Dibeh 2013). This 
meant that those increases contributed to an increase in the share of profits, rents 
and interests, which amounted to 75 percent of GDP (Dibeh 2013). As economist 
Ghassan Dibeh (2013) has noted, “due to the regressive tax system, the lower strata 
of society had to endure the brunt of the impact [of inflation and low wages]. This led 
to the transfer of wealth from taxpayers to debt holders, which led to the deepening 
of the rentier economy”.  
 
The rentier features of the economy are also indicated by the weight of the service 
sector, which made up 79-81 percent of GDP in 2010, while agriculture and industry 
constituted 5.1 percent and 13-15.9 percent respectively (BIC 2012:6). Services hold 
around 60 percent of the total labour force (Nasr 2003:153),71 while the industrial 
sector accounted for 15 percent, construction 8.6 percent and agriculture 7.6 percent 
in 2007 (UNDP 2008a:143).72 This weakness in the productive sectors is reflected in 
the dependence on foreign capital inflows and remittances from the Lebanese 
diaspora. The share of FDI in GDP reached 15 percent in 2009, and was mostly 
concentrated in real estate and tourism-related investment (70 percent and 22 
percent respectively of total inflows) (Investment Development Authority of Lebanon 
(IDAL) 2011:14). Another significant source of foreign capital came from Lebanese 
expatriates, with remittances constituting 22 percent of GDP in 2011 ($7.6 billion) 
                                                            
71 Moreover, Lebanese banks employ currently close to 21,337 employees throughout the country, amounting to 
1.2 percent of the total labour force. 
72 Lebanon’s industrial sector was made up 4,033 establishments (with 5 workers and more) in 2007. There is a 
sharp division between a large number of very small firms (78.2 percent of all Lebanese industrial enterprises 
employed between 5 and 19 workers in 2007) and a handful of large ones (3 percent had more than 100 
workers). Large industries employing more than 50 workers represented 7.1 percent of total establishments but 
employed more than 45 percent of the workforce, while medium size establishments (from 20 to 49 workers) 
represented 14.8 percent of total establishments and 21.1 percent of the total workforce (Republic of Lebanon, 
the Ministry of Industry, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), Association of 
Lebanese Industrialists (ALI) 2007). In agriculture, 5 percent of the farmers’ control 47 percent of the total 
cultivated lands, while half of the farmers own only 8 percent of the total cultivated lands (Nasr 2003).  
The state is also a major employer as political parties often use the availability of jobs in public administration 
for clientelist purposes. The number of state employees increased from 75,000 in 1974 to 175,000 in 2000, or 
from 9 percent to 12-14 percent of the total labour force (Nasr 2003:153). 
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(The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 
2011:14). 
 
The implications of these processes for the relative balance of different regions and – 
in a closely-related sense – the economic weight of Lebanon’s sectarian 
communities, will be explored in the following chapter. I will show that one of the 
main outcomes was the promotion of a number of newly emergent groups in 
Lebanon that came to rival the commercial and financial bourgeoisie, who had left 
during the course of the Civil War.  As a result, a new bourgeoisie formed through the 
fusion of different sections of capital: wealthy “Gulf entrepreneurs” who amassed 
large fortunes in the Gulf (the most prominent being Rafiq Hariri), rich émigrés 
returning to the country (especially Shi’a from West Africa), and some war profiteers 
and new wealthy layers who were associated with the militias (Nasr 2003:151). At 
this stage, however, it is necessary to turn to Hezbollah’s response to these policies 
at both the political and economic level. 
 
3.4 Hezbollah's Changing Attitude towards the Sectarian State 
 
One of the striking features of Hezbollah’s evolution through the neoliberal period is 
its changing attitude towards sectarianism and its growing integration into the 
structures of the state. In its early days, the party was highly critical of the existing 
political system and the entrenched privileges of both Maronite and Sunni political 
classes. The 1985 founding manifesto of the party noted that the existing political 
system and its sectarian privileges was the root cause of Lebanon’s problems (Al-
rissâla al-maftûha allatî wajjahaha “Hizb Allâh” ila al-mustad’afîn 1985). As an 
alternative, Hezbollah advocated an Islamic form of government in the framework of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of Wilâyat al-Faqîh, stating the movement’s belief in 
Khomeini as the “single wise and just leader” (Al-rissâla al-maftûha allatî wajjahaha 
“Hizb Allâh” ila al-mustad’afîn 1985). Despite this call for a theocratic state, the party 
was nevertheless aware of the concerns that many Lebanese might have, adding 
that its foundation would only be possible “on the basis of free and direct selection of 
the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine” (Al-rissâla 
al-maftûha allatî wajjahaha “Hizb Allâh” ila al-mustad’afîn 1985).  
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This initial position against the sectarian status quo began to change following 
Hezbollah’s acceptance of the 1989 Ta’if agreement. While Hezbollah would note 
that Ta’if failed to eliminate the shortcomings of the old system in stating that it 
“maintains the Maronite system and reinforces the Israeli occupation” (Al-Ahed 1989 
cited in Khatib, Matar and Alshaer 2014:57), it began to emphasize the importance of 
civil peace and state reconstruction rather than any fundamental change in the 
system. This acceptance was partly due to the organisation’s greater weight in the 
political process – codified in the Ta’if Agreement – as well as its official recognition 
as a resistance movement that allowed it to remain armed while other militias were 
disarmed (Zigby 2000:41).  
 
The party was also affected by the changes in the IRI, its main political, military and 
economic ally. It signed the Ta’if agreement only after it had received permission 
from the Iranian government (Khatib, Matar and Alshaer 2014:57). The end of the 
Iraq-Iran war and the death of Khomeini led to a more pragmatic foreign policy in the 
IRI. The Iranian leadership, led by its new president Rafsandjani and the new 
Supreme Leader Khameini, was more preoccupied by socio-economic problems in 
Iran, and the rise of the USA as a single great power following the demise of the 
USSR. The Iranian leadership was therefore trying to adjust its policies in 
accordance with the new unipolar balance of power (Rakel 2009:117-118).  
 
Since this period, the IRI witnessed improvements in diplomatic relations with the 
monarchies of the Gulf, the European Union, China, India, central Eurasia, Russia 
and the United States, while the main currents arguing for the “Export of the 
Revolution” lost influence in the highest echelon of the state (Rakel 2009:113). This 
was represented in 1989 first by Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri's fall from favour, 
who had been the designated successor of Khomeini for years, (a few months before 
the death of Ayatollah Khomeini after he protested against the liquidation of 30,000 
members of the People’s Mujahidin) and secondly of Ali Akbar Mohtachemi who was 
no longer Minister of Interior (Daher 2014:117). The “revolutionary” tendency was 
sidelined in the IRI.  
 
At the same time, this evolution in the Iranian political sphere was accompanied by a 
policy of socio-economic liberalization, which included invitations to Iranian investors 
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and managers that had left the country during the Iraq-Iran war to return to their 
country (Tehranian 1993:354). This economic opening was reflected by 
Rafsandjani’s speech during a Friday Prayer in October 1990, in which he advised 
Iranian Muslims to try to live well and even urged that “Friday Prayer is an occasion 
for Muslims to display their wealth” (Rajaee 1993:118). 
 
The pragmatic turn of the Iranian leadership, and the end of the willingness to export 
the “revolution” at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, pushed Hezbollah to 
attenuate and even cease its rejection of the Lebanese political system and seek 
increasing integration.  
 
The election of Abbas Al-Mussawi in May 1991 as Secretary General, instead of 
Tufayli, represented this evolution. The election of Hassan Nasrallah as Secretary 
General, following Al-Mussawi’s assassination in 1992 by the Israeli army, confirmed 
the path of “infitâh” (opening). Tufayli was considered to be too close to the currents 
of the “Export of the Revolution” camp. Others in this camp, such as Ali Akbar 
Mohtachami, were no longer welcome by the Iranian leadership, led by Rafsandjani 
and Khameni. Al-Mussawi and Hassan Nasrallah were considered to be ideologically 
close to the latter currents and had a more conciliatory attitude toward integration in 
the Lebanese political system (Daher 2008:273-274). It was in this period that the 
last western hostages were released and the Islamic movement allowed the army to 
deploy to their strongholds in the Iqlim Al-Touffah, region of South Lebanon (Blanford 
2011:95). 
  
Moreover, the increasing political and military domination of Lebanon by Syria, the 
intermediary through which arms and Iranian aids had to go through, also played a 
role in pushing for Hezbollah’s integration into the Lebanese political system 
(Blanford 2011:95). Hezbollah had to take into consideration the Syrian regime’s 
interests because of its domination over Lebanon and its position of intermediary for 
the weapons transfer from Iran. Therefore, they also accommodated Syria’s use of 
the Islamic movement against Israel to serve its own geopolitical calculations and 
diplomacy in any prospective Arab-Israeli peace negotiations (Salloukh 2012:100). 
 
Iran and Hezbollah nevertheless continued to have a strong relation throughout the 
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1990s. The link between Khamenei and Hezbollah was strengthened and formalized, 
as the Iranian Supreme Leader was adopted as their marja’ by the party in 1995, and 
Hassan Nasrallah and Muhammad Yazbeck were designated in 2000 as his 
representatives in Lebanon (Mervin 2008a:83). 
  
In this context, Hezbollah’s participation in the 1992 legislative elections provoked a 
range of heated debates within the organisation, with two schools of thought 
emerging. A very small minority within Hezbollah, led by the ex Secretary General 
Sheikh Tufayli, opposed any integration into the political system,73 while the bulk of 
the leadership argued for a more pragmatic orientation (Blanford and Bourday 2007). 
Eventually the matter was submitted to Ayatollah Khameini for judgement, who 
issued a fatwa supporting the decision of the majority of the leadership to participate 
in the elections (Khatib 2014:24). Tufayli also distanced himself further from the 
leadership by attacking it for being “subordinate to the Christians” over its decision in 
1995 to back the extension of President Elias Hrawi’s Mandate (Yehia 1998). 
 
Growing disagreements between Hezbollah and Tufayli gradually appeared between 
the two actors, especially following the 1996 “Hunger’s Revolt” in the Bekaa and the 
call to overthrow the government in 1997. Tufayli was definitively expelled from the 
Islamic movement after he organised a separate demonstration from Hezbollah’s 
official march on Jerusalem Day in 1998 (Harb 2010:195; Daher 2008:274-275). The 
reasons for Tufayli's increasing defiance through the years towards the leadership of 
the Islamic movement are various, ranging from the refusal to accept his sidelining 
from leadership to his competition over control of the Bekaa (Daher 2008:274). He 
later became one of the most outspoken critics of Hezbollah and the leadership of 
the IRI, accusing both of corruption and of selling out the ideals of Iran's 1979 Islamic 
revolution adding that "Hezbollah is no longer a real liberation force but just a tool for 
Iranian interests” (Blanford and Bourday 2007).  
 
The Tufayli episode did not stop Hezbollah’s leadership policy of “Infitâh” and the 
Islamic movement has participated in all parliamentary and municipal elections since 
then. From 1992 to 2009, the party controlled the largest legislative blocs in the 
                                                            
73 Tufayli declared that the move ran contrary to Islam, which forbids participation in a political system that 
oppresses people (Yehia 1998). 
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National Assembly. Their elected positions were 12 seats (in 1992), 10 (1996), 12 
(2000), 14 (2004), 11 (2005), and 12 (2009) out of a total of 128 seats. In the various 
municipal elections, Hezbollah has also demonstrated its popularity, winning 87 
municipalities out of 142 in the South (61.2 percent), 36 municipalities out of 38 in the 
Bekaa and all of the six municipalities in the suburbs of Beirut (100 percent) in 2000 
(Hamzeh 2004:132-133). 
 
This period of “Infitâh” was also characterised by growing collaboration between 
Hezbollah and the Syrian-backed Lebanese Army and its security agencies, 
particularly following the election of General Emile Lahoud, former commander of the 
army, as President of Lebanon in 1998. This relationship was further cemented 
following the nomination of Maj. Gen. Jamil Al-Sayyid to the leadership of General 
Security. This position had traditionally been reserved for a Maronite, but shifted to 
Shi’a control in 1998 after then-President Lahoud appointed Al-Sayyid, his long-term 
army colleague (Hodeib 2013b). In the words of Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah (2012a), 
director of the Hezbollah think thank CCSD, Emile Lahoud's arrival to power in 1998 
began an alliance with the state on a strategic level regarding the resistance.74 Dr. 
Hassan Fadlallah, Hezbollah MP, also confirms the role of Emile Lahoud in 
strengthening the collaboration between the leadership of the army and Hezbollah, 
describing the latter as a partner of the resistance (Fadlallah 2014 cited in Bassam 
2014; Nassif 2014).75  
 
In addition to this, a number of analysts have pointed out the presence of Hezbollah 
in the state structure, securing especially key positions in the security apparatus: the 
military tribunal, general security and airport security. Several critical army posts are 
currently headed by individuals with ties to Hezbollah or its allies (ICG 2014:13), and 
                                                            
74 Hezbollah actually voted in August 2004 in favour of the amendment of the constitution, under the Syrian’s 
regime imposition, in order to allow for President Emile Lahoud to extend his Mandate for an additional 3 years. 
75 The close collaboration between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah was witnessed again in June 2013 in the 
military seizure of the mosque and the security compound of the Salafist cleric Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir in Saida, 
following the attack by its followers of a Lebanese army checkpoint, killing 16 soldiers and wounding 35. 
Reports emerged of Hezbollah’s role alongside the army in the fight against Al-Assir’s loyalists. On June 24 
2013, Manar TV showed live footage of uniformed soldiers arresting Assir fighters and chanting ‘Ya Zeinab’, a 
Shi’a religious cry. Future Television, owned by Hariri, showed video footage of fighters in the battle area 
wearing yellow armbands, presumably identifying themselves as Hezbollah. Some journalists (McClatchy and 
Yahoo) reported speaking to Hezbollah fighters on the ground and eyewitnesses who attested to the party’s role 
in the battle (Khoury 2013a). Again in mid September 2014, Shi’a residents of the northern Bekaa Valley stated 
that Hezbollah assisted the Lebanese army in firing mortar rounds and artillery rockets at the jihadists in the 
mountains outside Ersal (Blanford 2014b).  
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the General Security Director of the Interior Ministry (one of the two state security 
agencies) General Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, and the head of security at Beirut’s 
airport, Wafiq Shuqayr, are known to be close to Hezbollah (Khoury 2013a and ICG 
2008:3).7677 
 
This gradual acceptance of the political sectarian system was reflected in the new 
Manifesto of the party in 2009. Although it confirmed the position of the 1985 
manifesto, that political sectarianism was a major problem “which thwarts Lebanon’s 
reform and development” (Manifesto 2009), the new manifesto postponed any 
change to the system until a non-determined future date. Until that point 
“homogenous democracy” – a term used to describe the sectarian system – would 
remain “the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon, because it is the actual 
quintessence of the spirit of the constitution and the core of the Charter of the co-
existence” (Manifesto 2009, Section 3: State and Political System). In this 
contradictory sense, political sectarianism was described negatively but the sectarian 
system itself was upheld as the basis of co-existence. Previous to the Manifesto, 
Naim Qassem expressed a nearly similar position in his book declaring that “the 
suppression of political sectarianism was the best and healthiest way to alleviate the 
burden of the confessional system in Lebanon”, but at the same time “there is a need 
of an objective and calm debate, based on proofs and dialogue, to elaborate an 
adapted project and its mechanism of implementation, even on the long term” (cited 
in Qassem 2008:287).  
 
Likewise, Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah, the director of Hezbollah’s development think tank, 
the CCSD, has argued that the Lebanese sectarian system allowed a sectarian 
balance in political representation, adding that the nominations of senior officials 
                                                            
76 The General Security Director is also the one to decide the censorship of movies and on numerous occasions 
Iranian movies critical of the IRI were banned in Lebanon. For example the previous General Security Director 
Wafic Jezzini (2005-2010) had censored first the movie Perspepolis because it was considered by the censorship 
authority as “offensive to Muslims and to Iran” although he reversed his decision after strong opposition (The 
Daily Star 2008). Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim censored in 2011 the Iranian film "Green Days," which dealt with 
protests against the 2009 re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and in November 2014 the movie 
"The Silent Majority Speaks", which focuses on the 2009 “Green Movement”, was also banned. In these two 
cases, the censorship authority deemed these movies as insults “to a foreign country", in other words the IRI 
(The Daily Star 2014c).  
77 The Lebanese Army Intelligence is identified as cooperating with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, while 
the Information Branch, the intelligence arm of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), is seen as being connected 
with the Future Movement and the March 14 alliance.  
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should continue to respect this balance, while at the lower levels the cancellation of 
administrative sectarianism could be discussed (Fadlallah 2010). In an interview for 
this thesis, Fadlallah stated that Hezbollah took a tactical position towards the 
sectarian system, considering that it was now possible to change the system slowly 
from within through reforms (Fadlallah 2012a). Only through a consensus of 
Lebanese political parties could a solution be achieved, argued Fadlallah, adding that 
Hezbollah could not ignore the fears of the Christian community regarding the end of 
the sectarian political system (Fadlallah 2012a). Similarly, this rather unclear position 
was reflected in the debate around the proposal for the formation of a national 
committee to discuss the elimination of sectarianism made by Nabih Berry, head of 
the Amal movement and Chair of the Lebanese Parliament since 1992, in which 
Nasrallah, who supported this initiative, argued that “this committee or body may 
continue its dialogue for five, ten, twenty or even thirty years” (cited in Shapira 2009). 
 
Hezbollah suspiciously viewed attempts to challenge the sectarian system from 
outside the parliament. Hezbollah did not participate or mobilize its members to 
demonstrate in the demonstrations of the beginning of 2011, calling for an end of the 
sectarian regime that started in February 2011 and which gathered more than 3,000 
people. The mobilisation then grew to 10,000 and 25,000 people on 6 and 20 March 
demonstrations respectively. Its organisers included leftist and secularist political 
groups, NGOs, gender and sexual preference collectives and many independent 
activists (Abi Yaghi 2012). On the contrary, Hezbollah, as well as other political 
forces, warned their members not to participate (Chiit 2011; Daou 2011). The Islamic 
movement also did not participate in the protest that gathered around 300 
participants outside the parliament to protest against the ‘Orthodox law’ on February 
19, 2013 (Al-Akhbar English 2013b). The electoral “Orthodox Gathering” Law, which 
was promoted by Hezbollah ally the FPM and endorsed by all of Lebanon’s Maronite 
leaders, entrenched Lebanon even further into sectarianism by allowing voters to 
vote for candidates that were exclusively from their confession (Nakbi 2011). At that 
time, Hezbollah, although supporting officially and rhetorically an electoral law based 
on a single constituency and proportional representation that maintains the same 
sectarian representation (Qassem 2008:260; Fadlallah 2010; Fadlallah 2012b; Orient 
Le Jour 2012b), supported and voted in favour of the electoral “Orthodox Gathering” 
Law in joint parliamentary committees (Orient Le Jour 2013a). The law was 
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nevertheless finally abandoned. 
 
Hezbollah went from being a radical anti-systemic party in the 1980s to a party 
participating at all levels of the Lebanese political system. This is not in contradiction 
with the fact that Hezbollah never stopped declaring that an Islamic state was its 
preferred option. Hassan Nasrallah declared in 1994:  
 
"The solution, in our opinion, is the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Lebanon and beyond...I cannot honestly say I do not 
advocate an Islamic state...but I do not wish [to impose this] by 
force or violence, rather we prefer to wait for the day that we 
succeed in convincing our countrymen – by means of dialogue 
and in an open atmosphere – that the only alternative is the 
founding of an Islamic state". (Al-Ahed 1994 cited in Wärn 
2012:23)  
 
In 2004, Hezbollah’s declaration “Identity and Goals” stated that one of its ideals is 
the establishment of a “pure” Islamic state (cited in Alagha 2006:245-246). The Vice 
President of the party Naim Qassem (2008:47) has also written in his book that the 
preferred option for Hezbollah is an Islamic state, as stated in the Manifesto of 1985, 
but this should not be imposed against the will of the population and therefore is not 
an option today in Lebanon as a majority would refuse it. Hezbollah’s leadership has 
indeed be keen to stress that this objective was not a practical option in the near 
future given Lebanon’s confessional and sectarian make up. In addition, no mention 
of establishing an Islamic state was made in the municipal and parliamentary 
elections programmes since 1992 (Alagha 2007:104). Despite the absence of the 
establishment of an Islamic state in the Manifesto of 2009, this remains a 
fundamental and founding principle of Hezbollah. Nasrallah actually admitted during 
the presentation of the new Manifesto that it was essentially a “political document”, 
which did not touch on “matters of creed, ideology or thought” (cited in Blanford 
2011:480). He said for example that the Islamic movement’s view on the Wilâyat al-
Faqîh “is not a political stand that can be subjected to revision” (cited in Blanford 
2011:480). 
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Hezbollah’s downplaying of the enforcement of an Islamic state has not prevented 
the Islamic movement from opposing several propositions regarding the 
secularization of the state. Hezbollah has indeed declared its opposition to any kind 
of possible personal status civil law alongside Islamic Status law, and declared such 
propositions as being anti-Islamic (Qassem 2008:288 and Orient Le Jour 2011b). 
Qassem, for example, considers that the Islamic status law governs the social 
relationship between spouses, children, divorce, inheritance and all the elements of 
marital life. He adds that “it’s a divine law, and what has been authorised by God 
cannot be forbidden by anyone, and what has been forbidden by God cannot be 
authorised by anyone” (Qassem 2008:288). Sheikh Naim Qassem said that the 
personal status among Muslims in particular "does not constitute a material idea, but 
is an integral part of faith, creed, religion and commitment" (cited in Orient Le Jour 
2011b). He added that any attempt to go against the (religious community) status is 
religiously prohibited. The head of the Sharia commission within Hezbollah, Sheikh 
Muhammad Yazbeck (Orient Le Jour 2011b), followed the same logic saying that the 
solution is not, as some proclaim, "to separate the state from religion". 
 
This evolution of Hezbollah’s position towards the political system has important 
implications for the party’s relationship to Lebanese neoliberalism. Most particularly, 
its increasing participation at all levels of the political system since 1992, including 
national and municipal administrative bodies, has meant that the party has become 
directly responsible for implementing many of the reforms advocated by the 
Lebanese elite and international institutions. Even whilst in opposition, the party has 
increasingly subordinated opposition to these reforms to its growing interests within 
the political system. The tensions this has generated within the organisation can be 
seen through a closer examination of Hezbollah’s economic programme. 
 
In addition to the formal role that Hezbollah plays in Lebanon’s political economy, its 
integration into the system has also encouraged forms of clientelism and corruption. 
Even close allies of Hezbollah have raised this issue. Zyad Abs (Orient Le Jour 
2012c), for example, a member of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and one of the 
main actors behind the Memorandum of Understanding between Hezbollah and the 
FPM, has criticized the fact that "it is in Hezbollah controlled regions, such as the 
southern suburbs, that we saw the development of mafias of motors, of forgery 
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networks, kidnapping for ransom and taxes collected illegally on certain businesses”. 
In 2010, Hezbollah was faced by a huge internal corruption scandal following the 
collapse of a pyramid scheme allegedly led by one of the richest men in the South of 
Lebanon, Salah Ezzedine. Ezzedine had close ties to the party and its leadership. He 
owned the Dar al-Hadi publishing house, which handles many of Hezbollah’s 
publications and is named after Nasrallah’s son who was killed in 1997 in battle 
against Israel (Blanford 2011:475). The collapse of Ezzedine resulted in the loss of 
$300 million to $1 billion for some 10,000 Lebanese Shi’a. After the collapse, 
Ezzedine was dubbed the “Lebanese Bernie Madoff” by Lebanese newspapers, 
while bankers declared that it was the biggest fraud of its kind the country had ever 
seen (The Star 2009; Worth 2009; Hersh 2010). More recently, Hezbollah has been 
accused of importing hundreds of untested medications into the country. Those 
involved include Abdul Latif Fneish, the brother of Hezbollah Minister Muhammad 
Fneish, and four companies linked to the organisation (Kraiche 2012; Now Lebanon 
2012; Orient Le Jour 2012d; El-Cheikh and Saghyieh 2013a).  
 
Journalist Nicolas Blanford was reporting at the beginning of 2015 increasing 
allegations of corruption within Hezbollah following the decline of financial assistance 
from the IRI to Hezbollah because of falling oil revenues and the consequences of 
internalional sanctions against Iran. He wrote that the Hezbollah-run Rassul al-
Azzam hospital in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which has treated hundreds of 
casualties evacuated from Syrian battlefields, started to pay its suppliers every six 
months, instead of every three months, and with an Iranian official flying in specially 
to handle the transfers so as to prevent pilfering (Blanforfd 2015). Hezbollah has also 
been accused of being involved in illegal transnational activities as a source of 
funding for the Islamic movement such as: bank frauds, currency counterfeiting, drug 
trafficking, the manufacture and sale of fake goods, intellectual property piracy and 
the trade in African “blood diamonds” (Blanford 2011:356). 
 
3.5 Hezbollah’s Response to Neoliberal Reform 
 
Throughout three decades of neoliberal reform, Hezbollah continued to portray itself 
as the party of the “oppressed”, which opposes deprivation and champions the rights 
of farmers, the poor, workers and the homeless (Harb 2010:16). In its manifesto of 
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2009, Hezbollah wrote: 
 
“Savage capitalist forces, led by the USA and Western 
countries and embodied mainly in international monopoly 
networks of companies that cross nations and continents, 
networks of various international establishments especially the 
financial ones backed by superior military force have led to 
more contradictions and conflicts – of which not less important- 
are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to 
the conflicts of poverty and wealth … these savage capitalist 
forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and 
destruction of identities as well as imposing the most dangerous 
type of cultural, national, economic as well as social theft.” 
(Hezbollah Manifesto 2009, Section 1: American-Western 
Hegemony and the world)  
 
Despite this militant tone, Hezbollah’s theoretical conception and policy orientation 
have not presented any systematic alternative to neoliberalism in Lebanon. Instead, 
the organisation’s overall attitude has been an attempt to balance its professed social 
justice goals with consistent support for neoliberal measures such as liberalisation, 
privatisation, and fostering the growth of the private sector. We can find this 
contradiction in the political thought of previous important figures of Shi’a Islamic 
fundamentalism such as Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and especially Khomeini.  
 
Al-Sadr wrote two books (among many others), “Falsafatunâ” (Our Philosophy) in 
1959 and “Iqtisâdunâ” (Our Economics) in 1961, with the aim of confronting Marxism 
and secular thoughts. These texts were very popular among Iraqi youth during this 
period (Baram 1994:539). In Falsafatunâ, his main thesis was to show Islam as the 
provider of a philosophy superior to other currents of thought, particularly Marxism. 
He advocated that the best solution to the plight of the population is the Islamization 
of society and an Islamic state. A follower of Al-Sadr acknowledged that Falsafatunâ 
was written with the aim of opposing the powerful communist tide during the time of 
Qasim's rule in Iraq between 1958 and 1963 (Mallat 1988:707).  
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The second book, Iqtisâdunâ, is structured along similar lines, criticizing extensively 
Marxism (specifically Capital volume 1) and attempting to demonstrate that Marx 
underplays spiritualism in favour of economic reductionism. He promoted an Islamic 
economic system, which consists of private and public property, while refuting both 
socialism and capitalism (Mervin 2007:304-305). In his opinion, socio-economic 
problems are the result of the misconduct of man. Two reasons are put forward by 
Al-Sadr regarding socio-economic problems: (1) the oppressive character of man, 
arising from his self-love; and (2) man's inefficiency in the utilization of economic 
resources (Aziz 1993). According to him, the solution is therefore religious. It is an 
Islamic solution and not a materialistic one. He argues that the Islamic state, which 
will implement an Islamic economic system, sets the direction of economic activities 
while giving individuals the right of private ownership to achieve asocial goal. He 
adds that the government's role in the Islamic state is to oversee and regulate 
economic activities, while adding that the Islamic government is free to adopt a wide 
range of economic policies from full control of the economy to free-enterprise in order 
to achieve its social goals (Aziz 1993). 
  
Meanwhile, Khomeini developed various economic discourses according to the 
particular political period, adopting its economic discourses according to the interests 
of its Islamic movement. In 1979-82, at the height of Iran’s revolution and popular 
mobilisation, Khomeini had presented Islam through the lens of social justice, 
praising the oppressed (who were equated with the poorest sections of society) and 
condemning the oppressors understood as the rich, the greedy palace dwellers and 
their foreign patrons (Abrahamian 1993:133). This radical rhetoric was instrumental 
in mobilising the urban populace against the Pahlavi monarchy. But after 1982, 
during the consolidation of the new Islamic regime of Khomeini and associated 
repression of the opposition (especially the left and progressive forces) he 
increasingly equated Islam with respect for private property and depicted the bazaar 
(market place) as an essential pillar of society. He now progressively delineated 
three main classes: an upper class (tabaqeh-e bala) constituted of the remnants of 
the old wealthy families; a middle class (tabaqeh-e motavasset) formed of clerics, 
intellectuals, civil servants, merchants, shopkeepers and tradesmen; and a lower 
class (tabaqeh-e payin) composed of labourers, peasants and slum dwellers 
(Abrahamian 1993:51). The “oppressed” ceased to be an economic category 
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describing the deprived masses, becoming instead a political label for the new 
regime's supporters and including wealthy bazaar merchants (Abrahamian 1993:53). 
The class-struggle rhetoric was significantly diminished with Khomeini arguing that 
Islam sought harmonious relationships between factory owners and workers and 
between landlords and peasants, while warning that "if these class antagonisms are 
not alleviated, their inevitable explosion would destroy the whole Islamic Republic” 
(cited in Abrahamian 1993:51). 
 
In much the same way as Sadr and Khomeini, Hezbollah’s economic thought has 
consistently upheld the market and defence of private property as a key tenet, 
despite also professing allegiance to social justice goals.78 Throughout the neoliberal 
period in Lebanon, this theoretical orientation meant that Hezbollah’s support for 
measures such as privatisation, liberalisation and opening up to foreign capital 
inflows, has not been viewed by the organisation as being in contradiction to its 
commitment to addressing poverty and inequality. Understood within a calculus of 
strengthening the party’s political position and clientelist networks, Hezbollah may 
have expressed a limited rhetorical opposition to specific policies and their outcomes, 
but it has not presented any consistent or principled opposition to the overall 
trajectory of neoliberal reform in Lebanon. 
 
These characteristics are most clearly articulated in the work of Hezbollah’s 
development think tank, the CCSD, which has organised several large conferences 
around economic and social issues, including a 1999 conference entitled “The 
economic and social crisis in Lebanon, and alternatives” and a 2012 meeting around 
the theme of “Reform of social policies in Lebanon: from selective subsidy towards 
welfare state”. During fieldwork for this thesis, I attended the latter conference held in 
Beirut at the Hotel Semiramis on 15 and 16 March 2012. Although the conference's 
introductory document noted that “it is necessary in a country such as Lebanon to 
seek unifying social policies ensuring community security and guaranteeing welfare”, 
its major emphasis echoed the neoliberal language of Lebanese policy makers, 
highlighting “motivating growth” and facilitating “the established monetary and 
financial objectives [of the state]” as the key goals (CCSD 2012). Muhammad Raad 
                                                            
78 Abrahamian notes that Khomeini remained constant in his defence of private property throughout his entire 
political life (Abrahamian 1993:51). 
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(2012), head of Hezbollah’s Deputy bloc in parliament, summed up this orientation in 
his introductory speech, declaring that “the objective of social policies are to 
guarantee social peace, achieve well being and stimulate development in Lebanon 
… the mission of this conference is to find a formula that conciliates between 
achieving this objective and preserving the competitiveness of the economic sectors”. 
 
This balance between ameliorating the impact of neoliberal reform while promoting 
growth and private sector development is also found in the writings of two prominent 
Hezbollah thinkers, Ali Fayyad (a former director of CCSD and currently a MP for 
Hezbollah in the Lebanese parliament), and Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah (the current 
director of CCSD) alongside the collective works undertaken by the CCSD under 
their leaderships. On the one hand, both authors are critical of some aspects of 
globalisation and the implementation of various economic agreements, including 
those with the IMF and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Fayyad 2008:15). The 
CCSD, in a collective work (2009:16) and Fadlallah (2008:13), also condemned the 
liberalisation of trade in 2001 because it hurt small enterprises not competitive 
enough to compete with foreign products. It also criticised the reduction of public 
social spending and the increase in indirect taxes (CCSD 2008a:24). In addition, the 
lack of transparency and equity in development policy are recurrent criticisms of 
CCSD works (Fadlallah 2008:13).  
 
Despite these criticisms, however, both authors continue to place a primacy on the 
support of the private sector based upon “non-ideological motivated choices that 
enjoy a general consensus and guarantee the interests of all the parties and sectors 
of the society” (Fadlallah 2008:16; Fayyad 2008:13). They argue that economic and 
social decisions should not be taken at the expense of the private sector (CCSD 
2009). In this regard, budget rationalisation is put forward as necessary in areas such 
as health and basic education (CCSD 2009:42). Along similar lines, both Fayyad and 
Fadlallah (CCSD 2008a:62) have supported the privatisation of the state electricity 
company, Electricité du Liban (EdL), and praised this as a positive outcome of the 
Paris III agreement that could help the general finances of the state. Indeed, 
Hezbollah Minister Muhammad Fneich was an important actor in the on-going 
privatisation of EdL (Verdeil 2008) as Minister of Energy and Water between July 
2005 and November 2006, arguing for the possibility of private companies to provide 
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their electricity to the network (Verdeil 2009). Fneich called for the full privatisation of 
electricity production stating that experience showed that the "state is an 
unsuccessful merchant" (cited in Habib 2008), while declaring in addition that the 
government “should not be involved in any commercial activity, adding that the 
private sector should be given a bigger role in some of the public departments' affairs 
which have commercial nature” (cited in Habib 2008). According to Fneich, the 
private sector should be responsible for the operation and maintenance of power 
plants, as well as importing fuel oil (Habib 2008). 
 
Even Hezbollah-affiliated trade unionists have supported this privatisation, with one 
trade unionist interviewed for this thesis noting:  
 
“If privatization is good for the people why not? It might open 
new opportunities for workers and I am ready to listen to what it 
can give. If the privatization can settle the problem of electricity 
(regarding the problems of provisions of the EdL and to secure 
stable jobs to its employees) I say yes.” (Zeid 2012)  
 
This attempt to balance social justice goals with neoliberal reform is further indicated 
in comments by Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah. He affirmed that “the economic direction of 
the party leans towards the social market economy, neither open liberalism nor 
socialism” (Fadlallah 2012a). He added that he is in favour of the free market, 
because there is no alternative to it in Lebanon. He nevertheless emphasized the 
need of a stronger state, and not an economy that impoverishes the poor for the 
benefit of the rich (Fadlallah 2012a). He has also said that Hezbollah does not 
oppose a liberalised economy or the privatisation of public enterprises if this process 
is transparent and respects social and economic balances (Fadlallah 2010). He 
declared that social justice is possible through a liberal economy if it is well regulated 
and the productive economy plays a role in it (Fadlallah 2010). 
 
In reality, however, this orientation towards a “social market economy” has tended to 
be eclipsed by Hezbollah’s consistent support for neoliberal measures. This has 
been the case whether the organisation has been in opposition or part of the ruling 
government. Following the 2003 Paris II Conference, while Hezbollah was part of the 
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opposition, it did not take a position or offer any assessment of the social 
consequences of privatising state assets including Middle East Airlines (MEA) (Abla 
2003; Nsouli 2007), a company that employed several hundred Shi’a who were 
subsequently made redundant. The privatisation of MEA led to considerable protests 
against the prospect of 1,200 to 1,500 workers losing their jobs (Al-Bayyan 2001). Ali 
Taher Yassine, the current head of the Hezbollah-linked al-Wafa trade union (see 
chapter 6), was involved in the negotiations around the lay-offs as a representative of 
the workers. In an interview for this thesis, he claimed that the proposed privatisation 
was not necessarily against the interests of the workers or the wider population 
(Yassin 2012). Moreover, he stated that Hezbollah has no principled positions 
against privatisation, but that each case must be studied to determine whether it has 
positive or negative implications for the country’s economy (Yassin 2012). He 
explained that: 
 
“the company used to lose money every year, it was a burden 
on the Lebanese society and, the company had no stability. 
Privatisation became a necessity and the state was still able to 
keep the majority of shares of the company. This solution was 
the least harsh solution for the workers. We protected a number 
of workers and eased the pressure on them, but at the end of 
the day we have to make a balance between the interests of the 
workers and the needs of the Lebanese economy. I don’t want 
to protect the rights of the workers and then the company dies. 
It does not make sense. The first right is the right to work, then 
other rights come.” (Yassin 2012) 
 
Since Hezbollah’s participation in successive Lebanese governments from 2005, no 
additional funds were allocated to sectors like education and health or the productive 
sectors of economy. There was no attempt to implement progressive taxation. On 
January 4 2007, the parliament, including Hezbollah, adopted the plan conducted by 
then Prime Minister Siniora, which included: austerity measures aimed at bringing the 
debt down from 180 percent to 144 percent of GDP in 2011, VAT increase from 10 
percent to 15 percent, privatisation of the mobile telephone sector, elimination of the 
budget deficit in five years, initiatives to attract foreign investors, and fiscal reform of 
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the administration (Vivien 2007). 
 
Even when Hezbollah and its allies of the March 8 movement controlled the 
government during Miqati’s government between 2011 and 2013, it did not challenge 
Hariri’s policy legacy. They continued the process of privatisation in the electricity 
company EdL, promoted a project to liberalize the system of house rent, which could 
force more than 180,000 families out of their homes (see below) and rejected a 
program by Charbel Nahas 79  to increase wages and social benefits including 
universal health coverage of workers and transport indemnities (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6). 
 
Budgets for the productive sectors have not seen any increase, except for a very 
small increase in the Ministry of Agriculture – and, in this case, only to expand its 
bureaucracy (see below). In the 2012 budget, the accounts of the CDR as well as 
some other accounts were kept off the budget, which meant that the supervision and 
governance of public spending would remain unchanged. This is in opposition to 
Hezbollah previous claims for more transparency (Saif 2012). The increase in the 
salary scale, which was accepted by the Minister of Education in 2012, was not 
included in the 2012 budget (Saif 2012). 
 
In the 2013 draft budget of the Miqati government, supported by Hezbollah, a number 
of provisions raised taxes on many everyday items while creating loopholes and 
workarounds for banks, real estate developers and sectarian institutions. The draft 
notably included an increase in the VAT from 10 to 12 percent, which would raise the 
poverty rate to 32 percent (Chaaban and Salti 2009:7). Five-year tax exemptions 
(beginning from the date of the law’s issuing) were given to hotels in areas that the 
state wishes to develop. Tourist establishments built in the last three years would 
also be exempted from taxes on profits for the next five years (Zbeeb 2012b). In 
2014, with the establishment of a new national unity government led by Prime 
Minister Tamam Salam, Hezbollah member Hussein Hassan (the newly appointed 
                                                            
79 Charbel Nahas is a political personality who was a former Minister of Telecomunication between 2009 and 
2011, and then Labour Minister between 2011 and February 2012 in Najib Miqati's second government. He was 
representing in government the bloc Change and Reform, which is headed by General Michel Aoun. He 
submitted his resignation to Michel Aoun on the 21st of February 2012, and officially resigned on the 22nd of 
February 2012, arguing that all of his colleagues in government were preventing any effective improvement in 
workers' rights.  
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Minister of Industry) thanked the Parliament for decreasing tax on exports by 50 
percent and congratulated industrialists for this long awaited accomplishment 
(National News Agency (NNA) 2014a). He added that this was the first step in 
support of exports (NNA 2014a).  
 
In summary, while Hezbollah has periodically condemned the outcomes of capitalist 
development in Lebanon at a rhetorical level, it has been a willing participant in the 
elaboration of neoliberal policies through successive Lebanese governments. As the 
first section of this chapter observed, these policies have particularly concentrated on 
urban renewal and reform, linked to the financialisation of the economy – and have 
led to the on-going marginalisation of other sectors such as agriculture. For this 
reason, a more detailed understanding of Hezbollah’s orientation to these processes 
is best illustrated through an examination of three key areas that lie at the juncture of 
these outcomes: (1) Municipal urban policy in Hezbollah-controlled areas, (2) 
Debates around the liberalisation of the rent market, and (3) Agricultural 
development. In each of these areas, we can discern Hezbollah’s support for 
neoliberal reforms, coupled with the organisation’s attempts to strengthen its 
clientelistic networks and influence in Shi’a dominated areas. 
 
3.6 Municipal Policies, the Case of Ghobeyri 
 
In Lebanon, municipal councils are accorded a great deal of influence over urban 
planning, zoning regulations and housing policy. In this context, the municipality of 
Ghobeyri, in southern Beirut, constitutes a particularly instructive example of 
Hezbollah policies at the local level. Ghobeyri occupies a large part of Dahyeh, and is 
the location of the headquarters and associations of Hezbollah.80 Mona Harb has 
noted that, in Ghobeyri, “the largest municipal committees (those of work, education, 
health, financial and social) are in the hands of Hezbollah executives or individuals 
who worked with the party through its social associations” and, for this reason, it 
provides “a microcosm of the operation of Hezbollah on the field” (Harb 2001:7). In 
                                                            
80 Ghobeyri has been controlled by Hezbollah since the end of the Civil War. Its inhabitants differentiate 
themselves according to various categories: national (Lebanese, Palestinians, Syrians) and regional. The region 
of origin sometimes shapes the organisation of a neighbourhood, for example, families from the same village in 
South Lebanon or the Bekaa are aggregated in a similar place. In addition, there is a differentiation between the 
“aslyiin” originaly from the neighbourhoods and the “wafidin” newcomers or migrants, who differentiate 
themselves according to their date of arrival (Harb 2010:82). 
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Ghobeyri, and Dahyeh more widely, Hezbollah’s urban restructuring policy has 
closely followed the main precepts of neoliberal reform – the prioritisation of private, 
individual ownership of real estate and the marginalisation of existing residents. It is a 
policy that, according to Mona Fawaz, has acted to “consolidate spatial segregation, 
the privatization of public spaces, the gentrification of its areas of intervention, and 
further delegation of communal or public services to private channels of provision” 
(Fawaz 2014:922-923).  
 
One of the consequences of this policy has been the increasing polarisation of wealth 
in the municipality. On one hand, the area is home to a number of expensive hotels 
and touristic developments, including BHV-Monoprix, Mariott, Summerland and the 
Coral Beach (Harb 2002:133). At the same time, large numbers of poor residents live 
in dilapidated and informal housing arrangements. This includes the Palestinian 
refugee camp of Shatila, the site of an infamous massacre by Phalangist forces. 
 
Muhammad Said Al-Khansa, who is a founding member of Hezbollah and has been 
active in the various party social organisations, has been the Mayor of the 
municipality of Ghobeyri since 1998. He comes from a large and respected clan that 
dominates the busy trade in automobile parts, according to Norton (2007:104). He 
adds that the “Al-Khansa are represented across a rich variety of business” (Norton 
2007:104). 
 
With increased powers as a result of the 1997 Law, the Mayor of Dahyeh Al-Khansa 
has followed a municipal development policy that is in close synergy with the urban 
renewal schemes launched under Hariri. Most saliently, this policy has focused on 
attracting private capital flows and speculative investment into real estate property, 
while marginalising and dispossessing poor communities who have long been 
resident in the area (Harb 2009).  
 
During an interview for this thesis, Al-Khansa confirmed this orientation and his 
prioritisation of private real estate development in Ghoberyi.  He cited numerous 
examples, including two large malls directly linked to the liberalisation of financial and 
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real estate markets through the 2000s – the Beirut Mall (2006),81 funded by Saudi 
investors, and BHV (1998), a large French multinational company. In addition, Al-
Khansa has overseen the development of commercial tourist resorts (Summerland, 
funded by Saudi and Lebanese investors, and Coral Beach), luxury hotels (Monroe 
and Mariott) and the Cité Sportive (a sport centre) (Harb 2002:137; Al-Khansa 2012). 
The Mayor explains his support for these developments through the taxes they pay to 
the municipality, and characterises them as an example of “progress” that responds 
to the consumer demands of the residents of Dahyeh (Harb 2002:137; Al-Khansa 
2012). They were provided with numerous incentives, including fast track permits, 
construction subsidies and the development of associated infrastructure (Al-Khansa 
2010; Al-Khansa 2012). In an interview, Al-Khansa commented that “the region of 
Dahyeh has witnessed an urban renaissance over the past years, and it is not 
surprising that there are luxury apartments in the area of Ghobeyri ranging between 
800,000 dollars to one million dollars” (Al-Khansa 2010).  
 
While expressing pride in this on-going construction boom and real estate 
investments from wealthy Shi’a businessmen of the diaspora and from Arabs in the 
Gulf, Al-Khansa has another project planned called “New Dahyeh”. This new 
neighbourhood aims to attract diplomatic buildings, large malls, retailers, 
businessmen and investments from the Shi’a diaspora. Al-Khansa explained that this 
project had the intention to keep the most prosperous Shi’a classes in Dahyeh and to 
not see them depart for other areas of Beirut (Al-Khansa 2012).  
 
While these developments are planned, the Shatila refugee camp and informal 
neighbourhoods in Ghobeyri, including Sabra, Horch Al-Qatil and Jnah, are provided 
with only minimal and ineffective urban services (Harb 2009). The Mayor commented 
in his interview that he would like to see the residents of these informal 
neighbourhoods sell their lands and leave the area in order to build new buildings for 
middle class families – a goal first suggested by Rafiq Hariri in his incomplete 1996 
Elissar Project that aimed at restructuring the residential profile of Beirut through an 
expansion of highways and the removal of poorer residents (Al-Khansa 2010; Al-
Khansa 2012). More precisely, the project cited the western coastal sections of 
                                                            
81 In the case of the Beirut Mall, Al-Khansa was able to choose a percentage of the employees to recruit in order 
to favour people from Dahyeh, and most probably with links to himself (Deeb and Harb 2013:71). 
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Dahyeh that are an area of informal settlements with myriad unsettled property rights 
issues (Deeb and Harb 2013:233).  Indeed, Al-Khansa has expressed his support for 
the Elissar Project, claiming that it was a strategic choice that would enable 
increased tax collection from residents in the area. In 1996, at the beginning of the 
Elissar project, Hezbollah actually “convinced”, as explained by Lara Deeb and Mona 
Harb (2013:233), residents to accept Elissar’s financial compensation and leave their 
homes in order to facilitate the highways needed to complete Hariri’s reconstruction 
of downtown Beirut. They add that this clearly showed Hezbollah's prioritization of 
national political manoeuvrings and alliances over its constituents' rights (Deeb and 
Harb 2013:233). Mona Harb, however, has countered “that Hezbollah is interested in 
the Elissar model as a way to ensure that 'the seashore is liberated' for lucrative real 
estate development, which will benefit the class of bourgeois developers in its 
constituency” (Harb cited in Ohrstrom and Quilty 2007). 
 
Al-Khansa’s goal of spatially transforming Ghobeyri through the removal of informal 
communities is further indicated on the municipality’s website, which records 
destruction of ‘illegal settlements’ and lauds the joint efforts of the municipality, the 
police, and the army to demolish poorer, unregistered housing in order to preserve 
the “interests of all” (Ghobeyri municipality 2013). The Union of Municipalities of the 
Suburbs (Dahyeh), has echoed this orientation in declarations against informal 
dwellings – condemning them as violations of private property rights – and calling on 
the municipality and security agencies to remove all such housing from the area 
(Slab News 2013). In implementing these policies, Hezbollah has adopted a 
discourse that sees public space as a potential site of disorder (fawda). In addition to 
the privatisation of these areas, they have been earmarked for trash disposal sites 
(Fawaz 2007:22-23). These kinds of representations echo contemporary neoliberal 
language that justifies intensified securitisation and control over public access and 
use of municipal space (Fawaz 2007:22-23).  
 
3.7 Lebanon’s House Rent Policy 
 
The municipal development model embraced by Hezbollah in Ghobeyri confirms the 
organisation’s embrace of policies aimed at restructuring the urban space in line with 
the interests of capital accumulation. This same orientation can be seen in 
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Hezbollah’s attitude towards a new liberalisation law for house rents that was 
eventually passed by the Lebanese Parliament in May 2014. 
 
In 1992, following the end of the Civil War, two laws were passed in Lebanon (Rent 
Acts no.159 and 160) which froze all housing rental agreements signed before this 
date and thus helped to protect poorer communities from rent inflation and the 
possibility of eviction (Martot 2012). In 2012, however, a new law was proposed by 
the Administration and Justice Parliamentary Committee – a committee that included 
Hezbollah – to liberalise these pre-1992 house rents so that they would rise over a 
period of six years to current market levels. The projected rise in house rents is very 
high, and most tenants would not have been able to cope with it (Andraos 2012).82 
The new law also gave owners the right to evict tenants in the case where they could 
not afford to pay at the new level (Abou Zaki 2012b). 
 
These proposals raised considerable fears that the 180,000 families currently renting 
at pre-1992 levels would face the loss of their accommodation. A large proportion of 
this number is made up of elderly people, and it is estimated that 65 percent of those 
affected live in poverty.83 As Rana Andraos has noted, the significant gaps between 
income and rents means that people on “a minimum wage of around $500” would 
find it difficult to obtain housing in a situation where the “average annual rent is 
between $7-10,000 in the capital and suburbs” (Andraos 2012). Bruno Marot 
predicted:  
 
“the rapid deletion of House Rent Acts n°159 and 160 — 
meaning the liberalization of the whole housing stock — will 
confront many households with a housing market they cannot 
afford. Massive evictions towards the periphery should be 
feared and could result in the rise of social and territorial 
inequality between gentrified central urban areas and 
peripheries coping with a substantial influx of pauperised 
                                                            
82 The bill envisages an increase of about 20 percent of the difference between the old and the current rent during 
the first year following the implementation of the law. At the end of the initial six years period, the tenant must 
sign a lease contracts with duration of three years minimum. 
83 Three-quarters of the apartments affected by the new law are in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Abu Zaki 2012; 
Abdallah 2012). 
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families. This process would be far from being harmless in a 
society where the socio-sectarian fabric is still largely 
contentious.” (Marot 2012)  
 
Despite these fears, the proposed law was met with acclaim by banks and real estate 
developers who predicted a large increase in land prices following the removal of rent 
caps (Abou Zaki 2012b). One business magazine noted:  
 
“With buildings being vacated and renovated, and others being 
torn down for new projects … $50 billion could be pumped into 
the economy in the coming years. A back of the envelope 
calculation of 30,000 buildings being re-developed at an 
average of $500,000, would generate $15 billion and potentially 
billions more in associated services.” (Cochrane 2012) 
 
In an interview for this thesis, the head of the National Federation of Trade Union of 
Workers and Employees in Lebanon (known as FENASOL) and LCP member, 
Castro Abdallah, argued that:  
 
“The new law regarding house rents is in the interests of the big 
companies, foreign investments and banks. The most important 
investments are made in the real estate sector. They want to 
liberalize the rents because the price of lands went up, this 
concerns 180,000 renting families that they want to take out in 
the next 6 years and put them in other regions. They want to 
create new demographics on the ground. Want to push people 
back in their sectarian regions. They want to achieve what they 
were not able to do during the Civil War. Sectarian cantons.” 
(Abdallah 2012) 
 
On the main beneficiaries of this law, Hisham Ashkar has argued: 
 
“In sum, property owners are the main beneficiaries, since this 
reform allows them to have total control on their properties, and 
 126 
to maximize the capitalization on them. Tenants are the real 
losers, since they lost all their privileges, and most of them will 
be forced out of their homes. As for the real-estate 
investors/developers, they do not really benefit from this reform, 
since it strengthens property owners’ negotiation position, in a 
sector already characterized by the scarcity of its prime 
resource: land. A situation that will force investors/developers to 
compromise, to share a bigger part of the perceived profit with 
property owners, thus cutting down their own profit.” (Ashkar 
2014a)  
 
In the context of this highly contested debate over the rental laws, Hezbollah has 
been a prominent supporter of the new changes. In an interview for this thesis, Abd 
Al-Halim Fadlallah (2012a) from the CCSD stated that he was in favour of the new 
law and considered the fixed low house rents a problem and unsustainable for the 
owner, although he added that total liberalisation of the sector may not be the best 
solution because of its probable negative consequences on the 180,000 families 
concerned. Once again, we see Hezbollah’s general support for market reform 
coupled with an expression of social justice concerns.  
 
At the level of practical intervention however, these concerns around the possible 
implications of the law have not led Hezbollah to engage in any opposition to the law. 
The union leader Castro Abdallah (2012) (see above) stated in an interview that 
Hezbollah did not participate in any demonstrations against the law and has not 
supported the Association of the Owners of Rental Buildings, which defended the 
tenants. In April 2014, the law to liberalise the pre-1992 rent contracts was voted in 
the Lebanese parliament, and all Hezbollah deputies voted in favour with the 
exception of Walid Sukkarieh, Hezbollah MP, (who criticized the law as a gross 
violation of the rights of the tenants) (Noujeim 2014). A proposal by the Follow-Up 
Committee of the National Conference of Tenants to include a new housing plan for 
the poor was not included in the bill.84 In response to the passing of the bill, activists 
have continued to mobilise against the expected eviction of tenants and the 
                                                            
84 The bill did establish a temporary fund to help the poor pay their increased rent, but sceptics fear it is not a 
long term solution and will eventually lead to the eviction of thousands of families (Abizeid 2014). 
 127 
gentrification of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Hezbollah, however, has not participated 
in these protests (NNA 2014b).85  
 
3.8 The Bekaa Valley 
 
As the previous chapter detailed, the agricultural sector has been one of the most 
neglected economic sectors in Lebanon since the independence of the country. On 
many occasions, Hezbollah has organized few series of workshops on the Bekaa 
economoy and engaged in some small investment plans in the region, particularly 
after the revolt led by Tufaily in 1997 in which some protestors accused Hezbollah of 
acquiescing to the policies of the Hariri’s government and dismissing the Bekaa’s 
grievances (Abisaab M. and Abisaab R. 2014:134). The Islamic movement has also 
claimed to support more investment for poorer and marginalised farmers, but its 
presence in government since 2005 has not seen this take place despite the fact that 
the party was in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture between 2009 and 2014. 
Instead, Hezbollah has continued to advance the interests of large landowners from 
which it draws political and clientelistic support.  
 
These features of Hezbollah’s agricultural policy are clearly evident in the case of the 
Bekaa Valley. As noted earlier, the Bekaa Valley was the region in which Hezbollah 
was established in 1982 with the help of the IRGC. Following the Civil War, the 
region remained a political base for the organisation, which it has administered since 
that time (Harb 2010:79).  
 
With a population of 540,000, the Bekaa represents around 13 percent of the 
population of Lebanon (Republic of Lebanon, Ministry of Finance 2013:4; OCHA 
2014), in addition to nearly 400,000 Syrian refugees registered in the area (UNHCR 
2014). The Bekaa is populated by a large number of clans and the population is in its 
majority Shi’a, although it is also home to some Sunni and Christian. It is divided into 
three provinces: Baalbek/Hermel (composed of more than 72 percent of Shi’a, and 
around 14 percent of Sunni and 14 percent of Christian), Zahle (composed of around 
                                                            
85The new liberalisation law for house rents officially came into force on December 28 2014, but two articles of 
the new law were invalidated by the Constitutional Council. The law and its implementation are still being 
discussed in the Administration and Justice Parliamentary Committee. 
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58 percent of Christian, 27 percent of Sunni, and 15 percent Shi’a), and West Bekaa 
Rashaya (composed of around 47 percent of Sunni, 28 percent of Christian and 15 
percent of Shi’a) (Lebanese Election Data (LED) 2014). In addition, the Bekaa is an 
important farming area, with over 1/5 of the population engaged in agriculture. The 
central area of the Bekaa produces mainly potatoes, sugar beets, vegetables and 
grains, while on the slopes surrounding the western side of the Valley grapes are the 
most important crop (Chatila and Saade 1994). In the North, cannabis is widely 
grown.86 
 
It is estimated that 40 percent of people, around 150,000 people, in the Bekaa Valley 
lived on less than $4 a day (OCHA 2014), but this figure is widely accepted to have 
become worse over the last few years due to the influx of Syrian refugees.87 The 
region is also characterised by its poorly developed infrastructure, remote areas and 
a relatively weak local civil society structure, compared to South Lebanon or the 
urban coast areas of Mount Lebanon. 
 
Since the early 1980s, the Bekaa has been dominated politically by Hezbollah (Deeb 
M. 1988:693-694). In the local elections of 2000, Hezbollah won 36 municipalities out 
of 38 in the area (Hamzeh 2004:132-133). This domination has continued since that 
time, with the organisation (in partnership with Amal) winning the vast majority of the 
municipalities in the Bekaa in the 2010 elections. 
  
Hezbollah’s governance in the area has come under attack by farmers for its reliance 
on large landowners and powerful clans (Daher 2012:421). Indeed, cannabis farmers 
have criticised Hezbollah for “conspiring to keep people dependent on them” by 
refusing to support low-cost irrigation or the building of dams and instead supporting 
the interests of large landowners (Hodeib 2013a).88 In an interview conducted for this 
                                                            
86 In 2012, the areas planted with cannabis in Baalbek-Hermel covered more than 150,000 acres, despite annual 
attempts by the government to destroy the crops, according to unofficial numbers collected by the Lebanese 
security forces (Hamieh 2012).  
87 As Hourani and Van Vliet have noted: “a 60 percent wage reduction has been reported in the Bekaa as a result 
of competition from Syrian labour and reduced border trade activities. In Baalbek for instance, daily wages for 
unskilled labour dropped from LP 20,000 to LP 15,000 or LP 10,000. It should be noted, however, that wage 
reduction is not implemented by Syrian nor Lebanese workers, but by Lebanese employers. But for the Lebanese 
workers affected by this wage reduction, it is Syrian refugees rather than Lebanese employers who are to blame 
for this” (Hourani and Van Vliet 2014). 
88 An agreement was reached in the summer 2013 to postpone cannabis field destruction for the time being, 
because of the clashes between farmers and the security forces (Nazzal 2013). 
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thesis, Jihad Al-Mualim, President of the Federation of Workers and Employees in 
the Bekaa, noted that large landowners are the ones benefiting from Hezbollah’s 
agricultural policies in the Bekaa. He argued that these landowners are being 
assisted financially by the Ministry and being granted the vast majority of loans from 
private banks (Al-Mualim 2012). As a result, inequalities among farmers are very 
large, with 5 percent of farmers’ controlling 47 percent of total cultivated lands, while 
half of the farmers own only 8 percent of the total cultivated lands (Nasnas 
2007:178).  
 
For this reason, Al-Mualim’s federation has reiterated its demands for the 
establishment of a Bank of Development for Agriculture, in an attempt to redress the 
inequality in funding for smaller farmers. Despite an agreement between the Ministry 
and private banks to facilitate loans to small and middle farmers, this has not 
translated into reality because high risks and low benefits do not encourage banks to 
lend (Al-Mualim 2012; Nassif 2012, Mohieddine 2012). The need for a bank of 
development for agriculture has been a constant demand of the Federation of 
Agriculture since the end of the Civil War alongside the provision of social insurance 
in the agricultural sector and the establishment of a High Council of Agriculture 
including federations, unions, professionals and the Ministry, to discuss development 
policies in the sector (Nassif 2012, Mohieddine 2012). 
 
Al-Mualim further notes that no consistent or sustainable projects to improve the 
irrigation of lands – especially in the Bekaa and the South – have been undertaken. 
Lebanon still relies upon foreign agricultural imports while national products are not 
protected (Al-Mualim 2012). At the same time, despite rhetorical support of 
Hezbollah’s Minister of Agriculture to tackle the problem of cartels and monopolies in 
the sector, no measures limiting their influence have been implemented. The large 
landowners and retailers still dominate the market (Al-Mualim 2012; Mohieddine 
2012). 
 
The budget of the agriculture Ministry has been slightly increased under Hezbollah’s 
administration, but most of this rise has been used to recruit new employees and not 
to promote development projects. According to Youssef Mohieddine, President of the 
Federation of Agriculture, the new development projects are mostly linked to 
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international financial assistance and projects, and not from the government. Funding 
is distributed to further reinforce clientelist and sectarian interests of Hezbollah 
(Mohieddine 2012).89 Mohieddine claimed that:  
 
“Until today, May 2012, no development project has been 
suggested by the Ministry despite the fact that we had a 
conference at the Ministry of Agriculture where we agreed on a 
common strategy for the agricultural sector and we agreed on a 
structure of a committee, which would gather all the unions and 
federations and Ministry to discuss and work projects of 
development. All these decisions taken by this conference were 
not taking into account and not implemented, and the Ministry 
continued to work on partisan base and work with Jihad al-Bina 
[Hezbollah’s construction wing]… the Minister favours its own 
people and institutions, by providing them first and with the 
largest international funding development projects. The Minister 
Hussein Hassan is the one who controls the distribution of aid 
as minister. He favours the people in his party or close to it.” 
(Mohieddine 2012) 
 
In the same vein, Alfred Nassif, President of Federation of Proprietors of Kermel in 
the Bekaa, and Secretary President of the Federation of Agriculture in Lebanon, 
stated that “Yes the budget of agriculture was raised, but we have not seen anything 
change, and when they distribute financial assistance, it’s first to [Hezbollah’s] public 
and people” (Nassif 2012). This clientelism further extends to claims that Hezbollah 
has attempted to marginalise and divide the main agriculture unions, by establishing 
new structures in the Bekaa: 
 
“[Hezbollah’s Minister of Agriculture] gave licences to numerous 
new associations and cooperatives in the country, and 
especially in the region of the Bekaa, in which they had only a 
poor presence. They were also provided with financial 
                                                            
89 The Federation of Agriculture includes farmers from all regions of the country (the Bekaa, the South, the 
North and Mount Lebanon) and from all sects. It includes 14 trade unions, two federations and 58 cooperatives. 
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assistance. He gave a lot of assistance to others but not our 
unions, maybe because of our politics… He did not give to the 
general Federation as well, because we disagree maybe… He 
gives assistance to his specific groups, unions and federations 
such the Federation of farmers in Lebanon (known as INMA), a 
federation linked to Hezbollah. There is a clear discrimination in 
the way of dealing with people and associations according to 
their political colour… the Ministry provides more services and 
assistance to [Hezbollah-affiliated] federations and unions, such 
as INMA, while filling its administration with Hezbollah members 
and making Jihad al-Bina [Hezbollah’s construction firm] an 
auxiliary institution of the Ministry.” (Nassif 2012) 
 
Antoine Hayek, the President of the Lebanese Association of Agriculture, has echoed 
these criticisms, declaring that a series of recommendations, endorsed by all political 
parties, were suggested in February 2009 at the socio-economic forum organized by 
the Commission of the European Union. The propositions were part of a 
comprehensive strategy to support the agricultural sector, which notably included a 
project of loans to the sector, the development of appropriate national banking laws 
and the modernisation of insurance policies related to hazards and natural disasters. 
All these propositions were then submitted to the Council of Ministers in 2009, but 
were not taken into consideration (cited in Orient Le Jour 2014a). Hayek (Orient Le 
Jour 2014a) also accused Hezbollah of not seeking stricter controls on imports in 
order to better protect national production. The former Minister of Agriculture Hassan, 
he said, has "failed to alleviate the problems of the sector. Agriculture has remained 
vulnerable to natural disasters, to all kinds of obstacles and corrupt practices, all 
generating high risk" (Orient Le Jour 2014a). 
 
In addition to all this, the Islamic movement has also adopted a laissez-faire attitude 
regarding the lawless northern Bekaa, where drug barons have small private militias 
to protect their hashish fields and where stolen cars are traded and counterfeit 
money is printed (Blanford 2011:476-477). Hezbollah especially turns a blind eye to 
the cultivation of hashish because it is unwilling to antagonize the powerful clans and 
tribes from their illicit business (Blanford 2011:477) and to maintain their influence in 
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the region.  
  
In general, the consensus among all the farmers and agriculture representatives and 
trade unionists interviewed for this thesis indicated that they felt sidelined from any 
real control or influence over agricultural policy, while Hezbollah has continued to 
prioritise its relationship with large landowners and its goal of strengthening its 
clientelist networks.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
Lebanon’s neoliberal reform process began in the early 1990s following the end of 
the Civil War, was accelerated under Rafiq Hariri, and has been consistently followed 
by all subsequent Lebanese governments. These policies have particularly aimed at 
attracting financial flows from outside – enabled by investment incentives, 
privatisation and liberalisation of ownership laws – with a focus on urban 
reconstruction as a main sectoral pivot of economic growth. This orientation confirms 
the way in which the outcomes of war and conflict have been used to deepen the 
trajectory of neoliberal reform. It is a trajectory supported by all main political actors 
in Lebanon, international institutions such as the WB and IMF (coordinated through 
the successive Paris aid conferences) and regional investors (particularly from the 
Gulf states). These policies have accentuated spatial and social inequalities in 
Lebanon and are closely linked to the heavily financialised nature of the country’s 
political economy and the marginalisation of important sectors such as agriculture 
and industry.  
 
In this context, Hezbollah has not distanced itself from the process of neoliberal 
reform. Whether in opposition or participating in government, Hezbollah has 
continually supported these policies including on issues such as: privatisation, tax 
reform and urban development. In the management of the municipalities that it 
governs, as well as in the urban sphere more generally, Hezbollah has promoted 
policies that encourage capital accumulation at the expense of poorer and 
marginalised residents. In agriculture, the Hezbollah Minister has not made any 
significant changes to previous policies and, moreover, has sought to strengthen its 
clientelist ties in areas such as the Bekaa Valley. We can see in Hezbollah’s Minister, 
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and more generally in the party’s policies regarding economic and social issues, no 
willingness of the party to challenge existent power structures and their entrenched 
institutional manifestations. 
 
Hezbollah’s sources of funding also explain the lack of opposition to the capitalist 
system and rather conservative economic program. The Islamic movement is 
founded on financial support from the Lebanese Shi’a middle class and bourgeoisie, 
the IRI, and the alms (zakât) collected by Hezbollah on behalf of Khomeini. 
According to Hamzeh, the party in addition to the massive funding of the IRI relies on 
“donations from individuals, groups, shops, companies, and banks as well as their 
counterparts in countries such as the United States, Canada, Latin America, Europe 
and Australia,” and on Hezbollah’s own business interests, which take “advantage of 
Lebanon’s free market economy” with “dozens of supermarkets, gas stations, 
department stores, restaurants, construction companies and travel agencies” 
(Hamzeh 2004:64). The Hezbollah’s Foreign Relations Unit, which was established in 
1985 and is currently led by cleric Ali Daamoush, is actually responsible for 
maintaining and developing relations with the Lebanese-Shi’a communities around 
the world. Its main obejctive is fundraising for the Islamic movement, and managing 
religious and political propaganda on behalf of Hezbollah. The Unit is mostly 
composed of clerics and businessmen who are known in the Shi’a communities and 
are publicly associated with Hezbollah. The Unit is active in Europe, Africa, the U.S., 
and Asia. (Terror Control 2014).  
 
Hezbollah’s role in these processes confirm that it does not present a fundamental 
challenge to the current political economy framework of Lebanon but, on the 
contrary, has been integrated into this system as a political fraction tied to the 
sectarian bourgeoisie. In this sense, the early assessment made by Mehdi Amel on 
the behaviour of the Islamic bourgeoisie in the 1980s can be in many ways observed 
in Hezbollah’s evolution regarding the Lebanese political system: 
 
“the aspiration of fractions of the Islamic bourgeoisie to 
strengthen their positions in the power structure, or rather to 
modify the place they occupy within the confessional political 
system, in order to better share the hegemony and not to 
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change the system… through its participation it will lead to a 
strengthening and an anchoring of the confessional political 
system and not to its change or its suppression. This solution is 
not actually a solution, it will lead only to a worsening of the 
crisis of the system.” (Amel 1986:337-338) 
 
The following chapter will further extend this analysis through a mapping of the 
evolving position of the Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie in Lebanon. It will show that 
Hezbollah’s links to this class fraction – particularly in the key sectors of urban 
renewal, construction and real estate – have been strengthened through the 
neoliberal period. The remaining chapters of the thesis will complement this analysis 
through an examination of how Hezbollah has nonetheless managed to deal with the 
contradictions arising from these policies: building a hegemonic position within the 
wider Shi’a population (Chapter 5) and acting to demobilise labour movements in the 
country (Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 4: Lebanese Class Structure under Neoliberalism 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter traces the class structure of Lebanese society through the neoliberal 
period, with a particular focus on the hierarchies within the Shi’a population itself. It 
demonstrates that one of the features of the changes noted in the previous chapter 
has been the growth of an emerging Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie – particularly 
linked to the urban renewal projects discussed previously, as well as trade and 
diaspora connections. This class fraction is tightly connected to Hezbollah, and 
carries important implications for understanding the nature of the party. 
 
The previous chapter described the initial phase of neoliberalism in Lebanon under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri until his assassination in 2005. This 
chapter begins by analysing the impact of this period on the Sunni and Christian 
bourgeoisie – the traditional elite of Lebanon. Hariri’s policy goals centred upon 
attracting foreign capital inflows and the prioritisation of privatisation and neoliberal 
urban reconstruction. These policies acted to strengthen the core of the capitalist 
classes in both the Sunni and Christian fractions of the bourgeoisie, which are 
structured around a handful of large conglomerates whose activities are spread over 
a range of financial, commercial and real estate interests. 
 
At the same time as the strengthening of the Sunni/Maronite elites, however, the 
neoliberal period has also seen significant changes in the distribution of wealth within 
the Shi’a population. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, Shi’a dominated 
areas had seen a marked growth in business and economic activities. Relatively 
speaking, the most impoverished regions had shifted to Sunni majority areas in the 
North of the country. Although these trends were not equally felt throughout all parts 
of the Shi’a population, they signified the emergence of large Shi’a-owned 
businesses that were particularly concentrated in the real estate, construction and 
trading sectors. The second part of the chapter maps concretely some of the 
ownership structures of these businesses and their close linkages to Hezbollah’s 
political institutions. Hezbollah has facilitated the emergence of this class fraction 
while developing its own significant business activities.  
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The final part of the chapter outlines further evidence of the changing social base of 
Hezbollah through an examination of the social background of its membership cadre 
and the organisation’s close linkages with important families in the Hezbollah 
stronghold of Dahyeh. It shows that Hezbollah is increasingly tied to these more 
prosperous layers of the Shi’a population, providing further confirmation of how 
Hezbollah’s political orientation – notably its support of policies outlined in the 
previous chapter – is connected to the expanding social base of the party itself. 
 
4.2 Sunni/Christian Business Elites in the Neoliberal Period 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the post Civil War era saw an increasing influence 
of the Sunni business community over various sectors of the Lebanese economy. 
The Christian fraction of the bourgeoisie lost much of its power to a Muslim-Sunni 
capitalist section, which benefited from foreign ties and lucrative connections to 
diaspora communities, particularly in the Gulf (Pearlman 2013:120-121). Today, the 
two richest families in Lebanon are from the Sunni community: the Hariri (three 
brothers and one sister) and the Miqati (two brothers) families.90 Together their 
estimated wealth is $14 billion — some 15 percent of all private wealth in the country 
(Executive Magazine 2013).  
 
An analysis of key economic sectors in Lebanon illustrates the rising weight of the 
Sunni fraction of the bourgeoisie, alongside the enduring influence of wealthy 
Christian families. The banking sector, for example, is made up of more than 70 
banks (Association of Banks in Lebanon 2014a), predominantly managed by 
founding families (although they are not always the major shareholders). The sector 
is largely dominated by the country’s 12 ‘Alpha’ banks,91 banks with deposits over $2 
                                                            
90 Najib Miqati is the co-founder of the M1 Group, a family-owned holding company registered on the London 
and Dubai stock exchanges. M1 has interests in various sectors such as telecom, real estate, aircraft financing, 
fashion and energy. It also operates the British Bank of Lebanon through a license it purchased from the British 
Bank of the Middle East (Najib Miqati Official Website 2014). The Hariri family is the owner of the Saudi Oger 
group, one of the largest construction companies in Saudi Arabia, which has financial interests in areas such as 
banking, telecommunication, real estate. The Hariri family is also a primary shareholder in the company 
Solidere, awarded control over the reconstruction of downtown Beirut as a centre of high-end shopping and 
leisure activities (Saudi Oger Website 2014). 
91 The 12 Alpha Banks are Audi, BLOM, Byblos, Fransabank, Societe Generale, Credit Libanaise, BankMed, 
Beirut, BBAC, Libano-Francaise, First National and Intercontinental. 50 percent of the Lebanese banking 
sector’s assets is owned by just three of these twelve: Audi, BLOM and Byblos (Traboulsi 2014:30). 
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billion (Cochrane 2010). At the end of 2008, Alpha banks held $95 billion in 
consolidated assets, or 88.3 percent of all banks’ consolidated assets, and $77.3 
billion in customer deposits (83.7 percent of total deposits) according to Bilanbanque, 
the annual report issued by the financial services firm BankData in collaboration with 
the Association of Banks in Lebanon (Cochrane 2010). 
 
The Christian fraction of the bourgeoisie dominates the leadership of many of these 
Alpha banks, without necessarily holding the majority of shares. These are often in 
the hands of foreign actors. This includes the largest bank in Lebanon, the Audi-
Saradar Bank, which is chaired by Raymond Audi,92 and the third largest bank, 
Byblos Bank, established by the Bassil Family.93 In addition to these two banks, other 
banks controlled by the Christian fraction of the bourgeoisie in the Alpha group are 
the Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL) headed by Antun Sehnaoui, who 
is also the Chair of Sehnaoui Group, which owns 81 percent of SGBL shares (SGBL 
2014); Banque Libano-Française, established and chaired by Farid Raphael94 who 
owns the majority of the shares through various financial entities;95  and Crédit 
Libanais, chaired by Dr. Joseph Torbey.96  
 
Despite these banking structures controlled by the Christian fraction of the 
                                                            
92 According to the website of the bank, “the Bank ranked first among Lebanese banks in terms of total assets 
(US$ 37.8 billion), shareholders' equity (US$ 2.8billion), customers' deposits (US$ 32.3 billion), loans and 
advances (US$ 15.3 billion)” (Bank Audi 2014a). Ownership of the bank is divided between the Audi Family 7 
percent, Saradar Family 5.4 percent, Al-Homaizi Family (Kuwait) 6.1 percent, Sheikh Dhiab Bin Zayed Al-
Nehayan (UAE) 5.10 percent, Investment Finance Opportunities Ltd (Lebanon) 4.9 percent, Middle East 
Opportunities For Structured Finance Ltd (Lebanon) 4.2 percent, Al-Sabbah Family (Kuwait) 4.8 percent, 
Investment and Business Holding sal (Lebanon) 3.9 percent, Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Hobayb (Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia) 2.6 percent, El-Khoury Family (Lebanon) 2.4 percent Executive and Employees (Lebanon) 4.7 percent, 
Others 15,3 percent, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas 29.3 percent (Bank Audi 2014b). 
93 Byblos Bank is chaired by François S. Bassil, who served three terms as Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the Association of Banks in Lebanon and remains a Member of the Board. He was elected as Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the Association of Banks in Lebanon again on July 5 2013. The Bassil family holds around 
7.94 percent of the bank directly (Byblos Bank 2014). 
94 Mr. Raphaël founded Banque Libano-Française (France) in 1976 and was its Chairman and General Manager 
from 1985 to 1989. He was Minister of Finance, Justice and Telecommunications of the Lebanese Republic from 
1976 to 1979, and President of the Lebanese Bankers’ Association between 1997 and 2011 (Banque Libano-
Française 2013:20-21). 
95 Libano Holding SAL 35 percent; S.E.M. Farid Raphaël 13.57 percent; Famille Khoury 7.9 percent; Financière 
Raphaël Holding S.A.L. 9 percent; Groupe Chaoui 8.15 percent; Al-Shams Holdings Ltd 8 percent ; Gil Holding 
SAL 8 percent; Others (each holding less than 8 percent of the Bank) 10.35 percent (Banque Libano-Française 
2013:5). 
96 Credit Libanais was established on July 12 1961, as a Lebanese joint stock company. The Bank's ownership is 
split between EFG Hermes CL Holding SAL controlling 63.74 percent of the share capital and CIH Bahrain 
International Holding SAL with a 23.52 percent stake. The remaining 12.74 percent is owned by over 1,000 
individual shareholders, including mainly executives and employees of the Bank, each with less than 5 percent 
(Credit Libanais 2014). 
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bourgeoisie, the Sunni bourgeoisie has made important inroads into the sector. The 
Hariri family owns the fifth largest bank in Lebanon, BankMed, through its GroupMed 
Holding (BankMed 2014a; BankMed 2014b:9). BankMed also owns other banking 
and financial companies including: Saudi Lebanese Bank, Med Investment Bank, 
BankMed Suisse, Saudi Med Investment Company, Med Securities Investment 
Company and Emkan Finance (BankMed 2014b:14). All of these institutions are 100 
percent owned by the Hariri family, with Rafiq Hariri’s son, Muhammad Hariri, chair of 
the board of many of them.97 Aside from the Hariri family, Sunni Muslims hold 
majority shares in several of the country’s other large banks, including the important 
Fransabank98 and Blom Bank99.  
 
These banking networks, both in the hands of the Christian and Sunni Muslim 
fraction of the bourgeoisie, form the financial core of large family-owned 
conglomerates that operate across other economic sectors. The Hariri Group, in 
addition to its control of BankMed, is involved in construction (through Saudi Oger 
and Solidere) as well as telecommunications (through Oger Telecom) (BankMed 
2014a). Other similar cases include: Pharaon Holding,100 which owns the Pharaon 
and Chiha Banks, and is also engaged in insurance, Household Appliances, 
Consumer Electronics, Agrochemicals, Industrial and Domestic Gases, Flavours and 
Fragrances, Pharmaceuticals and Medical equipment (Pharaon Holding Companies 
S.A.L, Group of Companies 2014); the Obegi Group, involved in Agri-business 
(Unifert company), 101  chemicals (Obegi Chemicals), 102  consumer goods (Obegi 
                                                            
97 BankMed Investment, Saudi Lebanese Bank, Med Investment Bank, Saudi Med Investment Company, 
BankMed Suisse. 
98 Fransabank is the fourth largest bank in Lebanon and is controlled by the Kassar Family. Adnan Kassar has 
been President of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the past forty years and served as Minister 
of Economy and Trade (2003 to 2004) and Minister of State (2009 to 2011) (Traboulsi 2014). The bank has 
developed the largest networks of local branches in Lebanon with a total of 116 branches, and operates in 10 
countries: Lebanon, France, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Belarus, Cyprus, Iraq, Libya, UAE (Abu Dhabi and soon in 
Africa) (Fransabank 2014).  
99 The Azhari family established the BLOM Bank in 1951, which is today the second largest bank in Lebanon. 
The Azhari family has a 2.86 percent direct stake, plus an 11.87 percent stake through the Azhari’s Banorabe 
Holding in Luxembourg, while AZA Holding – of which the family controls 50 percent – has a 9.33 percent 
stake in BLOM. The rest of the shareholders are Bank of New York 34.37 percent, Actionnaires Unis 1.83 
percent, Shaker Holdings S.A.L. 5.39 percent, Mrs. Nada Aoueini 5 percent, Jaroudy Family 3.52 percent, Saade 
Family 2.53 percent, Khoury Family 1.97 percent, others 19.51 percent (Blom Bank 2014).  
100 Forbes ranked it 56th in the list of the top 100 most influential companies in the Middle East (Forbes Middle 
East 2013).  
101 They trade and distribute fertilizers, seeds, agricultural chemicals and irrigation equipment (Obegi Group 
2014). 
102 The largest independent network for distribution of chemical raw materials in the MENA region (Obegi 
Group 2014). 
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Consumer Products);103 and the Sehnaoui group,104 which, in addition to its control of 
SGBC, is a shareholder in fifteen companies including tourism, real estate, the media 
and hotels.105  
 
Through conglomerates such as these, the Christian and Sunni fractions of the 
bourgeoisie are involved in other sectors such as trade (both imports and exports) 106 
and real estate development/construction. This sectoral distribution of economic 
interests is linked to the form of neoliberalism discussed in the previous chapter. It 
has also been marked by a strong interpenetration of both the political and economic 
spheres, with these large families straddling high-ranking positions in both commerce 
and government.107 The main business associations – the Beirut Traders Association 
(BTA), the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL), the Association of Lebanese 
Industrialists (ALI) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Beirut (CCIB) – 
are also dominated by these conglomerates.108 
 
Importantly – and again linked to the particular form of neoliberalism in Lebanon – 
foreign capital inflows have helped to strengthen the position of both these Sunni and 
Christian conglomerates. Most significant in this respect has been foreign investment 
from the GCC countries. Further confirming the link between the Lebanese 
government and the Gulf region (particularly under Hariri’s leadership), around 60 
percent of FDI from 2002 to 2007 originated from the GCC. More than half of this 
                                                            
103 Production, marketing, sales and distribution of fast moving consumer goods (Obegi Group 2014). 
104 Forbes ranked it 72th in the list of the top 100 most influential companies in the Middle East  (Forbes Middle 
East 2013). 
105 Other notable family owned groups are the Debbane Group, Kettaneh Group, Malia Group, Baalbaki Group, 
Abou Adal Group, Johnny R.Saadé Holdings, Issa Holding, Sarkis group International, and the Averda Group 
(Traboulsi 2014:85-93). 
106 Imports are highly monopolised – according to one estimate, just 4 percent of active importing companies are 
responsible for 90 percent of all imports. The import sector is still largely dominated by Christian owned 
conglomerates, which explains the sectarian nature of the debate around a proposal by Rafiq Hariri in 2001 to 
open up the import market, including abolishing exclusive agencies. The law has still to be implemented due to 
resistance from Christian owned conglomerates (Traboulsi 2014:33).   
107 In construction, for example, H. Ashkar has pointed out “In post war Beirut, amid the reconstruction process, 
the presence of economic elite, emerging from the real estate development sector, in the political arena 
intensified. In times where reconstruction was the flagship of the revival of a country and its economy, in an 
economy where the construction sector is a main contributor to the country’s GDP – second only to the service 
sector – several real estate developers and contractors held prominent governmental positions and several 
politicians had investments in the construction sector” (Hisham Ashkar 2011:70). 
108 Historically there have existed differences and disagreements between some of these groups, particularly 
between the BTA and the ALI. These differences largely centered around the relative weight of trade and 
industry, with some business actors arguing for a more open economy, while others sought better protection for 
Lebanese industry. Over time, however, these dividing lines have become increasingly blurred as the 
interpenetration of different sectors has increased. For a discussion of this issue see Gates 1989. 
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Gulf FDI was in real estate, and the remainer in services and the banking sector 
(Association of Banks in Lebanon 2012). As a consequence of these FDI flows, Gulf 
capital has become a major shareholder in key Lebanese banks – including Audi 
Bank109, Blom Bank110 and Credit Libanais.111 In real estate, Blom Investment Bank 
has documented that land held by GCC investors rose to “2 Million square meters 
(sqm) in 2005, up from 0.5 Million sqm in 2002 and increasing steadily since then” 
(Blom InvestBank report 2010:11).112 
 
Alongside these capital flows from the Gulf, political relationships between the GCC 
and the Sunni bourgeoisie have also strengthened. Perhaps the clearest example of 
this is the Hariri family, which, as Hanieh has noted: “could be considered a 
subcomponent of Khaleeji (Gulf) Capital – its accumulation is centered in its 
ownership of the Saudi-based construction company Saudi Oger, and the family 
holds Saudi citizenship. In this sense, the neoliberal trajectory of the Lebanese 
government – and the country’s economic penetration by Khaleeji Capital – are 
directly linked to the GCC’s political influence” (Hanieh 2011:160).113  
 
4.3 Poverty and Lebanon’s Sectarian Mix 
 
The political and economic dominance of Sunni and Christian elites, however, has 
not been extended to all layers of both communities. Indeed, one of the striking 
                                                            
109 Gulf investors hold 18.6 percent of Audi Bank. These investors include the Al-Homaizi family from Kuwait 
6.1 percent and Al-Sabbah Family from Kuwait 4.8 percent, Sheikh Dhiab Bin Zayed Al-Nehayan from UAE 
5.10 percent, Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Hobayb from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2.6 percent (Bank Audi 2014b).  
110 Saudi-Lebanese Ghassan Shaker, son of one of the bank’s founders, owns 5.39 percent of BLOM’s shares 
through Shaker Holding and his wife. Nada Oweini (daughter of former Prime Minister and BLOM founder 
Hussein Oweini) owns 5 percent (Traboulsi 2014:87). Hussein Oweini was the first Saudi-Lebanese to become 
Prime Minister of Lebanon in 1951 and between 1964 and 1965, and was also a business agent for the Saudi 
royals between 1923 and 1947. Oweini continued playing this role even while he served as Prime Minister 
(Mehio 2002).  
111 Credit Libanais’ ownership is split between EFG Hermes Holding, an Egyptian company whose largest 
shareholder is from the UAE, and CIH Bahrain Holding owned by Saudi investor Khaled Ibn Mahfouz (Credit 
Libanais 2014). 
112 Much of this investment was facilitated by the Hariri Government’s “Foreign Acquisition of Property Law 
(Law No. 296, 2001)”, which abolished discrimination on property ownership by Arab and foreign nationals, 
and lowered real estate registration fees from 6 percent for Lebanese and 16 percent for foreigners to 5 percent 
for both categories of investors. In addition, capital gains made by individuals on real estate are exempted from 
any kind of taxation (IDAL Report 2013:20). 
113 These ongoing connections have been shown by a surprise visit of a delegation of 13 representatives in March 
2013 from Lebanon’s main business associations to the number three person in the Saudi royal family, Prince 
Muqrin Bin Abdul-Aziz, following a threat by Saudi Arabia to pull out billions from Lebanese banks due to 
statements by the Lebanese foreign minister regarding the conflict in Syria (Al-Akhbar English 2013c).  
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characteristics of the last two decades has been the increased prevalence of poverty 
in some key Sunni and Christian-dominated areas. While Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
continue to be the centre of most economic growth, the previously marginalised Shi’a 
areas of the South of Lebanon, southern Beirut and the Bekaa Valley (although this 
latter area still has high level of poverty) are no longer the poorest regions of the 
country. Poverty is today the most acute in some areas of northern Lebanon, in 
particular the city of Tripoli and its surrounding suburbs.  
 
The most recent demographic study conducted by Informational International, a 
Beirut-based research firm, showed that the country was composed of 4.8 million 
Lebanese citizens in 2011 divided as follows: 29.375 percent Sunni Muslim (1.41 
million), 29.375 percent Shi'a Muslim (1.41 million), 19.3 percent Maronite Christian 
(927,000), 6.75 percent Greek Orthodox (324,000), 4.375 percent Greek Catholic 
(210,000), 5.5 percent Armenian (132,000), 1.55 percent other Christian (74,180), 
5.5 percent Druze (263,000), 0.9 percent Alawite (43,000), and 0.08 percent Jew 
(4,000) (As-Safir 2011). This makes a ratio of 34.8 percent of Christian and 65.1 
percent of Muslim. 
 
Of these religious groups, the Shi’a community is concentrated in the northern half of 
the Bekaa, Baalbek and Hermel, which have a population of more than 75 percent 
Shi’a, in southern Beirut and southern towns such as Bint Jbeil and Nabatieh 
(Corstange 2012). Sunni mainly live in Beirut, and northern areas such as Tripoli and 
the Akkar, as well as in the central Bekaa and in the southern city of Saida. Various 
Christian communities are located in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Zahle, Jezzine, with 
smaller numbers living in the Bekaa, the South and the North (Lebanese Election 
Data 2014). 
 
Regarding the socio-economic situation of each region, from 1997 to 2005, the two 
governorates of Mount Lebanon and the North saw a relative decline in their mean 
per capita expenditure. The decline was nevertheless far more significant for the 
mostly Sunni-populated North, which witnessed a major deterioration in its mean per 
capita ranking – from the third highest in the country to the lowest in 2004-2005 
(UNDP 2008b:16-17). In this same period, Beirut saw the highest growth rate in per 
capita consumption, 5 percent annually, as a result of investments and widespread 
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job creation witnessed in the city after 1997. Growth rates in consumption 
expenditures were around 4 percent higher than the national average in Shi’a 
populated areas such as Nabatieh, the Bekaa and the South (UNDP 2008b:17). 
Mount Lebanon and the North had a growth below the national average, with the 
Northern governorate observed an insignificant annual growth of 0.14 percent (UNDP 
2008b:17). The Shi’a dominated Nabatieh governorate witnessed the country’s 
highest level of growth in per capita private consumption between 1997 and 2004 
with a figure of 5.82 percent (UNDP 2008b:46). This growth was most likely the effect 
of worker remittances from abroad, and a strong network of non-governmental 
organised support around reconstruction (discussed further in the following chapter) 
(UNDP 2008b:46). 
 
In 2005, the mean per capita consumption was highest in Beirut (more than 150 
percent of the national average), and lowest in the Sunni-dominated North (75 
percent of the national average) (UNDP 2008b:46). These figures were reflected in 
the North’s increased poverty levels (a 52 percent poverty headcount using the upper 
poverty line and 17.5 percent using the lower poverty line) (UNDP 2009:151). The 
North makes up 20.7 percent of Lebanon’s population, but 46 percent of the 
“extremely poor population” and 38 percent of the entire poor population, which is the 
aggregate of the extremely and moderately poor population (UNDP 2008b:48). At the 
same time, the “extremely poor population” represented in Beirut is 0.87 percent, 
Mount Lebanon 18.94 percent, the Bekaa 17.16 percent, the South 15.38 percent 
and Nabatieh 1.62 percent (UNDP 2008b:111). 
 
Households in the North are four times more likely to be poor in comparison with 
those that reside in Beirut. There are, moreover, substantial differences in poverty 
within the North governorate: Tripoli city and the Akkar region, mostly populated by 
Lebanese Sunni, have the highest percentage of overall poverty rates, with extreme 
poverty reaching 20.61 percent in Akkar and 23.17 percent in Tripoli, and overall 
poverty rates of 62.98 percent and 56.72 percent respectively (UNDP 2008b:48). The 
economic and employment conditions of Akkar were particularly hard hit by the 2006 
Israeli war on Lebanon, and later as a result of the destruction of the Palestinian 
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refugee camp of Nahr Al-Bared camp in the summer of 2007.114 In contrast, the 
Koura, Zgharta, Batroun and Bcharre regions, mostly populated by Lebanese 
Christian, have relatively low poverty levels with 24.7 percent of overall poverty and 
4.5 percent extreme poverty (UNDP 2008b:48).  
 
In terms of infrastructure and economic activities, the differences are also significant. 
According to the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS), there are only 17,000 
[commercial] establishments in the North Lebanon governorate, compared to 73,000 
in Mount Lebanon and 72,000 in Beirut (Abou Zaki 2012a). Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon are also the main centres of tourism and hold 75 percent of the country’s 
hotels (Ministry of Tourism 2004 cited in UNDP 2009:129). Moreover, Beirut and its 
suburbs, which include nearly 38 percent of the total population of Lebanon, had at 
the end of 2004 nearly 70 percent of all commercial bank deposits and were 
receiving more than 80 percent of total bank loans (Nasnas 2007:46). In contrast, the 
northern city of Tripoli’s share of bank loans to the private sector did not exceed 2-3 
percent (Abou Zaki 2012a). 
 
These statistics show that the most impoverished regions are now concentrated in 
Sunni majority areas of the North115 rather than the previously excluded Shi’a areas 
of the southern suburbs of Beirut and South Lebanon. Over the past two decades, 
the regions with a majority Shi’a population have actually moved from a position of 
marginalisation and poverty to one of increased economic and political weight, while 
the northern areas mostly constituted of the Sunni population, have seen their 
position worsen.  
 
At the same time, inequalities, just as in the rest of the Lebanese society, are 
                                                            
114 The effects of both wars had important consequences on revenue in the region: businesses registered a 91.5 
percent decrease in income due to closures or damages to shops. Akkar was also excluded from most national 
and international emergency funds donated to rebuild and rehabilitate war-stricken areas (Moushref 2008; Carpi 
2014).  
115 In this context, Sunni-populated regions in the North have witnessed the development of Islamic political 
movements and Salafi groups, which provide many health and social services, as well as a political presence. In 
Tripoli, Salafist factions rely on a network of mosques, NGOs and schools, and receive financing from various 
Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait (Alami 2008). Salafist groups developed considerably 
in Tripoli in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the Syrian army in 2005. Many salafists schools and 
organisations who were closed or had to stop their activities reopened in this period, including the Institute of 
Guidance and Charity of the Salafist Sheikh Shahal, the son of the founder of the Salafist movement in Lebanon 
(Nadine Elali 2012).  
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important in Shi’a populated areas. This can be seen in the very high within-region 
poverty rates for those areas where Shi’a form a high majority: in the Baalbek Hermel 
region, comprised of more than 70 percent Shi’a, the percentages of lower and upper 
poverty lines represented respectively 13.4 percent and 32.54 percent in 2005; in Tyr 
(around 84 percent Shi’a), they were 8.96 percent and 36.41 percent respectively 
(UNDP 2009:147); in Nabatieh (more than 95 percent Shi’a), they were 1.05 percent 
and 11.37 percent respectively; in Bint Jbeil (more than 87 percent Shi’a), they were 
3.09 percent and 25.51 percent respectively (UNDP 2008b:110; Lebanese Election 
Data 2014). These figures indicate that poverty remains very high within Shi’a areas, 
despite the fact that the position of the community relative to other sects has 
improved. There has been, in other words, a widening gap and differentiation of the 
Shi’a population itself.  
 
The polarisation of wealth inside the Shi’a population is perhaps best observed in 
Dahyeh, a stronghold of Hezbollah and composed in its far majority by Shi’a (around 
80 percent of its 750,000 inhabitants) (Wehbe M. 2013b). The journalist Muhammad 
Wehbe has described the increasing social inequalities of Dahyeh as follows:  
 
“Overpopulation put pressure on public services and 
infrastructures, resulting in the strengthening of illegal individual 
initiatives, such as electricity generators and water tanks. The 
poor live side by side with the middle and high class in the 
same geographic location populated by one same sect. There 
is little development taking place in the suburb, and the crime 
rate is increasing. The children of parents, whom had come to 
Dahyeh in search of security and an income, are now leaving 
Lebanon in search of a decent job. The scene shows the 
numerous class contradictions within the walls of each religious 
sect. In the Hay Al-Sellom neighbourhood of Dahyeh, 
expensive SUVs share the road with small cars, taxicabs, and 
motorbikes. In Haret Hreik and Hay Al-American (the 
Americans’ neighbourhood) also in Dahyeh, it is not odd to find 
shops renting for as high as $3,000 a month, in contrast to 
other places in the southern suburbs like Souk Al-Jammal in 
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Shiah and Souk Al-Burj, where rents do not exceed, at most, 
$600 … The difference in the price of a square meter of a built-
up area between Hay Al-Sellom and Haret Hreik can reach up 
to 30 percent. Similarly, an apartment in Hay Al-American can 
cost more than $500,000, compared to a maximum of $170,000 
for an apartment in Hay Al-Sellom.” (Wehbe M. 2013b)  
 
The head of the CCSD, Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah, classified the residents of Dahyeh as 
lower middle-class or upper lower-class (Wehbe M. 2013a), while others have 
spoken of the rise of a “Shi’a middle class” after the Ta’if Agreement which spread 
over wider areas of Dahyeh (Mohsen 2012). This rising middle class has been 
experiencing, according to journalist Ahmad Mohsen, “an upward movement not only 
physically, with a construction boom, but also economically and socially. This 
encouraged investors to set up amenities to suit this new class, which grew on the 
margins of the changes taking place during the Hariri era” (Mohsen 2012). In addition 
to this, in the wake of the Liberation of the South in 2000 from Israeli occupation, 
private investments and real estate development schemes privileging middle and 
high-end consumers multiplied in Dahyeh (Deeb and Harb:53). The area is, in other 
words, not simply a zone of poor slums as it is often presented, but rather an 
increasingly significant indication of the class changes and differentiation within the 
Shi’a population itself. 116   
 
In summary, the last two decades have seen the emergence of a layer of the Shi’a 
population that has risen to an important position within Lebanon’s class structure. 
Taken as a whole, the Shi’a are marked by an increased polarisation of wealth 
between this layer – which profited from neoliberal reform and the recalibration of the 
sectarian system following the Ta’if Agreement – and poorer layers of the population 
which populate Shi’a suburbs in Beirut, the Bekaa and the South. The following 
section explores in greater detail the composition of this emerging Shi’a fraction of 
                                                            
116 According to one estimate, Dahyeh holds more than 30 percent of Lebanon’s total domestic purchasing power 
(Wehbe M. 2013a).  
The area’s business activities have increased following the 2006 war, a study carried out by Lara Deeb and 
Mona Harb published in volume 14 of Bâhithât [women researchers], 2009-2010, under the title “Cultural 
Activities of Arab Youth,” showed that 64 percent of Dahiyeh’s cafes and restaurants appeared between 2006-
2008, and the number of bank branches in the area increased from 64 in 2009 to more than a hundred in 2013, 
according to some bankers (cited in Mohsen 2012). 
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the bourgeoisie and its connection to Hezbollah. 
 
4.4 Mapping the Shi’a Fraction of the Bourgeoisie  
 
As the previous chapter outlined, one of the distinctive features of neoliberal reform 
in Lebanon has been the emphasis on the liberalisation of capital inflows, particularly 
aimed at the reconfiguration of urban space through new housing and tourist 
developments and other construction projects. Much of this has targeted Shi’a-
majority areas in Greater Beirut and the South of Lebanon under Hezbollah control. 
These construction activities have been supported through parallel state funding, 
which has leveraged a growing volume of investments from the Lebanese Shi’a 
diaspora living in Africa and North and South America (Nasr 2003:155). The 
emerging Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie has converged around these capital flows, 
utilising them as a means to deepen their accumulation opportunities.  
 
As part of the initial rise of Amal documented in the previous chapter, Nabih Berri 
played an instrumental role through the post Civil War period in supporting this 
process. Fawaz Traboulsi describes his role succinctly:   
 
“Berri needed the post (Speaker of Parliament) to become a 
focus for economic interests, especially the real estate, banking, 
trade and other concerns of Shi’a diaspora in Africa and the 
Gulf. During the Civil War, Berri had formed what was termed 
“the Shi’a Holding Company”, and when fighting forced the 
closure of Beirut’s commercial center and economic activity had 
become divided between Jounieh and Kaslik in East Beirut and 
Hamra and Verdun streets in the West, Berri came to oversee a 
new real estate zone in Ain El-Tineh and Verdun that 
constituted the second biggest arena for African investment 
after that of Mazraa. Following the 1975-89 Civil War he 
oversaw Intra Invest Company (IIC) and the Finance Bank 
through its chairman Hassan Farran, as well as infrastructure 
developments projects in the South.” (Traboulsi 2014:71)  
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One indication of the presence of this growing Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie is its 
increased representation in the main business associations. As Baroudi (2000:92) 
has noted, the number of members representing the Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie 
never held more than 2 out of 24 seats in the Jam’iyyat Tujar Beirut (Beirut Traders 
Association (BTA)) board prior to the Civil War. This number was to double to four in 
1998, following negotiations between Rafiq Hariri and Nabih Berri (the head of Amal) 
with the Shi’a members nominated by Shi’a merchants in consultation with the Shi’a 
dominated Tajamu’ al-Iqtisâdiyyin al-Lubnâniyyin (the Association of Lebanese 
economists) (Baroudi 2000:92). The number of members of the Shi’a fraction of the 
bourgeoisie on the BTA has remained at this level until today (Beirut Traders 
Association 2014).  
 
In the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, 
the representation of the Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie on the Board of Directors 
increased from 11 percent before the Civil War, to 21 percent after the Civil War 
(Baroudi 2000:96). Muslim members of the Board were now equally divided between 
Sunni and Shi’a. In the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, there is now parity on 
the board between Muslim and Christian, while in 1975 it was composed of two thirds 
Christian and one third Muslim (Baroudi 2000:96).117 The representation of the Shi’a 
fraction of the bourgeoisie has now reached five members, up from two in 1988 and 
none before 1975 (Association of Lebanese Industrialists 2014).  
 
The only business association where this shift is not found is the Association of 
Lebanese Banks, which was formed in 1959 and held a large Christian majority on its 
Board of Directors until the 1990s, reflecting the domination of Christians over the 
banking sector in the country described above. After the Ta’if Agreement, 
representation on the Board was distributed equally between Christians and Muslims. 
Four Sunni nevertheless dominate the representatives for the Muslim community, 
whereas there is only one Shi’a and one Druze (Baroudi 2000:98). In 2014 the only 
Shi’a representative was Tanal Sabah, President of the Lebanese Swiss Bank 
(Association of Banks in Lebanon 2014b). The weakness of Shi’a representation 
indicates the particular character of class formation in the Shi’a community (see 
below for further detail), specifically their absence in commercial banking; only four 
                                                            
117 At the time of independence, the ratio in the Board of Directors was actually five Christians to one Muslim. 
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banks are controlled by Shi’a – the Lebanese Swiss Bank, owned by Tanal Sabah, 
Middle East and African Bank (MEAB), owned by the Hejeij family, the Fenicia Bank, 
owned by the Achour Group and the Jammal Trust Bank (JTB) owned by Anwar Ali 
Jammal. 
 
A more micro-level analysis confirms these trends. The Annex provides an overview 
of some of the key Shi’a-owned companies and individuals that constitute an 
important segment of this bourgeoisie. The groups listed have been identified by their 
representation on the industry councils noted in the preceding paragraphs, as well as 
through discussions with business analysts and individuals in Lebanon itself. The 
data indicates three salient characteristics: 
 
First, these business groups are clustered around two main economic activities – 
construction/real estate activities and the import/export trade. One example of this is 
the Shar Metal Company (SMC), which is owned by the Shahrour family. SMC is the 
largest ferrous and non-ferrous scrap metal exporter and processor in the Middle 
East, and is thus a good example of how trade liberalisation has helped to underpin 
the development of Shi’a trading activities. SMC’s CEO, Fadi Ali Shahrour, has 
strongly supported neoliberal reform in Lebanon in his position as Vice President of 
the BTA since 1998 and is also close to Nabih Berri.118 The Shahrour family has 
important investments in multiple sectors of the Lebanese economy including trade, 
industry and real estate (March 14 2010; Shar Metal Company 2013; Metal Bulletin 
Company Database 2013). In the real estate sector, the Jaber Group provides an 
illustrative example of an important Shi’a controlled conglomerate. The Group has 
built numerous luxury apartment buildings in downtown Beirut and also operates 
three major hotel chains. In addition to its real estate development activities, Jaber 
produces and exports LPG gas cylinders (Jaber Group 2013). A member of the Jaber 
family, Yassin Jaber, was Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade between May 
1995 and November 1998. In this position, he supported the Hariri government’s 
liberalisation of trade (Baroudi 2001:89). 
 
Another important characteristic of these new Shi’a-based conglomerates is their 
                                                            
118 He also was elected to the municipality of Beirut in 2010 on the list Unity of Beirut supported by March 14 
and Amal (Now Media 2010). 
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international connections. While these groups are largely based in the core areas of 
Hezbollah's influence – Dahyeh, the Bekaa Valley and the South of Lebanon – they 
also have very strong links with Shi’a communities in the diaspora (particularly 
Africa). Pearlman describes this phenomenon well:  
 
“A long history of migration linked South Lebanon to Africa, 
where developing economies, minimal competition, and scant 
regulation enabled entrepreneurial migrants to make great 
profits with little formal education. Observers noted that, given 
these dimensions of African countries as destinations, émigrés 
maintained close ties and returned to Lebanon more than 
migrants to Europe or the Americas. Some returned to become 
a “nouveau riche” in the South, where they bought land and 
built commercial enterprises… Émigrés invested capital in 
banks, industries, real estate, and other business ventures. In 
some towns and villages neglected by the state, returned 
migrants assumed leadership over socioeconomic 
development.” (Pearlman 2013:117) 
 
These links with the Shi’a diaspora have provided important opportunities for the 
community’s emerging bourgeoisie. Indeed, the exceptions just noted for Shi’a 
involvement in the financial sector have arisen largely as a result of these diaspora 
links. Both the JTB and the MEAB were initially based in Africa, where prosperous 
Shi’a businesspeople opened banks to provide services to expatriate communities, 
and also financed trade to Lebanon itself. As the founder of JTB notes: 
 
“The Bank increased considerably its capital and services in 
Lebanon and abroad, especially in Africa towards the expatriate 
communities. JTB has developed a reputation for supporting 
both Lebanon’s SME markets through commercial lending and 
Africa’s Lebanese diaspora through a large-scale trade finance 
in more than one West and Central African country. To enhance 
such ties, alongside a significant share of the Lebanese market 
for small business loans, the bank has set up representative 
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offices in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. While on the drawing 
board our plans for expanding JTB’s African presence to cover 
several countries over the coming years, as well as in Europe.” 
(Jamal Trust Bank 2014) 
 
In the case of MEAB, the owners Hassan and Kassem Hejeij originally left Lebanon 
and built a large construction business in Africa. They extended their activities to 
other businesses before establishing the bank in 1991 (MEAB 2014). In 1993, the 
two brothers founded SOCOFI BTP, which has grown to oversee the majority of key 
civil constructions projects in Gabon.119 Kassem Hejeij is also the CEO SEGUIBAT 
SA, a leading civil construction company in Equatorial Guinea, while Hassan Hejeij 
served as CEO and founder of a Gabonese construction company before 1991 
(MEAB 2014). Similarly, the Achour Group, which controls Fenicia Bank, is heavily 
invested in real estate and manufacturing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
to a lesser extent in Angola, Romania and France (Cochrane 2014). 
 
These three characteristics of the emerging Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie – an 
emphasis on real estate and trade, a relative weakness in the financial sector, and 
linkages with Shi’a diaspora populations – have been further accentuated by 
economic policies supported by Hezbollah in its areas of influence. A majority of the 
companies listed in the Annex, for example, have their headquarters in Hezbollah-
controlled municipalities such as Ghobeyri. In these areas, they have benefited from 
the types of neoliberal urban redevelopment models discussed in the previous 
chapter. Moreover, Hezbollah’s ministerial representatives have promoted economic 
policies, particularly concerning trade, that have facilitated the activities of Shi’a 
controlled conglomerates – most recently in 2014 when the Hezbollah minister 
Hussein Hassan was the main actor pushing for an eventually successful 50 percent 
decrease in export tax (NNA 2014a). Through policies such as these, Hezbollah has 
facilitated the accumulation of opportunities for the Shi’a conglomerates discussed in 
this chapter. Moreover, Hezbollah has increasingly emphasized the strengthening of 
links with the Shi’a diaspora, especially in Africa, where it now provides loans for 
young entrepreneurs to establish businesses (Leichtman 2010:281).120  
                                                            
119 Hassan Hejeij was well known in Gabon to be a close advisor to the President Omar Bongo (Meunier 2009). 
120 The Ivory Coast is the country in Africa with the largest Lebanese community of more than 60,000, with 
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While the main levers of Lebanon’s economy remain in controll by conglomerates of 
the Sunni and Christian fractions of the bourgeoisie, the emerging Shi’a economic 
fraction is a striking development that has paralleled the rise of Hezbollah as a 
political force.  
 
4.5 Hezbollah’s Own Economic Development 
 
In addition to these privately owned Shi’a conglomerates, another significant feature 
of business activity in Lebanon is the increasing prominence of companies under 
Hezbollah’s direct influence. Already in the beginning of the 1990s, Mona Harb 
(1996) had actually noticed that the associations and organisations linked to 
Hezbollah dealt often with private architectural offices and companies whose officials 
were sympathizers of the Islamic movement. 
 
As with the conglomerates listed in the Annex, these companies have tended to 
focus upon construction and real estate, as well as tourism and recreational activities 
aimed at a growing Shi’a fraction of the middle class.121 In many cases, these 
companies have been involved in real estate development targeting prosperous Shi’a 
migrants as far afield as Michigan or Australia (Beydoun 1989 cited in Pearlman 
2013:123). The South of Lebanon, in particular, experienced a booming real estate 
market that a recent report described as “village after village [of] palatial-looking 
villas”, despite the fact that “many of them [were] empty” (Integrated Regional 
Information Networks (IRIN) 2013). Most of these villas were built by Lebanese in the 
diaspora as monuments of their successes abroad (Pearlman 2013:123). Hezbollah 
is well aware of the economic power of the growing Shi’a fraction of the middle class 
as is demonstrated by the following words of a prominent Hezbollah member 
interviewed by M. Harb and L. Deeb: “We are a big powerful consumer movement 
that attracts big investors” (Deeb and Harb 2013:55).  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Shi’a ranging from 80 to 90 percent of the total of the Lebanese population in the country (Bierwirth 1999:88). 
121 Hezbollah’s expansion in these areas is partially linked to a growth in religious tourism that caters to both 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese Arabs and Muslims, including student groups, academics, political delegations, and 
casual vacationers, who incorporate visits to sites into their trips to Beirut and the Lebanese coast. The 
description of tourism has evolved among Hezbollah officials from “jihadi tourism” to “conservative tourism’ 
(siyyâha muhâfidha) and to the most recent “purposeful tourism” (siyyâha hâdifa), all of which contain both 
ideological and market driven imperatives (Deeb and Harb 2011:40). 
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There are four companies under Hezbollah’s direct influence that provide an 
excellent illustration of these trends. The first of these is Tajco, a real estate 
development company owned by Shi’a businessman Ali Tajjedine. The Tajjedine 
family has operated real estate, diamond export, supermarket and food processing 
businesses across Angola, Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Congo for many years.122 
Ali Tajjedine is a former Hezbollah military commander who worked in trade and real 
estate in these countries before becoming owner of Tajco (Traboulsi 2014:90). One 
of the main missions of Tajco is to act as an intermediary for Hezbollah to purchase 
lands and it is also involved in construction and civil engineering works.123 In 2007, 
Tajco purchased a 2.2 million-square-meter farm near the villages of Rayhan and Al-
Qatraneh close to the city of Jezzine (Farrel 2012), which will welcome a new 
community called Ahmadiyeh with houses and shops surrounding a stone quarry 
owned by Tajjedine (Blanford 2007). The current Minister of Industry and Hezbollah 
member Hussein Hajj Hassan declared at the time that this would accommodate the 
”natural growth'' of Lebanon's Shi’a population and buttress “resistance'' against 
Israel (Williams 2007). Tajjedine has also bought lands in Dalhamiyeh, in the Bekaa 
Valley, with the goal of launching further residential projects (Farrel 2012).  
 
A second large construction company linked to Hezbollah is the Al-Inmaa group, 
which has been involved in the construction of numerous Hezbollah projects and one 
of the partners of the company is Amin Chirri, who was Hezbollah’s MP in parliament 
between 2005 and 2009 (Deeb and Harb 2013:71). Inmaa defines itself as an 
“Engineering & Construction company and a leading investment group in Lebanon” 
(Al-Inmaa Engineering and Contracting 2013a), which employs more than 1200 
employees spread across different branches. Its projects are concentrated in Shi’a 
populated regions, especially in Dahyeh (notably Bir Hassan, Haret Hreik, Shiah) and 
the South of Lebanon. Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013:88) explain that the 
company started its activities in the beginning of the 1990s building relatively 
affordable housing complexes in Dahyeh and then progressively began catering to 
more affluent customers, with middle and high end buildings in Dahyeh’s 
                                                            
122 Ali Tajjedine and two of his brothers have been accused by the United States Department of the Treasury 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of providing support to Hezbollah.  
123 Tajco is involved in the building of residential complex, malls, resort (Al-Nasim Resort), education 
institutions, Artesian well, etc… all of these projects being based in their majority in Dahyeh and South 
Lebanon, or in areas with expanding Shi’a population such as Choueifat (Tajco Construction and Development 
2013). 
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neighbourhoods. 
 
The close linkages between al-Inmaa and Hezbollah’s political structures is 
confirmed by its CEO, Adham Tababja (Janoubia 2012), who is also the Mayor of the 
Kafr Tabnit municipality and is affiliated to Hezbollah (Bint Jbeil 2010; Nejm 2010). 
Moreover, Tababja is Vice President of the al-Ahed football club (Al-Akhbar 2011), 
which is sponsored by Hezbollah (Daher 2014:170), and a shareholder of the 
Lebanese Media Group, Hezbollah's parent company for al-Manar Television and al-
Nour Radio (see following chapter for more description of these media groups) 
(Wikileaks 2009). The director of Al-Inmaa group in South Lebanon is Ali Tababja, 
who is also the President of the Employers Association of Restaurants, Parks and 
Tourism Companies in the South (Al-Ainin 2008), and the Vice President of the 
Lebanese Federation of tourism unions (Itihâd Al-Wafâ`:2014). Mona Harb and Lara 
Deeb (2013:88) also state that kinship relations with Hezbollah members have 
facilitated the company’s contracting work and growth over the years. 
   
The scale of Inmaa’s construction activities and its linkages with the reworking of 
urban space in Hezbollah-controlled areas can be seen in the company’s project 
portfolio. In Dahyeh, the group built an amusement park (Fantasy-World), which 
includes restaurants and coffee shops targeting a pious clientele. Hezbollah Mayor of 
Ghobeyri participated in the planning and facilitated the legal processes necessary 
for the project's implementation (Deeb and Harb 2009:199). Inmaa has also built 
restaurants and amusements centres in the Bir Abed neighbourhood (Family house), 
Saida (World of Joy), Tyr (City of Joy), Hadath (New Land), Baalbek (Restaurant al-
Rawabi), Bint Jbeil (Family Park) and Nabatieh (Joy) (Al-Ainin 2008). These projects 
include gyms, pools, saunas, and massage rooms (Deeb and Harb 2008). In the city 
of Taybe in Baalbek, Inmaa built a summer tourist resort aimed at attracting religious 
families on vacation (Le Thomas 2012b:290). It has also built the Hezbollah-
controlled al-Mehdi school in Hadath (Al-Inmaa Engineering and Contracting 2013b), 
the Hezbollah radio building (Radio Nour) in Haret Hreik (Al-Inmaa Engineering and 
Contracting 2013c) and a number of residential buildings. In recent years, Inmaa has 
been involved in operating international projects, including the Maxime Restaurant in 
Dubai (Al-Inmaa Engineering and Contracting 2013d). 
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Another important Hezbollah-linked company is Meamar Engineer and Development, 
which was founded in 1988 (Meamar 2014). Since that time, Meamar has been 
involved in more than 150 projects including: sporting facilities, Shi’a religious 
institutions, schools and hospitals. For these projects, Meamar’s clients are almost 
exclusively organisations linked to Hezbollah, such as the Islamic Health Society, the 
Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (ICRL), the Mehdi Scouts, the 
Shahid Association, the Islamic Religious Education Association (IREA) and 
municipalities controlled by Hezbollah Mayors (such as Ghobeyri and Bint Jbeil). At 
the celebration of the company’s 25th anniversary, many Hezbollah members were 
present including Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah Deputy bloc in 
parliament, Muhammad Fneich, Minister of Administrative Development, and the two 
Deputies Ali Fayyad and Ali Mekdad (Meamar 2014).124 The event was prominently 
covered on Hezbollah’s Manar TV (2014) and in the party’s magazine (Al-Amal al-
Baladi 2013:42).  
 
The final enterprise linked to the party is the Arch Consulting Company, which was 
previously part of Jihad al-Bina (Hezbollah’s construction organisation) but separated 
as an independent company in 2005 (Nasr 2011). Arch is registered under the name 
of Walid Ali Jaber (Arch company 2014) who was a Hezbollah-supported candidate 
in the Burj Al-Barajneh’s municipal elections in 2004 (Al-Ahed News 2004). As with 
Meamar, Arch has built hospitals, schools and religious institutions in Hezbollah-
controlled areas in Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa (Arch 2014).125 It is also 
involved in tourism, infrastructure, and hydraulic projects. Internationally, Arch 
company built the Abidjan Islamic Cultural Centre in the Ivory Coast managed by al-
Ghadir Association (Arch 2014), a Shi’a religious association established by a 
supporter of Hezbollah (Mieu 2009; Pompey 2009).  
 
These companies offer important insights into the nature of Hezbollah’s economic 
activities. Each of them is privately-owned and operated and thus help to enrich a 
narrow layer of the Shi’a community who control them. At the same time, they are 
very closely linked to the party itself; all four companies are headed by Hezbollah 
                                                            
124 In the pictures of the celebration we can see clearly that Hezbollah Deputies and Ministers are put forward. 
125 These include the Psychiatric Hospital, in Khalde, the Beirut Cardiac institute and Ragheb Harb Hospital in 
South Lebanon close to Nabatieh (client Shahid Association), the Bathoul Hospital and Sohmor Hospital in the 
Bekaa (client Islamic Health Society), and numerous buildings for al-Mahdi schools. 
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members and supporters, including electoral candidates for the party. Their projects 
are largely based in Hezbollah-controlled areas with clients mostly drawn from 
Hezbollah’s educational, media and schooling institutions. Hezbollah officials 
frequently praise these institutions in publicly organised celebrations.126 Indeed, the 
close links between Hezbollah and these companies have led to public concerns 
being expressed around clientelism and patronage stemming from the party’s 
position in the state apparatus.127 The explicit and open nature of their relationship 
with the party is one further indication of the network of private sector institutions that 
have arisen around construction and real estate activities in Shi’a populated areas, 
and points to the emergence of a bourgeoisie linked to Hezbollah.  
 
The investments in the construction and real estate sectors of Hezbollah affiliated 
companies or under its influence in Lebanon corresponds and reflects the nature of 
an adventurous, speculative and commercial capitalism that dominates the region, 
which is characterised by short term profit seeking as explained by Gilbert Achcar 
(2013a:102). The construction and real estate sector, which is a successful economic 
branch in the region, is at the crossroads of land speculation, driven by (1) the search 
for shelter investments in real estate and (2) an economy of commercial and touristic 
services funded greatly by the regional oil revenues, both by the capital and 
consumers alike from rentier states.  
 
4.6 The Changing Character of Hezbollah’s Social Base 
 
The preceding discussion provides confirmation of the expanding social base of 
Hezbollah. From its roots in the poor Shi’a populations of Lebanon, Hezbollah has 
become a party whose membership and cadres increasingly reflect the growing Shi’a 
fraction of the middle class and bourgeoisie – especially in Beirut.128 In the southern 
suburbs of Beirut, many members of wealthier families and most of the merchants 
                                                            
126 For example at the opening of the Ceremony Hall of the Martyr Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, the head 
of the Hezbollah executive council Hisham Safieddinne honoured and thanked Inmaa, Meamar Engineering and 
Development company, and Arch Consulting (Al-Mahdi 2012).  
127 For example, the municipalities under the control of Hezbollah or its allies have increasingly used these 
companies for construction activities. The Wa’d Reconstruction Project, discussed in the following chapter, also 
relied heavily on these companies. 
128 In addition regarding the large amount of Hezbollah’s employees (see chapter 5), Gilbert Achcar argues that 
“even if some of them are of proletarian background, the fact of becoming salaried cadres of such an 
organisation means a social upgrade, constituting a petty-bourgeois mentality” (cited in Macdonald 2012:31). 
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have been integrated into Hezbollah (Abisaab M. and Abisaab R. 2014:133), while 
the party’s activities and institutions (particularly those connected to tourism and 
leisure) cater to middle class Shi’a.  
 
This transformation is reflected in the profile of party cadres, who are no longer 
composed of clerics from a lower middle class background as at the time of the 
party’s foundation in 1985, but are now largely drawn from a professional class who 
hold secular higher education degrees. One illustration of this is the party’s 
increasing weight in professional associations (Qassir 2011). The Order of Engineers 
and Architects, for example, has been dominated by Hezbollah since 2008 when the 
party won the most votes in the association’s elections (Bou Dagher 2008). 
Hezbollah estimated that at least 1300 engineers were members of the party in 2006 
(Al-Akhbar 2006). The high numbers of engineers in Hezbollah is linked to the 
reconstruction of the South and Dahyeh following the various wars, especially after 
the end of the Civil War and the 2006 war and the development of the real estate 
projects in these regions.  
 
In the Medical Doctors Association, Hezbollah was represented on the winning list in 
the 2013 elections (Shibani 2013). Likewise, in the Lebanese Dentist Association, 
Vice President Muhammad Kataya is supported by Hezbollah (Now Media 2011; 
Lebanese Dentist Association 2014). In the Lebanese Pharmacist Order, which has 
7,000 registered members (El-Shark Online 2012), a Hezbollah representative 
narrowly missed out from winning leadership of the union in the 2012 elections – 
losing by only 131 votes to a Future Movement-backed candidate (Hamdan 2012). 
The only exception to this trend is the Lawyer’s Association, where despite 
expanding numbers and an increasing challenge to the Amal-controlled leadership, 
Hezbollah has not managed to become dominant (Al-Nahar 2013).  
 
Similarly, Hezbollah’s political leaders are typically drawn from well-educated and 
wealthy layers of the Shi’a community. In the national elections of 2009, for example, 
five of the ten elected Hezbollah deputies held doctoral degrees and at least four 
others were involved in prominent Lebanese businesses.129  The longest serving 
                                                            
129 The five deputies with PhDs were Ali Mekdad, Hassan Fadlallah, Nawaf Mussawi, Ali Fayyad and Hussein 
Hajj Hassan. In terms of business interests, Nawwar Sahili is a board member of the Syrian Lebanese 
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Hezbollah Deputy, Ali Ammar, comes from one of the wealthiest families in Burj Al-
Barajneh (Karim 1998:211).130 At the municipal level, these patterns are repeated, 
with Hezbollah electoral candidates selected from powerful Shi’a families such as Al-
Khansa, Kazma, Kanj, Kumati, Farhat, Rahhal and Slim (see Table below) (Harb 
2010).  
 
Important families of Dahyeh linked to Hezbollah131 
 
Families Names and Links to Hezbollah 
Al-Khansa - Muhammad Said Al-Khansa (Member of Hezbollah, and Mayor of 
Ghobeyri) 
- Sayyid Ali Ahmad Al-Khansa (On the list supported by Hezbollah of 
“The sons of Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2004 and 2010) 
- Qassem Muhammad Al-Khansa (On the list supported by 
Hezbollah of “The sons of Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2010) 
Kazma - Sayyid Muhammad Wafik Kazma (On the list supported by 
Hezbollah of “The sons of Ghobeiri” municipal elections 2004 and 
2010)  
Kanj - Sayyid Hassan Jamil Kanj (On the list supported by Hezbollah of 
“The sons of Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2004) 
- Engineer Firas Kanj (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2004) 
Komati - Hajj Saleh Ali Komati (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Haret Hreik” municipal elections 2004) 
-Muhammad Komati (member of the political bureau of Hezbollah)  
Farhat - Wissam Fahd Farhat (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Burj Al-Barajneh” municipal elections 2004) 
- Hajj Ali Farhat (head of the real estate and engineer company 
Inchaat, close to Hezbollah) 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Commercial Bank, Muhammad Raad and Muhammad Fneich are shareholders in the Lebanese Media Group, 
and Hajj Hassan runs two private schools in Beirut. 
130 Ammar has been elected every year since 1992, with the exception of 1996. His uncle, Mahmoud Ammar was 
also a former Deputy from 1957 to 1992 and close to former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun (Karim 
1998:211). 
131 Sources: Al-Ahed News 2004; Janoubia 2012 
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- Bilal Farhat (Hezbollah Deputy) 
- Gazua Farhat (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2004) 
Rahhal - Abbas Rahhal (He was the head of Al-Manar's Media Relations 
Unit and news chief editor)  
- Ahmed Kamal Rahal (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Burj Al-Barajneh” municipal elections 2004) 
- Hussein Rahhal (Hezbollah’s former media advisor and was 
appointed official in charge of Hizballah electronic media in 2009) 
Slim - Ali Slim Slim (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Haret Hreik” municipal elections 2004) 
- Hajj Ahmed Youssef Slim (On the list supported by Hezbollah of 
“The sons of Burj Al-Barajneh” municipal elections 2004) 
- Khalil Hussein Dib Slim (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The  
sons of Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2004) 
- Riyad Slim (On the list supported by Hezbollah of “The sons of 
Ghobeyri” municipal elections 2004) 
 
Even at the supporter and sympathiser levels these same trends can be noted. 
Today, heterogeneous layers of society perceive Hezbollah in different ways. Judith 
Palmer Harik (1996:55), a professor at the American University of Beirut (AUB), has 
examined this social diversity of Hezbollah support. She found that beginning in the 
mid 1990s, supporters of the party could be found throughout all social classes, and 
were no longer largely restricted to the poorer, pious layers of the Shi’a population. 
This trajectory continued through the 2000s, as indicated by the party’s very high 
results in the 2009 legislative elections from areas that were not traditionally poorer 
Shi’a communities, such as Nabatieh and Jbeil.132 In an interview for this thesis, Abd 
Al-Halim Fadlallah (2012b) also confirmed that a large number of youth from the 
middle and higher classes of the Shi’a population now support (or have joined) the 
party – including tribal elites in the Bekaa Valley who were traditionally opposed to 
Hezbollah. 
                                                            
132 The levels of lower and upper poverty lines were in 2005 respectively of 1.05 percent and 11.37 percent in 
Nabatieh (more than 95 percent of Shi’a) and of 0.9 percent and 2.93 percent in Keserwan/Jbeil (composed of 20 
percent of Shi’a) (UNDP 2008b). 
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In its educational network, the changing characteristics of Hezbollah’s social base is 
indicated by the very high tuition fees required to attend its al-Mustapha schools 
under the control of Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem. According to Catherine Le 
Thomas (2012a:179), these schools are aimed at the children of the party’s 
leadership, as well as upper and middle-class fraction of the Shi’a population. The al-
Bathoul school, a girls’ school that forms part of the al-Mustapha network, has annual 
fees of around $1,600, an amount that is unaffordable for the majority of Lebanese 
(Le Thomas 2012a:179). Le Thomas concludes that “the al-Mustapha network of 
schools, which can be considered as being part of the upper middle class category of 
Hezbollah schools, provide a service to the wealthy Shi’a class and spread the 
political ideology of the party under Naim Qassem’s supervision” (Le Thomas 
2012a:142-143).133    
 
These characteristics of Hezbollah’s political representation and social base indicate 
that while the organisation continues to draw support from people from all levels of 
society, its priorities are increasingly oriented to the highest strata. Hezbollah MP Ali 
Fayyad acknowledged this trend in 2010, when he remarked that “Hezbollah is not a 
small party anymore, it’s a whole society. It is the party of the poor people, yes, but at 
the same time there are a lot of businessmen in the party, we have a lot of rich 
people, some from the elite class” (Hersh 2010). Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah 
also provided indirect confirmation of these trends in a September 2009 speech, in 
which he urged members to quit the “love of luxury”, and called on them to adopt 
belief in God simply because of “fear of the end” (Al-Insaniyyah 2009).  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The post Civil War period witnessed the growing political and economic importance 
of the Shi’a population in Lebanon. This chapter has shown that Shi’a dominated 
regions are no longer the most impoverished (although poverty is still present in 
                                                            
133 In addition to this, other Hezbollah institutions orient towards wealthier layers of the Shi’a population. One 
example is the hospital Rasul Al-Azam, which provides VIP and “Super Suites” rooms for patients. The hospital 
website states: “It is true that medical care is a basic service, but the administration’s center does not forget to 
provide the best hotel services to their patients by having two wings of VIP, and two wings of Super Suite” (Al-
Rasul Al-Azam 2014).   
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these areas) but rather that the Sunni-populated regions in the North have been the 
worst affected by the deepening of neoliberalism. In Dahyeh, the South of Lebanon 
and the Bekaa Valley, an emerging Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie grew alongside 
the opportunities presented by neoliberal reform and the reconstruction funds that 
followed in the wake of 2006. This was indicated by an expanding presence of the 
Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie in various business associations. 
 
Hezbollah, as the most important representative of the Shi’a population in Lebanon, 
was influenced by these socio-economic transformations in three respects. Firstly, by 
the development and increasing presence of cadres coming from more privileged 
backgrounds and educated in secular universities, in contrast to the situation 
prevailing when the party was founded by religious clerics and people from a lower 
socio-economic background. Secondly, the party has formed close connections with 
the wealthier layers of the Shi’a population and elite families, indicated through its 
political alliances in elections in places such as Dahyeh. Third, Hezbollah has itself 
become an important economic actor in Lebanon, with multiple business interests 
that provided employment to thousands of people in addition to its network of 
organisations.   
 
The analysis of the context and the changes in the Lebanese economic and social 
structures are key elements to an understanding of Hezbollah’s behaviour and 
policies. They indicate that the party itself has undergone a profound transformation 
from an organisation firmly rooted in poorer Shi’a areas to one that increasingly 
represents the interests of a wealthier Shi’a constituency and that competes with 
Amal to best serve the interests of the Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie. There is 
indeed an increased competition between Amal and Hezbollah to attract the most 
wealthiest sectors of the Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie and best represent its 
interests in Lebanon. 
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Chapter 5: Hezbollah and Shi’a Civil Society  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the process through which Hezbollah has managed to achieve 
a position of hegemony in the Shi’a population. This hegemony was reached through 
a balanced combination of consent and coercion, based on the one hand through its 
provision of much needed services to large sections of the Shi’a popular sector, and 
on the other, through repressive measures directed against those who step outside 
the norms established by the party. 
 
These intertwined factors of consent and coercion are facilitated through Hezbollah’s 
wide-ranging network of organisations, which has helped it disseminate its ideas and 
deepen its support base within the Shi’a population. Hezbollah's parliamentary 
Deputy, Dr. Ali Fayyad, has claimed that “the organisations of Hezbollah were 
established to build a solid relation between the party and its public; they are one of 
the essential elements in its strategy of mobilisation” (1998 cited in Harb 2010:97). 
This network of institutions provides a wide array of services in fields such as 
education, finance, health, culture, religion and tourism. These services were initially 
organised in associative structures established in the 1980s but have expanded 
considerably since that time. Many of these organisations were affiliated with Iranian 
organisations and were developed through financial assistance from Iran and its 
Islamic charity networks. Although some of these organisations have autonomous 
administrative councils and considerable latitude in the programmes they offer, they 
are required to follow the political and cultural orientation of Hezbollah. 
 
This chapter demonstrates that Hezbollah’s organisations can be seen as part of 
what Gramsci described as the “multi-layered associations and voluntary groups” that 
constitute civil society: associations, educational and religious institutions, the media, 
and so forth (Fontana 2008:93). These institutions constitute a “hegemonic apparatus 
… a complex set of institutions, ideologies, practices and agents (including the 
“intellectuals”)” (Thomas 2009:225), through which Hezbollah has engaged its 
opponents in the struggle for political power by intervening in civil society. As Peter 
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Thomas has noted, the struggle for political power depends not simply on “the ability 
of a class’s initiative in political society” but is also related to whether it can “relate 
adequately to its 'social basis' in civil society… Political power is immanent to the 
hegemonic projects by means of which classes constitutes themselves as classes 
(relations within classes) capable of exercising political power (as opposed to an 
incoherent mass of corporative interest confined to the terrain of civil society)” 
(Thomas 2009: 226-227). 
 
Hezbollah’s institutional network also deserves a Gramscian description of 
‘hegemonic apparatus’ because it operates to a very pronounced degree as a 
coherent interlocked whole. There is significant rotation of leadership among the 
institutions, which also provide employment to the cadres and popular base of the 
party. 134  This network means that individual institutions reinforce each other’s 
activities – the construction wing of the party Jihad al-Bina (see below) builds the 
organisation’s schools, while Hezbollah religious centres and institutions provide 
them with books and instructors. The party’s media wing publicises the organisation’s 
reconstruction activities and religious message. Its research unit helps to plan social 
interventions and provides employment for graduates from its educational 
institutions. In this manner, Hezbollah’s institutions represent a unified and coherent 
intervention into Lebanese civil society. 
 
One striking aspect of this coherence is the ideological framework propagated 
through the organisation’s network of civil society institutions. The principal element 
of this framework is the on-going and deepening Islamization of the Shi’a population, 
which has been vital to strengthening Hezbollah’s hegemony. Hezbollah’s 
socialisation structures have been primarily aimed at strengthening the religiosity of 
its social environment, thereby fostering an adherence of the community to the 
organisation as the embodiment of Islamic values (understood, as discussed below, 
through a particularly distinctive variant of Islam). Islamization has been both 
                                                            
134 One prominent cadre of the party was, for example, successively director of the party’s construction wing, 
Jihad al-Bina (see below), the party’s research unit and its television station. The head of the organisation’s 
Shahid association was previously director of Jihad al-Bina. The current Mayor of the Ghobeyri municipality, 
Muhammad Al-Khansa, was at the head of Hezbollah social services. Dr. Hassan Fadlallah, currently a MP, has 
been occupying various functions in the media wing of the party, working successively in the weekly newspaper 
of the party al-‘Ahed, then the radio station al-Nour and finally in the television channel al-Manar. 
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promoted by Hezbollah organisations, while, simultaneously employed as a means of 
disciplining elements of the Shi’a population that have resisted this process. It is 
through these twin elements of consent and coercion, mediated through the vehicle 
of Islamization, that Hezbollah has developed its hegemonic position amongst 
Lebanese Shi’a.  
 
This chapter will demonstrate that the internal structure of Hezbollah can be 
compared to Althusser's State Apparatus (SA), which includes: the government, the 
administration, the army, police, courts, prisons, etc… These institutions constitute 
what we call the repressive SA. The repressive feature indicates that the SA in 
question operates prevalently through violence, at least to a certain extent (as 
repression, administrative for example, can take non-physical forms) (Althusser 
1976). We will analyse the army and military aspects in chapter 7. Secondly, I will 
look at Hezbollah’s network of organisations, which reflects the plurality of the 
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), as explained by Althusser (1976): the schools 
apparatus, the religious apparatus, the family apparatus, the trade union apparatus, 
the media apparatus, the cultural apparatus, etc… All these apparatuses can be 
found in Hezbollah. The network of organisations of Hezbollah corresponds to the 
purpose of the ISA, in other words as a tool similar to the repressive SA for the ruling 
class to maintain its hegemony, as argued by Althusser (1976). In Hezbollah’s 
network of organisations, each singular entity serves a particular purpose in the 
project of hegemony of the Islamic movement. The dominant ISA, which diffuses the 
dominant ideology to a large public with the most efficiency, is considered by 
Althusser to be school, which is an important element in Hezbollah’s network of 
organisations. Despite the diversity of Hezbollah’s organisations, what unifies them is 
that they follow and diffuse the ideology promoted by the Islamic movement, which 
has become the dominant ideology inside the Lebanese Shi’a population today.  
 
The chapter begins by outlining the organisational composition of Hezbollah itself, 
which needs to be understood as integrally connected to its wider intervention in the 
Shi’a population. The party is tightly centralised and hierarchical, structured in a 
nested, pyramid-like form that transmits decisions and political orientation seamlessly 
from top to bottom. This structure then interfaces with a broader set of civil society 
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organisations branching out through Shi’a areas. The chapter then turns to 
examining four priority areas of this intervention in Lebanese civil society: social 
support activities, religious institutions, media and culture, and the education/youth 
sector. In each of these sectors, the concrete activities of the main Hezbollah 
institutions are discussed, followed by their significance to the development of 
Hezbollah’s hegemony within the Shi’a population. The second half of the chapter 
draws together the main ideological threads of this hegemonic apparatus. It focuses, 
in particular, on the collective and individual norms articulated by Hezbollah in the 
concepts of hâla islâmiyya and iltizâm. These norms have a highly gendered 
component, and help to enact the consensual and coercive aspects of the party’s 
intervention in Lebanese civil society.  
 
5.2 Hezbollah’s Structure and Relationship to Civil Society 
 
An important facet to understanding Hezbollah’s intervention in civil society, and the 
Shi’a population more generally, is the organisation’s internal structure. This structure 
is defined by an extreme centralisation and concern with hierarchy and discipline 
(ICG 2003:2), features that enable the ideological and political orientation of the party 
to be consciously and systematically transmitted to its wider social environment. This 
structure is also marked by the predominance of religious clerics in its upper 
leadership, further confirmation of the significance that specific religio-ideological 
conceptions have on the organisation’s political practice (Hazmeh 1993:325).  
 
The highest decision-making body of the party is the “Decision Making Consultative 
Council” (Majlis Shura al-Qarâr) known as the Shura, which is composed of seven 
members: the Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, the Vice Secretary Naim 
Qassem, and five other cadres. In the Shura, decisions are usually reached by 
consensus and only occasionally through a formal vote. Resulting directives are 
binding on the movement’s constituent bodies (ICG 2003:2). The Shura is elected 
every three years not by the party rank and file members but by the General 
Convention (al-Mu’tamar al-’âm), which gathers according to different sources 
between 200 to 250 high cadres, and includes heads of various sections, 
geographical regions and units of work (Daher 2014:195). The last General 
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Convention was held in 2008-2009, with the 2012 meeting postponed due to the 
conflict in Syria (Al-Monitor 2013). In addition to electing the Shura, the General 
Convention discusses general policies of the party regarding the party’s daily 
operations in Lebanon, and its relations with Shi’a constituencies and other 
Lebanese political forces.  
 
The Shura forms the main core of the party’s strategic intervention in civil society and 
its wider political orientation. This role is carried out through five councils, each 
headed by one of the Shura members, who are joined by other key cadres. Daher 
(2014) describes these councils as follows:  
 
-­‐ The Executive Council (EC), composed of twelve members. The EC defines 
the public action of the party together with its foreign policy.  The members of 
the EC are generally regional party leaders and/or members in charge of 
specific sectoral policies (media, health, social, education and so forth).  
-­‐ The Political Council (PC), which is in charge of communication and 
coordination with the other Lebanese political and social actors. The PC 
analyses the general political situation and provides analysis and 
recommendations to the Shura. In addition to conjunctural political debates, 
the PC administers permanent ‘files’ on subjects such as relationships with 
Christian and Islamic parties, Palestinian factions and Arab countries. 
-­‐ The Jihad Council (JC), which runs the military resistance and the security 
apparatus of the party. The JC is responsible for the security of the members 
of the resistance and its arms, notably through the surveillance of alleged 
collaborators.  
-­‐ The Judicial Council (JudC), which brings together different clerics from the 
various regions of Lebanon and passes rulings on aspects of religious law.  
-­‐ The Parliamentary Work Council (PWC), which gathers Hezbollah members of 
parliament to coordinate their political interventions and the communication of 
decisions. A sub-council was added to this in 2005, the Government Work 
Council, which includes consultants specialised in certain sectors. (Daher 
2014: 193-195) 
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In turn, these councils oversee a further tier of committees that involve other party 
cadres tasked with implementing selected policies. In addition to these councils and 
committees, two new organisations were established in 2004: (1) the CCSD, the 
Hezbollah-affiliated think tank based in Beirut, responsible for social, development 
and economic research and programs, and (2) The Federation of Hezbollah 
Municipalities, an organisation that links together Hezbollah municipalities in order to 
strengthen coordination between them (Harb 2010:88).135  
 
These nation-wide structures are complimented at the regional level by district 
councils, called the Regional Shura Councils, which are supervised by members of 
the Shura. Their main responsibility is to follow up on the daily activities and needs of 
the district (Hazmeh 1993:327). In each district, Hezbollah members are organised in 
groups (majmu’ât) of between 30 to 35 persons, based on individual neighbourhoods 
(Daher 2014:191). These groups coordinate through factions (fasâ`il), networks of 4-
5 groups that represent a small city or set of villages and report to the Regional 
Shura Council (Daher 2014:191).  
 
At the same time the ideology of the Wilâyat al-Faqîh plays an important role in the 
internal coherence and discipline of the party. Membership in the Islamic movement 
is conditional on allegiance to the Wilâyat al-Faqîh and respect for the 
implementation of its decision among the leadership and its cadres. A high cadre 
actually acknowledged that the Wilâyat al-Faqîh has played a very positive role in the 
realization of internal discipline as an outcome of the religious respect of this 
principle, guaranteeing the unity of ranks inside the organisation (2005 cited in Daher 
2014:216). 
 
The picture that emerges from this structure is a tightly organised and highly 
hierarchical party, which clearly transmits decisions and their implementation from 
the top to the individual member. In an interview conducted for this thesis Abd Al-
Halim Fadlallah (2012a), the Director of CCSD, confirmed this conclusion. He 
described the party as a pyramidal organisation in which debate is limited to the 
highest ranks of the party. Decisions are communicated to members through the 
                                                            
135 Leaders of both of these organisations were interviewed for this thesis. 
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official structures described above, and cadres are also responsible for meeting with 
sympathisers in order to explain the official positions of the party (Fadlallah 2012b). 
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem has likewise stated:  
 
“affiliation to the party is realised, in the various sectors, through its 
direct structure, by all individuals accepting totally and completely 
the objectives of the party, a member is committed to implement 
organisational decisions, and dedicates the necessary time to 
achieve these obligations and possesses the personal qualities 
linked to faith, to the struggle and to behaviour, allowing him to 
strengthen the organisation, to develop his capacities, and to 
achieve its goals.” (Qassem 2008:86)  
 
This pyramidal structure – organised at its core by the Shura – is thus the sole origin 
of the party’s policy and strategic orientation towards the wider Shi’a population. This 
orientation, however, is mediated through a range of civil society activities that 
enable the party to interface with supporters and non-members. The most important 
of these activities: social support, religious institutions, media/cultural activities, and 
education/youth work are discussed in the following section. 
 
5.3 Social Support Activities of Hezbollah 
 
A vital element in Hezbollah’s support among the Shi’a population has been its 
attempts to support the civil population following conflict and war, demonstrated, 
most notably, in the aftermath of the 2006 war with Israel (Alagha and Catusse 
2008). The direct beneficiaries of the party’s resources and services, including 
employees and members in Beirut alone, are estimated to reach up to 30 to 40,000 
people, according to some sources (Harb 2010:91; Traboulsi 2014;80).136 Others 
have estimated the figure to be between 60,000 and 80,000, when factoring in the 
security and military apparatus (Nakhoul 2013).137 In addition to this, the party offers 
                                                            
136 F. Traboulsi (2014:80) estimated at around more than 35,000 the numbers of employees and full timers  
(working for the party) of Hezbollah working in the various institutions of the party, with Jihad Al-Bina 
accounting to around 10,000 workers.  
137 In a study report of Reuters on Hezbollah of Samia Nakhoul (2013), Hezbollah is said to pay salaries to 
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a range of social support to a wider layer of non-members and supporters in the Shi’a 
population. 
 
This support includes direct financial aid through the organisation’s ‘good loan 
institution’ (mu’assasa Al-Qard al-Hassan), which was established in 1982 and 
distributes loans without interest according to Islamic religious law (Alagha and 
Catusse 2008). This institution has 23 branches and around 300 employees 
distributed between Beirut, the Bekaa and the South (Al-Qard al-Hassan Association 
2014). According to its website, Al-Qard Al-Hassan has lent more than $245 million 
since 1983, in a total of over 700,000 loans, including 110,000 in 2013 alone (Al-
Qard al-Hassan Association 2014b). These loans are funded through donations, 
religious taxes, administrative fees and subscriptions to the institution (Al-Qard al-
Hassan Association 2014b). In 2012, the association had 150,000 subscribers who 
benefitted from preferential loans in exchange of paying a monthly subscription of 
10,000 LP ($6.66), and 35,000 people who contribute to the organisation (Al-Qard al-
Hassan Association 2014b).   
 
Much of Hezbollah’s financial support aims at the provision of welfare to the most 
vulnerable and poor Shi’a populations. The Imdad organisation, established in 1987, 
provides health care, education and recreation services, support for orphans, 
emergency relief, income generating programs and small amount of financial aid for 
impoverished families (Al-Imdad 2014).  
 
Another interesting means by which Hezbollah provides its welfare support are 
‘discount cards’, which can be purchased for a small fee and then entitle the holder to 
significant price reductions in Hezbollah-affiliated shops and community services. 
The card al-Amir, for example, is distributed by the association “La Famille”, 138 
whose general director is Imad Wehbe, a graduate of Hezbollah’s Mahdi school.139 
The card costs $1, and provides discounts of up to 50 percent in a wide range of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
60,000-80,000 people working for charities, schools, clinics and other institutions in addition to its military and 
security apparatus.  
138 The association La Famille was established in 2004 by a few persons who presented the idea to one of the 
officials in Hezbollah, who in turn gave positive feedback (Saqr 2008). 
139 Information retrieved on Imad Wehbe's personal facebook account (accessed 20 August 2014). A 2014 
ceremony for the card was held under the auspices of the Hezbollah Minister of Industry Hussein Hajj Hassan 
(Al-Ahed News 2014a). 
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institutions such as “cooperatives, clothing shops, libraries, medical centers, sport 
centers, furniture house, electronic and electricity shops, and recreational centers, 
(including restaurants and coffee houses)” (Anonym 2012a; Hassan 2014; La Famille 
2014). In this manner, Hezbollah not only reduces daily living costs for Shi’a families, 
but also provides support to local businesses (often Hezbollah-affiliated).140 The card 
was first launched in Dahyeh in 2004-2005, and has now expanded to the South and 
the Bekaa, with around 75,000 people using the card by 2014 (Hassan 2014). 
Moreover, Hezbollah also distributes these cards as presents to Shi’a families who 
regularly attend the organisation’s cultural events, as well as military training (Saqr 
2008). 
 
Other kinds of discount cards are only available to Hezbollah members. One 
example of this is the al-Nour card, which can be obtained by members for a 20,000 
LP ($13) monthly subscription. According to a wife of a Hezbollah member 
interviewed for this thesis, the al-Nour Card allows its holders to benefit from price 
reductions in various Hezbollah-affiliated shops and warehouses, furniture shops 
entertainment locations, kindergartens, restaurants throughout the country and 
organised hajj pilgrimages (Anonym 2012a; Shamseddine 2012; El-Cheikh and 
Saghyieh 2013a). 
 
Alongside these welfare activities and financial support to poorer Shi’a populations, 
perhaps the most striking example of the social support offered by Hezbollah has 
been its building efforts within Shi’a areas, particularly following the destruction of 
2006. The implementing body for these building projects was the aforementioned 
Jihad al-Bina foundation, which was created in 1985 to assume responsibility for 
reconstruction during and after the Civil War (Hamzeh 2004:50-51). Between 1988 
and 2002, Jihad al-Bina led the construction of 78 buildings and the rehabilitation of 
another 10,528 structures (including homes, schools, shops, hospitals, infirmaries, 
mosques, cultural centres and agricultural cooperatives), most of them in South 
Lebanon (Hamzeh 2004:50-51). Jihad al-Bina relies on financial assistance from its 
Iranian sister organisation as well as from Islamic charitable sources. In addition to 
                                                            
140 La Famille (2014) states that the purpose of the card is “to ease the economic and social burdens on the life of 
people, especially the people from the reality of the social situation and living conditions that plague the 
Lebanese citizen”.  
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reconstruction, the organisation also helps provide water and electricity to Shi’a 
populations where the government is weak or absent. From 1988 to 2012, the 
Foundation distributed 8,095,055 barrels of water to 113 reservoirs in all regions of 
the southern suburbs, drawing periodically from a reservoir in Burj Abi Haidar (Jihad 
al-Bina Development Association 2013).  
 
A few days following the 2006 war, Hezbollah distributed millions of dollars in cash 
for building purposes to thousands of families, a process described by Jihad al-Bina 
as follows:  
 
“the housing compensations were paid according to the initial 
surveys of demolished buildings, which Jihad al-Bina was 
capable of accomplishing in an unprecedentedly short period of 
time. Compensation was settled without any complications to 
$12,000 in Beirut (representing $4,000 for rent allowance for 
the year, and $8,000 for the furniture), $10,000 in the South 
($2,000 for rent allowance for the year and $8,000 for furniture). 
They settled the documents essential to identify the individuals 
and their demolished buildings, and in one month, 
compensations were paid to more than 12,000 individuals.” 
(Jihad al-Bina` Ma’an nabnî wa nuqâwim 2014) 
 
The party’s Executive Council was in charge of this distribution that took place in 
offices situated in schools and other buildings throughout the bombed 
neighbourhoods of the southern suburbs, South Lebanon and the Bekaa. Hundreds 
of volunteers helped expedite the process, covering 75 percent of the requests in 48 
hours (Harb 2007:229). 
 
Most of this activity focused on reconstruction of the Dahyeh neighbourhood, the 
principal urban base of the organisation. To this end, Jihad al-Bina established the 
project ‘Wa’d’ (Promise), which specifically targeted building in Dahyeh. According to 
the CCSD (2008b:67), Wa’d arose following numerous meetings between the 
residents of Dahyeh, whose homes had been destroyed during the war, and 
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Hezbollah cadres, in which 80 percent of the residents of destroyed homes decided 
to entrust Hezbollah and its teams of engineers with the reconstruction of the zone. 
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah explained how the process occurred in a speech 
on May 11 2012 to commemorate the conclusion of Wa’d:  
 
“Then I met with the people – the owners of the residential units 
– you remember that. It was a beautiful and massive meeting in 
the Hall of Great Sayyida Khadeja (Peace be upon her) 
following the war. I presented to the people the decision as it is. 
There is no possibility that the state rebuild your houses. It will 
pay the compensations for the residential units and you have 
two choices:  
The first choice is that residents of every building form a 
committee and agree among themselves to build the building 
and we are at your service. We will also help with financing and 
paying the differences and also improving the building because 
the money which will be paid by the state is not enough even to 
reconstruct the building as it was, and as well from building it 
better than it was. Of course we are at your service and we will 
not withdraw.    
The other choice: we have a project and the institution will be 
charged on your behalf, by consulting you and cooperating with 
you, to reconstruct these buildings.  
So we were before a democratic project, which is based on 
dialogue. No one has obliged anyone to do anything. No one 
imposed anything on anyone.” (Al-Manar 2012b) 
 
Nasrallah’s account, however, is challenged by Mona Harb, who was a member at 
the time of the Reconstruction Unit at the AUB (Harb 2007:229; Fawaz and Harb 
2010:22). The members of this group tried to initiate a public debate on the 
reconstruction options in the neighbourhood of Haret Hreik (in Dahyeh), but their 
propositions were rejected by the Wa’d team (Fawaz and Harb 2010:2). Harb and 
another Beirut-based scholar, Mona Fawaz, have argued that Hezbollah controlled 
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the reconstruction process completely; involving only selected actors from its own 
apparatus. They claim that Hezbollah operated outside public institutions and even 
isolated the Haret Hreik elected local government from its decision-making structures 
(Fawaz and Harb 2010:30-31). In this manner, Hezbollah took responsibility for the 
reconstruction of Dahyeh and at the same time asserted its domination over this 
section of the city. The Wa’d project had the advantage of maintaining, and 
legitimising, the geographical integrity of Hezbollah’s power base, while reinforcing 
the party’s prestige because it was implemented by the party’s development wing. 
Fawaz and Harb note:  
 
“Dahyeh is Hezbollah’s capital, the site of its institutional 
headquarters and of its governing councils. Its location in the 
city of Beirut gives it tactical weight and significant visibility that 
is capitalized upon in the party’s mobilisation strategies and 
political decision making. Its reconstruction is thus an 
opportunity to reassert the party’s dominance, especially amid 
acute life threatening challenges such as those unfolded in 
summer 2006. In Dahyeh, more than elsewhere, the act of 
reconstruction was hence an act of defiance and survival for 
Hezbollah. This largely explains the party’s swift mobilization in 
the process.” (Fawaz and Harb 2010:21)  
 
The Wa’d project indicates the way in which reconstruction has been utilised by 
Hezbollah as a major element in building a popular base of support in key Shi’a 
areas. Not only were the residents of Dahyeh supplied with desperately needed 
housing, but the reconstruction activities provided thousands of jobs in a community 
that consists of half a million Shi’a Lebanese. Moreover, the organisation’s high 
profile activities in the area provided it with an enormous propaganda victory in the 
wake of the war. In this manner, reconstruction represented a potent symbol of the 
party’s claims that it was the principal defender of the rights of the Shi’a community in 
Lebanon.  
Nonetheless, despite the important social role that Wa’d (and reconstruction in 
general) has played in Shi’a areas, it is important to note that the model envisaged by 
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Hezbollah continued to emphasize market-driven and private property-based 
conceptions of urban space (Fawaz 2014:922-924). Mona Fawaz has highlighted this 
feature of Wa’d in Haret Hreik, pointing to the fact that the project was centred upon 
the assumption that the beneficiaries would be “property owners in the area, those 
who can produce a substantiated claim for property ownership” (Fawaz 2011:60). 
She notes that to view Haret Hreik “as only the sum of 200 private individual 
apartments is nonetheless quite problematic … the neighbourhood was also, for 
example, the centre of economic and educational activities ... many other dwellers 
and visitors should be entitled to bring claims and participate in articulating a 
communal vision for what the neighbourhood was and the potential it has” (Fawaz 
2011:60). The residents’ desire for increased and better utilised public space – 
including “better sidewalks, more open spaces, playgrounds, less [traffic] congestion” 
(Fawaz 2011:60) 141  – were ignored in the reconstruction plans, which instead 
emphasized the interests of retailers and owners of companies and institutions 
(CCSD 2008b:131-135). Moreover, in line with the arguments made in the previous 
two chapters, these reconstruction activities not only helped to consolidate 
Hezbollah’s social base in Dahyeh (Fawaz 2009:332-334), but also acted to enrich 
those large construction conglomerates that were close to the party itself – 
companies not linked to the party were excluded from the lucrative contracts (Irving 
2009). 142 
 
5.4 Mosques, Hawzât and Religious Institutions 
 
As noted in earlier chapters, the political elites of the Shi’a population, in other words 
the zu’âma, were significantly weakened during the Civil War as a consequence of 
the political and military strength of Amal and Hezbollah. In this context, new religious 
institutions were an important site of challenge to those existing elites who had 
typically monopolised religious learning and scholasticism. These new institutions 
included Hezbollah-affiliated mosques and hawzât (religious seminaries), which 
provided space for previously marginalised youth to enter religious vocations while 
                                                            
141 Fawaz also points out that residents were not consulted in the composition of the Wa’d board or the architects 
involved in the construction of their houses. 
142 Hezbollah (in alliance with Amal) was criticised for its clientelist and patronage policies in this regard. 
Indeed, Riyad Al-Assad, an important political figure in the South, declared that Hezbollah systematically 
refused reconstruction contracts for his company because of a veto from Nabih Berri (cited in ICG 2007:7).  
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simultaneously helping to disseminate Hezbollah’s particular worldview and ideology. 
According to Rula Abisaab, the new hawza: 
  
“posed a challenge to elitist and family-transmitted scholastic 
traditions in Jabal Amil and brought about a status reversal for 
displaced Shi’a youth from working-class backgrounds whose 
lives lacked the educational stability or socio-economic growth 
necessary for self-actualization. The seminary students who 
identify with Hezbollah are largely drawn from lower social 
classes and families that lack the traditions of Shi’a 
scholasticism. This challenge to the older traditions of learning 
must be seen against the background of overall socio-economic 
changes. An incremental process of rural deterioration in the 
Shi’a regions, combined with demographic change and 
marginalization at the hands of the Lebanese state, popularized 
new modes of thought, of which the Islamist cultural and 
political revolution represented by Hezbollah is one. The 
production of Islamist ideas, in turn, led to the emergence of 
new forms of economic activity, wage labour and professions 
tied directly to the institutions, seminaries, schools, 
organisations and overall mobilization activities of Hezbollah.” 
(Abisaab 2006:231)  
 
The main historical places of public religious activity in the early years of Hezbollah 
were the mosques of Bir Al-Abed (al-Imâm al-Rida), Ghobeyri (al-Imâm al-Mahdi) 
and Airport Road (al-Rasul al-‘Azam), all located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, 
and the hawza of Baalbek founded in 1978 by Abbas Al-Mussawi (second Secretary 
General of the party, 1991-1992).143 The sermons and religious formations provided 
in these institutions were highly politicised. Their diffusion was also helped by 
recorded audiotapes, which had proven an effective means of propaganda during the 
years of the Iranian revolution (Lamloum 2009a). Important Hezbollah “Hawzât” are 
                                                            
143 Abbas Al-Mussawi was a Lebanese Shi’a cleric who was a member of al-Dawa before he joined Amal. He 
was then one of the founders of Hezbollah, and became Secretary General in May 1991. He was killed by the 
Israeli forces in 1992 (Blanford 2011:96-100). 
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found today in Siddikin in South Lebanon Hawza al-Imâm al-Mahdi, the Hawza al-
Imâm al-Muntazar in Baalbek, Hawza al-‘almiyya al-dînniyya in Tyr and al-Rasul al-
Akram’s in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Other institutions linked to Hezbollah 
diffusing the religious and political message of the Islamic movement are the Centre 
for Youth Education in Jibsheet (South Lebanon), the Educational Hawza in Brital 
(Bekaa), the Iranian Religious Centre in Tyr and the Centre for Islamic Martial Arts in 
Kabrikha (South Lebanon) (Hamzeh 1993:327).  
 
Hezbollah has also established very strong relations with three clerical associations, 
which are the “Hay`at Ulamâ` Jabal ‘Amil” (the Committee of Ulema of Mount Amil), 
directed by Atif al Nabulsi,144 (who is not a member of Hezbollah but is very close to it 
and supports its policies), the “Tajamu’ al-‘Ulamâ` al-Muslimîn fi Lubnân“ 
(Association of Muslim Ulema in Lebanon), headed by Sheik Hassan Abdallah 
(Tajamu’ al-‘Ulamâ` al-Muslimîn fi Lubnân 2014), and the “Tajamu’ al-‘Ulamâ` al-
Muslimîn fîl-Biqâ’’” (Association of Muslims Ulema in the Bekaa) (Charara 2007:4).  
 
In the hawzât, sheikhs train other sheikhs whose role is to spread support for the 
Islamic way of life (see below) and the policies of Hezbollah. Women and men are 
trained separately, and go on to pass their religious knowledge to the immediate and 
extended family unit (Harb 2007:225). Through these institutions, Hezbollah 
promotes a certain popular conception of religion that links support for the party with 
the fulfilment of religious obligations. Hezbollah-affiliated sheikhs in hawzât and 
mosques can be viewed as organic intellectuals whose role, in a Gramscian sense, is 
to elaborate a particular project for the Shi’a population by organising it in both 
ideological and practical terms. The role of the ulema, or more generally religious 
clerics, as a vanguard is also symbolized by Khomeini’s slogan: “the Ulema are the 
leaders” (cited in Charara 2007:65). An important aspect to this religious work is the 
institutionalisation of religious celebrations and ceremonies, which are used to bind 
Hezbollah’s members and supporters around a common ideology and conception of 
collective action (Harb 2010:173-175). In this sense, the form of Hezbollah’s religious 
activities is highly political; a link that is clearly demonstrated during election periods. 
                                                            
144 The Sheikh Atif Al-Nabulsi, was the one to issue a fatwa during the 2005 crisis in the Lebanese government 
following the suspension of participation of Shi’a Ministers to the Siniora Cabinet forbidding the approval of the 
nomination of new Shi’a ministers not issued from Amal and Hezbollah (cited in Daher 2014:282). 
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At these times, religious ceremonies are used to mobilise popular support for the 
party. At the same time, Sheikhs play a key role in relaying fatwas from Hezbollah or 
religious leaders close to the Islamic movement, for example in imposing a moral 
obligation to vote for the list supported by Hezbollah during the various elections 
summed up in the party slogan: “your vote is a duty (amâna) on which you will be 
judged at the end of your days” (Al-Hajj 2002:176). 
 
One very important example of this use of religious celebration is that of Ashura,145 
which commemorates the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein in 680, during the Battle 
of Karbala. Hezbollah began to organise its own separate Ashura processions in 
1985, in which the organisation regularly engaged in street confrontations with its 
rival Amal, reflecting competition over who would become hegemonic within the Shi’a 
population (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2005:140). In 1993, Hezbollah organised its first 
meeting of public lamentation for the death of Hussein (also called majlis husaynî) in 
Dahyeh and two years later a large tent was installed (Mervin 2008b:196). In 2002, 
Hezbollah built a building for this specific event in which Hassan Nasrallah made 
speeches. Since that time, Hezbollah has turned the Ashura celebrations into a 
symbol of its power of mobilisation, especially in Dahyeh. The processions indicate 
the high level of organisation and conformity within the party, in which “everyone 
wears the required costume, holds the place that was assigned in the rank and hit 
their chest in a similar pace” (Mervin 2008b:197). In this sense, the ritual practices of 
Ashura constitute an “invented tradition” (see Hosbawm and Ranger 1992): they 
build a Shi’a collective memory, whether on a local level or at the wider community 
level. These invented traditions act to reinforce processes of identity construction and 
a definition of politics. 
 
All religious holidays give rise to activities and celebrations prepared by Hezbollah 
through the “Jam’iyya al-Ta’lîm al-Dînî al-Islâmî”, the Islamic Religious Education 
Association (IREA), an educational organisation linked to Hezbollah. IREA organises 
numerous activities: preparation of Islamic and cultural competitions during 
Ramadan, celebration of the “sacrifice” feast or “ ’Aîd al-Adha ” in the al-Mustapha 
schools, celebration of the “taklîf Char’î” feast in which 9-year old girls in the al-
                                                            
145 This event takes place on a yearly basis from the first days of the “muharram” month. 
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Mustapha schools put on the veil (see below), organisation of three iftars during 
Ramadan in Beirut, the South and the Bekaa and theatre plays and competitions for 
religious commemorations (Le Thomas 2012a:157-158).146  
 
All of these institutions and religious occasions are thus used by Hezbollah to 
develop a wider religiosity within the Shi’a population and a separate sense of 
identity set apart from the wider Lebanese society. In this manner, as Mona Harb 
(2010:173) has noted, Shi’a Islamic belief – reinforced and institutionalised by 
Hezbollah in religious holidays, ceremonies and processions – allow Hezbollah to 
accumulate ‘symbolic capital’, thus guaranteeing the reproduction and the 
legitimation of the party itself. She adds that the investment of the movement in these 
types of activities, called demonstratives, “constitutes a form of legitimate self 
assertion by which power is known and recognized” in the words of Pierre Bourdieu 
(1980 cited Harb 2010:173). 
 
5.5 Media and Production of Culture 
 
Since its establishment, Hezbollah has placed a particular emphasis on developing 
its media network. Hezbollah started to develop formal media institutions as soon as 
1982, by groups of people that would officially establish the party in 1985. First, they 
published a newsletter called al-Mujtahid (the Struggler), which had a peculiar Iranian 
inspired rhetoric and style. As described by the scholars Lina Khatib, Dina Matar and 
Atef Alshaer: 
 
“the newsletter carried reports about Iran and local 
developments related to Iran, such as celebrations of the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution in Iran and in Lebanon, as well as the 
activities of the Islamic Committees and speeches by Iranian 
and Lebanese clerical leaders.” (Khatib, Matar and Alshaer 
2014:9)  
 
                                                            
146 These commemorations include Ashura, 14 Rabab (celebration of the birth of Imam Ali), 15 Cha’ban 
(celebration of the birth of the Imam al- Mahdi), 18 Thu al-Hijja (‘Aîd al-Ghadîr) (Le Thomas 2012a:158).  
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The publication of this newsletter was stopped following the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in June 1982, and was replaced by a four page leaflet called Ahl al-Thugur 
(the People of the outpost), which maintained its focus on Iranian affairs and the 
battle between the Islamic Nation and the Israeli enemy (Khatib, Matar and Alshaer 
2014:9). 
 
According to Abbas Al-Mussawi, the second Secretary General of the party 
assassinated by Israeli forces in 1992, “When the stands of the mosques will 
associate themselves with the modern stands that are television and video, it is at 
this moment that we will be able to create the Ummah” (Lamloum 2008a:22). Naim 
Qassem has also noted that Hezbollah’s “visual media is an efficient arm because it 
transmits the event without any need of comments” (cited in Lamloum 2008a:26).  
 
Hezbollah’s media network has three main components: First, the television channel 
al-Manar, established at the beginning of the nineties at the initiative of businessmen 
close to the party. The television channel is now under the total domination of the 
party (Qassir 2011). Second, websites, magazines and newspapers such as the 
weekly al-Intiqad (the critical) formerly known as al-‘Ahed (the Pledge), which is the 
party's main mouthpiece and was established in June 1984, Baqiyyat Allâh, a 
monthly cultural magazine focusing particularly on issues relating to Islamic Shi’a 
Law, which is distributed to around 17,000 cadres and members of Hezbollah 
(Lamloum 2008a:33) and the magazine “al-amâna” of the association “al-‘Amal al-
Baladî” (the municipal work), which concentrates on municipality issues. Lastly, the 
radio station al-Nour (Harb 2010:99) established in 1987, which is now one of the 
largest and most listened-to radio stations in Lebanon. It also broadcasts abroad 
(Qassir 2011). Each of these institutions play a key role in diffusing the vocabulary 
and the imagery of Hezbollah’s worldview through shows, documentaries and games 
addressing themes of resistance, Islam, Palestine and Zionism (Harb 2010:110). 
Hezbollah also has other resources to spread its messages such as musical groups 
(including al-Wilâya and Wa’d), publishing houses (Lebanese Cultural Centre, al-
Hadi Publishing) and film and production houses (Ressalat and Dar al-Manar) 
(Lamloum 2009a).  
 
 179 
Until the mid-2000s, all the communication activities of the party were supervised by 
the Central Information Unit (Wahdat al-I’lâm al-markazî) (CIU), which was managed 
by a member of the Majlis al-Shura and directly submitted to the authority of the 
President of the Executive Council (Lamloum 2008a:24). The CIU combined the 
regional units (Bekaa, Beirut and the South), the unit of foreign relations managing 
relations with national and international media, the committee of information activities 
in charge of graphics, banners, chants and placards, in addition to the directors of the 
al-‘Ahed newspaper, the directors of al-Manar television and al-Nour radio station 
(Lamloum 2008a:24). The CIU was also in charge of collaboration with municipalities 
governed by Hezbollah to rename squares and decorate them with specific pictures 
and banners. New names were attributed to some specific squares for example: 
Jerusalem avenue, Khomeini avenue, Hadi Nasrallah avenue and Resistance 
avenue (Harb 2010:163). As explained by the director of the CIU in an interview in 
2004: “we want to create a specific urban décor, pedestrian streets, monuments on 
squares that reveal the identity of the neighbourhoods, which show that we are here 
now, in this location” (cited in Harb 2010:163).  
 
In 2004, the party’s 7th Congress decided to place even greater prioritisation on 
cultural issues and their link with popular mobilisation (Harb 2010:87). This led to the 
establishment of the Artistic and Media Unit, attached to the EC, which was placed in 
charge of graphic means of communication (posters, paintings and slogans) that 
would be spread throughout Shi’a areas (Daher 2014:200). In this manner Hezbollah 
aimed at reproducing a specific identity in the territories it controlled, where party 
references would be materialised in space through banners and pictures installed in 
the streets, objects positioned on public squares and regular commemorations (Harb 
2010:163). This panoply of images is a striking confirmation of Gramsci’s observation 
that a movement seeking hegemony must never tire with repeating its ideas: 
“repetition is the best dialectic means for working on the popular mentality” (cited in 
Thomas 2009:340). 
 
In this framework, al-Manar television held a particularly important place due to its 
large audience as the second most watched TV channel in the Arab world (after al-
Jazeera with an estimated 10 million viewers in 2001) throughout the 2000s (Harb 
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2010:153). Al-Manar has nevertheless probably lost some sections of its audience 
following its military involvement in the Syrian revolutionary process alongside the 
Assad regime, which has proven hugely unpopular to the Islamic movement among 
the people of the region. According to a survey conducted in March 2013 by Pew 
Research Center, Hezbollah was widely unpopular in the region (Drake 2013). 
Hezbollah was actually viewed unfavourably in Egypt by 75 percent, in Turkey by 73 
percent, in Jordan by 72 percent and in Lebanon by 59 percent. Views are mixed in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories where 49 percent have an unfavourable view of 
Hezbollah while 43 percent have a positive one. Views of Hezbollah in the 
Palestinian territories have nevertheless turned significantly more negative since 
2011 when 61 percent saw the militant group positively and 37 percent had an 
unfavourable view. In Tunisia, 38 percent have an unfavourable view of Hezbollah 
and 35 percent have a positive one, with 27 percent expressing no opinion. Within 
Lebanon about nine-in-ten Shi’a (89 percent) view Hezbollah favourably while 94 
percent of Sunni and 60 percent of Christian regard Hezbollah unfavourably (Drake 
2013). 
 
According to station officials in the mid 2000s, al-Manar's annual budget stood at 
approximately $15 million (Krayem cited in Jorish 2004). It employs around 350 
people, including twenty foreign correspondents (Lamloun 2009b). Its organisation 
consists of six departments,147  including a department in charge of its Internet 
website which alone has ten employees. As Olfa Lamloun (2009b) has argued, the 
first mission of al-Manar was to build a space of legitimacy for the armed resistance 
against the Israeli occupation, whose ultimate reference point is Islamic and Shi’a 
symbolism. The channel has also filled two other major functions: 
  
“It is first to weld and reproduce the Shi’a popular basis of 
Hezbollah structured in a political community through the "mis 
en scene" or demonstration of the power of the party, especially 
in times of crisis and of intense inter-communitarian conflicts. 
Al-Manar therefore operates as a mediator of the identity of 
Hezbollah and of all its attributes of legitimation to its Shi’a 
                                                            
147 Social and entertainment programs, sports programs, programs for children and youth, cultural and religious 
programs, Lebanese and foreign programs and lastly head of directors. 
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popular base. It participates in the reproduction of its system of 
representation, which draws its references in the collective 
memory of the Shi’a martyrology. It boasts its cadres of frames 
of perception and allows the public to locate, perceive, identify, 
classify the events of (his or her) environment, their experiences 
and the world. It systematically transmits the different religious 
and political ceremonies and ritual celebrations organized by 
the party (the day of the martyr, the day of liberation, Ashura, 
the day of Jerusalem...), which characterises the time of the 
community and maintain a space of familiarity between its 
members. Social programs publicise the merits of Hezbollah’s 
social actions and valorise them as a source of legitimation. 
Sports and children programs and soap operas offer a fun but 
virtuous entertainment.” (Lamloum 2009b) 
 
One example of al-Manar’s broadcasting was the series “al-Ghâlibun”, which traces 
the history of Hezbollah from 1985 to 1992. Al-Ghâlibun was broadcast by al-Manar 
in the summer 2012, during Ramadan, and cost $2 million to produce (Calabrese 
2013). The series was explicitly crafted to portray Hezbollah as the principal 
resistance movement against Israel through the 1980s and early 1990s. It relates a 
fictional account of its main protagonist, Nasser, who begins as a secular fighter but 
finally decides to join Hezbollah because “it is stronger and more effective [than other 
parties] because of the faith of its members" (Calabrese 2013). In shows such as 
this, al-Manar’s programming projects a historical narrative that upholds the party’s 
claims to be the sole and most effective representative of the Shi’a population, while 
simultaneously tying this to its religious principles. 148 
 
Dina Matar and Farah Dakhlallah argue in a similar vein that: 
 
“Al-Manar has continued to promote Hezbollah’s culture of 
                                                            
148 The series was severely criticised by other forces in Lebanon – including the LCP, the SSNP and Amal 
Movement – because of its distorted view of Hezbollah’s role. Feminists also attacked the show because of its 
downplaying of the role of non-military resistance, particularly the direct and indirect support furnished to 
ﬁghters by women over past decades (Deeb and Harb 2010:26). 
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resistance, considered an integral aspect of the party’s Iranian-
inspired Islamic milieu in Lebanon, and, which along with its 
constituent resistance identity and culture, are essential 
products of Hezbollah’s institutions which operate today as a 
holistic and integrated network which produce sets of values 
and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and 
political framework – that of Wilâyat al-Faqîh … The rhetoric of 
resistance is reflected in al-Manar’s references to the grand 
narratives of Shi’a history such as the Battle of Kerbala, 
narratives that serve to interpellate all the country’s Shi’a 
population, as well as other Muslim Shi’a beyond Lebanon’s 
boundaries, while indirectly excluding members of other 
religious communities. This rhetoric also serves to link 
Lebanon’s Shi’a to a greater Shi’a community that extends 
beyond the borders and history of the Lebanese state.” (Matar 
and Dakhlallah 2006:31) 
 
They add that al-Manar particularly emphasizes its role as the communal voice of 
Shi’a in Lebanon during its coverage and religious programming of the Shi’a holy 
months (Matar and Dakhlallah 2006:31).  
 
The specific religious principles of the party are also imposed on the employees of 
the channel in regards to their personal appearance on air. The management places 
restrictions on what headscarves can be worn by female presenters, insisting that the 
head covering had to be a dark uniform colour (Zaraket 2012). The employees are 
also ordered by al-Manar management to avoid the appearance of unveiled women 
on the station’s programs, restricting their appearance to news bulletins and reports, 
where for example, people on the street are asked for their opinion (Zaraket 2012). 
As Huda Rizk has noted, “from a media perspective, i.e. externally, the party is open 
to unveiled women and accepts them because it needs them to show an image of 
openness in the Arab and Western worlds and it needs their political support” (cited 
in Merhi Z. 2012). Nonetheless, “the party wants to make sure that people who are 
socially different from it are not hostile to it. But if you are an unveiled Shi’a woman, 
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then it’s a different story. Such a woman can not be brought into prominence in the 
party because she can not be a role model” (cited in Merhi Z. 2012). Al-Manar 
therefore adheres fully to the role assigned to television by Imam Khomeini: of a 
public university whose pedagogic role is to guide the population towards a pure 
society, uncorrupted by the West (Chelkowski and Dabashi 2000:262-264). The IRI, 
since the victory of its own revolution, actually emphasized the role of media in the 
dissemination of the Islamic culture. This is demonstrated by the law of 1982, which 
approved the constitution of Iranian radio and television, stating that “mass media, 
radio, television, must be at the service of … the dissemination of Islamic culture” 
(Rajaee 1993:121). 
 
In addition to its media network, Hezbollah has developed a specific attitude towards 
the production and control of art. In 2004, the party centralised its direct involvement 
in these processes through an affiliated professional organisation called the 
Lebanese Association for the Arts (LAA) or ‘al-Jam‘iyya al-Lubnâniyya lil-Funun’ 
(Deeb and Harb 2011:17). The newly established LAA was in charge of designing 
and implementing cultural projects commemorating the resistance and other themes, 
centralising previously dispersed efforts in this sphere (Deeb and Harb 2013:67-70). 
The LAA produced exhibitions, videos, billboards and other media narrating the key 
ideals of the “resistance society”, celebrating political and religious events and 
commemorating the party’s successes and achievements. In 2006, following the war, 
the LAA was the institution in charge of the campaign in three different languages 
(French, English and Arabic) praising the divine victory of Hezbollah (Fawaz and 
Harb 2010:25). It was the LAA as well that launched the campaign “Values” with 
slogans such as “order is from the faith” and “my family is my happiness”, which 
wanted to raise awareness about “order” and “family values” as Hezbollah 
considered there was a general decline in values that led to growing “social 
problems” (divorce, selfishness and drug addiction). The campaign included, as 
described by Deeb and Harb (2013:69), both visual and substantive educational 
elements, such as billboards, television and radio shows hosting sociologists, 
lectures and workshops at schools and Friday sermons. 
 
The LAA showed the increasing importance given by Hezbollah to the notion of 
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“culture”, understood as a holistic concept, as it gathered professionally trained 
artists, graphic designers, and architects.149     
 
In 2010, the LAA was separated into two associations that are in charge of different 
domains of cultural production. Ressalat (messages) became the organisation 
responsible for media campaigns. The Association for the Celebration of the 
Tradition of Resistance, ‘Jam‘iyya Ihyyâ’ Turâth al-Muqâwama’, manages the 
construction of large-scale structures including the Khiam and Mleeta sites, the 
memorial garden in Marun Al-Ra’s in southern Lebanon the memorial museum for 
martyred Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyid Abbas Al-Mussawi in the Bekaa 
Valley, as well as the Resistance Museum in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Deeb 
and Harb 2013:239). The conscious attempt to build popular hegemony through the 
use of these sites has been noted by one of their designers: “You can control people 
by narrating a specific heritage and memory. This is what the Israelis do. We are 
fighting their culture by providing a counter-culture. We want to fix our memory 
through architectural and design language. Few people read books but many people 
come to visit a building, a museum or a heritage site” (cited in Deeb and Harb 
2009:203-204).  
 
Within this cultural emphasis, the control of the memory of Hezbollah soldiers dead 
on the military field against the Israeli army is highly significant. Hezbollah institutions 
involved in this include the ‘Tribute to Martyrs’, a foundation that honours the martyr’s 
family and assists them by, for example, taking care of the maintenance of the tomb 
(Daher 2014:149). Another centre, ‘Memories of the Martyrs’, was established in 
2004 with the objective of enhancing and preserving the legacy of the Islamic 
resistance and particularly of martyrs. They collect the personal belongings of 
martyrs ranging from items such as wills, letters, poems, books, testimonies and 
memories their families are willing to share (Markaz Athâr al-Shuhadâ` 2014). The 
central aim is to produce posthumous biographies of martyrs and has the objective of 
publishing an encyclopaedia of the martyrs of the resistance (Daher 2014:149). The 
centre also organises on a yearly basis, particularly during Ashura, exhibitions in 
                                                            
149 Lara Deeb and Mona Harb explain Hezbollah’s understanding of culture the following way: “Culture here is a 
holistic that includes ideas about politics, morality, nature, heritage, space, architecture, design, civic order, 
education, and taste” (Deeb and Harb 2013:67-70). 
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memory of the martyrs, while also assisting in the maintenance and beautification of 
tombs and mausoleums, the establishment of memorial tablets at the location of their 
death, and the lobbying of municipalities to change the name of streets and squares 
after the names of martyrs (Daher 2014:149). 
 
In all of these activities, it is evident that Hezbollah expends a conscious and 
considerable effort in shaping how the wider Shi’a population perceives the historical 
narrative of resistance and the party’s role in it. This narrative is heavily linked to – 
and reinforced by – the religious symbolism associated with the Shi’a faith. It is 
revealing, for example, how the contemporary themes of resistance, persecution and 
martyrdom are continually situated in reference to pivotal moments in Shi’a history 
(notably Ashura). The construction of this narrative through Hezbollah’s intervention 
in the media and cultural field thus helps to legitimise Hezbollah as the authentic 
expression of Shi’a identity today. It also acts to strengthen the norms associated 
with Hezbollah’s religious message, an important aspect to the consensual and 
coercive features of Hezbollah’s hegemony explored further below.  
 
5.6 Education and Youth 
 
A fourth major priority of Hezbollah’s intervention in civil society is the education and 
youth sector. The Educational Institute (al-Mu'assasa al-Tarbawiyya, founded in 
1991) of Hezbollah is the institution that supervises the educational sector and is 
aimed at recomposing Shi'a society (i'âda siyyâgha tarkiba al-mujtama') by producing 
“a new 'mentality' for a society participating actively in its own reconstruction, in 
resistance and in economic rebirth (Harb and Leenders 2005:187). An important 
feature of this ‘rebirth’ is the inculcation of the values of iltizâm (religious 
commitment) – a notion that is discussed in detail below (Interview of the Vice 
President of the Islamic Institute, 1998 cited in Harb and Leenders 2005:187).  
 
To this end, the party has established and directly operates a network of private 
schools including al-Mahdi (13,500 students), al-Mustapha (8,300 students) and 
Imdad (3,500 students). The al-Mahdi schools have expanded rapidly to 14 schools 
in Lebanon (seven in the South, four in the Bekaa and three in Dahyeh) as well as 
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one institution in the city of Qom in Iran (Le Thomas 2012a:92). The total number of 
students in Hezbollah’s network of schools reached nearly 30,000 in the mid 2000s 
(Le Thomas 2012a:85). According to one researcher, between 70 percent and 80 
percent of students in al-Mahdi schools had a family member affiliated to Hezbollah 
(Osseyran 1997:142). Hezbollah also runs technical institutes established by 
independent foundations linked to the party, such as the al-Shahid technical 
institution linked to the al-Shahid hospital.  In the mid 2000s, around 23,000 children 
were beneficiaries of the financial support system for education established by the 
Islamist movement, according to Lebanese researcher Nizar Hamzeh (2004:57). 
 
There are two main institutional links between the party and this network of schools. 
First, the organisation has a Student Mobilisation Unit, which is in charge of student 
related issues. Catherine Le Thomas notes that the Unit “is the interface between the 
party and its institutional environment (including its private schools and the public 
schools under its domination)” and through this Unit the party “seeks to promote 
Hezbollah’s interests in the sector, by pursuing as far as it can a cultural, social and 
political action on the public and private education establishments located in the Shi’a 
majority populated regions” (Le Thomas 2012a:97). To this end, the Student Unit 
organises students affiliated to the movement through student committees. The 
movement also provides scholarships for students to complete their university 
studies.  
 
The second key institutional link to the education sector is the IREA mentioned 
above. IREA provides Islamic religious teaching, which is the main objective of the 
association and is widely known to be linked to Hezbollah. Naim Qassem was a 
founding member and the organisation’s President from 1974, the year of its 
establishment, to 1988 (Le Thomas 2012a:85, Jam’iyya al-Ta’lîm al-Dînî al-Islâmî 
2012).  
 
The association employs 1,300 employees and manages the al-Mustapha schools. 
Through the 2000s, about 60 percent of the public schools in Shi’a dominated 
regions were using IREA services, particularly in Beirut and the Bekaa (Le Thomas 
2012a:85). The association provided its services to about 135,000 students in 507 
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schools, both private and public, in 2002-2003 (Le Thomas 2012a:85).  It was around 
141,260 students in 2012 (Jam’iyya al-Ta’lîm al-Dînî al-Islâmî 2012). Hezbollah’s 
influence is therefore not limited to its own schools but to other public schools as 
well.   
 
The iconography deployed in the schools reinforces the religious and political content 
of visible images in the streets of Dahyeh, with a prevalence of Shi’a religious images 
and portraits of Khomeini and Khameini (Le Thomas 2008:156). Hezbollah's 
Information Unit, which is in charge of displaying this iconography, aims to propagate 
a message conveying the religiosity of the school environment that is seamlessly 
connected to the surrounding streets (Harb and Leenders 2005:190). Teachers are 
selected on the basis of their religious commitment, and are expected to take 
mandatory religious lessons of 30 hours per year, with an exam at the end of the 
year (Le Thomas 2008:155). Catherine Le Thomas argues that: “schools are an 
essential tool in the societal perspective of Hezbollah, because they represent a 
matrix to consolidate and expand the popular basis of the party and to form a new 
generation of youth – all-rounded Shi’a – holders of its project of society (Le Thomas 
2008:149)”. 
 
In addition to formal schooling, Hezbollah also seeks to mobilise youth through extra-
curricular activities. One of the most important institutional examples of this is the al-
Mahdi scouts, which help to socialise youth aged from 6 to 18 years old into 
Hezbollah’s belief system. In 2015 more than 76,000 youth were members of the 
organisation, which also had close to 4,000 scout leaders, according the General 
Commissioner of the association Nazih Fayyad who is at the head of the Mahdi 
scouts since its establishment in 1998 (Ayub 2015). The al-Mahdi scouts are not 
limited to Hezbollah’s network of schools, but include Islamic establishments and 
villages in Shi’a dominated regions. Numerically, they are the most important scout 
group in Lebanon (Le Thomas 2012b:288). The al-Mahdi scouts organise a number 
of activities, but with a specific emphasis on religion, notably by teaching to follow the 
Wilâyat al-Faqîh (Le Thomas 2012b:299) and the culture of religious commitment 
(Harb 2010:111). The General Commissioner of the association Nazih Fayyad 
explains that the scouts are educated in the Islamc method and the objective of the 
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association is to firstly teach individulas to be self reliant, secondly to serve the 
people and the society, thirdly to defend the motherland, and finally to promote 
education and ijtihâd (Ayub 2015). Scout activities are spread throughout the year 
and link up with activities of other Hezbollah’s organisations. Sporting events are an 
important focus of scout involvement, and Hezbollah owns seven sport fields in 
Dahyeh as well as a sports club of around 120 teams (Harb 2010:110). The sports 
teams compete against each other in tournaments during religious and political 
celebrations organised by the party. The driving principle of these activities is clearly 
expressed by the head of the youth and sport division in Hezbollah:  
  
“The young children play in the streets, lose their time with 
electronic games. From 1982, the party wanted to diffuse a 
sport culture and a work among the youth to mobilise them. 
Sport gathers and unifies… The sport work unifies the opinions 
and allows the control of moral corruption. This latter has 
increased, we must teach people religion, and try to reform the 
individual religiously. Sport educates the mind.” (cited in Harb 
2010:110)  
 
5.7 Hâla islâmiyya: Consent and Coercion 
 
This survey of Hezbollah’s network of social, cultural, religious and educational 
institutions confirms the importance attached by the organisation to building a base of 
support in Shi’a areas of Lebanon and the ways in which hegemony has been 
constructed through the party’s intervention in the various spheres of civil society. A 
common theme that runs through all of these spheres is a pronounced emphasis on 
a particular religious conception of the world. As noted earlier, this conception is 
consciously articulated from the top of the organisation’s hierarchy (the Shura 
Council) and runs through all subsequent institutional tiers. Members of Hezbollah 
are expected to follow a strict religious education, including acceptance of the 
Wilâyat al-Faqîh doctrine (Fadlallah 2012b). The party’s work in the areas of culture, 
media, schooling and youth has a strong emphasis on religious symbolism and is 
generally directed by religious figures (Daher 2014:200). Even its social support 
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services are conceived of in religious terms.150 
 
The ideological framework guiding this religious framework is, however, distinct and 
relatively unique.151 It is encapsulated in two important notions: the hâla islâmiyya 
(the Islamic milieu) and iltizâm (commitment), which have as their aims an increase 
in the level and the atmosphere of religiosity among both society and individuals.  
 
The hâla islâmiyya expresses a totalising, collective identity that embodies a vision of 
“Islam as an ideology (‘aqîda) and system (nizâm), as an idea (fikr) and government 
(hikm)” (Qassem 2008:34-35). The adhesion to the hâla islâmiyya produces a 
collective identity generating a strong sense of belonging, which gives meaning to the 
individual. Lara Deeb (2006:36), for example, explains that for the hâla islâmiyya to 
be fully accomplished, each person is responsible for carrying out informed choices 
based on religious knowledge. The hâla islâmiyya is therefore conceived as a 
collective product, with solidarity and a sense of voluntarism as essential keys to its 
development. Harb and Leenders emphasize that “Hezbollah's institutions make sure 
to promote the significance of solidarity and community work through a variety of 
religious narratives and symbolic references” (Harb and Leenders 2005:192). 
 
Within this collective identity, iltizâm refers to individual norms and practices (Harb 
2010:190). Lara Deeb (2006:102-103) describes iltizâm as obligations, for example 
the hijab (headscarf) is part of the iltizâm for women, drinking alcohol is forbidden for 
committed (multazimîn).  Iltizâm ranges from the contractual to those that are linked 
to a personal sense of duty. There are many ways to express iltizâm, as Deeb 
explains “a socially inclined person might distribute food to the poor, a politically 
inclined person might collect donations for Hezbollah resistance fighters, and a 
religiously inclined person might pray and fast regularly” (Deeb 2006:36).  
 
A key characteristic of these notions is the role of Hezbollah authority figures in 
circumscribing the norms of social behaviour. As one observer has noted in regards 
                                                            
150 Muhammad Al-Khansa, Hezbollah Mayor of Dahyeh declared on several occasions that “the greatest Jihad is 
to reach to the people in the framework of social work” (Al-Khansa 2012; Harb 2002:152). 
151 Hamas has also worked to enforce an “Islamic milieu” in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, particulary in 
the Gaza Strip. Although there are many similarities with Hezbollah in this regard, Hamas’ ideology has placed 
greater emphasis on Palestinian national identity, and the role of the national struggle. 
 190 
to the Hezbollah schools in Dahyeh, “The Islamic school cultivates particular ways of 
life consistent with the Islamic ideal, which is defined by the religious figures and 
persons of authorities in the community or the network it belongs. It (the Islamic 
school) seeks to draw for its users the right paths, moral, social, religious, political 
and offer figures that embodies the highest level of the ideals and thoughts that it 
promotes” (Le Thomas 2012a:151). 
 
 A notable and important feature of this religious perspective is the way in which 
social passivity and difference are stigmatised. All social practices that do not fit 
within the framework defined by Hezbollah are thereby branded as being unlawful 
(harâm), corrupted (mafsudîn) or shameful (‘ayb) (Harb 2010:185). In this manner, 
Hezbollah propagates a worldview that encourages support and engagement with 
the party’s activities (as a necessary requirement of religious piety), while 
simultaneously ostracising those who deviate from these norms. Social behaviour 
thus adapts itself to the worldview of Hezbollah, and leads to high levels of 
conformity within Shi’a populations. 
 
Hezbollah’s vision of these religious codes and norms also sets itself up as  
“authentic” Islam, which Lara Deeb (2003:2) defines as an Islam that has a modern 
interpretation based on knowledge and understanding, in contrast to a traditional, 
unquestioned Islam that is followed blindly by the older generations. This is a further 
reflection of the transformation within the Shi’a population itself, between old and new 
elites (Deeb 2003:2-3). 
 
A distinctive feature of this ‘authentic Islam’ is a specific Shi’a identity that is 
demarcated from Sunni and Christian populations. One illustration of this is shown in 
the content of school textbooks used in Hezbollah schools. In the history textbook 
‘Nahnu wa Târîkh’ (Us and History), for example, the history of Islam is taught in a 
manner that is highly sectarian and Shi’a oriented (Le Thomas 2012a:229). The 
Umayyad government is described as corrupt and unjust, while the penetration of 
Shiism in Lebanon in the region of the Jabal ‘Amil is characterised as the real or 
authentic territory of belief. This particular status of Jabal ‘Amil is specific to 
Hezbollah’s schoolbooks and is not present in other history books of Lebanon (Le 
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Thomas 2012a:229). The Abbasid Caliphates are also portrayed very negatively in 
showing their cruelty and injustice and presenting them as the assassins of the 
descendants of Imam Hussein, and Jaafar Sadiq (the sixth Imam of Duodeciman 
Shiism). The decline of the Abbasid Caliphates are explained as the logical 
consequence of their injustice and their taste for pleasure. Catherine Le Thomas 
argues that “although the story always condemn personalities and dynasties, and not 
a religion or a particular sect, this nevertheless contributes to underline the 
boundaries and limits between Shi’a and Sunni and to trace the founding moments 
establishing this boundary” (Le Thomas 2012a:229).152 
 
This particular variant of Shi’a Islam – articulated through the notions of hâla 
islâmiyya and iltizâm – is consistently promoted by Hezbollah through the institutional 
networks described in this chapter. Ideologically, it is a key element to Hezbollah’s 
construction of consent and coercion within Lebanese Shi’a areas. The consensual 
aspects of this have been discussed in the preceding chapter and include the various 
social services provided by Hezbollah and the socialisation of youth into the hâla 
islâmiyya through the organisation’s network of kindergartens, schools, scouts, 
leisure parks, summer camps, organised trips, television programs and so forth. All 
these institutions and experiences contribute from a young age to the learning and 
acquiring of religious, social and political values linked to the hâla islâmiyya. Media 
and cultural networks of the party further strengthen the acquisition and 
internalisation of these values (Harb 2010:182). 
 
It is critical, however, not to ignore the coercive aspects of this particular ideological 
framework. Precisely due to the high levels of social conformity and the strict policing 
of any deviation from the dominant norms, any behaviour that steps outside these 
norms is likely to be very costly to the individual on both a social and material level. 
This prospective threat is utilised as a form of coercion.  
                                                            
152 Despite this fact, at a political level Hezbollah continues to maintain and nurture relations with parties who 
have different religious bases and identities, for example Hamas, a Palestinian Sunni political movement and an 
offshoot of the MB, or the FPM, headed by General Michel Aoun, based in the Christian population, and 
Hezbollah’s closest ally in Lebanon. In the past few years, and especially following the document of 
understanding, a political agreement between Hezbollah and FPM signed in February 2006, Hezbollah has made 
numerous openings to Christians in Lebanon. I witnessed Hezbollah members installing banners celebrating 
Easter celebrations for Christians in Dahyeh, sending numerous delegations to meet the various Christian 
religious authorities, and broadcasts on al-Manar of Christian religious celebrations and church services, 
including Christmas 2013 where it extensively reported from various churches in Lebanon. 
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One example of this is Hezbollah’s network of neighbourhood committees for 
“enjoining virtue and forbidding vice”, which are active in party-dominated areas, 
particularly Dahyeh. The activities of these committees include decorating city blocks 
during Ramadan and informing the party about “improper” activities occurring in their 
neighbourhoods (Deeb and Harb 2010:16). The party is able to exercise social and 
economic pressure in order to forbid activities that fall outside its understanding of 
appropriate moral behaviour. If a business does not reform (which, for example, can 
include abstaining from serving alcohol or exerting greater control over mixed-sex 
interaction in the establishment), Hezbollah will initiate a boycott and put the café or 
restaurant out of business by ruining its reputation (Deeb and Harb 2010:16-17). In 
one example, in the town of Hula in 2012, members of Hezbollah attempted to close 
a shop providing alcohol and wounded two members of the LCP who came to the 
help of the owner of the shop (Orient Le Jour 2011c; Noujaim 2012). In October 
2009, a Brazilian samba show was banned and torpedoed in the southern city of Tyr 
after about 100 Shi’a clerics under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ali Yassine, a 
powerful Hezbollah follower, met and issued a fatwa forbidding it and declaring it 
sinful (Bejjani 2009). Hezbollah militants have also disrupted events such as 
ceremonies called zajal (improvised poetry competition) in some areas of the South 
(ICG 2007:20). In the August 2002 edition of Hezbollah’s magazine Baqiyyat Allâh, 
Khameini’s fatwa on music was published, which characterised any music that takes 
a human being into a state of euphoria is haram, and that one should only listen to 
cassette tapes registered and approved by the Islamic Council. According to Deeb 
and Harb (2013:137), Hezbollah follows this understanding by deeming as haram 
any music conducive to dancing or that excites the sexual instincts. 
 
Mona Harb recounts another case of an ex-Hezbollah member who became a 
communist and was subsequently stigmatised by his neighbours in the Hay Al-
Sellom neighbourhood. His ostracism was articulated through the notions of hâla 
islâmiyya/iltizâm and their emphasis on conformity; being a communist was 
characterised as heresy, and led to his social exclusion and eventual departure from 
the neighbourhood (Harb 2010:183). Even members close to the leadership can feel 
these disciplining elements – in 2003, the director of al-Manar was fired for having 
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published unconventional views on Ashura and for implicitly questioning the doctrine 
of the Wilâyat al-Faqîh (ICG 2003:14).  
 
Hezbollah also uses forms of coercion and consent when individuals attempt to 
utilise certain ideological concepts outside of the party’s tutelage. One example of 
this is the case of a Shi'a entrepreneur who launched a children’s magazine 
independently from Hezbollah, in which he featured prominently the concepts of 
resistance and Wilâyat al-Faqîh (Harb and Leenders 2005:197). The individual was 
quickly approached by Hezbollah members, who informed him that he would either 
need to partner with Hezbollah and place the magazine under the supervision of the 
party, or cease publication (he chose the latter course) (Harb and Leenders 
2005:197). 
 
Hezbollah has also used its financial influence to pressure institutions to conform to 
the principles of the hâla islâmiyya. The Shqif Club for example, which had previously 
played a prominent social and cultural role all over the South and served alcoholic 
drinks and hosted dancing parties, was forced to ban alcoholic drinks and dancing 
after the club experienced a financial deficit and Hezbollah took over its cafeteria 
through one of the party’s financiers (El-Cheikh and Saghyieh 2013b). The same 
thing occurred with the Qasr al-Muluk, which was “rescued” by Hezbollah money and 
ceased serving alcohol (El-Cheikh and Saghyieh 2013b).  
 
On a political level, any dissenting Shi’a voice or critic of Hezbollah faces the threat 
of violent intimidations from the party, its supporters and even its allies. Sheikh 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, for example, was the target of violent condemnations 
from the followers of the Wilâyat al-Faqîh and Hezbollah after he proclaimed himself 
a “marj’iyya” (religious reference) in 1994, following the death of the Imam Al-Khui’ in 
Iraq of whom he was the representative in Lebanon. Flyers and graffiti condemning 
him were placed the following evening on the walls surrounding his house and his 
mosque in Haret Hreik. For some Hezbollah members and followers of the Wilâyat 
al-Faqîh the self-proclamation by Fadlallah as a “marj’iyya” was considered as 
challenging Khameini and the IRI. Fadlallah argued for the plurality of the “marj’iyya”, 
but also of the Wilâyat al-Faqîh (Mervin 2008c:283). Hezbollah nevertheless 
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intervened quickly to cease any further violent outbreak, fearing dissension among 
the Shi’a population as Fadlallah was a very popular cleric and a religious reference 
(marj’iyya) for many (Harb 2010:239).153 
 
The aftermath of the 2006 war strengthened Hezbollah’s refusal to tolerate criticism 
from other organisations and actors in the public sphere. Members and supporters of 
Hezbollah engaged increasingly in a takhwin discourse (accusations of treachery) 
against Shi’a who criticized or expressed reservations about the practices of 
Hezbollah. Such individuals were denied certain social and economic services, with 
the community as a whole subject “to greater pressure to conform to the expectations 
of Islamist clerics about religious observance, dress code, and social conduct (Abi 
Saab M. and Abi Saab R. 2014:143). 
  
There are several recent illustrations of the increased use of coercive measures 
against those critical of Hezbollah. For example, the members and supporters of the 
Lebanese Option Party (formerly called the Lebanese Option Gathering) (LOP), have 
been the target of numerous attacks. Established in 2007 and headed by Ahmad Al-
As’ad, the son of the well known As’ad feudal family in the South, the LOP is an 
independent Shi’a political party opposed to March 8, and more particularly to 
Hezbollah154 and Amal. The car of Ahmad Al-As’ad was burned in 2009 (Khatib, 
Matar and Alshaer 2014:32). Moreover, Hezbollah members attacked protesters from 
the LOP and killed the head of the party’s student wing Hachem Salman (19 years 
old), after shooting him in the abdomen during a protest against Hezbollah’s 
involvement in Syria (Naharnet 2013; Orient Le Jour 2013d). 
 
                                                            
153Differences continued to arise between the cleric and Hezbollah and Wilâyat al-Faqîh’s followers on political 
and doctrinal subjects throughout the nineties and the beginning of the 2000s. In 2003, he launched a strong 
verbal attack against the IRI, blaming it for arrogantly seeking to monopolise Shi’a religious teaching in Qom 
(ICG 2003:13-14). He was not welcome anymore in Hezbollah or Iranian circles. The rivalry was financial as 
well as social. Fadlallah, as a “marj’iyya’”, received voluntary donations (“Khoms”) from his followers and 
channelled these resources into the social activities of his association “al-Mabarrât”. These helped bolster his 
popular support by running various schools and educational institutions, a radio station (al-Basha’ir), mosques, 
cultural centres, cooperatives, hospitals and subsidy programs for students and orphans. By 2002, Fadlallah 
activities were said to be worth $12.6 million (ICG 2003:13-14). The 2006 Lebanese war witnessed a 
rapprochement between Sheikh Fadlallah and Hezbollah because of the necessity of unifying against foreign 
aggression (Mervin 2008:283). In 2014, “al-Mabarrât” included 20 schools with 22,000 students (The Daily 
Star 2014b).  
154 As’ad accused Hezbollah of feeling “that its military, ideological and political links with Iran are more 
important than its commitment to Lebanon" (Bathish 2007). 
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In interviews conducted by International Crisis Group on the situation for political 
opponents of Hezbollah in Dahyeh, several individuals complained of political 
intimidation against them and spoke of an atmosphere hostile to all critics of the 
party. One journalist said that “when you live in Dahyeh and are opposed to 
Hezbollah, you must accept to lead a difficult life. You will probably feel isolated. If 
you oppose, or simply don’t follow Hezbollah, you can’t run a business. Party 
members, partisans, supporters will just boycott your shop” (cited in ICG 2014:20). In 
another case, a young woman who criticised Hezbollah’s support of the Syrian 
regime was threatened and insulted on Facebook and banned from returning to her 
village (ICG 2014:20). In May 2014, the journalist Hanin Ghaddar faced a violent 
campaign from Hezbollah media and its allies after criticising Hezbollah’s intervention 
in Syria to assist the Assad regime (Ghaddar 2014). In July 2014, in the city of Saida, 
a member of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, which are affiliated to Hezbollah, 
attacked and threatened to kill the journalist Abdel Basset Tarjman, who directs a 
website critical of Hezbollah (Orient Le Jour 2014c).  
 
5.8 Gendering Hegemony: The Role of Women in Hezbollah’s Worldview 
 
The intertwined features of coercion and consent expressed through the Islamization 
of Shi’a populations also have a specific gendered component. In many ways, 
Hezbollah’s promotion of a particular role for women in society is a central aspect to 
the way that its hegemony is projected. It should be noted that membership of the 
party is officially a male privilege – no women members are permitted (Daher 
2014:206). Instead, following the position of Khomeini, women are seen as the main 
transmission mechanism for the collective inculcation of religious norms embodied in 
the hâla islâmiyya and iltizâm. As mothers, according to Khomeini, women hold a 
“sensitive role … in the upbringing of their children and consequently in the 
rectification or degeneration of society” (Khomeini 2001:38+81). 155  Similarly, 
Hezbollah Sheikh Naim Qassem (2008:291-293) has characterised the primary role 
of women as mother, sister, wife and daughter.  
 
This perspective can be seen in Hezbollah’s school textbook, “Al-Islâm Risâlatunâ”, 
                                                            
155 See “Imam’s speech on the sensitive role played by mothers in the upbringing of their children and 
consequently in the rectification or degeneration of society”(Khomeini 2001:81). 
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published by the IREA, which has a chapter entitled “the position of woman in Islam”. 
This book is taught to children prior to high school level, and outlines the role of 
women according to Hezbollah’s interpretation of Islam. While upholding the right of 
women to work and to be educated, it emphasizes what it describs as “female work”: 
teaching, sewing, nursing and so forth. Most significantly, the manual notes that: 
“Islam states that the work of a woman should not be done at the expense of the 
family, because to educate the future generations is the most important for Islam” (Le 
Thomas 2012a:206).  
 
In line with this emphasis on the transmission of values to future generations, women 
form a major strategic interface between the party and its surrounding social 
environment. They are typically organised in specific womens' councils, distributed 
through mosques and neighbourhoods, which help mobilise for social and cultural 
events called for by the party (Qassem 2008:86). Some women of Hezbollah have 
run for office in Lebanese city councils, but none in parliamentary elections. In 
comparison, there are 9 female deputies in the IRI out of 290, while in Iraq we can 
find 83 female deputies out of 328 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014).   
 
In most cases, Hezbollah's institutions are led by a small number of male cadres, 
alongside a large number of women volunteers who interact with its wider 
constituency. The party’s Social Affairs wing, for example, is organized through the 
structure of ‘al-akhawât al-mutatawwi’ât’ – sisters’ volunteers – who target 
beneficiaries of Hezbollah’s social work. 156  The network of social workers is 
composed of five to six men working full time, and more than one hundred female 
volunteers. Men hold fixed employment and work schedules, and their role is to 
process loans and allowances for beneficiaries. Women volunteers, on the other 
hand, have no fixed timetable, contract or office space. The recruitment of these 
volunteers is based on two criteria: to live in the neighbourhood where she works and 
to believe in Hezbollah’s ideology, including Islamic values and support for the 
resistance (Fawaz 2004:358-359).  
 
                                                            
156  These social services are provided by the al-Imdad, al-Shahid and al-Jarha Institutions. These three 
institutions provide welfare services for impoverished families, as well as help the families of martyrs and 
injured.  
 197 
As volunteers, they make a weekly visit to families in the neighbourhood they live in 
to check on benefits and other needs (Fawaz 2004:358-359). One of their key tasks 
during these visits is to strengthen their links with families and to monitor the 
households’ commitment to Hezbollah’s political perspective as well as conformity to 
the hâla islâmiyya and iltizâm (Harb 2010:176). If the volunteers detect any 
behaviour deemed to lie outside the norms established by the party, it could lead to 
the termination of social support (Le Thomas 2012a:142). In this manner, female 
volunteers play a central role in transmitting the particular values associated with the 
party to its wider social milieu, while also mediating the coercive aspects of 
Hezbollah’s hegemony. 
 
In consolidating this particular position of women in the organisation, Hezbollah 
places considerable emphasis on building adherence to fixed gender roles. Once 
again, this is closely related to religious symbolism and reference to historical 
moments within the Shi’a faith. In the Ashura commemorations, for example, clerics 
stress the differently gendered roles of Ahl-al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family) – men are 
said to have participated in fighting while women looked after the children and 
provided moral support (Boumet Beirut 2013). Males are presented as chivalrous and 
strong; women are modest, patient and supportive. The cleric usually explains that 
these roles complement each other and that therefore, men and women must take on 
these roles in contemporary struggles. Men must be "Hussayniyyûn",157 and women 
must be "Zaynabiyyât".158  This is the way, according to Hezbollah’s rhetoric, to 
strengthen the nation, achieve victory and guarantee their places in heaven (Boumet 
Beirut 2013). 
 
The differently gendered roles of Hussein and Zaynab translate into the appropriate 
types of contemporary social activism promoted by Hezbollah. Lara Deeb (2009:249) 
notes that men are encouraged to work and volunteer with organisations such as 
Jihad al-Bina in roles such as engineering, management and construction, while 
women are expected to engage in social-welfare voluntarism. In this way, Zaynab 
provides the model for the ideal Shi’a woman – a pious individual whose voluntarism 
                                                            
157 Referring to Imam Hussein, the head of the family and the leader of the Battle (Boumet Beirut 2013).  
158 Referring to Sitt Zaynab, Imam Hussein’s sister who played a prominent role in managing care-giving tasks, 
keeping the family together, and ensuring the dissemination of Hussein’s message after his martyrdom (Boumet 
Beirut 2013). 
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in health, education or welfare serves as her contribution to the community’s 
development.  
 
Within this gendered division of labour, the headscarf and other sartorial codes are 
given an important place in marking how women are expected to appear and behave. 
The headscarf is presented as the equivalent of weapons wielded by men in combat. 
Men resist by their strength, while women protect themselves and society through 
wearing the headscarf and veil.159 Again, this is closely related to the individual 
norms of iltizâm. The committed woman is known as the multazima, and she is 
expected to wear the veil and a long dress that covers her body. The colours that she 
wears should be dark in order not to attract attention.160 The veil expresses both a 
religious and political commitment, in contrast to the traditional headscarf usually 
worn in Lebanese villages (Chaib 2008:297). The borders between men and women 
are strictly codified – multazimât are expected not to shake hands or mix with men 
and schools segregate girls and boys starting from the age of nine (girls are also 
taught different subject matter) (Deeb 2006:107; Le Thomas 2012a:256). These 
practices should not be seen as merely an attempt to return to tradition, but rather to 
re-work supposed religious norms as an integral part of what is conceived as 
‘modernity’ (Deeb 2006:32-33). Gendered roles are particularly important in this 
respect, because the explicit dress and behavioural codes assigned to women 
become central markers of modernity.  
 
Hezbollah has adopted many of these customs aimed at fixing gender roles from 
similar practices in Iran. A significant example is the celebration of the taklîf, 
widespread in all schools in Iran and known as the Day of Prayer (Paivandi 
2006:132). This ceremony is aimed at nine-year old girls who are said to have 
reached the age of responsibility (accountability), and encourages them to undertake 
certain religious obligations, such as praying and fasting, and to begin wearing the 
headscarf and veil (Le Thomas 2012a:377). Taklîf was initiated at the end of the Civil 
War, first in Hezbollah’s network of schools and then with the al-Mahdi scouts (Le 
                                                            
159 Le Thomas (2012a:256) recounts the story, for example, of a theatre play held in one of the al-Mustafa 
schools in Nabatieh in 2009, where the father of the heroine tells her that her commitment to wear the veil 
honours him and makes her a symbol of the resistance, while her brothers are engaged in the armed struggle.  
160 Harb (2010:175) notes that women do not always conform to these codes – some “multazimât”, especially 
younger women, are increasingly favouring dresses with brighter colours.  
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Thomas 2012a:300+377).161 
 
In line with these attitudes towards women’s role in society, Hezbollah has not 
supported legislation at the national level aimed at ensuring equality for women in the 
family. In 2010, for example, women’s rights activists submitted a draft bill regarding 
the protection of women, including the criminalization of marital rape. This draft bill 
was completely modified by the parliamentary subcommittee at the urging of 
Hezbollah’s minister, Muhammad Fneich (Merhi N. 2012). In particular, the text was 
changed to remove the key clause legislating against marital rape (Merhi N. 2012). 
The subcommittee maintained Article 26, which states that women can only bring 
cases of domestic and family violence to the civil courts if permitted by religious 
courts – institutions known to be patriarchal because they consider the male as the 
head of the household and the family unit as sacrosanct (Khoury 2013b). As a result, 
while present in the Miqati government (2011-2013), Hezbollah deputies resisted 
attempts to move marriage and divorce rights into civil courts rather than religious 
jurisdiction (Khoury 2013b). In March 2014, the whole parliamentary bloc of 
Hezbollah deputies refused to respond to a petition from the National Coalition for a 
Law to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, which would have criminalised 
marital rape (Majed 2014). 
 
In summary, Hezbollah’s involvement in Shi’a civil society has distinctly gendered 
characteristics that are reflected in the organisation’s structure and political 
orientation. The norms set out in the hâla islâmiyya and iltizâm ascribe fixed gender 
roles and, as part of this, women are expected to play a central position in the 
transmission of Hezbollah’s ideological tenets to its wider social base codified in their 
role as mothers, educators and carers. This “gendering of hegemony” is reinforced 
through historical allegory and reference to Shi’a religious traditions (Deeb 2009:350-
353). It is demarcated through detailed sartorial codes and modes of behaviour, 
which also help to reinforce social norms through mechanisms of consent and 
                                                            
161 Another example of the defining of gender roles is the restriction placed on mixed-sex interaction on social 
media. At the beginning of 2014, the Hezbollah Deputy Hussein Mussawi defended the fatwa of Imam 
Khamenei prohibiting "chat" between men and women on Facebook and warning those who participate in social 
networks by declaring "to those who commented on the fatwa of one of our references that prohibited a 
particular mode of social networks that lead to moral corruption and to the fall of the safeguards of society, we 
say God bless those who know their limits and respect them” (Orient le Jour 2014b). 
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coercion. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
Hezbollah was born in the Bekaa Valley and then expanded through the southern 
suburbs of Beirut, concurrent with the high levels of Shi’a migration from South 
Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli occupation. In the absence of a functioning state, 
Hezbollah has built a highly visible social base in these areas during the 1980s and 
1990s. A key reason for Hezbollah’s success is the result of its deep penetration of 
civil society, expressed through its wide network of social institutions and extensive 
cultural apparatus. This success contrasts with rival organisations such as Amal, 
which tends to rely upon clientelism and familial links and is largely viewed as 
permeated by corruption and nepotism.  
 
Hezbollah’s growing hegemony within the Shi’a population originated in the context 
of a society ruled by militias and a weak Lebanese state during the Civil War. The 
weakness of the Lebanese state in the post Civil War period, whether in terms of 
service provider or even as guarantor of civil peace, enabled Hezbollah to develop its 
domination of the Shi’a population concomitant with its military resistance against 
Israel. The party utilised the reconstruction projects associated with the aftermath of 
Civil War and Israeli invasion to provide much needed social services to Shi’a 
populations. Much of this activity focused on key power centres of Hezbollah's rule, 
notably Dahyeh.  
 
All of these activities have displayed aspects of both consent and coercion, 
understood in a Gramscian sense. Underpinning this consent and coercion has been 
a specific religiously inspired conception of the world, captured in the notions of hâla 
islâmiyya and iltizâm. An important place has thus been accorded to religious, media, 
cultural and educational institutions, which form an overarching ‘hegemonic 
apparatus’ that operates as a key site of cultural acquisition for the Shi’a population. 
In this regard, party cadres and activists in the institutions of this apparatus can be 
seen as Hezbollah organic intellectuals.  
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Through all these mechanisms, Hezbollah’s civil society organisations help to 
promote a coherent worldview that is able to incorporate a variety of individual and 
collective interests within the Shi’a population.162 The construction of Shi’a identity is 
not static and fixed but an on-going process that is mediated through Hezbollah’s 
institutional networks. Through the conscious application of the notions of hâla 
islâmiyya and iltizâm, this process of identity formation delineates the borders of 
Shi’a belonging, in both its coercive and consensual aspects. It is also distinctively 
gendered, promoting a particular role for women in Hezbollah organisations as the 
key mediating link in the transmission of the party’s ideology. 
 
Althusser argued that no class can hold state power without exerting its hegemony 
over and within the ISA. This process does not happen automatically, it is rather the 
result of a continuing struggle: first against the old ruling classes and their positions 
in the old and new ISA, then against the exploited class. Similarly, Hezbollah has 
developed its network of organisations from the mid 1980s until today, overcoming all 
its competitors within the Shi’a community (notably Amal and the left). Old Shi’a 
feudal forces disappeared of the political scene, with the exception of the 
aforementioned Ahmed Kamel Al-As’ad.163 The domination of Hezbollah’s ideology in 
its network of organisations allows the continuation and the reproduction of its power 
over all sectors of the Shi’a population. 
 
Nonetheless, while Hezbollah has utilised these institutions as a means of building 
popular consent and support (always circumscribed by the borders of coercion), their 
vision should not be understood as a complete, anti-systemic vision of society as a 
whole.164 Hezbollah’s process of engagement with civil society has not challenged 
contemporary hierarchies within Shi’a society nor encouraged any form of 
independent self-mobilisation from below. Instead, popular activities have been 
utilised to further inculcate the religious values associated with the hâla islâmiyya, 
                                                            
162 Mona Harb (2010:191) has listed these as material interests (employment or access to collective service), 
intellectual interests (the resistance cause and the Wilâyat al-Faqîh principle), moral interests (based upon hâla 
islâmiyya and iltizâm), ludic interests (having access to regular “entertainment” linked to the volunteering and 
associative sector), and affective interests (to feel fulfilled and satisfied). 
163 He is the son of the former Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Kamel Al-As’ad and the grandson of the 
former Speaker of the Parliament Ahmed Al-As’ad.  
164 Here I would disagree with Rula Abisaab who argues that Hezbollah promotes a version of ‘revolutionary 
Islam’ (Abisaab 2006:255).  
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and are typically carried out in a top-down fashion from the executive levels to the 
social base. The next chapter explores this tension within Hezbollah’s social 
engagement through the lens of the labour movement. 
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Chapter 6: Hezbollah and the Lebanese Labour Movement  
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines Hezbollah’s relationship and orientation to the Lebanese 
labour movement. Trade unions and other labour organisations have played a 
prominent role in Lebanon’s social struggles over the last four decades. Many 
workers’ protests occurred during the Civil War, led principally by the General Union 
of Lebanese Workers (GULW), and these continued as successive post Civil War 
governments implemented those neoliberal policies identified in Chapter 3. The 
GULW built these actions in a non-sectarian fashion and had significant capacity to 
mobilise workers and other social forces in the country. Throughout the 2000s, 
however, sectarian division within the labour movement – deliberately cultivated by 
the Lebanese government and other political actors – has acted to undermine the 
work of the GULW. In this context, the GULW has been increasingly bypassed during 
a renewal of labour struggles that occurred between 2004 and 2013.  
 
In light of Hezbollah’s implantation in Lebanese civil society traced in the previous 
chapter, the party’s attitude towards labour struggles provides a revealing case study 
of the tension that exists between the party’s attachment to an emerging Shi’a 
fraction of the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the implications of neoliberal reform 
for the Shi’a population and poorer layers of Lebanese society on the other. In this 
light, the party’s relationship with the labour movement captures the core of the 
contradiction that lies in Hezbollah’s ‘social market’ economy approach discussed in 
Chapter 3. It also helps to illuminate the way in which the organisation has attempted 
to maintain its hegemonic position within the Shi’a population, despite the very real 
social differentiation of that population over recent decades.  
 
The chapter shows that Hezbollah has dealt with these tensions through projecting a 
sectarian discourse that sets the specific interests of Shi’a identity above and 
opposed to broader class interests. In this way, the specific ideological formulations 
discussed in the previous chapter have been employed by the party as a means of 
attempting to consolidate its hegemony over poorer Shi’a neighbourhoods and 
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workers within its sphere of influence. These tensions continue to persist – and have 
been reflected in the emergence of new and cross-sectarian labour organisations in 
recent decades. 
 
6.2 Labour Mobilisation: From the Civil War to the 1990s Strike Wave  
 
During the Civil War, and the rule of militias, trade unions played an important role in 
organising various demonstrations and civil resistance against continuation of the 
conflict, sectarian division of the country, the power of militias and the Israeli 
occupation during the 1980s (Al-Amir Najde 2012; Dirani 2012). In fieldwork 
conducted for this thesis, labour leaders and activists spoke proudly of this record.  
 
Adib Bou Habib, head of the Printing Press Employees Federation, founder of the 
Lebanese Observatory of the Rights of Workers and Employees (LORWE) and ex-
member of the LCP, recounts that: “federations and trade unions continued during 
the Civil War to play a role for the workers by fighting for increased wages and 
inflation adjustment, as well as access to social insurance. The trade union 
movement was the conscience of the people” (Bou Habib 2012). A distinctive feature 
of this role was the attempt by federations and unions to organise across the 
sectarian lines that were becoming increasingly entrenched. Ahmad Dirani, member 
of the LORWE and ex-member of OCAL, highlighted this characteristic of labour 
work, noting that: “during the Civil War, the trade unions organized demonstrations in 
1987 and 1988 that gathered workers from both sides of Beirut for the unity of the 
country. This was important because it existed outside of the dynamics of the Civil 
War, and against the system of militias” (Dirani 2012). Likewise, Ghassan Sleibe, 
regional coordinator of the International Union of Public Service Workers and ex-
trade unionist in the GUWL, spoke of how “Federations and Unions organised many 
mobilizations during the Civil War. In 1987, several demonstrations occurred at the 
initiative of federations and unions in Beirut to unite workers and to oppose the Civil 
War” (Sleibe 2012). 
 
Between 1985 and 1989, more than 114 collective protests took place in opposition 
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to the Civil War. 165 The increasing number and diversity of demonstrations in these 
years expressed the frustration of the population with increasing socio-economic 
difficulties such as the remarkable 400 percent inflation rate of 1987 (Sleibe 
1999:156-157), as well as anger with the activities of militias.166 These protests also 
took place during a period of intense internal conflicts within political organisations of 
the same front, such as the battle between the Kataeb and Lebanese Forces (LF), or 
the disputes between Amal, the PSP and LCP (Sleibe 1999:160-161). In this context, 
the role of the GULW and other trade unions took on growing importance. 
 
In May 1987, the first national general trade union conference occurred under the title 
of “No to the Civil War, Yes to reconciliation, No to the policy of starvation of the 
state, Yes to the legitimate social demands”, with the participation of the GULW, two 
teachers’ trade unions, trade unions of liberal professions, trade unions of craftsmen, 
the League of Teachers of Primary and Secondary Public Schools, the Federation of 
Agricultural Workers and the United Committee of the Workers of the Public 
Administration (Sleibe 1999:159). At the end of the conference, these organisations 
issued a number of decisions addressing national, economic, financial, monetary and 
social issues (Sleibe 1999:159). This meeting, in which the league of teachers of 
primary and secondary public schools and public administrations employees were 
present and participated, played a key role in the organisation of alternative union 
structures in later decades (see below).  
 
A second conference was held in August 1987 with the same organisations, in 
addition to student, women, cultural and social committees, this time under the title: 
“Against the policy of starvation of the state, and for an independent, sovereign and 
united state that believes in democracy and a life with dignity and social justice” 
(Sleibe 1999:160). This conference led to a cross-sectarian nationwide mobilisation 
on October 15 1987, which saw various unions and the GUWL organise marches 
throughout the country that eventually came together in front of the Lebanese 
                                                            
165 These included hunger strikes, marches of Muslim and Christian women, sit ins in front the parliament, 
labour strikes against the kidnapping of workers, cultural exhibitions, marches of the handicapped for peace and 
human rights from Halba to Tyr, strike of the GULW for 5 days which culminated with demonstrations (Sleibe 
1999:143-144). 
166 Adib Bou Habib: “People opposed increasingly the destruction of the society by the militias” (Bou Habib 
2012).  
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National Museum in Beirut. This museum was on the confrontation line between a 
divided East and West Beirut, and workers from both sides gathered at the spot 
(Sleibe 2012; Al-Muntada al-Ishtirâkî 2012b:4-8). They demonstrated for the unity of 
the country and raised four additional main demands: an end to the Civil War, 
liberation of the territories occupied by Israel, reassertion of the authority of the state 
throughout all Lebanon and defence of workers’ rights (Bou Habib 2012). A few 
weeks later, on November 5 1987, an open-ended general strike was launched that 
lasted for five days. During this strike, further demonstrations were organised 
throughout the country with workers and demonstrators from both sides of Beirut 
gathering again in front of the Museum (Sleibe 2012; Al-Muntada al-Ishtirâkî 
2012b:4-8). Independent estimates put the crowd’s size at 60,000, a very significant 
mobilisation given the Civil War conditions existing at the time (Baroudi 1998:534).  
 
In examples such as these, the GULW mobilised throughout the Civil War around the 
issues of sectarianism and the specific concerns of workers; notably the declining 
value of wages (as a result of inflation) and the provision of social insurance to all 
workers (Bou Habib 2012). The GULW was the only significant nationally-organised 
force that had cross-sectarian representation and emphasized unity of the country 
and opposition to the Civil War. Between 1983 and 1991, its leadership was 
dominated by members or sympathisers of the LNM, which included most nationalist 
and leftist forces (Sleibe 1999:64).  
 
In the years following the end of the Civil War, this social weight continued to be 
asserted in demonstrations and strikes throughout the country. In 1992, for example, 
the GUWL organised strikes and demonstrations in protest against inflation, the high 
cost of living and the management of the economic crisis. Despite threats from the 
Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam against GULW leaders – who had been 
summoned to Damascus by the Syrian government – the strikes lasted for three days 
(Bou Habib 2012; Dirani 2012, Al-Muntada al-Ishtirâkî 2012b:4-8).167 Eventually the 
GULW called off the strikes, but nonetheless, the Karama government resigned in 
face of the social mobilisations and new elections were organized (Al-Muntada al-
Ishtirâkî 2012b:4-8).  
                                                            
167 At the time, the Syrian army – in alliance with some Lebanese politicians – held control of the country’s 
political system. 
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Following the election of Hariri in 1992, the GULW presented the new government 
with a list of demands that included wage increases, expansion of workers’ fringe 
benefits, consumer price regulations, rent controls, respect for the autonomy and 
independence of the labour movement, and incorporating the views of federations 
and unions into the reconstruction and economic recovery plans (Baroudi 1998:536). 
Despite the union movement’s demonstrated capacity to mobilise, these demands 
were not addressed by Hariri. As a result, further national strikes and demonstrations 
were called in 1994 with essentially the same demands as the 1992 strikes (in 
addition to concerns around the lack of publicly owned social services). In September 
1994, the GUWL submitted more detailed demands to the government, published a 
few months later in a ‘program of action’ (Baroudi 1998-537). Indicative of the 
specific character of neoliberalism under Hariri discussed in Chapter 3 – specifically 
the private sector-led focus on urban reconstruction – the main slogan raised by the 
GULW in this program was “Build Humans and not Stones” (Bou Habib 2012). 
 
On July 19 1995, a further general strike was called that was only stopped following 
the deployment of the army and security services against striking workers (Sleibe 
1999). At the same time, the government passed a law that forbid any gathering of 
more than five people or participation in demonstrations. Social struggles 
nonetheless continued throughout 1995 and 1996, particularly following the 
government’s refusal to increase public sector wages. During these two years, public 
school teachers suspended grading of the official baccalaureate high school exams 
to pressure the government for wage increase. Their actions were particularly 
effective because the fate of about 60,000 students hung in the balance. Likewise, 
university professors launched a strike in February 1996, and further strikes were 
called by the GULW (Baroudi 1998:537). In response, the government declared a 
state of emergency and sent security forces to break the strikes (Baroudi 1998:538). 
Despite this repression, some gains were won through the mid-1990s strike wave, 
including a three-fold increase in wages between 1993 and 1996. Real wages, 
however, continued to fall, as the government refused any indexation to inflation 
(Baroudi 1998:544). 
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6.3 Demobilisation and Cooption  
 
As this 1990s wave of strikes unfolded, a clear strategy to undercut the power of the 
GULW and associated federations and unions became evident. According to Adib 
Bou Habib, this strategy was jointly elaborated by the main political elites in Lebanon 
at the time (despite their different interests and rivalries): the Hariri government, 
Hezbollah, Amal, and other Syrian-government aligned forces such as the Ba’th party 
and SSNP (Bou Habib 2012; Dirani 2012). The latter parties played a critical role in 
this process since all Lebanese Labour ministries between 1993 and 2005 were 
controlled by political forces close to Syria. In the main, this strategy rested upon two 
essential pillars: (1) establishing rival federation and union bodies organised along 
sectarian lines, and (2) intervention in the internal affairs of the GULW itself. Through 
these means, the Lebanese political elite attempted to weaken the ability of the 
GULW to mobilise across sectarian lines, and to subordinate the labour movement to 
the priorities of the government’s economic reform measures. 
 
State intervention in the GULW started as early as 1993 when the Minister of Labour 
Abdallah Amin, a member of the Ba’th party, attempted to revive an older trade union 
body, the Federal Confederation of Sectoral Unions. He planned to bring in new 
legislation that would permit the involvement of the state in GULW affairs (Bou Habib 
2012; Dirani 2012; Abdallah 2012; Gharib 2012). This initiative failed and, in its place, 
the Minister of Labour began to issue licenses for the creation of new federations and 
unions, mostly divided along sectarian lines and with little real presence on the 
ground. In 1993, 41 new trade unions and five new federations were licensed, a very 
significant jump on the 62 trade unions and 22 federations that existed the year 
before (Bou Habib 2012; Dirani 2012; Abdallah 2012; Gharib 2012). These new 
labour bodies, as Ghassan Sleibe noted in an interview for this thesis, “were 
designed to compete with existing trade unions and to limit the autonomy of the union 
movement” (Sleibe 2012). Importantly, they also impacted the nature of decision 
making in the GULW because representation in the Executive Council of the GULW 
was not based on a union’s membership size – rather, each union was automatically 
granted two seats. Moreover, the Executive Council elected the GULW’s Political 
Bureau, composed of 12 members (Bou Habib 2012; Dirani 2012). In this manner, 
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the new licensed unions invariably linked to political parties close to the Syrian 
regime (Hezbollah, Ba’th and the SSNP), gained increased weight in the GUWL. 
 
Despite these attempts to undermine the GULW, the strategy of Lebanon’s political 
elite met with significant resistance from the federation’s leadership and rank-and-file 
workers. From 1993 to 1998, a series of intense political struggles emerged within 
the GUWL between non-sectarian and leftist forces, on the one hand, and the 
government and Syrian-linked forces on the other.168 It was in the context of these 
struggles that the Hariri government promulgated the 1995 law against ‘unapproved’ 
public demonstrations (see above) and, in 1997, arrested the GULW’s President and 
Vice President because they had refused to allow seven new unions established by 
Amal and the Ba’ath to join the federation and participate in its elections (Bou Habib 
2012; Sleibe 2012). The 1997 elections proved to be an important turning point 
seeing a contest between, Elias Abou Rizk (one of those arrested by the 
government), supported by the left and democratic trade unions, and Ghanim Al-
Zoghby, supported by the Ministry of Labour and the SSNP, Hezbollah, the Ba’th 
party and Amal. Zoghby won the election but was only in office for one year, unable 
to decisively defeat the support base of Abou Rizk (Abdallah 2012; Al-Muntada al-
Ishtirâkî 2012b:4-8). When Abou Rizk returned to office between 1998 and 2001, 
attempts were made to unite the GUWL  across party and sectarian lines and to 
mobilise against the policies of the new Hoss government. However, with the 
increased weight of pro-Syrian federations and trade unions in the GULW leadership 
(who supported Hoss), Abou Rizk’s attempt to renew labour mobilisations proved 
unsuccessful (Habib 2012; Sleibe 2012). Between 1998 and 2000, the GUWL 
organised only two demonstrations against the government (in April 1999 and July 
2000), both of which were poorly attended (Baroudi 2002). This was despite the 
intensification of neoliberal policies through this period (see Chapter 3), while 
thousands of workers were also laid off in 2000 from failing economic 
                                                            
168 In 1993, the left backed candidate Elias Abou Rizk, who won the GULW elections against Antoine Bechara, 
who had allied with the authorities and the Ministry of Labour (Baroudi 1998). Castro Abdallah (2012), LCP 
member and President of the FENASOL, explains that it was Antoine Bechara’s move towards an alliance with 
the state that pushed the left to vote for Elias Abou Rizk. In 1995, the new Minister of Labour As’ad Hardan, a 
member of the SSNP, encouraged the Federation of Independent Authorities (representing workers in railway, 
port, electricity and water sectors, and which was led by Bechara), as well as the Federation of Bank Employees 
and the Federation of Airline Company Employees to suspend their membership in the GUWL executive 
council.  These Federations refused to participate in the 1995 and 1996 strike wave (Bou Habib 2012; Dirani 
2012; Sleibe 2012). 
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establishments. More than 8,000 workers petitioned the Ministry of Labour in 1999 
and early 2000 to object to their dismissals from around 40 failing establishments 
(Baroudi 2000:88). 
 
By 2001, the Lebanese state had achieved virtually full control of the leadership of 
the GULW following the election of Ghassan Ghosn as President. Ghosn’s candidacy 
was supported by the government and the March 8 forces, including Hezbollah, 
Amal, SSNP and the Ba’th. In the decade following Ghosn’s election, the GUWL was 
progressively restructured along sectarian lines. At the time of writing, Ghosn 
remains in the presidency, and 10 out of 12 members of the GUWL’s leadership are 
affiliated with the March 8 Alliance.169 On the Executive Council, March 8-allied 
members hold 44 seats out of a total of 66. A number of independent and left-wing 
federations have deserted the GULW due to its sectarian character.170 
 
6.4 Hezbollah’s Intervention in the Labour Movement 
 
Hezbollah’s prominent position in the GULW leadership reflects its will to create new 
rival and sectarian federations and unions as a means of building a base in the 
GULW structures. To this end, the party has established numerous federations and 
trade unions across different sectors whose leadership is composed solely of Shi’a 
members and which are politically dominated by Hezbollah. The most important 
example of this is the al-Wafa federation (which was first established in 1988 as al-
Wafa Bekaa federation) as it was only composed of trade unions from this region – 
mostly bringing together workers in agriculture, construction, and hospitals (Yassin 
2012).171 In 2000, only five trade unions were linked to al-Wafa with around 400 
members in total (Bedran and Zbeeb 2000:223). But over the last decade it has 
                                                            
169 These March 8-aligned members are Ghassan Ghosn (originally SSNP, but today close to Nabih Berri), 
Hassan Faqih (Amal), Saad Al-Din Hamidi Saqr (Al-Jama’ al- Islâmiyya), Ali Yassin (Hezbollah), Boutros 
Saade, (SSNP), Ali Mussawi (Amal), Ahmad Zbidi (Hezbollah), Fawzi Sayyid (Ba’th), Bechara Chai 
(Independent close to Amal), Joseph Richa (FPM) (Anonym 2012b)  
170 These federations include the Federation of Bank Employees, the Federation of Print and Media Employees, 
the National Federation of Chemical Workers, Federation of Construction Workers and Scaffolders, and the 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions. 
171 1) Trade Union of workers’ hospitals in the Bekaa (187 members registred); 2) Trade Union of workers’ 
vegetable markets in the Bekaa Valley (32 members registred) 3) Trade Union of workers’ construction sector 
and its derivatives in Baalbek (45 members registred); 4) Trade Union of workers and fish farmers in the Bekaa 
Valley (54 members registred); 5) Trade Union of workers’ cooperatives in the Bekaa (92 members registered) 
(Bedran and Zbeeb 2000:222-224). 
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expanded to Beirut and the South of Lebanon, bringing in a wider range of economic 
sectors (Itihâd Al-Wafâ` 2014). There are currently eight trade unions affiliated to al-
Wafa,172 representing around 2,500 workers according to its current head, Ali Taher 
Yassin, who was interviewed for this thesis (Yassin 2012).  
 
Ali Taher Yassin is now on the executive body of the GULW representing Hezbollah. 
He explained that the role of al-Wafa is to protect the rights of the workers, but added 
that the union is “linked to Hezbollah and follows its line. We belong to Hezbollah”. 
The main reason that Hezbollah first established new trade unions in the Bekaa, 
according to Yassin, was that trade unions in the region were not linked to the party, 
despite the fact that the region was dominated by Hezbollah and was a majority Shi’a 
area. Most of the heads of federations and trade unions linked to Hezbollah are 
members of the party, and are required to follow the party ideologically, religiously 
and politically (Yassin 2014). The executive council of al-Wafa is only composed of 
Shi’a members (Itihâd Al-Wafâ` 2014a).  
 
In addition to al-Wafa, Hezbollah has also established rival federations in the 
agricultural sector,173 the health sector174 and the transport sector.175  
 
In this latter sector, the first taxi drivers’ federation was set up in 1969 by a group of 
leftist taxi drivers with the support of Kamal Jumblatt, Minister of the Interior and 
leader of the PSP. It succeeded in negotiating the affiliation of taxi drivers to the 
NSSF in 1982 (Abi Yaghi 2012). However, the federation was weakened during the 
Hariri government when Minister Abdallah Al-Amin (1992–95) granted Amal a licence 
to create a new federation in the sector. The appointment of Hezbollah ally Trad 
Hamadeh as Minister of Labour in 2005 then led to the granting of another licence to 
                                                            
172 Trade Union of workers’ cooperatives in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Trade Union of technicians and 
professional workers in the domain of electricity in Beirut; Trade Union of workers in the cultivation of 
vegetables in the South, Trade Union of printing press workers in the South, Trade Union of workers’ hospitals 
in the Bekaa; Trade Union of workers’ vegetable markets in the Bekaa Valley, Trade Union of workers’ 
construction sector and its derivatives in the Bekaa; Trade Union of workers and fish farmers in the Bekaa 
Valley (Itihâd al-Wafâ` 2014) 
173 The Federation of Trade Union of Workers in the Cooperatives, Institutions and Vegetable Markets headed 
by Omar Subhi Abdallah; and the Federation of Trade Unions of Farmers in Lebanon (known as Inma’) headed 
by Jihad Abbas Al-Baluq (see Chapter 3 for further discussion of the sectarian role of this union). In both these 
federations, all members of the executive council are Shi’a. 
174 Federation of Worker and Health Trade Union in the Bekaa, headed by Berbir Othman Hassan. 
175 The Loyalty Federation of Transport in Lebanon headed by Abdlallah Hamadeh 
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a third federation also in the transport sector (Abi Yaghi 2012)176 called, “the Loyalty 
Federation” (al-Wala’), which is affiliated to Hezbollah according to its head Abdallah 
Hamadeh (2012). The al-Wala’ Federation brings together four other trade unions: 
General Trade Union for the Drivers of Public Minibuses in Lebanon, Trade Union of 
Transport Drivers and Workers in Lebanon, Trade Union of Van Drivers of Schools 
and Universities in the Bekaa and the Union of Drivers for Student Transport in the 
South (Itihâd al-Wafâ` 2014b). The executive council of al-Wala’ is solely composed 
of Shi’a members and is politically dominated by Hezbollah (Itihâd al-Wafâ` 2014b). 
 
The party organises its work in these affiliated federations and unions through its 
Trade Union and Workers’ Unit (TUWU) headed by Hashim Salhab (Itihâd al-Wafâ` 
2013). The orientation of the TUWU closely echoes the ‘social market’ approach 
analysed in Chapter 3. While claiming to prioritise the defence of workers, its public 
statements and annual reports tend to call for harmonious economic development 
and a dialogue that unites business owners and employees towards the greater 
national interest of Lebanon (Wahdat al-niqâbât wa al-‘ummâl al-markaziyya fî Hizb 
Allâh 2008). 177  The TUWU’s position towards neoliberal measures such as 
privatisation – as evidenced in the significant case of the MEA sell-off discussed in 
Chapter 3 – does not display any principled opposition, but rather calls for the 
balancing of interests and the judgement on a case-by-case basis.178 At the same 
time, while employing this cross-class discourse, the TUWU also specifically 
emphasizes Shi’a religious reference points – including the commemoration of 
historic Shi’a martyrs (such as Imam Mahdi) as well as that of Hezbollah political and 
military figures (Wahdat al-niqâbât wa al-‘ummâl al-markaziyya fî Hizb Allâh 2008; 
Wahdat al-niqâbât wa al-‘ummâl al-markaziyya fî Hizb Allâh 2009). Workers’ 
celebrations organised by the TUWU, such as Labour Day, are also held in religious 
institutions controlled by Hezbollah. 
 
 
                                                            
176 During Trad Hamadeh’s period as Minister of Labour he granted licenses to a total of 22 new trade unions 
(Khaddaj 2010a). 
177 (See for example Wahdat al-niqâbât wa al-‘ummâl al-markaziyya fî Hizb Allâh 2008; Wahdat al-niqâbât wa 
al-‘ummâl al-markaziyya fî Hizb Allâh 2009). 
178 In a 2009 statement, the Unit argues that “each privatisation should be analysed and studied according to the 
national interests of the country, whether they are positive or negative, to resolve any controversy around this 
subject” (Wahdat al-niqâbât wa al-‘ummâl al-markaziyya fî Hizb Allâh 2009). 
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6.5 A Renewal of Labour Struggles: 2004-2011 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the early 2000s marked an important moment in the 
consolidation of Lebanese neoliberalism following the IMF-led negotiations around 
the Paris I and II Agreements from 2001-2003. Despite the significant economic 
changes that occurred in the wake of these agreements, opposition by the GUWL to 
government economic reform was largely absent, with no major mobilisations against 
the 2001 IMF agreements, the acceleration of privatization, or the drastic reduction in 
employer contributions to the NSSF in the same year (38.5 percent to 23.5 percent) 
(Nasnas 2007:90). A new wave of labour mobilisation would emerge, however, which 
lay largely outside the structures and initiative of the GULW. The full implications of 
the progressive weakening of the GULW – and its subordination to the Lebanese 
Labour Ministry and the March 8 political forces – would be demonstrated throughout 
this renewal of the country’s labour struggles. Moreover, Hezbollah’s orientation 
towards these new movements has been characterised by prevarication and an 
unwillingness to encourage independent mass struggles. At all decisive conjunctures, 
Hezbollah has prioritised its own sectarian interests, frequently counterposing these 
against a cross-denominational labour movement. 
 
In 2004, GULW called a general strike and protests spread throughout the country 
against rising prices and inflation. The country was paralysed by the mobilisations; all 
political forces were compelled to take a position. According to the President of the 
Federation of the Public Transport Drivers, Abdel Al-Amir Nadje (2002), interviewed 
for this thesis, the GUWL’s bureaucracy, under pressure from the political elite, 
wanted to stop the strike. Workers, however, especially in the transport sector, 
opposed this decision and called for its continuation (Chiit 2009b; Al-Amir Najde 
2012). The GUWL leadership withdrew from the strike, allowing the army to 
intervene. The army then opened fire on demonstrators and strikers, who were 
gathered in Hay Al-Sellom, one of the poorer Shi’a neighbourhoods of southern 
Beirut, killing five workers and injuring dozens. The main political parties, including 
Hezbollah, supported the army saying: "The army is the red line", while most of the 
media portrayed the strike as a “barbaric attempt to attack the army” (Chiit 2009b). 
The GULW did not issue any declaration and remained silent on the killing of the five 
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workers. Ali Taher Yassin (2012), Hezbollah trade unionist, in an interview for this 
thesis, characterised the events of Hay Al-Sellom in 2004 as an attempt to create 
instability and chaos in the country by some parties, while regretting the repression 
and acknowledging that some people had legitimate demands. He nevertheless went 
on to say that Hay Al-Sellom’s neighbourhood had a particular situation, with family 
and tribal dynamics, instead of the social dynamics created by the strikes and the 
demands of the people (Yassin 2012). Abdallah Hamadeh (2012), head of the 
federation of al-Wala’ linked to Hezbollah, also argued that Hay Al-Sellom events 
were the result of provocateurs and armed men that had nothing to do with the 
demonstrators and unions’ strikes. 
 
Following the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, a new government was 
formed by Siniora on July 19 2005. This government included Hezbollah 
representatives for the first time in Lebanese history, including Trad Hamadeh as 
Minister of Labour. In this position, Hezbollah was faced with a major mobilisation for 
the defence of public services by the teachers’ union in May 2006, which gathered at 
least a quarter of a million people and forced the government to withdraw and cancel 
some of its decisions such as: “diminishing the pensions, increasing VAT from 10 to 
12 percent, raising fuel prices by 30 percent and imposing short term contracts on 
government workers and teachers” (Chiit 2006; Gharib 2012).  
 
Hezbollah participated massively in these protests, alongside the FPM and the LCP 
(Qualander 2006). The ruling parties of March 14 attacked the movement, saying it 
was mostly Shi’a orchestrated and was infiltrated by Syrian workers. The Siniora 
government claimed that the demonstrations were not workers' demonstrations but 
an attempted coup planned by the Shi’a to take power – this was despite the fact that 
the demonstration brought together workers from all denominations according to one 
participant interviewed for this thesis (Chiit 2009a; Gharib 2012). The GULW was 
again not a leading force in the mobilisation. 
 
In January 2007, a demonstration called by the GULW against the Paris III agenda 
gathered only 2,000 people. One of the reasons for this small size was the fact that 
the March 8 forces, including Hezbollah who were in the opposition at the time, did 
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not mobilise for the protest. While critical of some aspects of the Paris Conference, 
Hezbollah explained that they did not want to jeopardise its outcomes (Achcar 2007). 
Indeed, Hezbollah parliamentary deputies, despite their resignation from the 
government in December 2006, supported the reform program presented by Prime 
Minister Siniora to the conference itself (Catusse and Abi Yaghi 2011:73). 
Nonetheless, following this small demonstration in January and the increasing 
tensions between the opposition and the government, the March 8 Coalition including 
Amal, Hezbollah and FPM, called for a general strike on January 23 2007.179 
Although this began as a largely bureaucratic initiative, it turned rapidly into a popular 
uprising with the main roads of transit in the country blocked. This situation 
overwhelmed the strike’s initiators and they decided to end the strike declaring that it 
might “create confessional tensions” (Chiit 2009a). Hezbollah agreed to this 
termination of the strike, refusing suggestions by General Aoun to launch a rally in 
front of the government headquarters (ICG 2007:2). According to radical left activist 
Bassem Chiit (2009a), the March 8 coalition feared that this popular movement was 
moving towards taking up socio-economic issues across sectarian lines, and the 
organisation preferred to emphasize only the interests of the Shi’a.  
 
One of the characteristics of Hezbollah’s orientation towards these social and labour 
struggles, particularly those that were to emerge through 2008, was its unwillingness 
to support large-scale, independent mass mobilisations of workers, preferring to rely 
instead upon small-scale, armed actions against its political opponents. In this sense, 
Hezbollah has reinforced a sectarian dynamic within these struggles, undercutting 
any cross-sectarian impulse that they may have potentially held.  A good example of 
this is given in an aborted general strike of May 2008, which was called for by 
federations and trade unions of taxi drivers, teachers and farmers, demanding an 
increase in the minimum wage, higher public wages (which had been frozen since 
                                                            
179  The main point of contention was the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which was deemed as 
unconstitutional and illegal for Hezbollah and its allies in March. Hezbollah MP Ali Fayyad argued that it 
undermined Lebanese judicial sovereignty and put Lebanon at the mercy of foreign influences, while it 
exacerbated internal divisions. Hezbollah and its March 8 allies therefore strongly opposed it, triggering 
parliamentary and cabinet crises and several months of hostile popular protest in front of the Prime Minister’s 
office when in November 2006 Shi’a members of the cabinet suspended participation to protest the government 
bypassing the parliamentary blockade and its signature of the draft agreement of the STL. Under the Lebanese 
constitution, parliamentary approval was needed for the creation of the STL. However, due to opposition by the 
8 March alliance, the parliament did not vote to ratify the agreement. Hezbollah saw this strike as a way to put 
pressure on the March 14 led government.  
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1996), and measures against the country’s runaway inflation (Catusse 2009).180 The 
strike, initially called for May 7, did not take place following the outbreak of street 
fighting between opposing political forces. The March 14 political forces, which at the 
time held governmental power, raised the threat of shutting down Hezbollah’s 
telecommunications network. In response, Hezbollah declined to mobilise for the 
general strike and instead launched armed attacks on neighbourhoods in Beirut that 
were known to be support bases of March 14. These fights broke popular 
mobilisation in the streets and any possibility of joint worker struggles across 
sectarian lines (Catusse 2009).181 As explained by trade unionist Ahmad Dirani, 
Hezbollah’s military intervention was “aimed against the possibility of a large trade 
union and workers mobilisation taking the lead against the government in a 
democratic way. Hezbollah did not favour this option” (Dirani 2012). Dirani argued 
that such a mobilisation would not only have achieved social gains around economic 
issues but could also have addressed the threat to Hezbollah’s telecommunication 
system. 
 
In June 2011, a new government led by the March 8 forces and headed by Najib 
Miqati as Prime Minister was formed. Hezbollah held two ministries in this 
government: the Ministry of Agriculture (Hussein Hajj Hassan) and a Minister of State 
(Muhammad Fneich). The experience of Hezbollah in this government is instructive, 
as it indicates the party’s unwillingness to support significant reform measures aimed 
at addressing the situation of workers in Lebanon. Debates around these measures 
focused particularly on an initiative advanced by the Minister of Labour Charbel 
Nahas, soon after the formation of the new government. Nahas’ initiative contained a 
number of significant social reforms, particularly the goal of establishing a “social 
wage”, which would adjust the salaries of workers and private sector employees in 
line with the rate of inflation, and also expand the range of subsidies (Traboulsi 
2014:51+55). These measures would be funded by higher taxation on finance and 
other rentier activities and, in this respect, would have represented a reversal of the 
weakening of labour vis-à-vis capital that had been characteristic of the previous 
                                                            
180 An earlier strike in January 2008 had been called along the same demands. These protests escalated into 
deadly battles in Beirut’s southern suburbs, with roads cut off and taxis refusing to take passengers. 
181 A few weeks after the cessation of hostilities and the formation of a new national unity government, the 
minimum wage was raised from LP 300,000 ($200) to LP 500,000 ($333), which was still far from the demands 
of the workers and as we said previously it only benefited the private sector and not the employees of the public 
sector (Zaraket 2014).  
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years (Lebanese Observatory of the Rights of Workers and Employees (LORWE) 
2013b:6-7). The initiative also proposed that transport allowances be included in 
salaries, and the establishment of a universal health care system (LORWE 2013b:6-
7). 
 
Nahas’ initiative was opposed by a range of different political forces. Initially, the 
inclusion of universal health coverage in a social wage was rejected by Amal’s 
Minister of Health, Ali Hassan Khalil, who opposed the plan because he believed it 
encroached on his domain of responsibility (Nahas 2012). This was despite the fact 
that the NFSS came under the Labour Ministry, and therefore was the responsibility 
of Nahas not Khalil (Traboulsi 2014:55). Lebanese journalist Zbeeb has argued that 
Khalil’s opposition was due to the fact “that the Ministry of Health and Social Security 
are part of Nabih Berri’s share in the pie and he can not concede his share while the 
shares of other political forces remain in place” (Zbeeb 2012a). Likewise, trade 
unionist Adib Bou Habib claimed in an interview for this thesis that “Amal and its 
Minister of Health did not want this project because they wanted to use the universal 
health coverage for their own political and clientelist interests (Bou Habib 2012). 
Following pressure from Amal and Hezbollah in October 2011, Nahas agreed to 
separate the universal health coverage from its wage reform project (Traboulsi 
2014:55-56). The latter would become the new line of battle inside of the 
government.  
  
Nahas’ first wage initiative included a rise in the minimum wage to 890,000 LP ($593) 
plus transport allowances. This proposition, however, was firmly rejected by private 
sector employers, who instead reached an agreement called the “Consensual 
Agreement on Wage Reform” with the leadership of the GULW and the Prime 
Minister Najib Miqati (LORWE 2013b:6-7). This agreement was less advantageous to 
workers as it did not include transport allowances and would only raise the minimum 
wage to 675,000 LP ($450) (Orient Le Jour 2012a). The private sector argued that 
adding transportation allowances to the basic salary would increase costs to an 
unsustainable level and damage the private sector in particular (The Daily Star 
2012). 
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The Consensual Agreement (CA) was adopted by the government in December 
2011, with the two Hezbollah ministers, Muhammad Fneich and Hussein Hajj 
Hassan, voting to support it rather than the Nahas initiative. In reference to the role of 
the GULW, Fneich argued: “workers and employees reject the wage adjustment plan 
proposed by the Minister of Labour Charbel Nahas” (Orient Le Jour 2011d). 
Hezbollah’s position, however, was strongly marked by the contradictions inherent to 
its ‘social market’ standpoint and the different demands emanating from its social 
base. The day after the vote, following widespread popular criticisms against the 
position of its ministers, Hezbollah shifted its position to support a strike and 
demonstration organised against the CA. Hezbollah ministers explained that their 
earlier vote in favour of the CA was the result of a lack of coordination with Nahas, 
and not in opposition to the plan itself. Indeed, they claimed that the wages proposed 
in the CA were far too low (Al-Akhbar 2012).  
 
Hezbollah, however, declined to support a demonstration in support of the Nahas 
Plan on December 15, which drew more than 6,000 people in Beirut (Al-Akhbar 
English 2011).182 At this demonstration, which the author attended, many protestors 
could be seen expressing opposition through placards, chants and group discussions 
about the role of the GULW.183 One activist, Farah Kobeissi (Al-Akhbar English 
2011), who was interviewed by al-Akhbar newspaper, accused the GULW of 
collusion with the government. She added that workers do not trust the GULW 
anymore, and that “we tried to give it a chance, but they betrayed us, all the workers 
and the independent unions, on December 12 [the day the cabinet passed Miqati's 
plan]", while adding that the GULW’s “decision is not taken democratically by the 
workers, but by a bunch of bureaucratic people that are very close to the employers, 
the government and the political forces in power" (Al-Akhbar English 2011). She 
argued that the GULW's ties with the government and the major political forces in 
power hindered its ability to be truly representative of workers (Al-Akhbar English 
2011). Indeed, not only did the GULW oppose Nahas’ plan, they also issued a 
complaint against him to the International Labour Organisation, accusing him of 
                                                            
182 This demonstration was also not backed by the GULW, which called for a different mobilisation on 
December 27 that was eventually cancelled. The representative of Hezbollah in the GULW, Ali Yassin, stated 
that the party decided not to support or mobilise for the 15th of December action due to its opposition of the 
GULW executive. (Interview Ali Taher Yassin, March 2012, Beirut).  
183 Personal observations, 15 December 2011.  
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fragmenting the trade union movement in Lebanon (LORWE 2013b:15). 
  
A final round of parliamentary voting on the CA and the Nahas initiative took place in 
mid-January 2012. In the debate around this vote, Nahas proposed a minimum wage 
of 868,000 LP ($578.6) plus transport allowances (Traboulsi 2014:55). Despite 
numerous meetings between Nahas and Hezbollah, Amal, and the Prime Minister, no 
agreement was reached. His plan was eventually rejected in favour of the CA, and he 
resigned from the cabinet in February of 2012 (Traboulsi 2014:56). Hezbollah trade 
unionist Ali Taher Yassin justified the vote and GUWL’s refusal of the Nahas plan 
stating that:  
 
“It was a special situation, you have to weigh how much you 
can mobilise and how much you want to destabilise this 
government. With strikes and demonstrations you put in danger 
the stability and the security of the country. The current situation 
(beginning of 2012) does not allow this, this would be very 
dangerous, and we have to take this into account. The GUWL 
did not want to hold the responsibility of putting in danger the 
stability of the country, it was too dangerous, it was a wise 
decision. The national and regional political scene does not 
allow all these changes, especially when you have the other 
party (March 14) trying its best to create instability. We decided 
to preserve the stability of the country, the project of Charbel 
Nahas is right, demands are right but to realize it now, it is very 
difficult. There is also a way to realise this project. He was 
alone, he did not share his plan with the three heads of state, 
with the economists, retailers, etc… The country cannot uphold 
these increase of salaries, we have to check the consequences 
of such a project.” (Yassin 2012)  
 
Yassin was to echo these sentiments at the CCSD conference, “Reform of Social 
Policies in Lebanon: From Selective Subsidy Towards Welfare State” in March 2012 
(which the author attended), arguing that it would be difficult for workers to raise 
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further demands around wages due to the lack of stability in the country, and the 
potential damage that may arise to the Lebanese economy. While declaring that 
‘humane’ salaries are necessary, Yassin argued that these should be reached 
through negotiation with employers. At the conference he defended the leadership of 
the GUWL from audience members who complained that the federation no longer 
represented the interests of workers (Yassin’s intervention in the Conference Reform 
of Social Policies in Lebanon: From Selective Subsidy Towards Welfare State 
2012). 184  Other trade unionists linked to Hezbollah, Akram Zeid and Abdallah 
Hamadeh (head of the al-Wala transport federation), also argued that the party could 
not support the Nahas initiative because of economic reasons and the potential for 
instability in the country (Zeid 2012; Hamadeh 2012).185  
 
In summary, the period 2004-2011 provides a useful illustration of the orientation of 
Hezbollah towards labour movements in Lebanon. The period witnessed a significant 
upsurge in labour militancy, marked particularly by the call for general strikes in 2004 
and 2008, and the fierce debate around the Nahas initiative in 2011. These struggles 
revealed the tensions inherent within Hezbollah’s claim to represent the poor and 
marginalised layers of the Shi’a population, alongside its integration into the political 
elite and increasing linkages to the emerging Shi’a bourgeoisie. At all major points, 
Hezbollah has expressed a rhetorical concern with issues such as privatisation, the 
implications of agreements such as Paris III and the decreasing value of real wages. 
At the same time, it has strongly resisted attempts to mobilise its mass base in a 
manner that would support independent initiatives across sectarian lines. In general, 
these tensions have been resolved in favour of neoliberal reform, particularly in those 
periods in which Hezbollah has held governmental positions.  
 
 
                                                            
184 Pointedly, Yassine’s intervention followed that of Nicolas Elie Chammas, President of Beirut Traders 
Association, with whom he shared the same panel. Chammas attacked Charbel Nahas for promoting a ‘Marxist 
discourse’ and an ‘atmosphere of class struggle’ in the country, adding his support for the CA. Yassine did not 
respond either directly or indirectly to Chammas. 
185 At the time of writing (January 2015), the increase in wages promised in the CA, has not been implemented 
and the mechanisms to fund them are still being discussed in commissions in parliament. Hezbollah, although 
rhetorically supporting the CA agreement, has joined the “technical accountant” discourse shared by March 14 
and March 8, as argued by researcher Raed Sharaf (2014), to explain the difficulties to implement the increase in 
wages as planned in the original agreement. Political parties, including Hezbollah, explain that they have to 
maintain the existing financial policy and express the threat of economic collapse if the increase in wage is 
implemented as currently planned and without workers making some sacrifices.  
 221 
6.6 Alternative Labour Movements in Lebanon? 
 
The 2011 mobilisations around the Nahas plan marked a significant moment in the 
Lebanese labour movement not least because they indicated the emergence of new 
organisational structures that have attempted to renew the earlier, cross-sectarian 
orientation of the GULW. One important example of this is the founding of the Union 
Coordination Committee (UCC) (Hay`at tansîq niqâbiyya). 186  The UCC brings 
together more than 40 independent trade unions and between 140,000 and 176,000 
members, mainly employed in the civil service or as public and private school 
teachers (Gharib 2012, LORWE 2013b:8). The league of teachers of primary (Public 
Primary Schools Teachers League in Lebanon (PPSTLL))187 and secondary schools 
(the Public Secondary Schools Teachers League in Lebanon (PSSTLL)),188 which 
consist respectively of 65,000 and 40,000 members (Catusse and Abi Yaghi 
2011:81), have been the driving force of the organisation. Mainly consisting of public 
employees of the state, the UCC is not legally recognized as a federation or a trade 
union,189 but it is nevertheless registered by the Ministry of Culture where its offices 
are located (Gharib 2012). This status does not officially allow the UCC to organise 
strikes, but has not prevented it from striking and placing itself at the head of social 
mobilisations. Leaders of the UCC, such as Hana Gharib and Mahmoud Haidar, have 
nevertheless expressed that one of their objectives was to transform the leagues of 
teachers into trade unions and the UCC into a federation of trade unions in the public 
sector (LORWE 2013a; Al-Hajj 2014a). According to activists interviewed for this 
thesis, the UCC’s democratic organisational structure has helped protect it from 
attempts by the state and political forces to undermine or intervene in its political 
affairs as had occurred with the GULW (Bou Habib 2012; Gharib 2012; Sleibe 2012; 
                                                            
186 There is no official date of establishment of the UCC as it is not an official institution, legally speaking. The 
UCC came to existence after the end of the Lebanese Civil War through the struggles of its two main 
organisations Public Primary Schools Teachers League in Lebanon and the Public Secondary Schools Teachers 
Leaugue in Lebanon thorughout the 1990s. It was neverthless the struggle around the salary scale and increase in 
wages that made the UCC the main workers organisation in the country at the end of 2011 and beginning of 
2012.  
187 Established in 1938. 
188 Established in 1980. 
189 Article 15 of the labour law forbids any state employee from “stating or publishing, without the written 
approval of the head of the directorate, any speech, public statement, or authored work in any subject, or to join 
professional organisations or unions, or go on strike or instigate others to strike” (Zbeeb 2012b). Moreover, the 
Lebanese state has always refused to ratify the ILO Convention number 87 on the trade union liberties, and 
forbids de facto all members of the public administration to join or create an union. Only the federation of 
teachers in the private sector is recognized as a federation in the UCC. 
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George Al-Hajj 2012). Indeed, the opposition to the CA was led primarily by the UCC, 
including the aforementioned demonstration on 15 December 2011. 
 
The growth of the UCC took place in the context of continued labour struggles 
throughout the country in 2012 and 2013. 190 In the spring and summer of 2012, for 
example, protests erupted by more than 2,500 contract workers at the electricity 
company, EdL, demonstrating against the privatisation plans of the government.191 
The workers claimed that the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) had failed to 
provide them with permanent employment, social security, a decent monthly salary 
and job security (Abou Zaki 2012c). At the time of the protests the minister in charge, 
Gebran Bassil, a FPM member and nephew of General Aoun, refused to meet the 
contract workers and described them as troublemakers and outlaws (Abou Zaki 
2012c). He also sent in the security services to prevent the strikers from reaching 
their sit in. His restructuring plan envisioned that 1,800 of these workers would be 
made redundant. Hezbollah, who had been in charge of the Ministry from July 2005 
to November 2006 under Minister Muhammad Fneich, supported the privatisation 
process; 192 first endorsing Bassil’s plan in Cabinet (Al-Akhbar English 2012a), and 
then voting in favour of a draft law allowing contract workers at Lebanon's state-run 
electricity company to become full-time employees.193 During this period, Hezbollah 
did not criticise Bassil’s vocal and sectarian attacks on the workers' mobilisation, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of affected workers were Shi’a.194 The GULW 
was also absent from supporting the workers, only intervening on the 93rd day of the 
strike in which they took the side of EdL administration and pressured strikers to end 
their action (LORWE 2013b:12).195  
                                                            
190 During the year 2012, the UCC held 14 strikes, 60 sit-ins, four demonstrations, boycotted exam for two 
consecutive years and organised two trade union conferences in Beirut (LORWE 2013b:8). 
191 Three private companies were offered a contract to manage the distribution of the electric power (system 
upgrades, notes indexes and collection of bills).  
192 Hezbollah Minister Muhammad Fneich has been an important actor in the ongoing process aimed at 
privatisation of the EdL, as Minister of Energy and Water between July 2005 and November 2006 (Verdeil 2008 
and see chapter 3).  
193 Under the draft law, all EdL contract workers younger than 58 will take an examination to determine their 
qualifications, which will be administered by the Civil Service Council (Verdeil 2008).  
194 According to Minister Gebran Bassil 80 percent of the workers belong to non-Christian sects, the majority 
being Shi’a, and most of them support Berri (Naharnet 2012). A large section of Christian members of 
parliament opposed the law because they feared that hiring the part-time workers, most of whom are Shi’a, 
would throw off the composition of EdL’s so-called sectarian balance (Abizeid 2014). 
195 The National Federation of Trade Union of Workers and Employees in Lebanon (FENASOL), through its 
President Castro Abdallah, was the only trade union to support the strike. I visited the EdL workers’ occupation 
and witnessed Castro Abdallah’s presence. In August 2014, daily contract workers and collectors were again 
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In February and March of 2013, massive demonstrations and open-ended strikes 
were called by UCC-led teachers demanding the implementation of a decision 
passed by the Minister of Education in 2012 to increase salaries. Tens of thousands 
of teachers demonstrated throughout the country and the strikes lasted for more than 
three weeks. The UCC was a major force behind these mobilisations, which have 
continued throughout 2014 due to the lack of implementation of the proposed wage 
increase. In this struggle, the UCC has resisted calls by the government to fund the 
salary increase through shifting the burden onto the poorer layers of society, 
including suggested measures such as new indirect taxes, a reduction of benefits for 
teachers, cuts to retirees’ pay and an increase in contractual employment (Orient Le 
Jour 2013c; Andraos 2013).196 By the summer of 2014, the UCC was still pressuring 
the government for the implementation of the salary increase that had been agreed 
to more than two years ago. 197 
 
The teacher’s struggles through 2013 and 2014 indicated several salient and inter-
related features of the Lebanese labour movement.198 First, they demonstrated the 
unwillingness of Hezbollah to support any independent mobilisations of workers, 
particularly given its participation in government. During these strikes, Hezbollah 
refused to take a stance within government in support of the salary increases and did 
not mobilise its membership in the UCC-led actions. On several occasions, 
Hezbollah representatives opposed these strikes. In November 2013, during a 
meeting of the southern branch of the Public Secondary Schools Teachers League in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
launching an open strike in protest against the decision of the EdL board of directors to limit the number of 
employees provided full-time jobs to 897 out of the 2,000 workers (The Daily Star 2014a). 
196 The demand of the UCC needs to be set in the context of a 120 percent increase in inflation from 1993 to 
2012, while public sector wages increased only 55 percent (Wehbe M. 2013a). It should also be noted that in 
2012, the private sector received a salary increase and that Parliament also approved legislation doubling the 
incomes of judges and university professors (Rifai 2014). 
197 Lebanon’s banks and other powerful business interests represented by the Economic Committees (ECs), were 
opposing this claim stating that it would bankrupt Lebanon’s economy, drain the cash-strapped treasury, increase 
inflation and reduce citizens’ purchasing power. On April 11 2014 bankers held a one-day strike against the 
proposed measure (Abizeid 2014). 
198 Other struggles that emerged in 2013 should also be noted, such as attempts by the Federation of Bank 
Employees to defend the last remaining collective agreement in Lebanon, protests by employees of the Spinneys 
supermarket chain to defend their right to organise, and mobilisations by contract workers and those without 
fixed contracts in the education sector who were seeking protection and continuity of employment. The UCC 
was again prominent in solidarity with these struggles, including a petition for a million person rally, which they 
built through campaigning across the country and in meetings with local popular organisations. The EdL strike 
has continued into 2014, including a strike on 15 April. Workers at EdL have expressed their agreement with the 
UCC’s attempts to increase the salary scale (Wehbe M. 2012).  
 224 
Lebanon, Hezbollah (and Amal) representatives argued against a UCC strike 
planned for November 26, while a majority of the remaining participants voted in 
favour (Sharaf 2014). Furthermore, Hezbollah teachers did not participate in open-
ended strikes called by the UCC, and refused the calls of Hanna Gharib for 
escalation of the protests (Sharaf 2014). Likewise, during a marking boycott called by 
the UCC in the summer of 2014, Hezbollah representatives called for an end to the 
boycott and supported a parliamentary decision to automatically pass all students in 
an attempt to break the action (Al-Hajj 2014b). Nonetheless, the UCC decided to 
continue the boycott and to join further strikes called by various sectors of the public 
administration to implement an increased salary scale (Orient Le Jour 2014d; Al-Hajj 
2014b).  
 
Despite its large teacher base and network of schools discussed in the previous 
chapter, only a small number of Hezbollah teachers participate in the UCC while 
many have let their membership in the organisation lapse.199 Hezbollah has argued 
that this was due to the UCC’s strategy of militancy, rather than their preferred 
course of consensus and dialogue (Zoghbi 2013). Indeed, the re-election of Nehme 
Mahfoud, President of the private schools teachers’ federation, in April 2013, by an 
overwhelming majority and without any political endorsement from Hezbollah (or, 
indeed, of the March 14 bloc) indicated the party’s lack of support or activity within 
the federation.200  
 
In addition to Hezbollah’s abstention from these strikes, the teacher’s strike further 
confirmed the marginalisation of the GULW, which had been undermined by the 
erstwhile attempts to bring it under state control. Instead, the prominent role of the 
UCC pointed to the emergence of a new institutional configuration within the trade 
union movement. These trends were captured by the journalist Lysandra Ohrstrom, 
commenting on the 2013 mobilisations:  
 
“After being fractured by sectarian schisms and hijacked to 
serve the interests of Lebanon’s political class for more than 
                                                            
199 One estimate put the number of lapsed Hezbollah members in the UCC at 1,600 out of a total of 2,200 
members (Zoghbi 2013). 
200 Mahfoud beat the Hezbollah-supported candidate by nearly 4,000 votes (Orient le Jour 2013b). 
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three decades, whatever last whiffs of legitimacy the GULW 
could claim were shattered when the rival UCC mobilized 
thousands of teachers and public sector workers in a month-
long campaign to force the government to pass a salary scale 
increase.” (Ohrstrom 2013) 
 
Today, the GUWL is facing significant problems. Its funding is now completely tied to 
the discretion of the Labour Ministry, which places considerable constraint on activity 
as the federation does not receive dues from its membership (Wehbe M. 2012 and 
Anonym 2012b). The federation’s leadership has resisted any reform in the structure 
of the GUWL, which is still organized through a federal structure that gives the same 
representation to a federation of more than 8,000 members (such as the Federation 
of Bank Employees) and a federation composed of 42 members (such as Federation 
of the Trade Unions of Mount Lebanon) (Bedran and Zbeeb 2000). The large growth 
in these small federations is indicated by the fact that the GULW now consists of 52 
federations and 640 unions, up from 22 federations and 62 unions in 1992 – 
concurrent with a significant reduction in the proportion of workers covered by the 
federation (now standing at between 4-7 percent of the country’s work force) (Bou 
Habib 2012; Abdallah 2012; Sleibe 2012). This structure has entrenched the control 
of the March 8 forces over the GULW, which now represent more than half of its 
component federations (Dirani 2012). Moreover, the leadership of the GULW, notably 
its President Ghassan Ghosn, has been accused of corruption (Wehbe M. 2012). 
According to Ali Taher Yassin, the GULW’s Council of Delegates (Majlis al-
Mandubîn), which is in charge of verifying the federation’s accounts, has not met 
since 2001 (Yassin 2012).201  
 
The decline of the GULW is further reflected in the increasing public opposition to the 
federation expressed by worker activists. In May 2012, a meeting called “The 
                                                            
201 It should also be noted that the trade union movement as a whole has been largely unsuccessful in attempts to 
organize women workers, who suffer most from unemployment, low paid work and a bias towards the informal 
economy. Women represent half of the population in the country, but only 21 percent are economically active, 
(compared to a 73 percent rate for men). There are no women members in the executive committee of 184 trade 
unions, although the participation of women in unions has increased slightly, thanks partially to the 
establishment of the Unions Training Centre in 2001, which offers educational programmes and supports 
women’s participation in various activities (ILO 2008 Country Brief Advancing women’s employment in 
Lebanon). 
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Consultative union meeting for a democratic and independent trade union 
movement” was organised at the initiative of the Lebanese Center for trade union 
Training. Numerous federations opposed to the GULW participated in this meeting, 
including the Printing Press Workers’ Federation, National Federation of Workers, 
Federation Chemical Workers and the Federation of Construction and Timber 
workers (LORWE 2013b:15). The gathering expressed its support to the UCC and 
criticised the economic direction of the state. The most important outcome was the 
goal of building a democratic and independent trade union movement, autonomous 
from the decisions of political parties and the leadership of the GULW. In response to 
threats to its authority, the GULW leadership issued a statement in December 2012, 
accusing anyone establishing an independent trade union outside of the GULW of 
seeking to “atomize, dismember, and divide the trade unions and abandon the 
workers in order to serve the Zionist project calling for constructive chaos” (Zbeeb 
2012d). 
  
At a conference held in October 2013 to discuss the GULW’s record, many labour 
activists argued for the establishment of an independent, combative and democratic 
trade union movement, as an alternative to the current federation (Al-Hajj 2013). 
Charbel Nahas declared at the conference that “the GULW’s leadership are little 
more than agents of big business” and that “their role is tantamount to keeping a lid 
on the labour movement and signing off one concession after another” (Al-Hajj 2013). 
Ghassan Sleibe pointed out that the great majority of trade unionists in the GULW 
are linked to the sectarian political parties who pay their wages, adding that “these 
officials, in most cases, do not even belong to the sector they represent, thus 
severely limiting their ability to represent the rank and file” (Al-Hajj 2013). This 
growing opposition has also manifested in demonstrations held on May Day in 2012 
and 2013 in front of the GULW’s headquarters, in protest against the federation’s 
policies. The slogan “The People Want to Overthrow the Confederation,” has been 
written several times on the walls of its headquarters, while graffiti campaigns by 
young activists on the streets of Beirut were organized for May Day in 2012 to 
express their rejection of the institution, which they see as a "traitor that does not 
represent the interests of workers, but those of the government" (Al-Kantar 2013).  
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
Historically, the Lebanese labour movement has played a prominent role in 
encouraging cross-sectarian mobilisations in support of worker and other social 
struggles. This record extends back to the period of the Civil War – when the GULW 
organised demonstrations and strikes across the various areas of Beirut – and 
continued through the mobilisations against the neoliberal policies of Hariri and 
subsequent governments, whether led by March 8 or March 14 forces. These 
struggles have been viewed by all sections of Lebanon’s elite as presenting a 
potentially serious challenge to the status quo, including the sectarian division of the 
political system. In response to the challenge posed by the labour movement, 
Lebanese governments have attempted to undermine the GULW through 
establishing rival sectarian-linked federations and trade unions as well as direct 
intervention in the affairs of the GUWL itself. By the early 2000s, this process proved 
relatively successful. 
 
Hezbollah, along with other political forces supported by the Syrian regime, has 
participated in this weakening of the labour movement. The party has formed 
separate, Shi’a-based federations and trade unions in agriculture, transport, 
construction, printing, press, health sector, cooperatives and electricity. This 
proliferation of federations and trade unions has enabled it to win significant power in 
the GULW, in which the majority of leadership seats are controlled by Amal and 
Hezbollah. Today, the GULW is unable and unwilling to mobilise workers despite the 
intensification of neoliberal policies over the recent period. As many of the interviews 
conducted for this thesis indicated, the GULW has instead become a vehicle for the 
political agenda of Hezbollah, Amal and the other smaller Syrian-allied parties (Bou 
Habib 2012; Dirani 2012; Gharib 2012; Sleibe 2012). 
 
This shift in the composition of the GULW leadership has created a transformation in 
the discourse of the Lebanese labour movement – away from an orientation based 
on cross-sectarian mobilisation, towards one that identifies sectarian goals as 
paramount and projects a unanimity of interests of different class fractions within 
sectarian communities. In this sense, Hezbollah (and likewise Amal’s) hegemonic 
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influence in the official structures of the labour movement corresponds to the 
changing class composition of the Shi’a community as a whole, and the palignment 
with the elites of the Sh’ia community. Concurrently, Hezbollah has utilised the same 
hegemonic apparatus identified in the previous chapter in an attempt to maintain its 
influence within the Shi’a population.  
 
This record, in regards to social and workers struggles, appears to confirm the basic 
argument of this thesis: the party’s interests are more aligned with those of the elites 
of the Shi’a community rather than workers or poorer populations. It is apparent that 
Hezbollah, much like the other political parties in Lebanon, acts in practice to prevent 
the emergence of a cross sectarian popular movement in Lebanon, which could raise 
deeper social and economic issues. The potential emergence of such a class 
dynamic could challenge the sectarian system and the position of the dominant 
political parties, including that of Hezbollah.  
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Chapter 7: Hezbollah’s Military Apparatus  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the main aspects of the SA and the ISA of Hezbollah but did not 
tackle a major aspect of the party: its military and security apparatus. The most well 
known use of this apparatus has been its use in fighting the Israeli occupation and 
responding to Israeli military attacks.  This armed resistance has brought much 
popularity to the party in Lebanon and the region, especially after the Israeli 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and again after the 2006 war with Israel. 
Hezbollah continues to justify its weaponry by the need to liberate the tiny Lebanese 
territory of the Shebaa farms, still occupied by Israel, to protect Lebanon as a whole 
against Israel, and what it describes as ongoing external threats in the wake of the 
regional upheaval that started in 2011.  
 
But Hezbollah’s military capacities have not been used solely against Israel. 
Throughout its history, the organisation has also directed armed violence against 
rival political parties. This was particularly the case during the Lebanese Civil War, 
when Hezbollah sought to develop its control over Shi’a populated areas and to act 
as the main power instead of the state. More recently, such as in 2008, Hezbollah’s 
arms have been directed again at other Lebanese political actors.  
 
This chapter presents an overview of Hezbollah’s military organisation and armed 
apparatus as a core feature of its repressive SA. The chapter begins by discussing 
the structure of Hezbollah’s armed apparatus, focusing in particular on three main 
bodies: the Islamic Resistance, the Security Organ Unit, and the External Security 
Apparatus. The chapter then examines how this apparatus has developed in line with 
the resistance component of Hezbollah’s worldview, particularly the confrontation 
with Israel. The third part of the chapter then turns to Hezbollah’s use of its weapons 
against internal political rivalries, focusing in particular on the May 2008 events in 
Beirut. The final section looks at Hezbollah’s recent involvement in Syria, and the 
ways this has acted to accentuate sectarianism within Lebanon itself. 
 
Through this narrative, the chapter demonstrates that the role of Hezbollah’s 
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repressive SA is essentially one of coercion in order to guarantee by force (physical 
or otherwise) political conditions that are suitable for the reproduction of the relations 
of production, which are ultimately relations of exploitation. The SA also allows by its 
repression, which can range from physical force to simple administrative orders and 
prohibitions, the political conditions for the exercise and the activity of the ISA 
(Althusser 1976). In this manner, it forms an essential component of the coercive 
aspect to Hezbollah’s hegemony in Lebanese society. 
 
7.2 Hezbollah Military Apparatus and Organisation 
 
Hezbollah’s military apparatus is governed by the Jihad Council (JC) (al-Majlis al-
Jihâdî), which, according to various sources (Daher 2014:195; Blanford 2011:101), is 
presided over by Hassan Nasrallah. The Jihad Council is under the authority of the 
Majlis Shura al-Qarâr, which as Chapter 5 noted, wields all decision-making power 
and directs several subordinate functional councils. The Majlis Shura al-Qarâr views 
all elements of the group's activities, including its political and military wings, as part 
of one holistic entity (Qassem 2008:91). According to Hezbollah’s top officials, this 
unity of purpose among the group’s diverse activities is essential to its success. 
Qassem told a Lebanese newspaper in 2000 that  “If the military wing were 
separated from the political wing, this would have repercussions, and it would reflect 
on the political scene”, adding that “Hezbollah’s Secretary General is the head of the 
Shura Council and also the head of the Jihad Council, and this means that we have 
one leadership, with one administration” (cited in Levitt 2013). 
 
The Jihad Council nevertheless enjoys a strategic ambiguity according to American 
researcher Mattew Levitt. Levitt argues that neither the majority of Hezbollah officials 
nor the party's elected parliamentarians are aware of the details of their party's covert 
military activities, which are decided on by the most senior leadership of the party 
and of the Jihad Council (Levitt 2013). 
 
The JC runs three different units called the Islamic Resistance, the Security Organ 
and the External Security Apparatus (ESA). 
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a) Islamic Resistance  
 
The Islamic Resistance’s historic role since its establishement has been the military 
confrontation with Israel. As was noted in Chapter 2, 1,500 Pasdaran established the 
Islamic Resistance in the summer of 1982, setting up training camps in the Syrian 
city of Zabadani and in the western Bekaa district (with Syria’s authorisation) (Norton 
1987:19). At this time, Abbas Al-Mussawi encouraged his students and followers to 
undergo military training in the camps located in the West Bekaa. According to Subhi 
Tufayli, more than 1,000 youths were trained during the summer of 1982, and 
clandestine groups were constituted and sent to the South where the first military 
operations of the party were launched against Israeli’s occupation (cited in Daher 
2014:80).  
 
Today, the exact number of Hezbollah soldiers is difficult to estimate, but is believed 
to range from 5,000 (Daher 2014:295) to 7,500 full time soldiers with some 20,000 
reservists (Nakhoul 2013). Hezbollah recruits usually follow a specific course of 
military training, which generally takes places in Iran in the various training camps 
run by the Qods Force of the IRGC and sometimes in Syria. Recruits into Hezbollah’s 
Special Forces unit, the most elite element in the military organisation of the party, go 
through an intensive three month course divided into two forty-five day programmes 
with a five day break in between. The Special Forces cadres are full time soldiers 
who train continuously, while most Hezbollah combatants are part timers with daily 
jobs or college students (Blanford 2011:120-121).    
  
While receiving formal orders from the leadership, the military apparatus of the 
Islamic movement is very autonomous in their implementation. To this end, 
Hezbollah has purposely reduced intermediaries between the top military leadership 
and local commanders on the ground (Berti and Gleis 2012:64-65). Naim Qassem 
(2008:98-100) has stated that once the green light for a military operation is given, 
the small command involved in its planning, execution and tactics handles all the 
decision-making.202 In this manner, Hezbollah’s command structure is less pyramid-
                                                            
202 For example, in an interview with the Lebanese Newspaper al-Akhbar, Hassan Nasrallah declared that the 
decision to capture the Israeli soldiers had been taken in Hezbollah’s Shura Council months before the operation 
in July 2006 (Al-Amin, Ileik, Qanso, Zarakat 2014). 
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like and more horizontal in nature (Berti and Gleis 2012:65). Timur Goksel, the 
former spokesman of the United Nations monitoring force in South Lebanon, has 
confirmed this – noting that Hezbollah fighters “don't work in military hierarchies or 
military command levels. There is one leader in Beirut and all the other units in the 
field are autonomous, they know what they are doing [by themselves]. They don't 
need communications, they don't report everything, they don't ask for orders, they 
know what they are doing” (cited in Asia Times 2006). 
 
b) Security Organ Unit 
 
The Security Organ Unit is responsible for the security of the members of Hezbollah 
and its arms in Lebanon, notably through the surveillance of alleged collaborators 
(Daher 2014:195, Blanford 2011:428-432). It is in charge of Hezbollah’s four 
territorial commands covering the south, Dahyeh, the Bekaa Valley and the 
Mediterranean coastline (Blanford 2011:346).  In these regions, the Security Organ 
monitors the entry and activities of visitors, including journalists and photographers. 
As a result, there have been many cases of foreigners who have been stopped, 
questioned and occasionally followed by this unit (Blanford 2011:428-432).  
 
The Security Organ Unit has been quite effective in the protection of Hezbollah 
members since the establishment of the Islamic movement. This was particularly 
visible during the 2006 war: not a single high-ranking cadre of Hezbollah was killed 
during the 33 days of war despite numerous attempts by the Israeli army, including 
the dropping of 22 tons of bombs on a bunker in Beirut allegedly used by senior 
members of Hezbollah (Democracy Now 2006). The Israeli army also failed twice to 
kidnap the Sheikh Muhammad Yazbeck in the city of Baalbek and its surroundings. 
Both times the Israeli elite commandos had erroneous information on the location of 
the Sheikh Yazbeck (Daher 2007:45). 
 
The Security Organ Unit, with the cooperation of the ICRG, was recently responsible 
for the discovery of the most significant security breach in the party’s history – a 
Mossad agent located in the leadership of Hezbollah Unit 910 (a unit that coordinates 
the group's foreign operations, see below). This double-agent, Muhammed 
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Shawraba, worked along with four other members of a Mossad team (Janoubia 
2014). The Hezbollah security apparatus has detained and interrogated Muhammed 
Shawraba and his four colleagues since November 2014, after placing them under 
surveillance for six to seven months. Shawraba was tried for treason after he tipped 
off Israel about five operations to avenge the killing of Hezbollah’s top military 
commander Imad Mughniyah, which led to their failure (The Daily Star 2014d). He 
allegedly also passed information to Israeli secret services that led to the 2008 
assassination of high-ranking Hezbollah official Imad Mughniyah and the 2013 killing 
of Hassan Al-Laqqi (Middle East Eye 2014).203  This was not the first time that spies 
had penetrated the ranks of the party. In 2011, Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hasan 
Nasrallah acknowledged that at least two Hezbollah members had confessed to 
working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (The Daily Star 2014d). 
 
The Security Organ Unit, despite its efficiency, has nevertheless not prevented the 
assassination of seven Hezbollah commanders by Israeli armed forces. The first was 
Sheikh Ragheb Harb, one of the founding fathers of Hezbollah, who was gunned 
down in the Nabatieh town of Jibchit in southern Lebanon in 1984 (The Daily Star 
2013a).  The last one was in December 2013: Hajj Hassan Al-Laqqis, who was 
according to Lebanese journalist Radwan Murtada the “head of Hezbollah’s air 
defence division, and one of the resistance’s most important 'electronic minds'” 
(Murtada 2013), and was killed outside his home in the southern suburbs of Beirut.  
 
In addition to these functions directed against external threats, the Security Organ 
Unit is an important part of the repressive apparatus of Hezbollah within Lebanon 
itself, and has frequently been compared to a ‘quasi-state apparatus’ in the regions 
under Hezbollah’s domination. This has been illustrated on numerous occastions 
where the Security Organ Unit has overruled the authority of Lebanese government 
institutions. In September 2010, for example, SUVs with tinted windows and no 
license plates, belonging to Hezbollah, entered the grounds of Lebanon's 
International airport to provide security to the former head of the General Security in 
                                                            
203 He is also said to have revealed Hezbollah members to the Israelis that led to the arrest of Muhammad 
Amadar in Peru this year and Hossam Yaacoub in Cyprus last year, as well as Daoud Farhat and Youssef Ayad – 
detained in April 2014 in Bangkok for allegedly planning attacks against tourists in Thailand (Middle East Eye 
2014). 
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Lebanon, retired General Jamil Al-Sayyid (Khaddaj 2010b).204 He was greeted by 
Hezbollah’s MPs and allies in the VIP lounge of the airport, in an attempt to prevent 
his arrest by security services. The Lebanese judiciary had earlier issued a 
memorandum to the Central Criminal Investigations Department to bring Al-Sayyid in 
for questioning as a defendant for the offence of threatening the Prime Minister of 
Lebanon Saad Hariri.205 Hezbollah, however, called on the judiciary to revoke the 
decision (Lynch 2010 and Khaddaj 2010b). Against the accusations of "violation of a 
public facility" and undermining the “authority of the state” following the airport 
incident, Hezbollah MP Nawaf Al-Mussawi responded that  "the authority of the state 
is already violated," and added that "what happened, will happen every time we want 
it to happen" (cited in Khaddaj 2010b).  
 
Hezbollah has further demonstrated its quasi state capacities through displaying its 
own security forces in Dahyeh and some other Shi’a populated regions in spring 
2013 after they were the target of several planned explosions and attacks from 
jihadist groups. These groups justified their attacks as an act of retaliation for 
Hezbollah's involvement in Syria.206 In response, Hezbollah’s soldiers implemented 
tight security measures and put up multiple check-points throughout Shi’a populated 
areas. Although these checkpoints were later taken over by Lebanese soldiers, 
Hezbollah continued to deploy security units and also deepened its coordination with 
the army. 207  Through 2014, particularly around the Ashura religious events, 
Hezbollah again utilised its own security units to patrol and police Shi’a areas – 
further confirming its ability to take the place of the state in regions under its 
control.208 Indeed, regions under Hezbollah’s influence were left out of the 2015 
                                                            
204 Al-Sayyid, was the director-general of Lebanon's General Security between 1998 and 2005. He was then 
imprisoned on suspicion of involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 
then later released due to lack of evidence. 
205 On September 12 2010, Al-Sayyid said in a statement that Prime Minister Saad Hariri “should take a lie 
detector test to prove he did not support or fund false witnesses in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon” (Lynch 
2010). 
206 For example the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a Jihadist group linked to al-Qaida, claimed responsibility for the 
attack against the Iranian Cultural Center in February 2014 in a posting on Twitter and said it would “continue to 
target Iran and its party in Lebanon” until Hezbollah forces are pulled out of Syria (Abu-Nasr and Shahine 
2014). 
207 The head of army intelligence in South Lebanon, General Ali Shahrour, organised a meeting with security 
officials in Hezbollah and Amal in the region to coordinate security measures for the Ashura’s commemoration 
in November 2013 (Khalil 2013). 
208 Dahyeh was nearly completely closed from the 1st to the 4th of November 2014 according to local residents, 
while in the cities of Hermel and Baalbek municipalities, controlled by Hezbollah, published statements asking 
their “Syrian brothers to stay in their homes and to not go out from Monday 3rd of November until the evening of 
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security plan of the Lebanese Interior Ministry, with the Minister stating that Dahyeh, 
South Lebanon and Bekaa, were part of Hezbollah’s defensive framework and 
therefore no deployment of state security forces would take place (Orient le Jour 
2015). 
 
c) External Security Apparatus (ESA) 
 
Finally there is the External Security Apparatus (ESA), which is the unit in charge of 
operations conducted by Hezbollah outside of Lebanon.209 The ESA was reportedly 
led by Imad Mughniyah until his assassination in February 2008 in Damascus. His 
successor is his brother in law Mustapha Bader El-Din, who has filled a series of 
military and security positions in the organisation (Terror Control 2014).  
 
The best-known part of the ESA is Unit 1800, which is responsible for conducting 
operations in Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories (POT). Unit 1800 
establishes contact and coordinates with Palestinian groups including Islamic Jihad, 
Hamas and others, in military operations against Israeli targets (Berti and Gleis 
2012:65). The unit provides military training, expertise, and funding to Palestinian 
groups and has also recruited Palestinians to conduct operations directly under its 
control (Berti and Gleis 2012:65). The unit also supervises the creation of cells and 
networks in the POT and within Israel, trains Palestinians at camps in the Bekaa 
Valley, or sends them to Iran for advanced training (Blanford 2011:357). 
 
Through this Unit, Hezbollah has reportedly assisted some Palestinian armed 
factions during the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000-2005), despite the fact that it 
prevented the launching of any military operation from Lebanon against Israel by 
anyone other than Hezbollah and its allies.210 The Islamic movement also helped with 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the day after (Orient le Jour 2014e). 
209 The ESA is also known as the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO) (Levitt 2013). 
210 The only exception was the operation led by two members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organisation in 
March 2002, and assisted according to journalist N. Blanford (2011:310) by Hezbollah, which crossed the border 
from Lebanon to Israel and killed 5 Israelis.  The actual attack was actually filmed from the Hezbollah post and 
broadcasted live on al-Manar TV (Blanford 2009). The IDF killed the two men, but decided to not retaliate 
against Lebanon. Otherwise, Hezbollah did not hesitate to chase and participate in the arrests by the Lebanese 
authority of members of small Palestinian factions from Lebanese refugee camps that fired several Katioucha 
rockets from South Lebanon in March and April 2002 (Harik 2004:189; Blanford 2011:313). Even today 
Hezbollah today controls the South and especially the areas close to the border and tries to prevent any action 
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the smuggling of arms and ammunition to the Gaza Strip by sea directly, or through 
tunnels dug under the Gaza-Egypt border. Technical data was also allegedly 
transferred to some Palestinian armed factions for bomb building techniques or 
rocket design (Blanford 2011:351).  
 
Unit 1800 has also been involved in the countries surrounding Israel: Jordan and 
Egypt. In Egypt, a Hezbollah cell was discovered by the Egyptian security services.  
Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad Mansur, who served as an Egypt-based leader of a 
Hezbollah cell, and along with a number of his fellow operatives was arrested for 
planning to carry out terrorist operations against Israeli and other tourists in Egypt. In 
November 2009, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah publicly 
acknowledged that Mansur was a Hezbollah member involved in transporting arms 
and equipment to Palestinian militants.  In April 2010, an Egyptian court sentenced 
Mansur to 15 years for his involvement in the cell, which was subordinate to 
Hezbollah’s Unit 1800. Muhammad Qabalan was the Lebanon-based leader of Unit 
1800, and Mansur’s superior, coordinating the Egyptian cell’s activities from 
Lebanon. For his involvement, he was sentenced in absentia by the Egyptian court, 
to life imprisonment (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2013). In late January 2011 
during the beginning of the Egyptian revolutionary process, the imprisoned members 
of the Hezbollah cell escaped and Mansur returned to Lebanon.  In February 2011, 
Mansur appeared on Lebanese television with Hezbollah officials at a Hezbollah rally 
in Beirut (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2013).    
 
Following the American and British military led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Hezbollah 
also established the Unit 3800, formerly known as Unit 2800, to support the training 
and operations of the Mahdi Army and other Shia political groups under the guidance 
of IRGC (Orléans 2014). These groups were mostly involved in combatting Western 
occupation forces and Iraqi Sunni-sectarian groups, but attacked Iraqi Sunni civilians 
as well (Blanford 2011:357; Deghanpisheh 2014b). Unit 3800 drew on expertise from 
Hezbollah’s Unit 1800. According to a 2010 Pentagon report, Unit 3800 provided 
these Iraqi Shia sectarian militias with "the training, tactics and technology to conduct 
kidnappings [and] small unit tactical operations," and to "employ sophisticated 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
that is not under its domination. 
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improvise explosive devices (IEDs)” (cited on Orléans 2014). The individual in charge 
of Hezbollah's Iraq activities and relations with Iraqi political movements is the 
Lebanese cleric Muhammad Kawtharani, who is a member of Hezbollah's Political 
Council and was a former protégé of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr (Rayburn 
2014:18).211 According to some sources, Hezbollah’s Unit 3800 commander Khalil 
Harb has also been spotted in Yemen in 2012 training Houthi rebels in Yemen and 
has been accused of facilitating the movement of large amounts of currency to them 
(Orléans 2014).  
 
7.3 Hezbollah and Armed Resistance 
 
As is clear from the above account, the formation and development of these parts of 
Hezbollah’s armed apparatus have been closely connected to the organisation’s 
resistance activities, particularly against Israel. The 1989 Ta’if Agreement legitimized 
Hezbollah’s military wing as a resistance actor against Israel, and the organisation 
was not required to disarm, unlike all other factions. Hezbollah’s attacks against 
Israel steadily increased following the Ta’if agreement reaching 644 operations 
against the Israeli armed forces and South Lebanese Army (SLA) in 1994 and 908 in 
1995 (Blanford 2011:145).  
 
In September 1997, a week after the death of Hadi Nasrallah (the 18 year old eldest 
son of the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah alongside two other Hezbollah soldiers 
in a clash with the Israeli army), the Islamic movement announced that Hezbollah 
was forming a new resistance unit, the Sarâya al-Muqâwama al-Lubnâniyya or 
Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB). The LRB were open to all volunteers 
regardless of their religious sect (Blanford 2011:197). This new unit would be trained 
and guided by Hezbollah cadres. The Saraya launched their first attack against SLA 
outposts six months after their establishment (Blanford 2011:212).212  
                                                            
211 Kawtharani was also the one to help secure the release from Iraqi custody of Hezbollah operative Ali Musa 
Daqduq, a senior Hezbollah commander who worked closely with one of the Iraqi Shi’a armed groups called 
“Asâ`ib Ahl al-Haq ”  and was responsible for numerous attacks against Coalition Force in Iraq (Blanford 2014a; 
Orléans 2014). 
212 The LRB were also re-established in 2006, after having been disbanded following the liberation of the South 
of Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000, to serve different purposes such as including non Shi’a partisans in 
Hezbollah’s “reservist resistance” to strengthen the impression of a national resistance rather than a uniquely 
Shi’a force and to train Hezbollah’s political allies (Blanford 2011:436). The LRB nevertheless were not 
expected to play a role in any new military confrontation against Israel and would rather “look after the refugees 
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In the few months prior to the liberation of the South, Hezbollah was launching as 
many as 300 attacks against Israeli forces per month (Daher 2014:138-141). The 
ratio between the losses of Hezbollah and Israel had also declined considerably from 
the beginning of the 1990s, from ten to one, to nearly one to one at the end of 1990s 
(Daher 2014:132).  
 
The South of Lebanon was finally freed from Israeli occupation in May 2000, 
following the withdrawal of the Israeli army. The number of Lebanese civilians dead 
in the numerous attacks by the Israeli forces and the SLA between the years 1982 
and 2000 was around 23,500, in addition to 46,880 injured. Hezbollah, on its side, 
lost 1,276 fighters (Blanford 2011:281). During the same period, the Israeli army 
suffered the loss of 1,580 men, while 6,485 others were injured, and the SLA's total 
was 824 dead and 1,439 injured (Daher 2014:144).  
 
Following the liberation of the South and the withdrawal of Israeli troops in May 2000 
(excluding anti-aircraft firing along the border) the Shebaa Farms became the 
exclusive site of official Hezbollah activity. Hezbollah's military actions nevertheless 
took on a mostly defensive nature following the withdrawal of the Israeli army. 
Hezbollah’s leadership had instructed its cadres in the South to automatically 
retaliate to breaches of the Blue Line, whether by ground, air or sea, including 
assassinations (Blanford 2011:281-283).     
 
This largely passive role was to change, however, following Israeli’s July 2006 
invasion of the country. During the invasion, Hezbollah reported as many as 250 of 
its fighters were killed (Israel claimed 530). On its side, the Israeli army lost 120 
soldiers and more than 40 civilians were killed, while between 300,000 and 500,000 
persons from the North of Israel evacuated to the South during the Israeli war on 
Lebanon because of Hezbollah’s rockets (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
2006). The war itself reinforced the popularity of Hezbollah as a resistance actor 
particularly in the southern areas of the country that are heavily populated by Shi’a. 
These areas suffered the most from Israeli attacks, invasions and occupation, and 
Hezbollah’s resistance enabled it to widen its social base in the Shi’a population even 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
from the South” according to a Hezbollah soldier (cited in Blanford 2011:439).    
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among those that did not adhere to its religious perspective. In a survey taken about 
10 days after the Israeli war against Lebanon in 2006, more than 85 percent of 
Lebanese citizens supported Hezbollah’s resistance (cited in Daher 2014:432). 
 
One month after the end of the War, on September 22, Hezbollah celebrated “Al-
Nasr al-ilâhi” (The Divine Victory) in the middle of Dahyeh and which gathered 
hundreds of thousands of people. Hassan Nasrallah declared that it was a strategic, 
historic and divine victory that had left Israel’s image in tatters: “We have done away 
with the invincible army. We have also [done] away with the invincible state”. He also 
added that Hezbollah’s resistance and steadfastness dealt a severe blow to the New 
Middle East plan, and that the party had more than 20,000 rockets (Al-Ahed News 
2006). The slogan Al-Nasr al-îlâhi” was later on reformulated in “Nasr(un) min Allâh” 
(A Victory from God) in the party’s propaganda in order to instrumentalize this slogan 
with the family name of Hassan Nasrallah as part of the leader’s image in the 
campaigns of communications of Hezbollah. 
 
Following the 2006 War, the Israel-Lebanon border witnessed only a few security 
incidents, most of which occurred between 2013 and 2014, after the outbreak of the 
Syrian uprising. Hezbollah retaliated militarily to the multiple Israeli incursions in 
Lebanon. The Islamic movement was attempting to convey a clear message to 
Israel: despite its involvement in Syria and elsewhere, as we will see later in text, it 
was ready to answer any kind of aggression by the Israeli military. According to the 
Lebanese journalist Ali Hashem, Hezbollah’s main concern was to enhance the 
deterrence against Israel, especially the southern border, and that “Israel should not 
try to take advantage of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria to try to impose new rules 
of the game” (Hashem 2014). 
 
Hassan Nasrallah’s speech for Ashura in November 2014 confirmed this situation by 
declaring that Israel should fear Hezbollah‘s rockets in the future because “they could 
reach every part of the Land of Occupied Palestine” (As-Safir 2014). He added that 
Hezbollah was never distracted from guarding Lebanon’s southern border, contrary 
to Lebanese and Arab media claims that the Syrian conflict had exhausted the 
party’s capabilities (As-Safir 2014; Khraiche 2014). 
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7.4 The Arms of the Resistance Against Rival Lebanese Actors 
 
The successes of Hezbollah on the military field against Israel should nevertheless 
not be interpreted as implying that its arms were directed solely toward the “Zionist 
enemy”. Despite the fact that Hezbollah’s official historiography claims that the party 
adopted a defensive attitude towards other political movements during the Civil War, 
and its armed activities were solely concentrated on resistance to the Israeli 
occupation, the historical record indicates that Hezbollah has been willing to use its 
weapons against political opponents, including those on the left and other secular 
forces.213  
 
In September 1982, the LNRF (see Chapter 2), was the target of a wave of 
assassinations, particularly of its communist leaders in West Beirut. Despite the fact 
that the LNRF was formed to fight the Israeli occupation, Hezbollah criticized it for its 
secularism, which was called a product of “Maronite pluralism”, and because it did 
not call for an Islamic alternative to gain Lebanese independence from both the 
western and eastern spheres of influence (Charara 2007:347). Those assassinated 
included Khalil Naouss (journalist killed February 20, 1986) Suhail Tawile (February 
24, 1986), Hussein Mroue (February 17, 1987), Mehdi Amel (May 18, 1987) Selim 
Yammout, and Professor Hikmat Al-Amin and others in a car bomb against the 
headquarters of the LCP in Rmeileh (Nassif Debs 2006; Nash 2008; Hajj Georgiou 
2012). These assassinations helped create a climate of fear among LCP members in 
regions populated mostly by Shi’a, and to a lesser extent among SSNP members 
(Charara 2007:350-356).  
 
Moreover, in November 1983, Hezbollah – with active Iranian IRGC assistance – on 
numerous occasions attacked the Lebanese state’s remaining presence in the Bekaa 
Valley, taking control of the Sheikh Abdallah barracks, which were the largest and 
best equipped. It actually became the headquarters of the Pasdaran (Chehabi 
2006:221). The Sheikh Abdallah barracks were given back to the army in August 
                                                            
213 Muhammad Raad, current head of the Hezbollah Deputy bloc in parliament: “We note that the resistance 
(Hezbollah) tried to affirm since the beginning its national character, of which the target was the Israeli 
occupation and not other Lebanese” (cited in Charara and Dromont 2004:120). The Lebanese author Walid 
Charara, who is considered close to Hezbollah, argued that “Hezbollah’s attitudes regarding different 
protagonists in the Civil War depended mainly on their stand towards Israel” (cited in Charara and Dromont 
2004:120). 
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1992 (Daher 2014:128). Hezbollah also had numerous violent military conflicts with 
Amal throughout the middle and end of the 1980s. The most serious battle was in 
1988 when both groups sought to establish their dominance in the southern suburbs 
of Beirut and in South Lebanon. The struggle ended with two negotiated settlements 
under the auspices of Iran and Syria in February 1989, in which Amal was excluded 
from the Bekaa and the suburbs of Beirut and the South was divided (Daher 
2014:108-109). The military fights between Amal and Hezbollah in 1988 and 1989 
caused 3,000 deaths, both civilian and fighters (International Center for Transitional 
Justice 2013). The reconciliation in 1990 allowed a refocus towards Hezbollah’s 
military resistance in the South, which was undermined considerably by the military 
confrontation with Amal.  
 
a) The May 2008 conflict  
 
In May 2008, for the first time since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah 
used its weaponry against Lebanese national actors following threats by the March 
14 alliance to politically attack key Hezbollah military interests. At that time, the 
Lebanese government, led by Siniora, passed two decrees aimed at weakening 
Hezbollah’s military apparatus: first, on May 6 2008, the government reassigned the 
head of security at Beirut’s airport, Wafiq Shuqayr, a general officer who was 
accused of being too close to Hezbollah and of having shared intelligence 
information with them.214 Secondly the council of ministers challenged the legality and 
constitutionality of Hezbollah’s independent telephone system, which the 
organisation claimed ensured the secrecy of internal communications and the 
efficiency of its command and control (ICG 2008:3). The telephone system was 
believed to have been a cornerstone of Hezbollah’s military performance during the 
July 2006 war with Israel.215 Hezbollah’s telecommunication network, which existed 
since 1995, was never raised when Hezbollah was allied with the March 14 
movement. This last decision was taken despite the fact that Hezbollah’s Deputy 
Secretary Naim Qassem had warned on May 5 that Hezbollah would deal with those 
                                                            
214 In particular, Shuqayr was accused of allowing Hezbollah to operate a system of listening devices and 
cameras it had set up to monitor runway 17, from where officials fly out and where they land. This directly 
affected the movement’s control over a strategic location that is vital to the flow of people and probably to 
various types of trafficking (ICG 2008:3). 
215 The Winograd report in Israel highlighted the need to eliminate Hezbollah’s command and control system in 
which telecommunication played a decisive role (ICG 2008:3). 
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who interfere with the network as if they were Israeli spies (cited in Blanford 2008b). 
Hassan Nasrallah promptly answered these decisions, describing them as a 
“declaration of war against the resistance and its weapons for the benefit of America 
and Israel” and added that “we will cut the hand that targets the weapons of the 
resistance” and “we will defend our weapons with our weapons” (Ladki 2008).  
 
These decrees were taken in an atmosphere of heightened social tension, as was 
discussed earlier in the text. Despite the fact that there was an on-going general 
strike at the time, which Hezbollah officially supported, the organisation did not put its 
efforts behind the labour movement but instead launched a military offensive to 
repeal the decrees. On May 7, West Beirut was taken over by Hezbollah and its allies 
in a deliberate and well-planned operation. Hezbollah, with far superior equipment, 
training and discipline overwhelmed their rivals, the militias from the Future 
Movement, taking control of West Beirut in less than twelve hours. The Future 
Movement was forced to shut down its main media offices, which were looted or set 
ablaze. The various militant groups, including Hezbollah, were accused of having 
attacked civilians, destroying cars and shops and proffering anti-Sunni insults (ICG 
2008:2). 
 
Each position taken by Hezbollah on the Future Movement was directly handed over 
to the army, demonstrating once more the collaboration and coordination established 
in the previous years between the two actors. Moreover the conflict was not confined 
to Beirut, intense fighting occurred in the Druze areas of Mount Lebanon between 
Jumblatt loyalists on the one hand and Hezbollah militants or allied forces on the 
other (ICG 2008:7). In Tripoli, pitched battles opposed inhabitants of Bab El-
Tebbane, a Future Movement dominated Sunni neighbourhood, and inhabitants of 
Baal Mohsen, populated mainly by Alawite who are close to a Hezbollah-led coalition 
of political parties gathered in the March 8 forces (ICG 2008:7).  
 
The violence ended a week later with over 80 deaths and 250 wounded (Baliani 
2008). Hezbollah had attained its objectives: the government cancelled its two 
decrees of May 6 and 7. Politically, the events led to the end of two years of paralysis 
on the Lebanese political scene with the Doha agreement. The agreement between 
the various Lebanese political forces led to the election of new President General 
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Michel Sleiman, the establishment of a national unity government, adopting the caza 
(smaller constituencies known as administrative units) as an electoral constituency in 
conformity with the 1960 law, whereby the cazas of Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Baalbek-
Hermel and West Bekaa-Rachaya each remain as a single electoral constituency 
(Now Media 2008). The adoption of the electoral law based on the cazas actually 
ensured better Christian representation and was one of the main demands of 
Hezbollah’s Christian ally the FPM.  
 
Hezbollah’s representatives continued to justify its military action in Beirut against the 
March 14 led movement. Hussein Al-Khalil, the political advisor of Hassan Nasrallah, 
declared in a press conference that Hezbollah’s intervention was made in order to 
defend itself from the decision of the government, which was an American plan to 
disarm the resistance and submit it to Israel’s will (Press TV 2008).  In addition to 
this, Hezbollah member Ghaleb Abou Zeinab (2008) added that Hezbollah’s military 
intervention did put an end to the Sunni Shi’a Fitna by avoiding any outburst.  The 
Secretary General Nasrallah reiterated a similar discourse a few months later in an 
iftar in Nabatieh (Al-Ahed News 2008) and even in May 2012 (Al-Manar 2012b). But 
contrary to Hezbollah’s claims, these events clearly intensified Sunni-Shi’a tensions. 
The most prominent Sunni religious authority, the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, 
actually characterised Hezbollah as an occupying force, a clear reference to Israel’s 
earlier occupation (ICG 2008:2).  
 
Following May 2008, Hezbollah has continued to declare publicly that any actor 
threatening its armament and its soldiers would face the attacks of Hezbollah. In 
2010, Hassan Nasrallah and other Hezbollah members216 declared that the Islamic 
movement would “cut off the hand” of anyone who tries to arrest any of its members 
charged in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) (Al-Ahed News 2010).217 On January 18 2011, in another 
show of strength of the Islamic movement to impose its decisions, Hezbollah 
deployed unarmed militants in Beirut’s streets as an attempt to warn March 14 
                                                            
216 The Hezbollah Deputy Nawaf Mussawi declared on a similar note that he warned "conspirators” that “any 
hand that will try to attack the resistance will be cut or paralyzed” (Orient Le Jour 2010). 
217 In 2007, a Lebanese investigator, Wissam Eid, discovered evidence linking some ranking members of 
Hezbollah to the phones that were used by the team that carried out the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Eid was 
killed several months later by a car bomb near his office. The indictments are widely believed to hinge on his 
work. 
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political forces of renominating Saad Hariri as Prime Minister. This was after 
Hezbollah and its allies of the March 8 forces toppled him on January 12 (Choufi 
2013; ICG 2014:17). This show of force, called in Lebanon the “incident of the black 
shirts”, because Hezbollah members were dressed in black, led Walid Jumblatt, 
leader of the PSP, to temporarily abandon his alliance with Hariri’s Future Movement 
and join March 8 forces in electing Najib Miqati, who was Hezbollah’s candidate, as 
new Prime Minister (Choufi 2013; Mouqaled 2013).  
 
These and other examples confirm Hezbollah’s on-going deployment of its weapons 
in internal Lebanese politics. Simultaneously, the evolution of Hezbollah from an anti-
systemic party opposing the Lebanese state and promising the liberation of Palestine 
from the “Zionist enemy”, has been increasingly replaced by a more moderate 
propaganda arguing that its weaponry was solely to protect Lebanon and not for 
external purposes. In 2008, Dr Ali Fayyad, at the time head of the CCSD, said in 
regard to Palestine that “We (Hezbollah) support the Liberation of Palestine, but we 
do no want to take their place to free their lands. Hezbollah is firstly a Liberation 
national movement against the threats and the violence of Israel and to free the 
Lebanese territories and prisonners” (Fayyad 2008). Ghaleb Abou Zeinab said the 
same in affirming that “Our arms are for the liberation of Lebanese lands and the 
defence of the state and not for Palestine” (Abou Zeinab 2008). 
 
This changed discourse – away from a resistance focus towards a pro-Lebanese 
state orientation – was especially strengthened since the beginning of the uprisings 
in Syria and Hezbollah’s increasing military involvement in the conflict. Hezbollah 
Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged this evolution in a 
meeting in the beginning of 2013 with his cadres in a private gathering declaring that 
the party “had changed” and that the group's ultimate priority is to “protect Lebanon” 
(Al-Akhbar English 2013a). He continued by saying that  
 
“Hezbollah has changed and its priorities have changed based 
on circumstances… There was a time when we used to see 
Lebanon as a colonial construct that was part of the 
Ummah…That was in our early days, and the country was 
going through a Civil War. All parties were calling for a Nation 
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that fit their liking…. Today conditions have changed. We 
believe that this country is our country, and that the flag of the 
cedar is our flag that we need to protect, too. At this stage, our 
priority is to protect the state in Lebanon and to build it”. (Al-
Akhbar English 2013a)  
 
7.5 The Military Intervention in Syria  
 
Hezbollah was initially enthusiastic with regard to the uprisings in the region, but the 
key turning point in the Islamic movement’s position towards the events of the region 
was definitely the beginning of the popular uprising in Syria and Hezbollah’s 
increasing military intervention in the country. 
 
Hezbollah has had a long relationship with the Syrian regime, which has increased 
through the years to become a strong alliance characterised by deep collaboration 
between the two actors, especially following the death of Hafez Al-Assad and his son 
Bashar's arrival to power. Hafez Al-Assad considered Hezbollah as a useful tool in 
strengthening relations with the IRI, at the same time exploiting them to extract 
concessions from Israel during peace negotiations. Under his rule, Syria regulated its 
support to Hezbollah according to the progress of the Middle East peace progress, 
tolerating more military operations by Hezbollah against Israeli forces in the South in 
low periods of the negotiation process to pressure Israel. This did not prevent 
clashes between the Syrian regime armed forces and Hezbollah during the Lebanese 
Civil War.218 
 
This situation changed with Bashar Al-Assad, especially following the withdrawal of 
Syrian armed forces of Lebanon in 2005 and the 33 Days War in 2006. The Assad 
regime increasingly viewed the relationship with the Islamic movement not as a 
tactical and temporal alliance like at the time of his father’s rule but as a strong and 
strategic ally, and he deepened collaboration with the group politically and militarily.  
 
In this manner, Hezbollah became a very important proxy for the Syrian regime in 
                                                            
218 See page 80 (Repression of Syrian military forces in February 1987 of Hezbollah members in the Fathallah 
military barracks in Basta, West Beirut.) 
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Lebanon. Bashar Al-Assad held multiple meetings with Hezbollah’s Secretary 
General Hassan Nasrallah, contrary to his father who saw him only twice (Blanford 
2011:290). In addition to this, while Hafez Al-Assad had imposed controls on the 
quantity and variety of arms he allowed the IRI to transfer to Hezbollah via Damascus 
airport, Bashar opened the arms floodgate, including greater quantities of weapons 
and more advanced systems dispatched across the border into the Islamic 
movement’s depot (Blanford 2011:337). Hezbollah supported the Syrian regime’s 
hegemony in Lebanon until its departure in 2005, and even after Syria’s departure it 
maintained close alliances with it. In Hezbollah’s new manifesto of 2009, the Syrian 
regime was described as having recorded:  
 
“a distinctive attitude and supported the resistance movements 
in the region, and stood beside us in the most difficult 
circumstances, and sought to unify Arab efforts to secure the 
interests of the region and challenges. Hence, we (Hezbollah) 
emphasize the need to adhere to the distinguished relations 
between Lebanon and Syria as a common political, security, 
and economic need, dictated by the interests of the two 
countries and two peoples, by the imperatives of geopolitics 
and the requirements for Lebanese stability and facing common 
challenges” (Manfesto 2009, section 5). 
 
In a recent book, Dr. Hassan Fadlallah, a Hezbollah MP, wrote that Lebanon was 
completely controlled after the Ta’if Agreement by a small number of Syrian officials, 
with the collaboration of some Lebanese politicians. He accuses the Syrian officials 
at that time, especially Ghazi Kanaan and Abdel Halim Khaddam219, to have worked 
for their personal interests at the expense of both Lebanon and Syria (cited in 
Bassam 2014). Despite disagreements regarding the internal Lebanese political 
scene, Fadlallah nevertheless explains that Syria and Hezbollah shared a central 
objective, being able to respond militarily to Israel, and that both Presidents Hafez 
and Bachar Al-Assad always assisted Hezbollah in its military confrontations with 
                                                            
219 We should note that Hezbollah’s criticisms are targeted to personalities of the Syrian regime that are no 
longer linked to it and who were put aside. Ghazi Kanaan died in September  2005 in unkown circumstances (the 
official version is that he committed suicide), while Abdel Halim Khaddam was sacked in the summer of 2005 
and relocated to Paris to live in exile. 
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Israel (cited in Bassam 2014 and Nassif 2014). The Hezbollah MP puts particularly 
forward the role of the current President Bashar Al-Assad in supporting the military 
assistance to the Islamic Movement since the beginning of the nineties, for example 
in the Israeli military aggressions against Lebanon in 1993 and 1996 in which the 
Syrian regime supplied missiles to Hezbollah (cited in Bassam 2014 and Nassif 
2014).  
 
The eruption of the Syrian uprising in March 2011 and the increased military 
intervention of Hezbollah alongside the Assad regime showed that the relationship 
between the two actors had become a strategic one. In May 2011, during Hassan 
Nasrallah's first speech regarding the situation in Syria, he declared that the 
overthrow of the regime in Syria is in American and Israeli interests (Al-Muqâwama 
al-Islâmiyya 2011a). In August of the same year, he said at the occasion of the al-
Quds International Day that “thanks [to] the Syrian leadership the Palestinian cause 
was preserved and not liquidated as it was the objective of all the US and western 
invasions and conspiracies against our region… Today some are seeking to break up 
Syria as part of a new Middle East agenda” (Al-Muqâwama al-Islâmyyia 2011b). In 
the beginning of the year 2012, Nasrallah increasingly accused the West, Israel and 
“moderate” Arab regimes of collaborating to overthrow the Assad regime:  
 
“Isn't it weird that America, Europe, Israel, and the so called 
moderate Arab states – which assumes the responsibility for all 
the catastrophes which afflicted Palestine, the Ummah, Iraq, 
Iran and the peoples of the region for decades – and al-Qaida 
stands on their side as well, how? All of these forces are united 
by one objective and are determined to achieve one objective: 
to overthrow the regime.” (Al-Manar 2012a). 
 
 He reiterated this position a few months later much more sharply by saying that 
these same parties (the West, Israel and some regional states) want the downfall of 
the Assad regime, because it supported the resistance, and these parties are 
seeking to realise the project of the New Middle East of George W. Bush (Al-Manar 
2012b). Nasrallah also accused the US and Israel on many occasions of using 
legitimate grievances in Syria as an excuse to destroy the country and the 
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resistance, in order to further Israel's control over the Middle East (Al-Akhbar English 
2012b).  
 
In May 2013, Hassan Nasrallah declared that:  
 
“Syria has been the spine of the resistance, so the resistance 
can't stand still while that spine is being ruined… The US has 
brought in "al-Qaida" and the other Takfiris organisations from 
all over the world, paid them money, and offered them all the 
assistance they needed… Obviously, the Takfiris current is 
dominant among the Syrian opposition, and it is being funded 
and armed by a number of Arab and regional states… If Syria 
falls in the hands of the US, Israel, Takfiris, and US instruments 
in the region, then the resistance will be besieged, and "Israel" 
will invade Lebanon to impose its conditions and revive its 
project again. If Syria falls, then Palestine, the Palestinian 
resistance, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Holy al-Qods 
(Jerusalem) will be lost and the the people of our region will 
face a dark and cruel era!” (Al-Ahed News 2013) 
 
In addition to this, Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah’s support to the Syrian regime 
was not only for Hezbollah and the Shi’a, but for Lebanon and all its various religious 
communities against the threats of Takfiri forces. (Al-Ahed News 2013)  
 
In this context, Hezbollah has intervened militarily alongside the Syrian regime's 
armed forces. Accusations of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria were raised by 
opponents of the Assad regime since protests erupted in March 2011 (Ajbaili 2011), 
but many were hard to prove and to confirm because of a lack of any conclusive 
evidence.220 In October 2011, Nasrallah said in a television interview that accusations 
regarding the deployment of Hezbollah fighters into Syria were “absolutely untrue” 
(Blanford 2013). In May 2012, a senior Hezbollah official was also asserting that the 
                                                            
220 Since mid-2011, Hezbollah had been training thousands of Lebanese and Syrian youths in several combat 
camps. Leaked obituaries for fallen fighters whose families refused to remain silent mentioned that Hezbollah 
operatives had died “while on jihad duty” (Itani 2014). 
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Islamic movement did not and will not fight in Syria (ICG 2014:1). This however was 
contradicted by some journalists such as Nicholas Blanford, who wrote: “by early 
2012, it was becoming public knowledge within Lebanese Shi’a circles that some 
Hezbollah fighters were being sent into Syria” (Blanford 2013). Hezbollah’s presence 
was confirmed with the first “martyrs” in Syria, as soon as June 2012 (Ashkar 2014b). 
Hezbollah announced the death of its soldiers while performing their “jihadist duties”, 
a standard phrase used by the group when announcing deaths of fighters in 
circumstances other than direct combat with Israel (Blanford 2012). 
 
In the middle of 2012, Hezbollah was increasingly accused of providing technical and 
logistical support to Damascus and helping some of Syria’s Shi’a population to 
develop their own self-defence militias (ICG 2014:1; Orient Le Jour and AFP 2014b). 
Hezbollah also opened training camps in the area outside the city of Baalbek in the 
Bekaa Valley, close to the Syrian border, to train youth from various religious sects, 
although the highest percentage of the trainees in these camps are Shi’a, to develop 
similar self defence militias as in Syria (Al-Monitor 2014).  
 
As reports of Hezbollah casualties mounted, especially after the death of Ali Nassif, a 
senior Hezbollah veteran commander near Qusayr in Syria in September 2012 
whose funeral was attended by Sheikh Muhammad Yazbeck, it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to hide Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria. A few days after the 
death of Nassif, Hassan Nasrallah justified the death of several Hezbollah fighters in 
Syria by claiming that they were fighting on an individual basis to defend Lebanese 
villages in Syrian territories close to the border with Lebanon, rather than in 
Hezbollah-sponsored patterns (Itani 2014; ICG 2014:1). He added that he also did 
not rule out the possibility of Hezbollah joining the battle in the future inside Syria 
(Hersh 2013). By December 2012, videos allegedly portraying Hezbollah fighters in 
southern Damascus, home to a shrine revered by Shi’a, had emerged (Blanford 
2013). 
 
Hezbollah fighters were increasingly participating in the fights alongside the Syrian 
army. In the spring of 2013, Hezbollah actually played a key role in the military 
offensive launched by the regime on Qusayr controlled by the Syrian rebels at the 
time. The importance of the city of Qusayr was that it served as a logistical conduit 
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for the anti-Assad revolt facilitating the movement of weapons and militants between 
Lebanon and Homs (Blanford 2013b). Roughly 1,200 to 1,700 fighters of the Islamic 
Movement participated in the battle, and most of them were seasoned veterans 
drawn from Hezbollah’s Special Forces (Blanford 2013b). Hezbollah supporters and 
sympathisers in Dahyeh celebrated the victory of Hezbollah and the Syrian regime 
forces against rebels in the district of Qusayr. Hezbollah members offered sweets in 
Dahyeh for the victory, which was adorned with flags of Hezbollah and banners 
saying “Qusayr fell” (Now Media and AFP 2013). 
 
In November 2013, Hassan Nasrallah publicly acknowledged Hezbollah’s presence 
in Syria and added that “the presence of Hezbollah fighters on Syrian soil aims at 
defending Lebanon, the Palestinian cause, and Syria, which defends the resistance” 
and "as long as there is a purpose for our presence there, we will remain there” (Al-
Manar 2013a). In December 2013, he later claimed ”We are protecting Lebanon… If 
Hezbollah did not fight in Syria, there would have been a Civil War in Lebanon and 
hundreds of car bombs. We did damage control and diminished the repercussions of 
the Syrian crisis on Lebanon” (Al-Manar 2013b). 
 
Hezbollah’s increasing military role in Syria took various forms ranging from veteran 
Hezbollah fighters commanding squads of Syrian soldiers, essentially acting as Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCO), to the less experienced Syrian regular troops in street 
fighting in Homs (Blanford 2013b). They also took care of the training of some pro 
regime militias known as “popular committees” (Nakhoul 2013) and of some of the 
new recruits in the army (Orient Le Jour and AFP 2014b). In February 2014, 
Hezbollah sent a great number of its troops to the town of Yabroud, in the Qalamoun 
Mountains north of Damascus, while maintaining a presence in other regions of Syria 
such as the outskirts of Aleppo, Idlib, Deraa, Damascus and its suburbs (El-Hassan 
2013; ICG 2014:2). Following new military victories by the Assad regime in April and 
May 2014, Hassan Nasrallah was confident enough to say that Syria's regime and 
the “axis of resistance” were no longer in danger of being toppled (Al-Akhbar English 
2014a; Al-Ahed News 2014b). 
 
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria was increasingly presented to its supporters and 
more largely to the Lebanese Shi’a population as an "existential battle" against the 
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Sunni extremists qualified as "takfiris" (Orient Le Jour and AFP 2014a). This feeling 
among the Shi’a population was particularly strengthened following the multiple 
attacks by jihadist groups221 targeting Lebanese Shi’a populated areas and more 
particularly Dahyeh since 2013 (Al-Akhbar English 2013d). Estimates at end-2013 of 
Hezbollah fighters in Syria number between 3,000 and 4,000, including elite fighters, 
experts and reservists, at a time and rotating in and out of the country on thirty days 
deployments (Orient le Jour and AFP 2014b; Sullivan 2014).  
 
According to some Hezbollah soldiers, the war in Syria has considerably 
strengthened the Islamic movement at the military level. One Hezbollah commander 
explained that the Islamic movement was now militarily stronger than ever before and 
had nearly become a real army. He added that Hezbollah’s military involvement in 
Syria “has led to an uptick in recruiting, filling the group’s ranks with a growing 
number of young fighters, and years of combat have created a new generation of 
battle-tested militants” (cited in George 2015).  
 
7.6 Consequences of Hezbollah’s Intervention in Syria: Rising Insecurity and 
Sectarianism 
 
The increasing insecurity in the country and the numerous attacks against Shi’a 
populated areas was accompanied by intense and growing sectarianism. Despite the 
denial of Hezbollah’s leadership, the involvement in Syria of the Islamic movement 
has increased the level of sectarianism and sectarian tensions between Sunni and 
Shi’a in Lebanon.  
 
Several events in the last few years have radicalised the Sunni Lebanese population, 
strengthening especially Salafists and Sunni jihadists groups. This frustration 
spanned from the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005, in which the Assad regime 
and then Hezbollah were accused of having a hand; the events of May 2008 
mentioned earlier; the fall of the Lebanese National Unity government led by 
Lebanese Sunni leader Saad Hariri following the resignation of Hezbollah and its 
                                                            
221 After the fall of the city of Yabroud in January and February 2014, in which Hezbollah played a leading role 
in the military fights against Syrian rebel fighters, a suicide bomb targeted Dahyeh claimed by Jabhat al-Nusra in 
Lebanon and the Liwa Ahrar al-Sunna. Both groups said they were avenging Yabroud. “Prepare for the transfer 
of the battle of Yabroud into Lebanese territory,” warned the latter (Nashashibi 2014). 
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political allies from the cabinet over arguments stemming from a UN investigation into 
the assassination of Rafiq Hariri; the assassination in 2012 of Brigadier General 
Wissam Al-Hassan, chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Lebanese Internal Security 
Forces (one of the two state Security agencies headed by Ashraf Rifi and considered 
as an ally of the Hariri Future movement and Saudi Arabia) (Saab 2012). Finally the 
involvement of Hezbollah in Syria has considerably worsened the Sunni and Shi’a 
sectarian tensions in the country. 
 
At the same time, Hezbollah has increasingly used a religious and sectarian Shi’a 
discourse among its members to legitimize and justify its military intervention in Syria.  
Hassan Nasrallah, for example, said that Hezbollah needed to intervene in Syria not 
only to protect the resistance, but also to defend Shi’a villages by sending Hezbollah 
soldiers to the border. He also stressed Hezbollah's role in protecting Shi’a religious 
symbols like the mausoleum of the Prophet Muhammad's granddaughter, the Shrine 
of al-Sayyida Zaynab in Damascus that “has been already targeted many times by 
terrorist groups” (cited in Rida 2013). Sayyid Nasrallah added that this is a very 
sensitive issue, given the fact that certain extremist groups have announced that if 
they reach this shrine, they will destroy it. The shrine is located in the al-Sayyida 
Zaynab area in Damascus (Nashashibi 2014). Reports signalled that Hezbollah 
soldiers wore headbands with ‘O Husayn’ written on them (Blanford 2013b). 
 
There has also been an increase in the display of banners, photos and songs 
glorifying Shi’a religious symbols in Shi’a neighbourhoods, which previously usually 
appeared only during the Ashura. Social media outlets teemed with videos and 
pages calling for the defence of religious shrines in Syria and praising young Shi’a 
who died in a jihad to protect them have also increased considerably (Blanford 
2013b). In the Ashura celebrations of 2013, slogans such as "Hal Min Nâsirîn 
Yansurunâ? Labbayki ya Zaynab!” (Is there any supporter to stand up for us? we are 
all for you, Zeinab!), "Oh Zaynab! We are all your Abbass!” and “We swear by 
Hassan and Hussein, Zaynab will not be captured twice!” were raised to call for the 
defence of the Zaynab shrine that is protected by Hezbollah and other Shi’a sectarian 
groups from possible attacks of opposition armed groups in Damascus (Boumet 
Beirut 2013).  
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The growing insecurity in Shi’a populated areas since Hezbollah’s military 
intervention in Syria, and the worsening of sectarianism in Lebanon and in the region, 
in addition to the multiplication of deaths within the Islamic movement on the 
battlefield in Syria, have provoked some sense of dissatisfaction among sections of 
Lebanese Shi’a and even in Hezbollah’s popular bases. Vocal criticisms have 
remained very low and limited because of the control of Hezbollah over Shi’a 
populated areas. There are, nonetheless, some indications of growing discontent.  
 
Following the death of a dozen Hezbollah fighters and over 20 injured in an ambush 
in Sayyida Zaynab outside Damascus in April of 2013, the mother of a dead fighter 
asked Hezbollah official Sheikh Muhammad Yazbeck, who was offering condolences 
to a family of one of the deceased, the reason why they were sending their children 
to Syria while their battle was with Israel (Now Media 2013). In another case, a 
delegation from the Baalbek region representing the families of fallen Hezbollah 
fighters met with Muhammad Yazbeck in June 2013 and told the organisation that 
they found Hezbollah’s defence of the Syrian regime “flawed and intolerable,” an act 
which, according to the delegation, did not fall within the group’s raison d’etre—
resistance to Israel—and one that would widen the Sunni-Shi’a rift in Lebanon (Ya 
Libnan 2013a). Other persons such as journalist and critic of Hezbollah, Ali Amine, 
echoed similar feelings in the South of Lebanon (Nakhoul 2013).  
 
In autumn of 2013, in the South, rare behind-the-scenes disgruntlement was 
increasing within the Hezbollah leadership, according to Hisham Jaber, a Shi’a and 
retired Lebanese army general. He said that some southern Shi’a families were 
questioning the wisdom of Hezbollah fighting fellow Muslims, even if they are Sunni 
(Dettmer 2013). In the summer of 2014, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, made 
a rare public appearance in the Bekaa Valley, to greet families of fallen fighters and 
visit other Hezbollah soldiers. The visit was also partly intended to assuage 
frustration among Shi’a families who have lost family members in Hezbollah’s military 
engagements (Naylor 2014). 
 
The majority of the Shi’a population was nevertheless still very much supporting 
Hezbollah, despite some criticisms raised among sections of it. No alternative to 
Hezbollah has been provided by its critics, and many in the Shi’a population believed 
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that in the current situation the alternative to Hezbollah’s strengthening is Shi’a 
weakening (ICG 2014:12). 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus has been a central and key feature of the 
Islamic movement since its establishment.  This apparatus has served to oppose 
Israeli’s occupation of the South until 2000, and then to create a situation of 
deterrence against Israel’s attacks, especially during the 2006 war. Hezbollah’s arms 
are justified until today for the purpose of liberating the Shebaa farms still occupied 
by Israel and to defend and to protect Lebanon as well, not only against Israel, but 
increasingly against the “takfiris threat” as put forward by Hezbollah’s propaganda to 
legitimize its “pre-emptive war” in Syria (Al-Manar 2013b and ICG 2014:4). In addition 
to this military function, Hezbollah also has a large security apparatus aimed at 
guaranteeing and managing security in Shi’a populated areas. Hezbollah’s security 
apparatus, as discussed in this chapter and chapter 5, takes care of controlling and 
even sometimes repressing any kind of dissent or opposition against the Islamic 
Movement. 
 
Hezbollah’s use of its arms has clear resemblance to the repressive SA, as 
described by Althusser. This is actually materialized through two main aspects. First, 
Hezbollah's security apparatus implements tight control over Shi’a populated areas, 
without hesitating to use security or repressive measures to prevent any opposition 
arising as a serious threat or alternative to the Lebanese Islamic movement. 
Secondly, Hezbollah's military apparatus intervenes outside of Lebanon and 
particularly in Syria to assist the Assad regime, which is an important political and 
military supporter of Hezbollah as the arms produced in Iran are transferred to 
Lebanon from Syria, to maintain its political and military power in Lebanon. In this 
manner, Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus plays the role of the repressive 
SA in guaranteeing through repression, the political conditions for the activities and 
development of the ISA.  
 
Hezbollah’s armament is also perceived by large sections of the Shi’a popular and 
middle classes as a form of compensation for historic, political and economic 
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deprivation and a critical instrument of communal leverage in the Lebanese sectarian 
political system (Gambill 2007:42). Accordingly, as argued by Saad Ghorayeb 
(2005), “any plan that seeks to disarm the resistance will be construed as a form of 
communal disempowerment” for the Shi’a and strongly opposed. This feeling was 
only strengthened with the rise of jihadist forces in the region these past few years. 
Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus has been a key and central element in 
the development of the party. Its purpose today is clearly to guarantee its political 
domination and oppose any threats that would curtail its political interests, while 
maintaining a form of status quo of the sectarian political and economic system of 
Lebanon. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated and analysed the characteristics and evolution of 
Hezbollah in relation to the economic and political developments in Lebanese society 
and in the regional arena. It has shown that Hezbollah, and Islamic political parties 
more generally, can be analysed with the same theoretical and conceptual tools used 
to examine other movements in different regions of the world. The thesis has 
analysed Hezbollah in its totality and in its relation with capitalism, its policies and 
relations regarding the sectarian Lebanese political system, the state, revolutionary 
processes in the region, workers struggles, economics and women’s rights. This is 
where the thesis differs from other studies, which very often focus on one or two 
aspects of Hezbollah’s identity, typically the military side, while isolating the party 
from the political and social dynamics of the society and the policies of the party.  
 
In this regard, the political economic dynamics of Lebanon and the region have had 
profound consequences for the development and nature of Hezbollah. The historical 
and enduring context for this development is an economy dominated by the service 
sector, in which trade, finance and tourism have taken a leading position, and inflows 
of foreign capital have long played a central role. Hezbollah’s growing influence in the 
economy and Lebanese politics began with its control of the southern suburbs in 
1989, home to 500,000 Shi’a, of which more than 70 percent vote in South Lebanon 
and in the Bekaa. The control of these areas has been an important route to power at 
the national level. The southern suburbs lacked basic and necessary services for a 
population in need, which presented great economic potential for the actor controlling 
this space. Hezbollah allied itself with the growing and ascending Shi’a petit 
bourgeoisie, using it as a base for recruitment and fundraising, and in the process 
making this class a patron of the new society forming in the suburbs. Its huge 
network of organisations helped the Islamic movement consolidate its growing 
influence and control over large portions of the Shi’a population, which gained 
increasing importance in the socio-economic and political structure of Lebanon. Shi’a 
majority populated regions in Lebanon attracted investments from both public and 
private actors, while a new and growing Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie was 
developing. The large inflow of money to Hezbollah after the 2006 war against 
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Lebanon by Israel only increased the importance of Hezbollah as a large economic 
actor in the country. Hezbollah is known to have purchased large portions of lands in 
South Lebanon and in Beirut, which made the party increasingly connected to 
important land owners and the continuous fast growing Shi’a fraction of the 
bourgeoisie, mainly concentrated in the construction and trade sectors of the 
economy.  
 
Over time, these socio-economic and political changes have had important 
consequences on the party and its policies. Hezbollah has witnessed the growing 
significance inside the party of new higher middle class cadres involved in liberal 
professions, and lessening of radical and smaller petit bourgeois elements such as 
the clerics. At the same time, a new fraction of the bourgeoisie linked to the party 
through Iranian capital and investments was created, while the rest of the Shi’a 
fraction of the bourgeoisie, whether in Lebanon or in the diaspora, came increasingly 
under the umbrella of Hezbollah – or at least close to the party because of its political 
and financial powers. Alongside this increasing economic weight and integration into 
the political system, Hezbollah has also been linked to corruption and growing 
clientelist practices. 
 
The economic and political importance of Hezbollah in Lebanon has made the 
organisation an increasingly significant rival to the fraction of the Lebanese 
bourgeoisie gathered around Hariri and March 14 (linked, in turn, to Gulf capital), 
particularly after Syria’s withdrawal in 2005. The political opposition of Hezbollah to 
March 14 forces, which are backed by Western states and Gulf monarchies, should 
be understood as inter-capitalist rivalry on the national scale of two forces linked to 
different regional forces. Despite these rivalries, however, these two inter-capitalist 
blocs have cooperated with one another at points of crisis – indicated by their similar 
attitudes towards labour and other social movements, their orientation towards 
neoliberal reform in Lebanon, and their cooperation in government following the 
departure of the Syrian army of Lebanon in 2005.      
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The Sectarian State 
 
Beyond these external features, there has been a subordination of initial political 
objectives affecting the ideology of Hezbollah. The organisation’s initial radical 
opposition to the Lebanese sectarian political system has been downplayed following 
its entry into parliament and participation in the political system along sectarian lines, 
regardless of its continued rhetoric and populist criticism.    
 
Hezbollah’s initial objective was to establish an Islamic regime, despite the near 
impossibility of such a task given the multi-confessional reality of Lebanese society. 
From total refusal of involvement in the sectarian system, the organisation has been 
progressively integrated into the system as one of its main actors. Hezbollah’s 
evolution was linked to various factors, including the change of political leadership in 
the IRI that sought a more pragmatic policy and improved relations with the Western 
and Gulf states; the development of Hezbollah as a mass party that was no longer 
primarily composed of young radical clerics and individuals who sought to impose a 
model similar to Iran; and, finally, Hezbollah’s need to protect its armaments and its 
growing political and economic interests in the country. The popular base of 
Hezbollah, which increasingly included the growing Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie 
and middle classes, especially in Beirut, did not necessarily yearn to live in an Islamic 
Republic such as the Iranian model and was satisfied with a return to peace and an 
improvement in terms of political representation. These developments reflected the 
new political and economic importance of the Shi’a population in the country, 
achieved after the Ta’if agreement. A further important feature in this integration into 
the political system was the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, which 
compelled the party to participate in all Lebanese governments from that point 
onwards.  
 
In light of these developments, Hezbollah does not constitute in any way a challenge 
to the Lebanese sectarian system. On the contrary, it sees this system much like any 
other sectarian political party – as a means to protect its own interests. This is 
particularly important given the various social and political forces that attempt to unify 
Lebanese popular classes beyond sectarian identities. Hezbollah has sought to 
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reach agreements and to cooperate with the rest of the Lebanese elites in this 
regard, despite some political differences, especially during periods of heightened 
social mobilisation.   
 
This “participatory” solution toward the confessional state taken by Hezbollah, 
reflects both an attempt to moderate the structural contradictions of Lebanese 
capitalism (Amel 1986:337-338) as well as the rivalries that exist within the 
bourgeoisie between its hegemonic and non-hegemonic fractions. The latter, as 
Mehdi Amel has noted, reflects: 
  
“the consciousness of non hegemonic layers of the bourgeoisie 
in their (legitimate?) aspiration to occupy hegemonic positions 
occupied by other fractions, or to rise to their level by identifying 
where possible with them in the political and economic domain. 
This non hegemonic layer of the bourgeoisie wants the end of 
the hegemonic fraction without removing the domination of the 
bourgeois class.” (Amel 1986:339)  
 
This evolution was also linked to Hezbollah’s regional allies, Syria and Iran, which 
both wanted an integration of the party into the Lebanese political scene after the end 
of the Civil War. At the same time, Hezbollah’s armed apparatus was subordinated to 
its political interests embodied in particular in the on-going stability of Lebanon. This 
led to increased collaboration with the Lebanese army and security services to 
prevent military conflict in the South of Lebanon with Israel, to collaborate against 
salfafist and jihadist groups, and finally to guarantee the security of some Shi’a 
populated areas. This does not mean that Hezbollah’s military component did and 
does not play a role against Israel’s aggressions and wars, but that Hezbollah’s 
armament was increasingly being used for other purposes, especially after the 2006 
war. 
 
Confirmation of this can be seen in the transformation of Hezbollah’s orientation 
towards the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Initially, in early 2011, 
Hezbollah stated that the uprisings in the region were part of the “project of 
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resistance” and opposed the USA and its allies in the region (Orient Le Jour 2011a), 
while Hassan Nasrallah condemned the accusations and conspiracy explanations 
that claimed that the USA were behind these revolutions (Al-Manar 2011). By 2013, 
the Lebanese Communication Group (LCG), (Hezbollah’s media arm) officially 
offered the Bahraini regime an apology for its coverage of the nearly three-year 
Bahraini uprising222 and Hezbollah was fully entrenched in supporting the Assad 
regime in Syria. In addition to this, in the beginning of 2015, Hassan Nasrallah 
welcomed the return of Egypt's role in Arab and regional arenas under the rule of the 
former head of Egypt's armed forces and current President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, 
asserting the importance of Egypt as a key regional anchor of stability (Al-Mayadeen 
2015).   
 
We can see that the material reality and conditions in which Hezbollah is located 
helps to explain its behaviour and policies. This is a very different approach than 
those who argue that this is just a normal transition towards pragmatism experienced 
by all radical parties. Yesterday’s radical rhetoric of the Islamic movement came from 
an emerging petit bourgeois leadership that constituted the party’s leadership at the 
time of their origin in the 1980s; while today, political and economic power of the 
party and the large upper middle class leadership and cadres tend towards other 
interests and policies. This has an intertwined dynamic that involves both national 
and regional levels.   
 
                                                            
222 The LCG offered this apology at the annual conference of the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) and 
promised to be more objective and to seek to maintain professional standards, promising to carry out regular 
evaluations of its editorial policies to ensure its compliance with international agreements. This was in return for 
allowing the Lebanese media group to continue to broadcast in the island kingdom (Al-Hakim, Baltayeb and 
Dirani 2013). The Arabic-language news station, al-Alam, linked to the IRI, had also at this period substantially 
reduced its previously intensive coverage of Bahrain (Al-Hakim, Baltayeb and Dirani 2013). After the apology 
of LCG was publicly known, Hezbollah nevertheless issued a clarification saying that the party leadership was 
not consulted by the LCG delegation in the meeting in Tunis, and that the decision to issue an apology was made 
by them alone (Al-Hakim, Baltayeb and Dirani 2013).  At the same time Hezbollah reiterated its support for the 
struggle of the Bahraini people. The al-Manar’s Managing Director Abdallah Kassir, ex Hezbollah MP, resigned 
from his post a few weeks later and has left the country for Iran (Ya Libnan 2013b). This could be a mere 
confusion inside Hezbollah's organisation, although decision making is usually very well planned and discipline 
in the party is strong. This episode occurred at the same period that a rapprochement was happening between 
Qatar and Hezbollah, which was confirmed by Hassan Nasrallah in a speech televised in December 2013. He 
declared that he had met with a Qatari delegation (Al-Manar 2013b). In addition, a meeting was held between 
Sheikh Naim Qassem and the new Qatari ambassador in Lebanon a few weeks later. Both parties stressed in a 
joint statement that political solutions in the region were the basis to constructively resolve issues for the interest 
of the people and they also affirmed that cooperation among parties in Lebanon is the remedy that serves this 
country and all its citizens (Orient Le Jour 2013e). 
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Ideology  
 
Hezbollah believes in the unity of the community and cooperation between classes, 
as Khomeini used to argue, where the workers should not ask more than what is 
given by the bourgeoisie and where the bourgeoisie has an obligation to be 
charitable towards the poor. Class struggle is seen as negative because it fragments 
the community or the Ummah. The Islamisation of large sections of the Shi’a 
population followed this objective in order to splinter and weaken solidarities between 
the different sects in Lebanon, whereas the Shi’a before the Lebanese Civil War 
were the largest section of nationalist and progressive parties that were leading 
social struggles. Sectarianism has always been a tool of the sectarian bourgeoisie in 
Lebanon to prevent any cross sectarian mobilisation, and Hezbollah is no exception 
to that. 
 
Hezbollah's poor record towards mobilisations around social and worker’s issues 
reflected the party’s changing class interests and its opposition towards greater 
empowerment of the popular classes. The possibility of cross sectarian mobilization 
and the development of class-based movements present a potential threat to all the 
sectarian and ruling class parties in Lebanon, of which Hezbollah has become part. 
This is why Hezbollah has never mobilized its constituency on purely socio-economic 
demands within a cross sectarian perspective, although rhetorically supporting the 
GUWL and/or social demands.   
 
Social and economic deterioration of Lebanese society was always subordinated to 
the recognition of the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s armed capacities, and this is why 
Hezbollah has called on Saad Hariri – on numerous occasions – to seek joint 
collaboration and participation in a government based on the agreements the party 
had with his father, Rafiq Hariri. 223  They understood this in the following way: 
Hezbollah takes care of the “resistance” against Israel and Hariri takes care of the 
economic and social policies of the country, each one not interfering in the affairs of 
                                                            
223 According to journalist Blanford (2011:360-361), Hariri and Nasrallah met secretely numerous times from 
mid 2004 until the assassination of Hariri in February 2005. In one of these meetings, Hariri assured Nasrallah 
would not seek to disarm Hezbollah by force. Dr. Hassan Fadlallah (2014 cited in Bassam 2014 and Nassif 
2014) wrote in his recent book that Rafiq Hariri accepted before his death to maintain Hezbollah’s military and 
organisational strength until the achievement of a settlement with Israel.  
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the other (Al-Muntada al-Ishtirâkî 2012a:4-8).  
 
Hezbollah, as we have seen, despite rhetorical and populist criticisms against what it 
called “savage capitalism”, did not develop any alternative. On the contrary, it 
continues to support capitalism, free markets and neoliberal policies. Hezbollah’s 
presence in the government has only confirmed the previous policies of earlier 
Lebanese governments. In this manner, Hezbollah has become an integral part of 
the Lebanese bourgeoisie, where rivalries exist but are overcome in the face of any 
popular revolts or mobilizations that threatens the established system of power.  
 
Regarding women, Hezbollah has promoted a conservative vision that confers the 
domination of men over women and attributes specific roles to women in society, the 
first and most important being the role of ‘motherhood’ in order to educate future 
generations with Islamic principles. Women in the Lebanese Islamic movement are 
not present in decision-making structures. In no way are patriarchal structures of the 
society challenged by the party, while women’s clothing and body must conform to 
particular norms that are said to preserve her honour and that of the family. The 
Islamic model is the only right path for women, otherwise they are considered to be 
somehow alien to their own society and under the influence of western cultural 
imperialism. As Hanieh has noted: “conservative structures on the role of women are 
an integral component of broader counterrevolutionary goals” (Hanieh 2013:172).  
 
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated that Hezbollah’s claim to express solidarity with 
the oppressed of the world is largely based on Hezbollah’s political interests, which 
are themselves closely linked to Iran and Syria. This is why Hezbollah’s military 
confrontation with Israel, which as we have seen in previous chapters has been at 
the core of its identity, has been subordinated to the political interests of the party 
and its regional allies. The armament of Hezbollah has been increasingly oriented 
towards objectives other than the military fight against Israel according to contexts 
and times, including military attacks on other political parties inside Lebanon or the 
prevention of any resistance actor other than Hezbollah in South Lebanon. The 
defence of the “axis of resistance” and of the armed apparatus of the party have 
been used by Hezbollah as a propaganda tool to explain the policies and actions of 
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the party, the last example being its military intervention in Syria under the pretext of 
defending the “resistance”.  
 
Counter society? Features of Hezbollah’s Hegemonic Project 
 
These elements lead us to affirm that Hezbollah is not building a counter-society or a 
counter hegemonic project per se as suggested by some, but more or less trying to 
Islamise the largest section possible of the Shi’a population, while not presenting a 
threat in any ways to the dominant political system in its own society or even at a 
larger level.  
 
In this regard, Hezbollah has pursued islamisation policies in Shi’a populated regions 
through multiple ways, including investments in businesses promoting the Hâla 
islâmiyya, social pressure through committees checking the conformity of institutions 
with the principles of the Hâla islâmiyya, as well as the use of its arms. The provision 
of social services through its huge networks of organisations has been instrumental 
in the spreading of Islamic principles among the wider population. Hezbollah, when it 
holds positions of power in ministries or in municipalities, acts to privilege actors 
close to their ideology, while reinforcing the exclusion of actors not sharing or in 
opposition to their political vision. In addition to this, Hezbollah’s armament has 
played an important role to diffuse the political thoughts of the party, especially in its 
military conflict against Israel, which brought huge popularity to the Islamic 
movement. At the same time its armament also serves other purposes such as 
defending the Islamic movement against any attempts to weaken it, including from 
internal Lebanese actors, as repressing forms of dissent within the Shi’a population, 
and plays the role of the “police” and the “army” to guarantee security in some Shi’a 
populated areas. As Chapter 5 and 7 discussed, Hezbollah’s apparatus and 
institutions displays very similar attributes to that of a state, and that through the 
combination of the ISA and the repressive SA, it is able to maintain its hegemony.  
 
Hezbollah has indeed been successful, as we have seen, in reaching a form of 
hegemony among the Shi’a population. This hegemony has involved the 
development of a two-fold nature of class domination, in which, according to 
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Gramsci, the party both “leads the allied classes, and dominates over adverse 
classes” (cited in Thomas 2009:163). In this manner, hegemony represents:  
 
“the form of political power exercised over those classes in 
close proximity to the leading group, while domination is 
exerted over those opposing it. Consent is one of the means of 
forging the composite body of a class alliance, while coercion is 
developed against the excluded other”. (Thomas 2009:163) 
 
Consent and coercion, in other words, operate together in a dialectical fashion. As 
Thomas has noted:  
 
“they counterbalance each other in a unity that depends upon 
the maintenance of a precise, unbalanced equilibrium between 
its two poles: forces must not appear to predominate too much 
over consent, but the proper relationship between in reality 
involves more weight on the side of the former”. (Thomas 
2009:165) 
 
Hezbollah has indeed been able to gain the consent of the popular classes through 
the mechanism of Islamisation and by the domination of the military confrontation 
against Israel, which acted to bind the interests of subaltern classes to the party 
structure and its interests, while it benefited and relied upon the continuing 
demobilisation of the proletarian forces.  Islamisation of the Shi’a population has 
been the mechanism to control and gain consent among the Shi’a population, while 
continuing a process of elimination of groups and individuals not sharing the Islamic 
milieu and culture spread by Hezbollah. 
 
In addition, as explained by Bob Jessop, “an hegemonic project can be concerned 
with various non economic objectives (even if economically conditioned and 
economically relevant)” (1990 cited in Roccu 2012: 208),224 in Hezbollah’s case these 
                                                            
224 Roberto Roccu adds, in relation to Jessop’s explanation: that “each accumulation strategy can be related to 
several alternative hegemonic projects, and on the other hand the success of the latter is dependant on their 
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non-economic objectives have been shown to be Islamisation and domination over 
the military confrontation with Israel. However, Hezbollah ultimately advances the 
long-term interests of the hegemonic class, which are not the interests of the popular 
classes but rather the rising petit bourgeoisie and increasingly through the years the 
Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie.  
 
In this regard, Islamisation and resistance were two core components of the ideology 
that allowed Hezbollah to mystify the nature of its hegemonic project. They formed, 
therefore, a mean to build a manufactured consent; passive and indirect rather than 
active and direct. As Gerratna argues:  
 
“a class that manages to lead, and not only to dominate, in a 
society based economically on class exploitation, and in which 
the continuance of such exploitation is desired, is constrained to 
use forms of hegemony that obscure this situation and mystify 
this exploitation; it therefore needs form of hegemony designed 
to give rise to manipulated consent, a consent of subaltern 
allies” (Gerratana 1997 cited in Thomas 2009:227). 
 
In this manner, Hezbollah’s ideology, in which mechanisms of Islamisation are 
predominant, is a “non organic” philosophy; one that has “maintained the subaltern 
classes in their subaltern position, glossing over or obscuring the true, fractured 
nature of the present by speculatively sanctifying it as the only possible present and 
this as eternity” (Thomas 2009:209). This summation accurately describes the ways 
in which Hezbollah’s ideology attempts to reconcile contradictory and opposing 
interests.  
 
Alternative Paths 
 
The initial point of departure of this thesis was that Hezbollah and Islamic movements 
in general are neither revolutionary or progressive groups, nor terrorist groups, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ability to relate to an existing or prospective accumulation strategy” (Roccu 2012:72). This is consistent with 
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, which “must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive 
function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (cited in Roccu 2012:212). 
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parties led by political interests and power that can be explained through a materialist 
approach, and not simply a focus on ideology. In a Marxist sense, these parties can 
be identified as parties pulled in two directions – towards radical rebellion against 
existing society and towards compromise with it- increasingly widening its base and 
support within the bourgeoisie in regard to their political leaderships and cadres, 
while keeping a cross-class base of support. We have seen throughout the text that 
Hezbollah has evolved from radical rebellion towards compromise and participation 
within its existing political structures. This project does not present a fundamental 
alternative to the dominant capitalist and sectarian system in Lebanon. On the 
contrary, it sustains it, as it does with the system of sectarianism, discrimination 
against women, Palestinian refugees, and so forth. In addition, the provision of 
services by its networks of organisations does not differ from other political and 
sectarian communities in Lebanon, except in its size and efficiency, by promoting 
private, sectarian and patronal support or management of social risks (Catusse and 
Alagha 2008:132-134). As this thesis has shown, the elites of Hezbollah have to deal 
with the important bourgeois families, tribes and clans in different areas and act as 
patrons dealing with clients and favouring their own networks. The best example of 
this latter case is with Muhammad Al-Khansa Hezbollah, Mayor of Ghobeyri. The 
party, in many aspects, only strengthens the prevalent principles of the Lebanese 
society, those of a social solidarity based on primordial or primary identities (family, 
sect and sectarian political party) rather than social rights (Le Thomas 2012a:145). 
    
As Achcar (2013b:35) argues, it is very misleading to consider Islam only as a “flag 
and mask” or merely as a language, as this overlooks the significant limitations 
placed upon the radicalising potential of these organisations' membership, and even 
their mass following, by their adherence to Islamic fundamentalist doctrines. Indeed, 
the weakness of Orientalist approaches that view religion as the main tool to analyse 
these parties and as the driving force of history in this region, is that they leave out 
the reality of socio-economic and political dynamics. Following Nilsen’s call for “a 
theory of social movement that is truly relevant to the needs and knowledge of 
activist that seek to contribute to what Marx referred to as 'the self clarification… of 
the struggles and wishes of the age'” (Nilsen 2013:183), this thesis has sought to 
show the nature and development of Hezbollah, while trying to understand the 
behaviours and dynamics within and around the Lebanese Islamic party and the 
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wider society.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to outline a full alternative to Hezbollah’s political 
programme or socio-economic practices. Suffice to say that the analysis above 
suggests that a truly counter-hegemonic project requires a rupture with the sectarian 
system, a full accounting of the class and social differentiation within Lebanon itself, 
and a nuanced appreciation of the regional dynamics as they intersect within 
Lebanon. Important moments in Lebanese history – notably the labour struggles of 
the Civil War period, and more recent experiences such as the formation of the UCC 
– point towards the possibilities and promise of a non-sectarian approach finding real 
roots in the country. In contrast, Hezbollah does not provide a vision of modernity in 
rupture with neoliberal capitalism or the Lebanese sectarian political system. In a 
region witnessing popular uprisings and intense and rapid political changes, 
Hezbollah’s contradiction between its proclaimed support of the “oppressed of the 
world”, on one hand, and its orientation towards Lebanese neoliberalism and the 
country’s elite class, on the other, will likely prove increasingly problematic for the 
leadership of the Lebanese Islamic movement.  
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Annex: Shi’a fraction of the bourgeoisie 
 
Shi’a fraction of in the industrial sector and members of the Association of 
Lebanese Industrialists (ALI) 2014, April 
 
Company  Owners Sector Location  Role  
Foam 
Mattresses Co. 
Fomaco SARL 
Ussama 
Helbawi 
Furniture Office: Hadath  
Factory: Baalbek 
 
President of the 
association of 
the industrialists 
of the southern 
suburbs of 
Beirut Ussama 
Helbawi (he is 
also the 
President of al-
Ahed football 
club considered 
as Hezbollah’s 
club and 
sponsored by 
al-Manar).  
Member of the 
board of the 
ALI.  
Maximum Pour 
Le Commerce 
et L'Industrie  
Hassan Yassine  Textile Ghobeyri Member of the 
board of the ALI 
Kassem 
Mahfouz and 
Sons Co. 
"Mahfouz 
Stores" 
Mr. Bassem 
Mahfouz  
Textile Office: Ghobeyri  
Factory: Chwaifat  
Member of the 
board of the ALI 
Plastic Khalil Cherry  Chemical Office: Beirut, Mar Secretary 
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Chemical 
Company 
P.C.C. 
(S.A.R.L.) 
Products Elias Str.  
Factory: Ghazieh  
General of the 
board of the ALI 
 
 
Other important Shi’a Industrialists  
 
Company  Owners Sector Location  Role  
Helbawi Bros. 
Co. SARL 
1982 
Mr. Mohammed 
Helbawi, Mr. Ali 
Helbawi, and 
Mr. Hussein 
Helbawi 
Seeds and 
spices trading. 
Burj Al-
Barajneh 
 
Mussawi 
Trading 
Company Co 
SARL  
Ali Al-Moussawi,  
Hossain Al-
Moussawi, 
Bachir Al-
Moussawi 
Steel works, 
steel gates, 
Carrosserie 
 
 
Baalbek    
Alfa InterFood 
Group is a 
Middle Eastern 
food company 
owned by the 
Group Harb 
Holding Int. 
S.A.L. Lebanon  
Zein Harb  Produce 
Canned Food 
products, under 
the Brand 
name “Chtoura 
Gardens”, in 
different 
factories in 
Lebanon.  
Factory: Bekaa  
Office: Haret 
Hreik  
Member of 
the Union of 
Lebanese 
Food 
Industries’ 
Board.  
Harb 
Holding, 
through Zein 
Harb, is also 
member of 
the 
Chamber of 
Commerce, 
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Industry, & 
Agriculture 
of Beirut 
Linda 
Chocolate 
Factory  
Ali Kobayssi Food and 
chocolate 
Address: 
Nabatieh 
Member of 
the Union of 
Lebanese 
Food 
Industries 
Dar Bilal For 
Printing and 
Publishing Co. 
SARL 
Mr. Ahmad 
Hussein  
Paper and 
Cardboard 
Bir Hassan, 
Jnah 
Ex-
Secretary 
General of 
the board of 
the ALI 
(2013) 
Syroliban 
International Co 
S.A.L. 
(Offshore)  
Khalil Zantout, 
Chairman and 
CEO of 
Syroliban 
International Co 
S.A.L. 
(Offshore).  
 
 
Sole distributor 
of Brigestone 
and Firestone 
tires in Syria 
 He is an 
elected 
board 
member of 
the 
International 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
in Lebanon. 
 
Khalil 
Zantout has 
been 
chosen by 
the ALI as 
one of the 
four 
prominent 
industrialists 
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who will 
establish the 
model of 
future 
industrial 
city. He is in 
charge of 
the 
industrial 
city in 
Nabatieh.  
 
 
Shi’a fraction of the Beirut Trade Association (BTA) 
 
Company  Owners Sector Location  Role  
Shar Metal 
Trading 
Co. 
S.A.R.L. 
Fadi Ali 
Shahrour 
Shar Metal Company 
(SMC), is the largest 
Ferrous and Non-Ferrous 
scrap metal exporters and 
processors throughout the 
Middle East region.  
They handle about 7000 
mt/month of non-ferrous 
and 40000 mt/month of 
ferrous metals. 
Factory: 
Beirut 
Office: 
Jnah, Beirut 
 
Vice 
President of 
the BTA 
Beydun 
Fire and 
Security 
S.A.R.L 
Youssef 
Mohamm
ad 
Beydoun 
Beydoun Fire and Security 
is a leading provider of fire 
and security services.  
Adress: 
Bir Hassan, 
Ghobeyri  
Member of 
the BTA. 
Member of 
the Union of 
Security and 
Safety 
Professional 
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in Lebanon  
Sadco 
Sami 
Dandan 
and Co. 
Jamal 
Sami 
Dandan 
Pharmacy. SADCO is a 
privately owned company. 
SADCO was established in 
1977 by entrepreneurs with 
experience in the field of 
pharmaceutical distribution 
since 1950. 
Address: 
Bir Hassan, 
Ghobeyri 
Member of 
the BTA. 
 
 Rashid 
Hassan 
Kebbe 
  Member of 
the BTA  
and President 
of the 
Barbour 
Street 
Merchants 
Association 
 
 
Shi’a fraction of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, & Agriculture of Beirut 
(CCIAB) 
 
Company  Owners Role  
Business Projects 
Company (BPC) is a 
Lebanese holding 
company, established in 
1978 to develop and hold 
investments in privately 
held companies around the 
world. 
Mr. Salah Osseiran, 
chairman and owner, 
initially managed BPC 
from Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia before the 
company transferred 
headquarters to Beirut, 
Lebanon in 1995. 
President of the Economic 
Committee of the CCIAB and 
member of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, 
Lebanon. 
Abdallah Ali Matar & Sons 
SARL, a company that 
engages in real estate and 
Mahmoud Matar is the 
Chairman and General 
Manager of Abdallah Ali 
President of Members 
Committee of the CCIAB. 
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property development, as 
well as scrap metal trading 
in Lebanon and Africa. 
Matar and Sons group. 
Harb Holding International 
S.A.L. is a holding 
company, which has 
subsidiaries that 
manufacture, pack, 
distribute all types of 
assorted foodstuff.  
Mr. Zeina Harb, CEO 
 
President of Exhibition 
Committee of the CCIAB 
- Jyl Food SAL (Off-shore)  
- Big Mills of the South – Al 
Dick  
Ahmad Hoteit, CEO of 
both companies and on 
the board of GS1 
company as well. 
President of Labour and 
Social Affairs Committee of 
the CCIAB. 
On the board of directors of 
the Union of agrifood traders 
of Lebanon and member of 
the Union of Lebanese Food 
Industries 
- Star Brands (Procter & 
Gamble Exclusive Agent in 
Algeria) 
- Lumière Group  (High-
end lighting fixture 
distributor in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, 
Jordan, Lebanon) 
- Hilight (Architectural 
lighting company) 
Wissam Ariss, Founder, 
Chairman of the Board 
& CEO of Star Brands. 
He is also Co-Founder 
& Vice Chairman of the 
Board Lumière Group.  
He is Co-Founder of 
Hilight (Architectural 
lighting company). 
He is finally the 
Chairman of the Board 
Nestle Algeria, Partner 
Founder & Chairman of 
the Board Star Goods  
President of the Financial 
Committee of the CIIAB 
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Shi’a fraction of the banking sector and members of the Association of Banks 
in Lebanon (ABL) 2014, April 
 
Jammal Trust Bank Mr. Anwar Ali 
Jammal 
The Bank was 
established in 1963 
under the name 
“Investment   Bank” 
with an initial 
capital of L.L. 
1million only.  In 
1966 Litex Bank 
took over and 
increased the 
capital to L.L. 3 
million then ended 
its services on 
September 30th 
1971. 
At this period, the 
entire share capital 
was purchased by 
a new group of 
shareholders who 
elected an entirely 
new Board of 
Directors under the 
Chairmanship of 
Mr. Ali Abdullah 
Jammal. The name 
was changed to 
Jammal Investment 
Bank S.A.L. 
Active member of 
the ABL 
Lebanese Swiss Tanal Sabah The bank was Member and 
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Bank originally licensed 
in Lebanon on 
1962. In 1973 it 
was taken over by 
Credit Suisse, 
Zurich, which 
controlled 99.01 
percent of shares 
under the name of 
Credit Suisse 
(Moyen-Orient) 
S.A.L.. Those 
same shares were 
acquired in 
1988   by a group 
of prominent 
businessmen and 
bankers headed by 
the current 
chairman Tanal 
Sabah to become 
Lebanese Swiss 
Bank SAL.  
Treasurer of the 
ABL 
Middle East Africa 
and Bank (MEAB) 
is owned by the 
Hejeij family. 
Hassan and 
Kassem Hejeij, the 
owners of the 
bank, originally left 
Lebanon and built 
a large 
Hassan and 
Kassem Hejeij. 
The Hejeij Group 
Holding S.A.L also 
exists.  
Brothers Hassan 
and Kassem Hejeij 
co-founded MEAB 
as a family-owned 
commercial bank in 
Lebanon in 1991.  
Today, of 73 active 
banks in Lebanon, 
MEAB is the 
fifteenth largest 
Member of the ABL 
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construction 
business in Africa. 
They extended 
their activities to 
other businesses, 
before establishing 
the bank in 1991.   
bank by deposits. 
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